Design Discussion and Comparison of Replay-Attack Protection Mechanisms for BGPSEC
draft-sriram-replay-protection-design-discussion-04

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Kotikalapudi Sriram  , Doug Montgomery 
Last updated 2015-04-13 (latest revision 2014-10-10)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-sriram-replay-protection-design-discussion-04.txt

Abstract

The BGPSEC protocol requires a method for protection from replay attacks, at least to control the window of exposure. In the context of BGPSEC, a replay attack occurs when an adversary suppresses a prefix withdrawal (implicit or explicit) or replays a previously received BGPSEC announcement for a prefix that has since been withdrawn. This informational document provides design discussion and comparison of multiple alternative replay-attack protection mechanisms weighing their pros and cons. It is meant to be a companion document to the standards track I-D.-ietf-sidr-bgpsec- rollover that will specify a method to be used with BGPSEC for replay-attack protection.

Authors

Kotikalapudi Sriram (ksriram@nist.gov)
Doug Montgomery (dougm@nist.gov)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)