Design Discussion and Comparison of Replay-Attack Protection Mechanisms for BGPSEC
draft-sriram-replay-protection-design-discussion-03
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Expired & archived
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Authors | Kotikalapudi Sriram , Doug Montgomery | ||
Last updated | 2014-09-26 (Latest revision 2014-03-25) | ||
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Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The BGPSEC protocol requires a method for protection from replay attacks, at least to control the window of exposure. In the context of BGPSEC, a replay attack occurs when an adversary suppresses a prefix withdrawal (implicit or explicit) or replays a previously received BGPSEC announcement for a prefix that has since been withdrawn. This informational document provides design discussion and comparison of multiple alternative replay-attack protection mechanisms weighing their pros and cons. It is meant to be a companion document to the standards track I-D.-ietf-sidr-bgpsec- rollover that will specify a method to be used with BGPSEC for replay-attack protection.
Authors
Kotikalapudi Sriram
Doug Montgomery
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)