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The "secret-token" URI Scheme
draft-nottingham-how-did-that-get-into-the-repo-02

Yes

Murray Kucherawy
(Barry Leiba)

No Objection

Erik Kline
(Alvaro Retana)
(Deborah Brungard)
(Magnus Westerlund)
(Martin Vigoureux)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 01 and is now closed.

Murray Kucherawy
Yes
Erik Kline
No Objection
Roman Danyliw
No Objection
Comment (2020-04-08 for -01) Sent
Section 1. Typo. s/ike CSRF/like CSRF/

Section 4.  Easy to find tokens will cut both ways.  This URI scheme would make it trivial (with likely an acceptable false positive rate) for a CI system to trigger on the presence of a token in a repo.  It would also be worth mentioning that adoption of this scheme would also further lower the bar for attackers when scanning for these tokens too – even less semantic parsing of source code would be required.
Barry Leiba Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -01) Not sent

                            
Alissa Cooper Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2020-04-08 for -01) Sent
Section 4: "prevent accidental disclosure" seems a little strong. Perhaps "reduce the incidence of accidental disclosure" would be better.
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Not sent

                            
Benjamin Kaduk Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2020-04-08 for -01) Sent
Section 1

Per the comment in the shepherd writeup, RFC 6750 has a passable definition of "bearer
token".

Section 2

Perhaps an example Authorization header field (a la RFC 6750) would
demonstrate the "required for later access" aspect?

Section 4

   The token ABNF rule allows tokens as small as one character.  This is
   not recommended practice; applications should evaluate their
   requirements for entropy and issue tokens correspondingly.

I feel like we have some more concrete guidelines regarding token
entropy floating around.  BCP 106 is the obvious candidate, though its
emphasis is different than I would prefer.  I guess Section 8 is
tolerable.

   If it is difficult to correctly handle secret material, or unclear as
   to what the appropriate handling is, users might choose to obfuscate
   their secret tokens in order to evade detection (for example,
   removing the URI scheme for storage).  Clear guidelines and helpful
   tools are good mitigations here.

What would those "clear guidelines" be?
Deborah Brungard Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Not sent

                            
Magnus Westerlund Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Not sent

                            
Martin Vigoureux Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Not sent

                            
Robert Wilton Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2020-04-06 for -01) Sent
It's not clear to me whether or not this will truly help, but I don't see it causing any harm to the internet, and I think that it is good to try to mitigate against folk who either accidentally commit security tokens or deliberately commit them without any awareness of the consequences.