Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IV: Schema Reference
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-09
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| Author | Phillip Hallam-Baker | ||
| Last updated | 2021-10-25 | ||
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draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-09
Network Working Group P. M. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft ThresholdSecrets.com
Intended status: Informational 25 October 2021
Expires: 28 April 2022
Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IV: Schema Reference
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-09
Abstract
The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure
infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and
credential data between multiple user devices. The core protocols of
the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and
reference data.
[Note to Readers]
Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list
(mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh.
This document is also available online at
http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema.html.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.2. Connection Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Catalogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1. Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.1. Access Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1.2. Null Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1.3. Cryptographic Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.4. Publication Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2. Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2.1. Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2.2. SSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3. Bookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4. Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.5. Credential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.6. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.7. Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.8. Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.9. Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5. Spools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.1. Outbound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2. Inbound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.3. Local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.4. Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6. Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7. Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.1. Key Derivation from Seed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2. Message Envelope and Response Identifiers. . . . . . . . 45
7.3. Proof of Knowledge of PIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.4. EARL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8. Mesh Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
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8.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.2. Mesh Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.3. Mesh Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.4. Device Pre-configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
9.1. Mesh Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
9.1.1. Account Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
9.2. Device Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.2.1. The Device Catalog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.2.2. Mesh Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.3. Mesh Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9.4. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9.4.1. Message Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9.4.2. Four Corner Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9.4.3. Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10. Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.1. Profile Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.2. Contact Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11. Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.1. Shared Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.1.1. Classes describing keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.1.2. Structure: KeyData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.1.3. Structure: CompositePrivate . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.2. Assertion classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.2.1. Structure: Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.2.2. Structure: Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.2.3. Base Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.2.4. Structure: Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.2.5. Structure: Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.2.6. Structure: ActivationEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.2.7. Mesh Profile Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.2.8. Structure: Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.2.9. Structure: ProfileDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.2.10. Structure: ProfileAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.2.11. Structure: ProfileUser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.2.12. Structure: ProfileGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.2.13. Structure: ProfileService . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.2.14. Structure: ProfileHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.2.15. Connection Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.2.16. Structure: ConnectionDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.2.17. Structure: ConnectionApplication . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.2.18. Structure: ConnectionGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.19. Structure: ConnectionService . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.20. Structure: ConnectionHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.21. Activation Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.22. Structure: ActivationDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.23. Structure: ActivationAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.24. Structure: ActivationApplication . . . . . . . . . . 67
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11.3. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.3.1. Structure: Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.3.2. Structure: Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.3.3. Structure: TaggedSource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.3.4. Structure: ContactGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.3.5. Structure: ContactPerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.3.6. Structure: ContactOrganization . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.3.7. Structure: OrganizationName . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.3.8. Structure: PersonName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.3.9. Structure: NetworkAddress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.3.10. Structure: NetworkProtocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.3.11. Structure: Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.3.12. Structure: Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.3.13. Structure: Bookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.3.14. Structure: Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.3.15. Structure: Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.4. Catalog Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.4.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.4.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.4.3. Structure: CatalogedPublication . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.4.4. Structure: CatalogedCredential . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.4.5. Structure: CatalogedNetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
11.4.6. Structure: CatalogedContact . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
11.4.7. Structure: CatalogedAccess . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
11.4.8. Structure: CryptographicCapability . . . . . . . . . 73
11.4.9. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11.4.10. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial . . . . . . . . 74
11.4.11. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced . . . . . . . . 74
11.4.12. Structure: CapabilitySign . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11.4.13. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate . . . . . . . . . . 74
11.4.14. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange . . . . . . . . . 75
11.4.15. Structure: CatalogedBookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
11.4.16. Structure: CatalogedTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
11.4.17. Structure: CatalogedApplication . . . . . . . . . . 75
11.4.18. Structure: CatalogedMember . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
11.4.19. Structure: CatalogedGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
11.4.20. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH . . . . . . . . . 76
11.4.21. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail . . . . . . . . 76
11.4.22. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork . . . . . . . 76
11.5. Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
11.5.1. Structure: DevicePreconfiguration . . . . . . . . . 76
11.6. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
11.6.1. Structure: Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
11.6.2. Structure: MessageError . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
11.6.3. Structure: MessageComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
11.6.4. Structure: MessagePinValidated . . . . . . . . . . . 77
11.6.5. Structure: MessagePin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
11.6.6. Structure: RequestConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
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11.6.7. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection . . . . . . . . . . 78
11.6.8. Structure: RespondConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
11.6.9. Structure: MessageContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
11.6.10. Structure: GroupInvitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11.6.11. Structure: RequestConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11.6.12. Structure: ResponseConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . 79
11.6.13. Structure: RequestTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11.6.14. Structure: MessageClaim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11.6.15. Structure: ProcessResult . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
15. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
16. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
1. Introduction
This document describes the data structures of the Mathematical Mesh
with illustrative examples. For an overview of the Mesh objectives
and architecture, consult the accompanying _Architecture Guide_
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. For information on the
implementation of the Mesh Service protocol, consult the accompanying
_Protocol Reference_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]
This document has two main sections. The first section presents
examples of the Mesh assertions, catalog entries and messages and
their use. The second section contains the schema reference. All
the material in both sections is generated from the Mesh reference
implementation [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].
Although some of the services described in this document could be
used to replace existing Internet protocols including FTP and SMTP,
the principal value of any communication protocol lies in the size of
the audience it allows them to communicate with. Thus, while the
Mesh Messaging service is designed to support efficient and reliable
transfer of messages ranging in size from a few bytes to multiple
terabytes, the near-term applications of these services will be to
applications that are not adequately supported by existing protocols
if at all.
2. Definitions
This section presents the related specifications and standard, the
terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the
terms used as requirements language.
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2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2.2. Defined Terms
The terms of art used in this document are described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
2.3. Related Specifications
The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. The Mesh
documentation set and related specifications are described in this
document.
2.4. Implementation Status
The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].
3. Actors
The Mesh mediates interactions between three principal actors:
*Accounts*, *Devices*, and *Services*.
Currently two account types are specified, *user accounts* which
belong to an individual user and *group accounts* that are used to
share access to confidential information between a group of users.
It may prove useful to define new types of account over time or to
eliminate the distinction entirely. When active a Mesh account is
bound to a Mesh Service. The service to which an account is bound
MAY be changed over time but an account can only be bound to a single
service at a time.
A Mesh account is an abstract construct that (when active) is
instantiated across one or more physical machines called a device.
Each device that is connected to an account has a separate set of
cryptographic keys that are used to interact with other devices
connected to the account and MAY be provisioned with access to the
account private keys which MAY or MAY NOT be mediated by the current
Mesh Service. A user's Mesh accounts and the devices connected to
them constitute that user's Personal Mesh.
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A Mesh Service is an abstract construct that is provided by one or
more physical machines called Hosts. A Mesh Host is a device that is
attached to a service rather than an account.
3.1. Accounts
A Mesh Account is described by a Profile descended from Profile
Account and contains a set of Mesh stores. Currently two account
profiles are defined:
ProfileUser Describes a user account.
ProfileGroup Describes a group account used to share confidential
information between a group of users.
Both types of profile specify the following fields:
ProfileSignature The public signature key used to authenticate the
profile itself
AccountAddress The account name to which the account is currently
bound. (e.g. alice@example.com, @alice).
ServiceUdf If the account is active, specifies the fingerprint of
the service profile to which the account is currently bound.
AdministratorSignature The public signature key used to verify
administrative actions on the account. In particular addition of
devices to a user account or members to a group account.
AccountEncryption The public encryption key for the account. All
messages sent to the account MUST be encrypted under this key. By
definition, all data encrypted under this account is encrypted
under this key.
User accounts specify two additional public keys, AccountSignature
and AccountAuthentication which allow signature and authentication
operations under the account context.
Every account contains a set of catalogs and spools that are managed
by the service as directed by the contents of the associated Access
catalog.
For example, the personal account profile Alice created in
For example, Alice creates a personal account:
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Alice> account create alice@example.com
Account=alice@example.com
UDF=MB5I-R24M-QXJT-KDBF-XFOA-DGC3-U3AA
The account profile created is:
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{
"ProfileUser":{
"ProfileSignature":{
"Udf":"MB5I-R24M-QXJT-KDBF-XFOA-DGC3-U3AA",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"0Q-Z5eDHtwWVYdkfyVT9R36-r0hO1fUHWpmI2mdIsi81s
djysgsAfdKoHZpKIZtKkMXSoOkFrpOA"}}},
"AccountAddress":"alice@example.com",
"ServiceUdf":"MD36-Q4SC-S4YZ-KPRP-7W4P-SNR7-QMD2",
"EscrowEncryption":{
"Udf":"MBFO-AXQH-VEJI-J47J-W3ZG-3ZPA-7FHS",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"GChyNFuHb6_BmogqEC3_R0aXaemmDlaDGyYYdl2FSAw4E
nKjC8AqGlpy7sQacRVj4-QbQJsz_PkA"}}},
"AccountEncryption":{
"Udf":"MBUH-FY45-DVNF-XMQV-SQC4-LTLI-K5AV",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"WSdlD8SLXWCFHhIHjCwQHB7b4Ym74kpM-XVZnFKWYYYpH
gBn-JIH3aPaHzd60MH3n1evVNUsTbCA"}}},
"AdministratorSignature":{
"Udf":"MCBO-ZK4F-QFYM-63TK-TA2C-LHQY-7QW5",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"KZPy-O5-rDXLTTo9ckiMR5mlOjkurMLRBZW5ZkUJJ97d8
HRtTABdLn66iOfEKCQ0si_l8O75VUQA"}}},
"AccountAuthentication":{
"Udf":"MAHC-QH3D-VLKC-UTFB-UEFR-M5VV-TWAH",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"EmSbhqkjgjYAGR_iNHzGi_SRB6vGlKqfIsCyQvxlVf79N
sSEEhmyPHq7zJ1AIl1eaidaS2r263kA"}}},
"AccountSignature":{
"Udf":"MBUX-YI5W-NTAH-UJN2-4FFC-4PAY-NI73",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"FfvEpMucwBoxAOS_-0tZUazve5J7IBXoXpjLXTPDuoDvN
udksR_1REfgh9Hb4bIpbZjl_8l-RiGA"}}}}}
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3.2. Device
Every Mesh device has a set of private keys that are unique to that
device. These keys MAY be installed during manufacture, installed
from an external source after manufacture or generated on the device.
If the platform capabilities allow, device private keys SHOULD be
bound to the device so that they cannot be extracted or exported
without substantial effort.
The public keys corresponding to the device private keys are
specified in a ProfileDevice. This MUST contain at least the
following fields:
ProfileSignature The public signature key used to authenticate the
profile itself.
Encryption Public encryption key used as a share contribution to
generation of device encryption keys to be used in the context of
an account and to decrypt data during the process of connecting to
an account.
Authentication Public authentication key used as a share
contribution to generation of device authentication keys to be
used in the context of an account and to authenticate the device
to a service during the process of connecting to an account.
Signature Public signature key used as a share contribution to
generation of device signature keys to be used in the context of
an account.
For example, the device profile corresponding to one of the devices
belonging to Alice is:
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{
"ProfileDevice":{
"ProfileSignature":{
"Udf":"MB33-ROBH-6WWL-J3IZ-N76K-FUMY-HLHD",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"tksYeycyGeML8xzV85WHpRVjeQYS1VpLrUxodez9e5At7
OjAsatGrG_dD-5xyJFzAFMG0ZU6aJGA"}}},
"Encryption":{
"Udf":"MAG6-3VSV-DZDM-MDLK-SGTS-O2VB-IKTS",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"5i6M3dzF1HLvyOtD5mxku58Yk81XmWLUYpE--PI1En9Rk
9YeI0BJr6KEj-wmTSui9Bkbmf_gcbOA"}}},
"Signature":{
"Udf":"MC5Z-6Z5Z-ZHMC-KN2B-AEH6-VC2Y-D7PT",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"v2UJt_on-FyQqBdNPLRJxdE21a365Fa4d62RWX8o1KCc8
uQ6hN0SAzk4oO9HcXD5hLqmI8Pug3YA"}}},
"Authentication":{
"Udf":"MBV4-NXKT-Y2Z5-KLXI-J3XM-NOGF-LFBJ",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"NyZDUp4n1W_RZdcIPBaaSVVHXM07YWGmbInSogiaJU4ye
39zf00lX2C7AkIlOMHqnGkXZn8WFAKA"}}}}}
3.2.1. Activation
The device private keys are only used to perform cryptographic
operations during the process of connecting a device to an account.
During that connection process, a threshold key generation scheme is
used to generate a second set of device keys bound to the account by
combining the base key held by the device with a second device
private key provided by the administration device approving the
connection of the device to the account. The resulting key is
referred to as the device key. The process of combining the base
keys with the contributions to form the device keys is called
Activation.
For example, Alice connects the device whose profile is shown above
to her account:
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Alice2> device complete
Device UDF = MB33-ROBH-6WWL-J3IZ-N76K-FUMY-HLHD
Account = alice@example.com
Account UDF = MB5I-R24M-QXJT-KDBF-XFOA-DGC3-U3AA
The activation record granting the device rights to operate as a part
of the account is:
{
"ActivationDevice":{
"ActivationKey":"ZAAQ-GWNX-ZE5I-HT5I-VGRY-4Y2N-A6CN-AU2Z-RPH5-2
QGV-6QUB-DD5Z-OHEJ-ABXP",
"AccountUdf":"MB33-ROBH-6WWL-J3IZ-N76K-FUMY-HLHD"}}
And:
{
"ActivationAccount":{
"Entries":[{
"Resource":"MMM_Contact",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MDBM-MZS5-4PU6-R67K-IYMD-CX7P-IBWJ",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"o-GyXZGC2B9Nwe-2FQTR7RnLyw_phzjkUPWNvblVE
1UrPEQCLbrIJHYMq_vXU-BcXDY4Uinj55IA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Private":"P7oi7focyX3G2jELR25VB5rlUV4SZnr2IziiWN9g
7_9eVN3h_XT55jB3uV9qd0DWKkmrOzQDfOw"}}}},
{
"Resource":"MMM_Publication",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MCI6-ED5E-2GOF-6GWI-7TVA-QCW4-7FX3",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"axZfYpZtKCHxAVuLXW18LQ2Hg0dyZU6ahzLnEeyJw
zUDW3IoZV98T5Cs5Lu4NhWQNgNGp9BtC_4A"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Private":"zIrUQg1xnIXYOz9v3fyZ8fgVUntF_y9qXqtcAuBF
kiJk5UEcdVKF960gh_EfmE2DPR72gif2jTQ"}}}},
{
"Resource":"MMM_Inbound",
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"Key":{
"Udf":"MBAG-7BKG-KJVH-6WJW-HIZW-BPRG-BAEN",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"nLLbvqa6YOSly_mr8kwtxdJFDd1FQ3cDeTZghwXDJ
0xoZIj1uKR9wGzRz1A-jScaBKMHkI9UeLQA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Private":"Hk6aSE686eM7IM2gP1AEt88_cUpy0ty2kbjbA_VT
P83AaXL8D9j8kwuUWRcfGONWkvjDrZkS43Y"}}}},
{
"Resource":"MMM_Outbound",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MBAC-FFPI-RXJR-EDH5-OQ4I-QK3A-EJKS",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"IlJ-1x6trFhAQ0pcAbnl2d2est-KRLEBJQhPVBdmr
N5pztzYqQr84uIk2yO_XYVg3ZL0qph1z7yA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Private":"Ku4LVVobClGn6nn7f4gobmaZZ4D7I9Njdyjv5yqi
viTFtkFGrx_EPgLN6H2KLORZrlqmQeYKv8I"}}}},
{
"Resource":"MMM_Network",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MCGU-SSLR-FWIK-BSCL-ZLGP-Z4P7-3UYZ",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"Pd4i7IA6y1BMNEl3S6GiDQJBaIoFdXJIpI-PVtlmm
DCusS-0stTUJxNx544tD7mPRdiS-MBxx7gA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Private":"pFcnzS6ivQ-Hnji8RaXlw-6d97PLDAVhD6Ou8BgP
psbzPsNBV9g9mcHi7TTVplVaq44Q-3aI3pA"}}}},
{
"Resource":"MMM_Application",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MCKR-5UNI-G6FH-V7OS-RIKX-XXHL-QQVY",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"3ma-Rp2ypt-14xHHJApZV3rknWzDyq2g99rYFEp5C
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yRDlj34f2XY2wnIFpgsiAtwMbQYiwFzbL0A"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Private":"DVeT_V20CObmkez8BI1t855NP4YE3SYvlQnBw88n
UoqUUNqmTtkD3J4BtyA_8cla6cXbvmHa_2s"}}}},
{
"Resource":"MMM_Credential",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MC7F-DLCK-JI67-VFL7-BOHX-T62Q-KCVG",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"n2TJxtwPNoguN414nG_aU9a8o7q1wI3RMSwwKBfOC
HZYzaTJFL9R3KqIK0izYD_NfmW2m4A-6OgA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Private":"ojQyYozR_a20_HERypl5xWQsbOzmLgkNmYcpF2z_
LgMwq_qSjH_2uF63I8W6NXsps13Pm5hoqZE"}}}},
{
"Resource":"MMM_Task",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MBZM-2RTE-UXMX-O6TL-KAMK-V4WB-7AE4",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"qGkDbgJVQpHtkWTRk5WuzIAiOYcNmy7Vlecskru4g
RlCf4qzKfQq6oYSN8T_RjjrS3qEnmHimPEA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Private":"TOmmssCChpEnImt_SuEQE777yTd1SwjZpHNF4b3a
Il3myFN6wSS3Q9DqW420O20J6vi6xrSxPfE"}}}},
{
"Resource":"MMM_Bookmark",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MBE4-FGWH-2XN5-4IBG-VRM2-2WTK-MXTW",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"Xk1e7PopfECElQxuFIMownIwIl1CkjBsn8NvyCy0w
UqaNkDQhNAeAc41G92t9hqOLvr4DF4983WA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Private":"sIC7Hqwbs7kvpa_3WLcKixv7yrTlkOZ41MGVtQMm
tk7x9-Z0X8j5Zua8UFvt9_1_f4boXt6TqW8"}}}}
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],
"AccountEncryption":{
"Udf":"MBUH-FY45-DVNF-XMQV-SQC4-LTLI-K5AV",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"WSdlD8SLXWCFHhIHjCwQHB7b4Ym74kpM-XVZnFKWYYYpH
gBn-JIH3aPaHzd60MH3n1evVNUsTbCA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Private":"YbrlMb1xsk7AHF2pTDQEepe0jrqMYx9XK7cZ_6Y4el9f
eYypxxnLxuwddljd1Rj7jjVl8VH_rBI"}}},
"AccountAuthentication":{
"Udf":"MAHC-QH3D-VLKC-UTFB-UEFR-M5VV-TWAH",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"EmSbhqkjgjYAGR_iNHzGi_SRB6vGlKqfIsCyQvxlVf79N
sSEEhmyPHq7zJ1AIl1eaidaS2r263kA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Private":"vfI1A6-a_ctEjhXifKAEnPpkIliRSePGU0URKMekPTkc
oGT91PHHKWhrd1tq1jv42Ljl0QCf_r4"}}},
"AccountSignature":{
"Udf":"MBUX-YI5W-NTAH-UJN2-4FFC-4PAY-NI73",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"FfvEpMucwBoxAOS_-0tZUazve5J7IBXoXpjLXTPDuoDvN
udksR_1REfgh9Hb4bIpbZjl_8l-RiGA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Private":"sjW5sxJyWdKkw0KrSt9VsMb4cpDZtRz8FtJn2XOaVPhb
2m3RyF2xGH_ibovBsOi9UOvjsv-rOVE"}}}}}
The Mesh protocols are designed so that there is never a need to
export or escrow private keys of any type associated with a device,
neither the base key, nor the device key nor the contribution from
the administration device.
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This approach to device configuration ensures that the keys that are
used by the device when operating within the context of the account
are entirely separate from those originally provided by the device
manufacturer or generated on the device, provided only that the key
contributions from the administration device are sufficiently random
and unguessable.
3.2.2. Connection Assertion
The administration device combines the public keys specified in the
device profile with the public components of the keys specified in
the activation record to calculate the public keys of the device
operating in the context of the account. These public keys are then
used to create at a ConnectionDevice and a ConnectionService
assertion signed by the account administration signature key.
The ConnectionDevice assertion is used by the device to authenticate
it to other devices connected to the account. This connection
assertion specifies the Encryption, Authentication, and Signature
keys the device is to use in the context of the account and the list
of roles that have been authorized for the device..
{
"ConnectionDevice":{
"Authentication":{
"Udf":"MB7N-QSGX-3QKH-5L5E-CTPA-H5EK-LVYU",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"OIVR98unWGKRIeuasqphMZq9hTRVfJcXPHN_q-UPrn2k8
CV85Kid06zomEoHNdAcpcCcVP3EJwwA"}}},
"Roles":["message",
"web"
],
"Signature":{
"Udf":"MAMU-5DAC-RMRU-J5VH-ONY6-DMML-BJVS",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"lM0UNrzn3msgwDYs6XqE_qL9eeB-mEbgg60JlsJOeL5N4
DBcqOuQtPimcqMlFPSdxOHrn9jYBG2A"}}},
"Encryption":{
"Udf":"MDH6-43JJ-WGIS-VDSE-A3HA-HM6S-3TCP",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"3hhKkF4KsSDyhcxo_slEZaN__aogdH2t2pZcTg4kTyNGu
2400-Bh7hJhT4YaB56Px3wdofX9CByA"}}}}}
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The ConnectionService assertion is used to authenticate the device to
the Mesh service. In order to allow the assertion to fit in a single
packet, it is important that this assertion be as small as possible.
Only the Authentication key is specified.
The corresponding ConnectionService assertion is:
{
"ConnectionService":{
"Authentication":{
"Udf":"MB7N-QSGX-3QKH-5L5E-CTPA-H5EK-LVYU",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"OIVR98unWGKRIeuasqphMZq9hTRVfJcXPHN_q-UPrn2k8
CV85Kid06zomEoHNdAcpcCcVP3EJwwA"}}}}}
The ConnectionDeviceassertion MAY be used in the same fashion as an
X.509v3/PKIX certificate to mediate interactions between devices
connected to the same account without the need for interaction with
the Mesh service. Thus, a coffee pot device connected to the account
can receive and authenticate instructions issued by a voice
recognition device connected to that account.
While the ConnectionDeviceassertion MAY be used to mediate external
interactions, this approach is typically undesirable as it provides
the external parties with visibility to the internal configuration of
the account, in particular which connected devices are being used on
which occasions. Furthermore, the lack of the need to interact with
the service means that the service is necessarily unable to mediate
the exchange and enforce authorization policy on the interactions.
Device keys are intended to be used to secure communications between
devices connected to the same account. All communication between
Mesh accounts SHOULD be mediated by a Mesh service. This enables
abuse mitigation by applying access control to every outbound and
every inbound message.
3.3. Service
Mesh services are described by a ProfileService. This specifies the
encryption, and signature authentication keys used to interact with
the abstract service.
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{
"ProfileService":{
"ProfileSignature":{
"Udf":"MD36-Q4SC-S4YZ-KPRP-7W4P-SNR7-QMD2",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"GuaeOHN1q9X7d1nOdBHa1EuCRRF7e9BgF8oupurCdjcOP
kyFALXQAgxsPJSQM5egAVPDkGmhr66A"}}},
"ServiceAuthentication":{
"Udf":"MBGZ-7SST-4HYK-FLMM-7N5L-WVAM-P3X7",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"enmpMVpIN5Y_CStHfXSmZkVnxgXJ6pbJ1AFnf3ZQVsk_W
dmFhDCjjlmn2lG2Xvr5DEYIiGJNmK6A"}}},
"ServiceEncryption":{
"Udf":"MBBR-KLL4-YRFX-K63E-2DCT-6UGQ-Z5JC",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"W2qil6gYJrfNj5zGjN0gzSEBEgu7kThfkGSaGFy-IAT63
nKA-MvyNGHIoE1ljzThn3pzHnPNyWuA"}}},
"ServiceSignature":{
"Udf":"MAGX-C3MN-DHNT-YUSI-ZYPH-VQ5W-C5SW",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"yqF9WaC9GzwXRLJ8QDU4K_L6PCsVv5o5TxqyIlGtABDH-
IpyEKsdyvAfZZwYDk1jQMooGdC1iUOA"}}}}}
Since Mesh accounts and services are both abstract constructs, they
cannot interact directly. A device connected to an account can only
interact with a service by interacted with a device authorized to
provide services on behalf of one or more accounts connected to the
service. Such a device is called a Mesh Host.
Mesh hosts MAY be managed using the same ProfileDevice and device
connection mechanism provided for management of user devices or by
whatever other management protocols prove convenient. The only part
of the Service/Host interaction that is visible to devices connected
to a profile and to hosts connected to other services is the
ConnectionHost structure that describes the set of device keys to use
in interactions with that specific host.
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{
"ConnectionService":{
"Authentication":{
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"-BhevM_ydw0M9zwSyhObuw1EfR-xWYmY4BgqAMnPjOr7c
CWrWo5bmzyRyZrKQC1SnRgMDLLiv-QA"}}},
"Account":"@example"}}
Mesh Services MAY make use of the profile and activation mechanism
used to connect devices to accounts to manage the connection of hosts
to services. But this is optional. It is never necessary for a
device to publish a ProfileHost assertion.
4. Catalogs
Catalogs track sets of persistent objects associated with a Mesh
Service Account. The Mesh Service has no access to the entries in
any Mesh catalog except for the Device and Contacts catalog which are
used in device authentication and authorization of inbound messages.
Each Mesh Catalog managed by a Mesh Account has a name of the form:
<prefix>_<name>
Where <prefix> is the IANA assigned service name. The assigned
service name for the Mathematical Mesh is mmm. Thus, all catalogs
specified by the Mesh schema have names prefixed with the sequence
mmm_.
The following catalogs are currently specified within the
Mathematical Mesh.
Access: mmm_Access Describes access control policy for performing
operations on the account. The Access catalog is the only Mesh
catalog whose contents are readable by the Mesh Service under
normal circumstances.
Application: mmm_Application Describes configuration information for
applications including mail (SMTP, IMAP, OpenPGP, S/MIME, etc) and
SSH and for the MeshAccount application itself.
Bookmark: mmm_Bookmark Describes Web bookmarks and other citations
allowing them to be shared between devices connected to the
profile.
Contact: mmm_Contact Describes logical and physical contact
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information for people and organizations.
Credential: mmm_Credential Describes credentials used to access
network resources.
Device: mmm_Device Describes the set of devices connected to the
account and the permissions assigned to them
Network: mmm_Network Describes network settings such as WiFi access
points, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc.
Member: mmm_Member Describes the set of members connected to a group
account.
Publication: mmm_Publication Describes data published under the
account context. The data MAY be stored in the publication
catalog itself or on a separate service (e.g. a Web server).
Task: mmm_CatalogTask Describes tasks assigned to the user including
calendar entries and to do lists.
The Access, and Publication catalogs are used by the service in
certain Mesh Service Protocol interactions. The Device and Member
catalogs are used to track the connection of devices to a user
account and members to a group for administrative purposes. These
interactions are further described below.
In many cases, the Mesh Catalog offers capabilities that represent a
superset of the capabilities of an existing application. For
example, the task catalog supports the appointment tracking functions
of a traditional calendar application and the task tracking function
of the traditional 'to do list' application. Combining these
functions allows tasks to be triggered by other events other than the
passage of time such as completion of other tasks, geographical
presence, etc.
In such cases, the Mesh Catalog entries are designed to provide a
superset of the data representation capabilities of the legacy
formats and (where available) recent extensions. Where a catalog
entry is derived from input presented in a legacy format, the
original data representation MAY be attached verbatim to facilitate
interoperability.
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4.1. Access
The access catalog mmm_Access contains a list of access control
entries providing authorization to devices authenticated by a
particular credential. The access catalog provides information that
is necessary for the Mesh Service to act on behalf of the user. It
is therefore necessary for the service to be able to decrypt entries
in the catalog.
The entries in the catalog have type CatalogedAccess and specify a
capability. The following capabilities are defined:
NullCapability A capability granting no access rights. May be used
to establish a positive statement denying all access.
AccessCapability Authorizes a device authenticated by specified
means to request privileged account operations. For example,
requesting the status of an account catalog. Also used to
provision devices with a copy of their CatalogedDevice entry
encrypted under a key held by the device.
CryptographicCapability Specifies a private key encrypted under the
encryption key of the service and criteria specifying the parties
authorized to request use of the key.
PublicationCapability Authorizes a device authenticated by specified
means to obtain a data item.
The Access catalog plays a central role in all operations performed
by the service on behalf of the user.
Every access capability is gated by a specified set of authentication
criteria. The following authentication criteria are currently
defined:
Profile Authentication Key The account profile authentication key
authorizes any account action without the need for an access
catalog entry. This capability is normally only used during
account binding. Administration devices SHOULD NOT have access to
the account profile authentication key after binding is completed.
Device Authentication Key The service will only perform the
operation if the device making the request presents the specified
authentication key.
This form of authentication is necessary to restrict access to
account operations so that only connected devices can interact
with stores, etc.
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Account Profile Identifier The service will only perform the
operation if the device making the request presents an
authentication key that is credentialed by a connection assertion
to the specified account profile.
This form of authentication is necessary to perform administration
operations on a group account since it is the account rather than
the device that is authorized to perform the operation.
Proof of Knowledge The service will only perform the operation if
proof of knowledge of the identified shared secret is provided.
This form of authentication criteria is used to allow device
connection and contact exchange by means of static (i.e. printed)
QR codes.
Future: Currently, the set of authentication criteria is limited to
direct grants of a single capability to a single specified device or
account. This approach may prove to be unnecessarily verbose
requiring the same information to be repeated multiple times.
4.1.1. Access Capability
The access capability permits a specified service operation on the
account. Optionally, an access capability MAY specify a Data entry
encrypted to a key held by the device.
The access capability specifies the set of rights granted to the
requester and optionally specifies an EnvelopedCatalogedDevice entry
containing the CatalogedDevice entry for the device encrypted under
the base encryption key or account encryption key of the device.
The CatalogedDeviceDigest value serves as a tag for the cached data.
4.1.1.1. Operation Rights
The reference code does not currently implement operation rights
beyond denying all operations to devices that do not have an access
capability entry.
Expansion of the rights handling is planned to permit granular
expression of access rights.
mmm_o_UnbindAccount UnbindAccount
mmm_o_Connect Connect
mmm_o_Complete Complete
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mmm_o_Status Status (of specified catalogs or all catalogs)
mmm_o_Download Download (of specified catalogs or all catalogs)
mmm_o_Transact Transact (of specified catalogs or all catalogs)
mmm_o_Post Post outbound message
4.1.1.2. Messaging
The reference code has limited messaging capabilities at present and
messaging rights are not specified. The following is a list of
possible rights:
mmm_m_Contact Contact messages from the specified subject.
mmm_m_Confirmation Confirmation messages from the specified subject.
mmm_m_Async Asynchronous delivery messages (e.g. mail)
mmm_m_Sync Synchronous delivery messages (e.g. chat)
mmm_m_Presence Forward presence request.
The following media are defined
mmm_c_Text Text that MUST NOT contain links or external references
mmm_c_Linked Text that MAY contain links or external reference
mmm_c_Audio Audio data (e.g. VOIP, voicemail)
mmm_c_Video Video data
mmm_c_Code Content containing active code including macros, scripts
and executables.
4.1.2. Null Capability
The null capability is used to affirmatively deny access to a
function. This allows access requests from previously authorized
devices whose credentials have been revoked to be handled separately
from requests from devices that were never authorized.
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4.1.3. Cryptographic Capabilities
A Mesh Service can perform cryptographic operations on a private key
according to access criteria specified by the user. This capability
is used to support use of threshold cryptography to mitigate
compromise of a particular device or individual. The splitting of a
cryptographic key into two or more parts allows the use of that key
to be split into two or more roles.
Note that this approach limits rather than eliminates trust in the
service. As with services presenting themselves as 'zero trust', a
Mesh service becomes a trusted service after a sufficient number of
breaches in other parts of the system have occurred. And the user
trusts the service to provide availability of the service.
A Mesh Service MAY also offer to perform private key operations for
other purposes. An embargo agent might offer to decrypt data under a
private key but only after a specified date and time. An expiry
agent might offer to decrypt data but only before a specified date
and time. Such services MAY be reserved to the customers of a
specified service or provided to the general public. Users of such
services MAY combine key services provided by multiple service
providers using threshold techniques to achieve separation of roles.
Since a service might not willingly co-operate with an account
transfer request, extension of the Mesh service protocol will be
required to enable threshold sharing of the keys required to effect
account transfer. This would require one administration device to
act as a proxy for threshold signature etc. operations being
requested by another administration device. While implementation of
such a scheme to support this limited function could be achieved with
little difficulty, such a scheme might not support the wider range of
peer-to-peer threshold capabilities that might be useful. For
example, the confirmation protocol might be modified so that instead
of merely providing non-repudiable evidence of the user's response to
a request, the confirmation device served as a policy enforcement
point through control of a necessary threshold share.
The following service cryptographic operations are specified:
4.1.3.1. Threshold Key Share
A private key share s, held by the service is split into key shares
x, y such that a = x + y. One key share is encrypted under a
decryption key held by the service. The other is encrypted under a
public key specified by the party making the request.
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This operation is not currently implemented in the Reference code.
When implemented, it will allow the functions of the administration
device to be threshold shared between the device and the service,
thus allowing the administration capability to be revoked if the
device is lost, stolen or otherwise compromised.
Implementation of this capability is expected to be based on the
scheme described in . [draft-komlo-frost]
4.1.3.2. Key Agreement
A private key share s, held by the service is used to calculate the
value (sl + c).P where l, c are integers specified by the requestor
and P is a point on the curve.
This operation is used
4.1.3.3. Threshold Signature
A private key share s, held by the service is used to calculate a
contribution to a threshold signature scheme.
The implementation of the cryptographic operations described above is
described in [draft-hallambaker-threshold].
Implementation of signatures is not currently covered pending
completion of [draft-irtf-cfrg-frost].
4.1.3.4. Fair Exchange
Perform a Micali Fair Exchange trusted intermediary operation.
On receipt of a signature SIG_B(Z), where Z=E_k(A, B, M), the service
decrypts Z and returns the result to B.
4.1.4. Publication Capability
The publication capability is not currently implemented.
Implementation would allow the Claim/PollClaim mechanism to be
eliminated in favor of a mechanism capable of re-use for other
purposes.
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4.2. Application
The application catalog mmm_Application contains
CatalogEntryApplication entries which describe the use of specific
applications under the Mesh Service Account. Multiple application
accounts for a single application MAY be connected to a single Mesh
Service Account. Each account being specified in a separate entry.
The CatalogEntryApplication entries only contain configuration
information for the application as it applies to the account as a
whole. If the application requires separate configuration for
individual devices, this is specified in the device activation
record.
Two applications are currently defined:
Mail An SMTP email account and associated encryption and signature
keys for S/MIME and OpenPGP.
SSH Secure Shell Client.
Accounts MAY specify multiple instances of each but each application
instance is considered as describing a single application account.
Thus, if Alice has email accounts alice@example.com and
alice@example.net, she will have application entries for each.
Accounts connected to Alice's Mesh account may be authorized to use
either, both or none of the email accounts.
*Note*: The implementation of these features in the current
specification is considered to be a 'proof of concept' rather than a
proposed final form. There are many issues that need to be
considered when integrating a legacy protocol with extensive
deployment into a new platform.
4.2.1. Mail
Mail configuration profiles are described by one or more
CatalogEntryApplicationMail entries, one for each email account
connected to the Mesh profile. The corresponding activation records
for the connected devices contain information used to provide the
device with the necessary decryption information.
Entries specify the email account address(es), the inbound and
outbound server configuration and the cryptographic keys to be used
for S/MIME and OpenPGP encryption.
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{
"CatalogedApplicationMail":{
"Key":"mailto:alice@example.net",
"Grant":["web"
],
"EnvelopedEscrow":[[{
"enc":"A256CBC",
"kid":"EBQA-DGO5-WJI3-CEPL-KVY3-FU4N-QM2T",
"Salt":"rNmeQlDeiQkooGoNB6Fsxw",
"recipients":[{
"kid":"MBFO-AXQH-VEJI-J47J-W3ZG-3ZPA-7FHS",
"epk":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"MKPHQGY_8g9taikXS8zuo0ZnjnKLAYchxJXVy
4eIr3rBdsuLr3prs23JCgtYC1KSchYds5OIijsA"}},
"wmk":"i2RdIj1a_c2L1lwvJb8jY5GFQXZz4kzKMEMVqvWuZ_TH
ZjScVuhmYg"}
]},
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mqr-D5UppiuoZ0xZ3S61PYPaBRoiW1NL5px_j6CTX8ii7jwD7-ApNwWvfE64x-TX3
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],
[{
"enc":"A256CBC",
"kid":"EBQF-PHTE-4LEB-KWAV-26WO-3M4M-CA5Q",
"Salt":"u9yo3dTiEs-heyXBs6BfIg",
"recipients":[{
"kid":"MBFO-AXQH-VEJI-J47J-W3ZG-3ZPA-7FHS",
"epk":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"bjkFbLCrOl4eWttmQzaQd82IUqaFtnEdUuZKk
TD-h0slXg_T38zPU2SbT0N3YuQMtVQN8oFlr_gA"}},
"wmk":"rLMIa4e9Mn1pD0yuDkU57RumkvHT7rPNIfjYiz_Fg-J0
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]},
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],
[{
"enc":"A256CBC",
"kid":"EBQA-U6UQ-QKTY-6YKT-OJM6-ZMUF-JUOE",
"Salt":"wzSCqTRJjlzQMPT_ZxwrVw",
"recipients":[{
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"epk":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
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]},
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],
[{
"enc":"A256CBC",
"kid":"EBQJ-ALJ5-QUTU-MXMI-SZHS-YZ2A-AROR",
"Salt":"qYOy7-oQsdShDcqNjxJZ-w",
"recipients":[{
"kid":"MBFO-AXQH-VEJI-J47J-W3ZG-3ZPA-7FHS",
"epk":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
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"wmk":"qowqtU0WeoH6IUwq2ebdmXkAgAHf3I3dQuvQCBgOlApG
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]},
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],
"AccountAddress":"alice@example.net",
"InboundConnect":"pop://alice@pop3.example.net",
"OutboundConnect":"submit://alice@submit.example.net",
"SmimeSign":{
"Udf":"MDVA-7WX4-LF2D-GDK3-CZTB-M2V5-NNCR",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyRSA":{
"kid":"MDVA-7WX4-LF2D-GDK3-CZTB-M2V5-NNCR",
"n":"1OYN0_ik4_xumv55F65fc7RHoBKUcoPmYL2uoeEtjry2XW0hMh
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"e":"AQAB"}}},
"SmimeEncrypt":{
"Udf":"MAHU-MIR5-BZVE-IOUS-DYDQ-MHCG-IF6V",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyRSA":{
"kid":"MAHU-MIR5-BZVE-IOUS-DYDQ-MHCG-IF6V",
"n":"uS2nl0O9hC5LHCSNZHG80cc0hvKrJnhZz0dosIJdWggxt9eUY3
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"e":"AQAB"}}},
"OpenpgpSign":{
"Udf":"MA3J-Y2O2-TYHP-2IAZ-3IW5-ANG2-AGIR",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyRSA":{
"kid":"MA3J-Y2O2-TYHP-2IAZ-3IW5-ANG2-AGIR",
"n":"xYf5DpQSgleszlwTxKztxQ-G41TU4lhFrFQ85sbND5bAcHy3qp
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"e":"AQAB"}}},
"OpenpgpEncrypt":{
"Udf":"MD5K-DR4V-5DK3-J4ZR-V4DX-DBBB-Q4HZ",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyRSA":{
"kid":"MD5K-DR4V-5DK3-J4ZR-V4DX-DBBB-Q4HZ",
"n":"um2rozPmSCnZQD9nm4G8C_YvZd8L3BSkiylc1M0Ia96-C4PBrK
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"e":"AQAB"}}}}}
Note that the inbound and outbound server configuration does not
specify the access credentials to be used to access the service.
These are specified in the Credential catalog.
Future: The mail application should support automated means of
credentialling the public key including obtaining an X.509v3
certificate or uploading the key to a key service.
4.2.2. SSH
SSH configuration profiles are described by
CatalogEntryApplicationSSH entries. The corresponding activation
records for the connected devices contain the contributions used to
derive the private keys.
Hallam-Baker Expires 28 April 2022 [Page 33]
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A user may have separate SSH configurations for separate purposes
within a single Mesh Account. This allows a system administrator
servicing multiple clients to maintain separate SSH profiles for each
of her customers allowing credentials to be easily (and verifiably)
revoked at contract termination.
{
"CatalogedApplicationSsh":{
"Key":"ssh",
"Grant":["web"
],
"EnvelopedEscrow":[[{
"enc":"A256CBC",
"kid":"EBQA-XLRF-3R62-CM7L-MPZG-6DQB-7CG7",
"Salt":"LLLbmrexmMC0waYowoa8zg",
"recipients":[{
"kid":"MBFO-AXQH-VEJI-J47J-W3ZG-3ZPA-7FHS",
"epk":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"oBoI3gVHFS1wmdljqrWnd1WsHcl51i_2PvK7V
4nbcpr6XX-TCNG2DW-zBt1Ma_Uf-sTja_OkIdUA"}},
"wmk":"LGmUWipX6xbyLOX-eLNonwE1XwDIG6jAAefr6cAKQoVR
vzEJwVwltQ"}
]},
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]
],
"ClientKey":{
"Udf":"MA7Z-CDPN-MRFL-XNJA-J2FQ-MQK6-ESHI",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyRSA":{
"kid":"MA7Z-CDPN-MRFL-XNJA-J2FQ-MQK6-ESHI",
"n":"0TPeFQGpnkzgDlETAWjUwnlX8T3OiB0O3c0UoZuMFvpiDM2CS0
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HeMOCVZitEAOyHeNuo1OjNxwc9vdyGuQ",
"e":"AQAB"}}}}}
Future: The SSH application is only used to track the SSH client
private key which is the same for all of a user's devices. This
approach is obviously not ideal from the point of view of
cryptographic hygiene: we would much prefer to specify a different
client key for every device.
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Future: The present specification only manages client keys. In the
context of managing IoT devices, the ability to manage service keys
is highly desirable.
4.3. Bookmark
The bookmark catalog mmm_bookmark contains CatalogEntryBookmark
entries which describe Web bookmarks and other citations allowing
them to be shared between devices connected to the profile.
The fields currently supported by the Bookmarks catalog are currently
limited to the fields required for tracking Web bookmarks.
Specification of additional fields to track full academic citations
is a work in progress.
{
"CatalogedBookmark":{
"Uri":"http://www.example.com",
"Title":"site1",
"Path":"Sites.1"}}
4.4. Contact
The contact catalog mmm_contact contains CatalogEntryContact entries
which describe the person, organization or location described.
The fields of the contact catalog provide a superset of the
capabilities of vCard [RFC2426].
{
"CatalogedContact":{
"Key":"MB5I-R24M-QXJT-KDBF-XFOA-DGC3-U3AA",
"Self":true,
"Contact":{
"ContactPerson":{
"Id":"MB5I-R24M-QXJT-KDBF-XFOA-DGC3-U3AA",
"Anchors":[{
"Udf":"MB5I-R24M-QXJT-KDBF-XFOA-DGC3-U3AA",
"Validation":"Self"}
],
"NetworkAddresses":[{
"Address":"alice@example.com",
"EnvelopedProfileAccount":[{
"EnvelopeId":"MB5I-R24M-QXJT-KDBF-XFOA-DGC3-U3AA",
"dig":"S512",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJNQjVJLV
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CiAgIkNyZWF0ZWQiOiAiMjAyMS0xMC0yNVQxNTo0ODo0NFoifQ"},
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"signatures":[{
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"kid":"MB5I-R24M-QXJT-KDBF-XFOA-DGC3-U3AA",
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],
"PayloadDigest":"0_av1I9T_vQ-6biLixf0vQ-_JLiUttOy
Ynb5fPbqu5l3agCn0lgRFl8uGdSgmzVqzUSIxQl36g-SDrhwApbyEw"}
],
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"Protocols":[{
"Protocol":"mmm"}
]}
],
"Sources":[{
"Validation":"Self",
"EnvelopedSource":[{
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{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MBUX-YI5W-NTAH-UJN2-4FFC-4PAY-NI73",
"signature":"4gyw3dH34sz4KhwN7Xazd_2HZhjQBkeE
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],
"PayloadDigest":"wKyLuwSyXzEw7soSKcGk_CIsHE_y7nZm
lmrix1BzQpLA12o_gTB9vO4WO6XO_mvD54crjS07iICsq4EXOh4XVA"}
]}
]}}}}
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The Contact catalog is typically used by the MeshService as a source
of authorization information to perform access control on inbound and
outbound message requests. For this reason, Mesh Service SHOULD be
granted read access to the contacts catalog by providing a decryption
entry for the service.
4.5. Credential
The credential catalog mmm_credential contains CatalogEntryCredential
entries which describe credentials used to access network resources.
{
"CatalogedCredential":{
"Service":"ftp.example.com",
"Username":"alice1",
"Password":"password"}}
Only username/password credentials are stored in the credential
catalog. If public key credentials are to be used, these SHOULD be
managed as an application profile allowing separate credentials to be
created for each device.
4.6. Device
The device catalog mmm_Device contains CatalogEntryDevice entries
which describe the devices connected to the account and the
permissions assigned to them.
Each device connected to a Mesh Account has an associated
CatalogEntryDevice entry that includes the activation and connection
records for the account. These records are described in further
detail in section ???.
4.7. Network
The network catalog contains CatalogEntryNetwork entries which
describe network settings, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc.
{
"CatalogedNetwork":{
"Service":"myWiFi",
"Password":"securePassword"}}
4.8. Publication
[Note, this catalog is obsolete, the functions provided by this
catalog are being merged with the Access catalog]
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The publication catalog mmm_Publication contains
CatalogEntryPublication entries which describe content published
through the account.
If the data being published is small, it MAY be specified in the
CatalogEntryPublication entry itself as enveloped data. Otherwise a
link to the external content is required.
The Publication catalog is currently used to publish two types of
data:
Contact Used in the Static QR Code Contact Exchange interaction.
Profile Device Used in the Preconfigured Device Connection
interaction.
The interactions using this published data are described in
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
>>>> Unfinished SchemaEntryPublication
4.9. Task
The Task catalog mmm_Task contains CatalogEntryTask entries which
describe tasks assigned to the user including calendar entries and to
do lists.
The fields of the task catalog currently reflect those offered by the
iCalendar specification [RFC5545]. Specification of additional
fields to allow task triggering on geographic location and/or
completion of other tasks is a work in progress.
{
"CatalogedTask":{
"Title":"SomeItem",
"Key":"NDX6-MX46-AFIL-BMLW-BTMN-SUTR-7DT5"}}
5. Spools
Spools are DARE Sequences containing an append only list of messages
sent or received by an account. Three spools are currently defined:
Inbound Messages sent to the account. These are encrypted under the
account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were
current at the time the message was sent.
Outbound Messages sent from the account. These are encrypted under
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the account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were
current at the time the message was sent.
Local Messages sent from the account for internal use. These are
encrypted under the encryption key of the intended recipient
alone. This is either the account administration encryption key
or a device encryption key.
Every Mesh Message has a unique message identifier. Messages created
at the beginning of a new messaging protocol interaction are assigned
a random message identifier. Responses to previous messages are
assigned message identifiers formed from the message identifier to
which they respond by means of a message digest function.
Every Mesh Message stored in a spool is encapsulated in an envelope
which bears a unique identifier that is formed by applying a message
digest function to the message identifier. Each stored message has
an associated state which is initially set to the state Initial and
MAY be subsequently altered by one or more MessageComplete messages
subsequently appended to the spool. The allowable message states
depending upon the spool in question.
5.1. Outbound
The outbound spool stores messages that are to be or have been sent
and MessageComplete messages reporting changes to the status of the
messages stored on the spool.
Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Sent,
Received or Refused:
Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool.
Sent The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to the
Mesh Service of the recipient which accepted it.
Received The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to
the Mesh Service of the recipient and the recipient has
acknowledged receipt.
Refused The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to
the Mesh Service of the recipient which refused to accept it.
MessageComplete messages are only valid when posted to the spool by
the service.
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5.2. Inbound
The inbound spool stores messages that have been received by the Mesh
service servicing the account and MessageComplete messages reporting
changes to the status of the messages stored on the spool.
Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Read:
Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool.
Read The message has been read.
A message previously marked as read MAY be returned to the unread
state by marking it as being in the Initial state.
5.3. Local
The local spool stores messages that are used for administrative
functions. In normal circumstances, only administrator devices and
the Mesh Service require access to the local spool.
The local spool is used to store MessagePin messages used to notify
administration devices that a PIN code has been registered for some
purpose and RespondConnection messages used to inform a device of the
result of a connection request.
The local spool is used in a device connection operation to provide a
device with the activation and connection records required to access
the service as an authorized client. Servicing these requests
requires that the service be able to access messages stored in the
spool by envelope id.
Messages posted to the outbound spool have the states Initial,
Closed:
Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool.
Closed The action associated with the message has been completed.
Future: Redefining the role of the Local spool would allow the Claim/
PollClaim operations used in device connection to be eliminated and
greater consistency achieved between the device connection
interactions.
5.4. Log
The log spo
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6. Logs
The logging functions are not currently implemented.
Logs are records of events. Mesh logs SHOULD be encrypted and
notarized.
The following logs are specified:
Service A log written by the Mesh Service containing a list of all
actions performed on the account
Exception A log written by the Mesh Service containing a list of all
exception events such as requests for access that were refused.
Notary A log written by administration devices connected to the
account containing a sequence of status entries and cross
notarization receipts.
The notary log will perform a particularly important role in future
Mesh versions as it provides the ultimate root of trust for the
account itself through cross notarization with the account holder's
MSP which in turn achieves mutual cross notarization with every other
MSP by cross notarizing with the Callsign registry. Thus every Mesh
user is cross notarized with every other Mesh user making use of the
Callsign registry through a graph with a diameter of 4.
7. Cryptographic Operations
The Mesh makes use of various cryptographic operations including
threshold operations. For convenience, these are gathered here and
specified as functions that are referenced by other parts of the
specification.
7.1. Key Derivation from Seed
Mesh Keys that derived from a seed value use the mechanism described
in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]. Use of the keyname parameter allows
multiple keys for different uses to be derived from a single key.
Thus escrow of a single seed value permits recovery of all the
private keys associated with the profile.
The keyname parameter is a string formed by concatenating identifiers
specifying the key type, the actor that will use the key and the key
operation:
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7.2. Message Envelope and Response Identifiers.
Every Mesh message has a unique Message Identifier MessageId. The
MakeID() function is used to calculate the value of Envelope
Identifier and Response identifier from the message identifier as
follows:
static string MakeID(string udf, string content) {
var (code, bds) = UDF.Parse(udf);
return code switch
{
UdfTypeIdentifier.Digest_SHA_3_512 =>
UDF.ContentDigestOfDataString(
bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId:
CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_3_512),
_ => UDF.ContentDigestOfDataString(
bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId:
CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_2_512),
};
Where the values of content are given as follows:
application/mmm/envelopeid The proposed IANA content identifier for
the Mesh message type.
application/mmm/responseid The proposed IANA content identifier for
the Mesh message type.
For example:
MessageID
= NA46-HSVG-N5NU-EXKZ-4X7G-GSF7-DUWS
EnvelopeID
= MDKW-3KOD-ZTW6-MRIB-AARK-UACM-PDOZ
ResponseID
= MAWR-ARTQ-H4GO-VXNI-LT5L-6ZB7-3HXR
7.3. Proof of Knowledge of PIN
Mesh Message classes that are subclasses of MessagePinValidated MAY
be authenticated by means of a PIN. Currently two such messages are
defined: MessageContact used in contact exchange and
RequestConnection message used in device connection.
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The PIN codes used to authenticate MessagePinValidated messages are
UDF Authenticator strings. The type code of the identifier specifies
the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code and the Binary
Data Sequence value specifies the key.
The inputs to the PIN proof of knowledge functions are:
PIN: string A UDF Authenticator. The type code of the identifier
specifies the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code
and the Binary Data Sequence value specifies the key.
Action: string A code determining the specific action that the PIN
code MAY be used to authenticate. By convention this is the name
of the Mesh message type used to perform the action.
Account: string The account for which the PIN code is issued.
ClientNonce: binary Nonce value generated by the client using the
PIN code to authenticate its message.
PayloadDigest: binary The PayloadDigest of a DARE Envelope that
contains the message to be authenticated. Note that if the
envelope is encrypted, this value is calculated over the
ciphertext and does not provide proof of knowledge of the
plaintext.
The following values of Action are currently defined:
Device Action info for device PIN
Contact Action info for contact PIN
These inputs are used to derive values as follows:
alg = UdfAlg (PIN)
pinData = UdfBDS (PIN)
saltedPINData = MAC (Action, pinData)
saltedPIN = UDFPresent (HMAC_SHA_2_512 + saltedPINData)
PinId = UDFPresent (MAC (Account, saltedPINData))
The issuer of the PIN code stores the value saltedPIN for retrieval
using the key PinId.
The witness value for a Dare Envelope with payload digest
PayloadDigest authenticated by a PIN code whose salted value is
saltedPINData, issued by account Account is given by PinWitness() as
follows:
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witnessData = Account.ToUTF8() + ClientNonce + PayloadDigest
witnessValue = MAC (witnessData , saltedPINData)
For example, to generate saltedPIN for the pin ABQR-GO5I-FPIE-TK5O-
M4VU-DALE-WM used to authenticate a an action of type Device:
pin = ABQR-GO5I-FPIE-TK5O-M4VU-DALE-WM
action = message.
alg = UdfAlg (PIN)
= Authenticator_HMAC_SHA_2_512
hashalg = default (alg, HMAC_SHA_2_512)
pinData = UdfBDS (PIN)
= System.Byte[]
saltedPINData
= hashalg(pinData, hashalg);
= System.Byte[]
saltedPIN = UDFPresent (hashalg + saltedPINData)
= ADL6-MGFR-DK2V-XMCH-Y4VK-FG4R-AIDL
The PinId binding the pin to the account alice@example.com is
Account = alice@example.com
PinId = UDFPresent (MAC (Account, saltedPINData))
= ACEE-R3XJ-23LL-A562-JOYB-UXNX-W6VO
Where MAC(data, key) is the message authentication code algorithm
specified by the value of alg.
When an administrative device issues a PIN code, a Message PIN is
appended to the local spool. This has the MessageId PinId and
specifies the value saltedPIN in the field of that name.
When PIN code authentication is used, a message of type
MessagePinValidated specifies the values ClientNonce, PinWitness and
PinId in the fields of those names. These values are used to
authenticate the inner message data specified by the
AuthenticatedData field.
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7.4. EARL
The UDF Encrypted Authenticated Resource Locator mechanism is used to
publish data and provide means of authentication and access through a
static identifier such as a QR code.
This mechanism is used to allow contact exchange by means of a QR
code printed on a business card and to connect a device to an account
using a static identifier printed on the device in the form of a QR
code.
In both cases, the information is passed using the EARL format
described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf].
8. Mesh Assertions
Mesh Assertions are signed DARE Envelopes that contain one of more
claims. Mesh Assertions provide the basis for trust in the
Mathematical Mesh.
Mesh Assertions are divided into two classes. Mesh Profiles are
self-signed assertions. Assertions that are not self-signed are
called declarations. The only type of declaration currently defined
is a Connection Declaration describing the connection of a device to
an account.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-09.html for artwork.)
Figure 1: Profiles And Connections
8.1. Encoding
The payload of a Mesh Assertion is a JSON encoded object that is a
subclass of the Assertion class which defines the following fields:
Identifier An identifier for the assertion.
Updated The date and time at which the assertion was issued or last
updated
NotaryToken An assertion may optionally contain one or more notary
tokens issued by a Mesh Notary service. These establish a proof
that the assertion was signed after the date the notary token was
created.
Conditions A list of conditions that MAY be used to verify the
status of the assertion if the relying party requires.
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The implementation of the NotaryToken and Conditions mechanisms is to
be specified in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-callsign] at a future date.
Note that the implementation of Conditions differs significantly from
that of SAML. Relying parties are required to process condition
clauses in a SAML assertion to determine validity. Mesh Relying
parties MAY verify the conditions clauses or rely on the
trustworthiness of the provider.
The reason for weakening the processing of conditions clauses in the
Mesh is that it is only ever possible to validate a conditions clause
of any type relative to a ground truth. In SAML applications, the
relying party almost invariably has access to an independent source
of ground truth. A Mesh device connected to a Mesh Service does not.
Thus the types of verification that can be achieved in practice are
limited to verifying the consistency of current and previous
statements from the Mesh Service.
8.2. Mesh Profiles
Mesh Profiles perform a similar role to X.509v3 certificates but with
important differences:
* Profiles describe credentials, they do not make identity
statements
* Profiles do not expire, there is therefore no need to support
renewal processing.
* Profiles may be modified over time, the current and past status of
a profile being recorded in an append only log.
Profiles provide the axioms of trust for the Mesh PKI. Unlike in the
PKIX model in which all trust flows from axioms of trust held by a
small number of Certificate Authorities, every part in the Mesh
contributes their own axiom of trust.
It should be noted however that the role of Certificate Authorities
is redefined rather than eliminated. Rather than making assertions
whose subject is represented by identities which are inherently
mutable and subjective, Certificate Authorities can now make
assertions about immutable cryptographic keys.
Every Profile MUST contain a SignatureKey field and MUST be signed by
the key specified in that field.
A Profile is valid if and only if:
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* There is a SignatureKey field.
* The profile is signed under the key specified in the SignatureKey
field.
A profile has the status current if and only if:
* The Profile is valid
* Every Conditions clause in the profile is understood by the
relying party and evaluates to true.
8.3. Mesh Connections
A Mesh connection is an assertion describing the connection of a
device or a member to an account.
Mesh connections provide similar functionality to 'end-entity'
certificates in PKIX but with the important proviso that they are
only used to provide trust between a device connected to an account
and the service to which that account is bound and between the
devices connected to an account.
A connection is valid with respect to an account with profile _P_ if
and only if:
* The profile _P_ is valid
* The AuthorityUdf field of the connection is consistent with the
UDF of _P_
* The profile is signed under the key specified in the
AdministrationKey field of _P_.
* Any conditions specified in the profile are met
A connection has the status current with respect to an account with
profile if and only if:
* The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile
_P_.
* The profile P is current.
A device is authenticated with respect to an account with profile P
if and only if:
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* The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile
_P_.
* The device has presented an appropriate proof of knowledge of the
DeviceAuthentication key specified in the connection.
8.4. Device Pre-configuration
The DevicePreconfiguration record provides a means of bundling all
the information used to preconfigure a device for use in the Mesh.
This comprises:
* The Enveloped ProfileDevice.
* A ConnectionDevice assertion credentialing the device to the
configuration provider Mesh Service.
* A ConnectionService assertion credentialing the device to the
configuration provider Mesh Service.
* The secret seed used to create the ProfileDevice data.
The DevicePreconfiguration record MAY be used as the means of
preconfiguring devices to allow connection to a user's account
profile using the Preconfigured/Static QR Code device connection
interaction.
For example, Alice's coffee pot was preconfigured for connection to a
Mesh account at the factory and the following DevicePreconfiguration
record created:
{
"DevicePreconfigurationPrivate":{
"EnvelopedProfileDevice":[{
"EnvelopeId":"MDDT-KTDT-AZ62-55HV-FFVY-JYNU-Y3YE",
"dig":"S512",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJNRERULUtURFQtQV
o2Mi01NUhWLUZGVlktSllOVS1ZM1lFIiwKICAiTWVzc2FnZVR5cGUiOiAiUHJvZml
sZURldmljZSIsCiAgImN0eSI6ICJhcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9tbW0vb2JqZWN0IiwKICAi
Q3JlYXRlZCI6ICIyMDIxLTEwLTI1VDE1OjQ5OjA3WiJ9"},
"ewogICJQcm9maWxlRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIlByb2ZpbGVTaWduYXR1cm
UiOiB7CiAgICAgICJVZGYiOiAiTUREVC1LVERULUFaNjItNTVIVi1GRlZZLUpZTlU
tWTNZRSIsCiAgICAgICJQdWJsaWNQYXJhbWV0ZXJzIjogewogICAgICAgICJQdWJs
aWNLZXlFQ0RIIjogewogICAgICAgICAgImNydiI6ICJFZDQ0OCIsCiAgICAgICAgI
CAiUHVibGljIjogInF0TDhCYVN3UUptNk12bE1BUXY0MkpsSk9MWFZMY0gxTWNweU
p1SWxJazhXbVpvYTlHd2MKICB4WjFIMmI5VE5MZGFZUGp1VlVaWHRkb0EifX19LAo
gICAgIkVuY3J5cHRpb24iOiB7CiAgICAgICJVZGYiOiAiTUFCQy1MR1k1LUJVMk8t
U0FaTi1ESjJFLVMzQ0ItQkc2NSIsCiAgICAgICJQdWJsaWNQYXJhbWV0ZXJzIjoge
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wogICAgICAgICJQdWJsaWNLZXlFQ0RIIjogewogICAgICAgICAgImNydiI6ICJYND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",
{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MDDT-KTDT-AZ62-55HV-FFVY-JYNU-Y3YE",
"signature":"VFD-9f8AXHdm38HR7y7JKsPStGNRu7wW5SXsJgc1
lbRyzQ0XVyDyNtqR5el9TCEuJKC0vU4lq4QAQfzJlUaa-viM7xhTcvJhVZ_YGiYEW
wq3Nb1-sortDNUdi7FGmG9C5Nh-ErWxy2oKkH8Nht19LDQA"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"PRkvfQ8djpN_Z3tY_p8qPRR4rTy_ZFEFW_WAqBcQ
2WpffnNZf_dPVKtW1XW9IpGjxYg2h0zB-hSVnCWViSUiEQ"}
],
"EnvelopedConnectionDevice":[{
"dig":"S512",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb25uZWN0aW
9uRGV2aWNlIiwKICAiY3R5IjogImFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL21tbS9vYmplY3QiLAogICJ
DcmVhdGVkIjogIjIwMjEtMTAtMjVUMTU6NDk6MDdaIn0"},
"ewogICJDb25uZWN0aW9uRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIkF1dGhlbnRpY2F0aW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",
{
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"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MDQJ-G5K2-BJ66-MPLM-FWSA-665O-MILP",
"signature":"r-JxVZxihprjMs3buV4yqmgXO7NdXlAEI-Cn2nYF
HB3rlbcNPwmi5z_0f5HpAXkQfFlVJefnxsMAffF8GNbOocmVEdaIXR8rHDkBMa1xd
6iCaWZdv8SAGdTHK0wLHkeAUDGj2wXsINFTMfDqhh_TjRUA"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"aT7dqhsuhW15GSExnBrO1nHQqAcT-uLaCUkJPhqg
AevgNUtTUuWkHC63T2ensFiSjCAAXd1YOvp7L8V7twmvZg"}
],
"EnvelopedConnectionService":[{
"dig":"S512",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb25uZWN0aW
9uU2VydmljZSIsCiAgImN0eSI6ICJhcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9tbW0vb2JqZWN0IiwKICA
iQ3JlYXRlZCI6ICIyMDIxLTEwLTI1VDE1OjQ5OjA3WiJ9"},
"ewogICJDb25uZWN0aW9uU2VydmljZSI6IHsKICAgICJBdXRoZW50aWNhdG
lvbiI6IHsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNQUJDLUxHWTUtQlUyTy1TQVpOLURKMkUtUzN
DQi1CRzY1IiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1
YmxpY0tleUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgI
CAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJYNlRoX0g4Qlk4LXNEenJ1Y1VXcXhLRzVhWWh6eFNULXZ0MT
lJOUo5TzdOaWdEZjFmaERxCiAgZkJPWlZaT25QOFg1V1MyQklYZDdKOVNBIn19fX1
9",
{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MDQJ-G5K2-BJ66-MPLM-FWSA-665O-MILP",
"signature":"BwF9R7byEqkzaUblEujRrko0zPuHn7NwH__14VRv
YH0jTblJSrmG40hujXOKqs9ElXe8F0jM26EAXm6l0Okhi_stdxotXwa8CHLZgzTGO
T9qEKdJElqkZIWLYJ9Tv_vM-VowlOz7jlzP4ThsVkI4fhcA"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"KUSigElHIQenRINVDSSgH5M9Dt5GJLzKUk5yylWM
TNdJ_4bW-JKREQiwutelFZvKv0-rX4XFnfBPwzmUflNY2A"}
],
"PrivateKey":{
"PrivateKeyUDF":{
"PrivateValue":"ZAAQ-APQL-QS4L-SY3L-RER2-TYEA-V4EF-Q3OB-6N2
F-DKDP-UJQ6-KXUN-LI2H-7RXH",
"KeyType":"MeshProfileDevice"}},
"ConnectUri":"mcu://maker@example.com/EC6P-KOIX-T3B4-YIKE-OLX3-
BUUD-64"}}
The use of the publication mechanism in device connection is
discussed further in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
9. Architecture
The Mesh architecture has four principal components:
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Mesh Account A collection of information (contacts, calendar
entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) belonging to a user
who uses the Mesh to management.
Mesh Device Management The various functions that manage binding of
devices to a Mesh to grant access to information and services
bound to that account.
Mesh Service Provides network services through which devices and
other Mesh users may interact with a Mesh Account.
Mesh Messaging An end-to-end secure messaging service that allows
short messages (less than 32KB) to be exchanged between Mesh
Accounts and between the Mesh devices connected to a particular
account.
The separation of accounts and services as separate components is a
key distinction between the Mesh and earlier Internet applications.
A Mesh account belongs to the owner of the Mesh and not the Mesh
Service Provider which the user may change at any time of their
choosing.
A Mesh Account May be active or inactive. By definition, an active
Mesh account is serviced by exactly one Mesh Service, an inactive
Mesh account is not serviced by a Mesh Service. A Mesh Service
Provider MAY offer a backup service for accounts hosted by other
providers. In this case the backup provider is connected to the
account as a Mesh device, thus allowing the backup provider to
maintain a copy of the stores contained in the account and
facilitating a rapid transfer of responsibility for servicing the
account should that be desired. The use of backup providers is
described further in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery].
9.1. Mesh Account
Mesh Accounts contains all the stateful information (contacts,
calendar entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) related to a
particular persona used by the owner.
By definition a Mesh Account is active if it is serviced by a Mesh
Service and inactive otherwise. A Mesh user MAY change their service
provider at any time. An active Mesh Account is serviced by exactly
one Mesh Service at once but a user MAY register a 'backup' service
provider to their account in the same manner as adding an advice.
This ensures that the backup service is pre-populated with all the
information required to allow the user to switch to the new provider
without interruption of service.
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Each Mesh account is described by an Account Profile. Currently
separate profile Account Profile are defined for user accounts and
group accounts. It is not clear if this distinction is a useful one.
9.1.1. Account Profile
A Mesh account profile provides the axiom of trust for a mesh user.
It contains a Master Signature Key and one or more Administration
Signature Keys. The unique identifier of the master profile is the
UDF of the Master Signature Key.
An Account Profile MUST specify an EscrowEncryption key. This key
MAY be used to escrow private keys used for encryption of stored
data. They SHOULD NOT be used to escrow authentication keys and MUST
NOT be used to escrow signature keys.
A user should not need to replace their account profile unless they
intend to establish a separate identity. To minimize the risk of
disclosure, the Profile Signature Key is only ever used to sign
updates to the account profile itself. This allows the user to
secure their Profile Signature Key by either keeping it on hardware
token or device dedicated to that purpose or by using the escrow
mechanism and paper recovery keys as described in this document.
9.1.1.1. Creating a ProfileMaster
Creating a ProfileMaster comprises the steps of:
0. Creating a Master Signature key.
1. Creating an Online Signing Key
2. Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key
3. Persisting the ProfileMaster on the administration device to the
CatalogHost.
4. (Optional) Connecting at least one Administration Device and
granting it the ActivationAdministration activation.
9.1.1.2. Updating a ProfileMaster
Updating a ProfileMaster comprises the steps of:
0. Making the necessary changes.
1. Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key
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2. Persisting the ProfileMaster on the administration device to the
CatalogHost.
9.2. Device Management
Device management allows a collection of devices belonging to a user
to function as a single personal Mesh. Two catalogs are used to
manage this process:
* The Access catalog is used to instruct the Mesh Service how to
respond to requests from the device.
* The Device catalog records information for use by administration
devices managing the device.
9.2.1. The Device Catalog
Each Mesh Account has a Device Catalog CatalogDevice associated with
it. The Device Catalog is used to manage the connection of devices
to the Personal Mesh and has a CatalogEntryDevice for each device
currently connected to the catalog.
Each Administration Device MUST have access to an up-to-date copy of
the Device Catalog in order to manage the devices connected to the
Mesh. The Mesh Service protocol MAY be used to synchronize the
Device Catalog between administration devices in the case that there
is more than one administration device.
The CatalogEntryDevice contains fields for the device profile, device
private and device connection.
9.2.2. Mesh Devices
The principle of radical distrust requires us to consider the
possibility that a device might be compromised during manufacture.
Once consequence of this possibility is that when an administration
device connects a new device to a user's personal Mesh, we cannot put
our full trust in either the device being connected or the
administration device connecting it.
This concern is resolved by (at minimum) combining keying material
generated from both sources to create the keys to be used in the
context of the user's personal Mesh with the process being fully
verified by both parties.
Additional keying material sources could be added if protection
against the possibility of compromise at both devices was required
but this is not supported by the current specifications.
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A device profile provides the axiom of trust and the key
contributions of the device. When bound to an account, the base keys
specified in the Device Profile are combined with the key data
provided in the Activation device to construct the keys the device
will use in the context of the account.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-09.html for artwork.)
Figure 2: Mapping of Device Profile and Device Private to Device
Connection Keys.
Unless exceptional circumstances require, a device should not require
more than one Device profile even if the device supports use by
multiple users under different accounts. But a device MAY have
multiple profiles if this approach is more convenient for
implementation.
9.2.2.1. Creating a ProfileDevice
Creating a ProfileDevice comprises the steps of:
0. Creating the necessary key
1. Signing the ProfileDevice using the Master Signature Key
2. Once created, a ProfileDevice is never changed. In the unlikely
event that any modification is required, a completely new
ProfileDevice MUST be created.
9.2.2.2. Connection to a Meh Account
Devices are only connected to a personal Mesh by an administration
device. This comprises the steps of:
0. Generating the PrivateDevice keys.
1. Creating the ConnectionDevice data from the public components of
the ProfileDevice and PrivateDevice keys and signing it using the
administration key.
2. Creating the Activations for the device and signing them using
the administration key.
3. Creating the CatalogEntryDevice for the device and adding it to
the CatalogDevice of the account.
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4. Creating an AccessCapability granting the necessary access rights
for the device and adding that to the CatalogAccess of the
account.
These steps are usually performed through use of the Mesh Protocol
Connection mechanism. However, Mesh clients MAY support additional
mechanisms as circumstances require provided that the appropriate
authentication and private key protection controls are provided.
9.3. Mesh Services
A Mesh Service provides one or more Mesh Hosts that support Mesh
Accounts through the Mesh Web Service Protocol.
Mesh Services and Hosts are described by Service Profiles and Host
Profiles. The means by which services manage the hosts through which
they provide service is outside the scope of this document.
As with a Device connected to a Mesh Account, a the binding of a Host
to the service it supports is described by a connection record:
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-09.html for artwork.)
Figure 3: Service Profile and Delegated Host Assertion.
The credentials provided by the ProfileService and ProfileHost are
distinct from those provided by the WebPKI that typically services
TLS requests. WebPKI credentials provide service introduction and
authentication while a Mesh ProfileHost only provides authentication.
Unless exceptional circumstances require, a service should not need
to revise its Service Profile unless it is intended to change its
identity. Service Profiles MAY be countersigned by Trusted Third
Parties to establish accountability.
9.4. Mesh Messaging
Mesh Messaging is an end-to-end secure messaging system used to
exchange short (32KB) messages between Mesh devices and services. In
cases where exchange of longer messages is required, Mesh Messaging
MAY be used to provide a control plane to advise the intended message
recipient(s) of the type of data being offered and the means of
retrieval (e.g an EARL).
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All communications between Mesh accounts takes the form of a Mesh
Message carried in a Dare Envelope. Mesh Messages are stored in two
spools associated with the account, the SpoolOutbound and the
SpoolInbound containing the messages sent and received respectively.
This document only describes the representation of the messages
within the message spool. The Mesh Service protocol by which the
messages are exchanged between devices and services and between
services is described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
9.4.1. Message Status
As previously described in section ###, every message stored in a
spool has a specified state. The range of allowable states is
defined by the message type. New message states MAY be defined for
new message types as they are defined.
By default, messages are appended to a spool in the Initial state,
but a spool entry MAY specify any state that is valid for that
message type.
The state of a message is changed by appending a completion message
to the spool as described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
Services MAY erase or redact messages in accordance with local site
policy. Since messages are not removed from the spool on being
marked deleted, they may be undeleted by marking them as read or
unread. Marking a message deleted MAY make it more likely that the
message will be removed if the sequence is subsequently purged.
9.4.2. Four Corner Model
A four-corner messaging model is enforced. Mesh Services only accept
outbound messages from devices connected to accounts that it
services. Inbound messages are only accepted from other Mesh
Services. This model enables access control at both the outbound and
inbound services
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-09.html for artwork.)
Figure 4: Four Corner Messaging Model
The outbound Mesh Service checks to see that the request to send a
message does not violate its acceptable use policy. Accounts that
make a large number of message requests that result in complaints
SHOULD be subject to consequences ranging from restriction of the
number and type of messages sent to suspending or terminating
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messaging privileges. Services that fail to implement appropriate
controls are likely to be subject to sanctions from either their
users or from other services.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-09.html for artwork.)
Figure 5: Performing Access Control on Outbound Messages
The inbound Mesh Service also checks to see that messages received
are consistent with the service Acceptable Use Policy and the user's
personal access control settings.
Mesh Services that fail to police abuse by their account holders
SHOULD be subject to consequences in the same fashion as account
holders.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-09.html for artwork.)
Figure 6: Performing Access Control on Inbound Messages
9.4.3. Traffic Analysis
The Mesh Messaging protocol as currently specified provides only
limited protection against traffic analysis attacks. The use of TLS
to encrypt communication between Mesh Services limits the
effectiveness of na?ve traffic analysis mechanisms but does not
prevent timing attacks unless dummy traffic is introduced to
obfuscate traffic flows.
The limitation of the message size is in part intended to facilitate
use of mechanisms capable of providing high levels of traffic
analysis such as mixmaster and onion routing but the current Mesh
Service Protocol does not provide support for such approaches and
there are no immediate plans to do so.
10. Publications
Static QR codes MAY be used to allow contact exchange or device
connection. In either case, the QR code contains an EARL providing
the means of locating, decrypting and authenticating the published
data.
The use of EARLs as a means of publishing encrypted data and the use
of EARLs for location, decryption and authentication is discussed in
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare] .
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10.1. Profile Device
10.2. Contact Exchange
When used for contact exchange, the envelope payload is a
CatalogedContact record.
Besides allowing for exchange of contact information on a business
card, a user might have their contact information printed on personal
property to facilitate return of lost property.
11. Schema
11.1. Shared Classes
The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile
specifications.
11.1.1. Classes describing keys
11.1.2. Structure: KeyData
The KeyData class is used to describe public key pairs and trust
assertions associated with a public key.
Udf: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the public key parameters
X509Certificate: Binary (Optional) List of X.509 Certificates
X509Chain: Binary [0..Many] X.509 Certificate chain.
X509CSR: Binary (Optional) X.509 Certificate Signing Request.
NotBefore: DateTime (Optional) If present specifies a time instant
that use of the private key is not valid before.
NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional) If present specifies a time
instant that use of the private key is not valid on or after.
11.1.3. Structure: CompositePrivate
Inherits: Key
DeviceKeyUdf: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the bound device
key (if used).
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11.2. Assertion classes
Classes that are derived from an assertion.
11.2.1. Structure: Assertion
Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived
Names: String [0..Many] Fingerprints of index terms for profile
retrieval. The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the
name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other
forms of abuse.
Updated: DateTime (Optional) The time instant the profile was last
modified.
NotaryToken: String (Optional) A Uniform Notary Token providing
evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was
created.
11.2.2. Structure: Condition
Parent class from which all condition classes are derived.
[No fields]
11.2.3. Base Classes
Abstract classes from which the Profile, Activation and Connection
classes are derrived.
11.2.4. Structure: Connection
Inherits: Assertion
SubjectUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the connection target.
AuthorityUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the connection source.
11.2.5. Structure: Activation
Inherits: Assertion
Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application
running on a specific device
ActivationKey: String (Optional) Secret seed used to derive keys
that are not explicitly specified.
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Entries: ActivationEntry [0..Many] Activation of named resources.
11.2.6. Structure: ActivationEntry
Resource: String (Optional) Name of the activated resource
Key: KeyData (Optional) The activation key or key share
11.2.7. Mesh Profile Classes
Classes describing Mesh Profiles. All Profiles are Assertions
derrived from Assertion.
11.2.8. Structure: Profile
Inherits: Assertion
Parent class from which all profile classes are derived
ProfileSignature: KeyData (Optional) The permanent signature key
used to sign the profile itself. The UDF of the key is used as
the permanent object identifier of the profile. Thus, by
definition, the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change
under any circumstance.
11.2.9. Structure: ProfileDevice
Inherits: Profile
Describes a mesh device.
Description: String (Optional) Description of the device
BaseEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for
encryption keys. Also used to decrypt activation data sent to the
device during connection to an account.
BaseAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for
authentication keys. Also used to authenticate the device during
connection to an account.
BaseSignature: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for
signature keys.
11.2.10. Structure: ProfileAccount
Base class for the account profiles ProfileUser and ProfileGroup.
These subclasses may be merged at some future date.
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Inherits: Profile
AccountAddress: String (Optional) The account address. This is
either a DNS service address (e.g. alice@example.com) or a Mesh
Name (@alice).
ServiceUdf: String (Optional) The fingerprint of the service profile
to which the account is currently bound.
EscrowEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Escrow key associated with the
account.
AccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key currently used to encrypt
data under this profile
AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign
connection assertions to the account.
11.2.11. Structure: ProfileUser
Inherits: ProfileAccount
Account assertion. This is signed by the service hosting the
account.
AccountAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
requests made under this user account.
AccountSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign data under the
account.
11.2.12. Structure: ProfileGroup
Inherits: ProfileAccount
Describes a group. Note that while a group is created by one person
who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to
other administrators over time.
[No fields]
11.2.13. Structure: ProfileService
Inherits: Profile
Profile of a Mesh Service
ServiceAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
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service connections.
ServiceEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to encrypt data under
this profile
ServiceSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign data under the
account.
11.2.14. Structure: ProfileHost
Inherits: Profile
KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
service connections.
KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to pass encrypted data to
the device such as a
11.2.15. Connection Assertions
Connection assertions are used to authenticate and authorize
interactions between devices and the service currently servicing the
account. They SHOULD NOT be visible to external parties.
11.2.16. Structure: ConnectionDevice
Inherits: Connection
Connection assertion used to authenticate service requests made by a
device.
AccountAddress: String (Optional) The account address
DeviceSignature: KeyData (Optional) The signature key for use of the
device under the profile
DeviceEncryption: KeyData (Optional) The encryption key for use of
the device under the profile
DeviceAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) The authentication key for
use of the device under the profile
11.2.17. Structure: ConnectionApplication
Inherits: Connection
Connection assertion stating that a particular device is
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[No fields]
11.2.18. Structure: ConnectionGroup
Describes the connection of a member to a group.
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
11.2.19. Structure: ConnectionService
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
11.2.20. Structure: ConnectionHost
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
11.2.21. Activation Assertions
11.2.22. Structure: ActivationDevice
Contains activation data for device specific keys used in the context
of a Mesh account.
Inherits: Activation
AccountUdf: String (Optional) The UDF of the account
11.2.23. Structure: ActivationAccount
Inherits: Activation
ProfileSignature: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to profile online
signing key used to sign updates to the profile.
AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to Profile
administration key used to make changes to administrator catalogs.
AccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to ProfileUser
account encryption key
AccountAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to
ProfileUser account authentication key
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AccountSignature: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to ProfileUser
account signature key
11.2.24. Structure: ActivationApplication
Inherits: Activation
[No fields]
11.3. Data Structures
Classes describing data used in cataloged data.
11.3.1. Structure: Contact
Inherits: Assertion
Base class for contact entries.
Id: String (Optional) The globally unique contact identifier.
Anchors: Anchor [0..Many] Mesh fingerprints associated with the
contact.
NetworkAddresses: NetworkAddress [0..Many] Network address entries
Locations: Location [0..Many] The physical locations the contact is
associated with.
Roles: Role [0..Many] The roles of the contact
Bookmark: Bookmark [0..Many] The Web sites and other online
presences of the contact
Sources: TaggedSource [0..Many] Source(s) from which this contact
was constructed.
11.3.2. Structure: Anchor
Trust anchor
Udf: String (Optional) The trust anchor.
Validation: String (Optional) The means of validation.
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11.3.3. Structure: TaggedSource
Source from which contact information was obtained.
LocalName: String (Optional) Short name for the contact information.
Validation: String (Optional) The means of validation.
BinarySource: Binary (Optional) The contact data in binary form.
EnvelopedSource: Enveloped (Optional) The contact data in enveloped
form. If present, the BinarySource property is ignored.
11.3.4. Structure: ContactGroup
Inherits: Contact
Contact for a group, including encryption groups.
[No fields]
11.3.5. Structure: ContactPerson
Inherits: Contact
CommonNames: PersonName [0..Many] List of person names in order of
preference
11.3.6. Structure: ContactOrganization
Inherits: Contact
CommonNames: OrganizationName [0..Many] List of person names in
order of preference
11.3.7. Structure: OrganizationName
The name of an organization
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
RegisteredName: String (Optional) The registered name.
DBA: String (Optional) Names that the organization uses including
trading names and doing business as names.
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11.3.8. Structure: PersonName
The name of a natural person
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
FullName: String (Optional) The preferred presentation of the full
name.
Prefix: String (Optional) Honorific or title, E.g. Sir, Lord, Dr.,
Mr.
First: String (Optional) First name.
Middle: String [0..Many] Middle names or initials.
Last: String (Optional) Last name.
Suffix: String (Optional) Nominal suffix, e.g. Jr., III, etc.
PostNominal: String (Optional) Post nominal letters (if used).
11.3.9. Structure: NetworkAddress
Provides all means of contacting the individual according to a
particular network address
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
Address: String (Optional) The network address, e.g.
alice@example.com
NetworkCapability: String [0..Many] The capabilities bound to this
address.
EnvelopedProfileAccount: Enveloped (Optional) The account profile
Protocols: NetworkProtocol [0..Many] Public keys associated with the
network address
11.3.10. Structure: NetworkProtocol
Protocol: String (Optional) The IANA protocol|identifier of the
network protocols by which the contact may be reached using the
specified Address.
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11.3.11. Structure: Role
OrganizationName: String (Optional) The organization at which the
role is held
Titles: String [0..Many] The titles held with respect to that
organization.
Locations: Location [0..Many] Postal or physical addresses
associated with the role.
11.3.12. Structure: Location
Appartment: String (Optional)
Street: String (Optional)
District: String (Optional)
Locality: String (Optional)
County: String (Optional)
Postcode: String (Optional)
Country: String (Optional)
11.3.13. Structure: Bookmark
Uri: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Role: String [0..Many]
11.3.14. Structure: Reference
MessageId: String (Optional) The received message to which this is a
response
ResponseId: String (Optional) Message that was generated in response
to the original (optional).
Relationship: String (Optional) The relationship type. This can be
Read, Unread, Accept, Reject.
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11.3.15. Structure: Task
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
Start: DateTime (Optional)
Finish: DateTime (Optional)
StartTravel: String (Optional)
FinishTravel: String (Optional)
TimeZone: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Description: String (Optional)
Location: String (Optional)
Trigger: String [0..Many]
Conference: String [0..Many]
Repeat: String (Optional)
Busy: Boolean (Optional)
11.4. Catalog Entries
11.4.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry
Base class for cataloged Mesh data.
Labels: String [0..Many] The set of labels describing the entry
11.4.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Public device entry, indexed under the device ID Hello
Udf: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device in the
Mesh
DeviceUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the offline signature key of the
device
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SignatureUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the account online signature
key
EnvelopedProfileUser: Enveloped (Optional) The Mesh profile
EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device profile
EnvelopedConnectionUser: Enveloped (Optional) The public assertion
demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh
EnvelopedActivationDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of
the device within the Mesh account
EnvelopedActivationAccount: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of
the device within the Mesh account
EnvelopedActivationApplication: Enveloped [0..Many] Application
activations granted to the device.
11.4.3. Structure: CatalogedPublication
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
A publication.
Id: String (Optional) Unique identifier code
Authenticator: String (Optional) The witness key value to use to
request access to the record.
EnvelopedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) Dare Envelope containing the
entry data. The data type is specified by the envelope metadata.
NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional) Epiration time (inclusive)
11.4.4. Structure: CatalogedCredential
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Protocol: String (Optional)
Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)
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11.4.5. Structure: CatalogedNetwork
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Protocol: String (Optional)
Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)
11.4.6. Structure: CatalogedContact
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
Self: Boolean (Optional) If true, this catalog entry is for the user
who created the catalog.
11.4.7. Structure: CatalogedAccess
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
[No fields]
11.4.8. Structure: CryptographicCapability
Id: String (Optional) The identifier of the capability. If this is
a user capability, MUST match the KeyData identifier. If this is
a serviced capability, MUST match the value of ServiceId on the
corresponding service capability.
KeyData: KeyData (Optional) The key that enables the capability
EnvelopedKeyShares: Enveloped [0..Many] One or more enveloped key
shares.
SubjectId: String (Optional) The identifier of the resource that is
controlled using the key.
SubjectAddress: String (Optional) The address of the resource that
is controlled using the key.
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11.4.9. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a decryption key
[No fields]
11.4.10. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial
Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt
The corresponding key is an encryption key
ServiceId: String (Optional) The identifier used to claim the
capability from the service.[Only present for a partial
capability.]
ServiceAddress: String (Optional) The service account that supports
a serviced capability. [Only present for a partial capability.]
11.4.11. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced
Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt
The corresponding key is an encryption key
AuthenticationId: String (Optional) UDF of trust root under which
request to use a serviced capability must be authorized. [Only
present for a serviced capability]
11.4.12. Structure: CapabilitySign
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is an administration key
[No fields]
11.4.13. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a key that may be used to generate key
shares.
[No fields]
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11.4.14. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a decryption key to be used in accordance
with the Micali Fair Electronic Exchange with Invisible Trusted
Parties protocol.
[No fields]
11.4.15. Structure: CatalogedBookmark
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Uri: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Path: String (Optional)
11.4.16. Structure: CatalogedTask
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
EnvelopedTask: Enveloped (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
11.4.17. Structure: CatalogedApplication
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Key: String (Optional)
EnvelopedCapabilities: DareEnvelope [0..Many] Enveloped keys for use
with Application
11.4.18. Structure: CatalogedMember
ContactAddress: String (Optional)
MemberCapabilityId: String (Optional)
ServiceCapabilityId: String (Optional)
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
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11.4.19. Structure: CatalogedGroup
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
EnvelopedProfileGroup: Enveloped (Optional) The Mesh profile
EnvelopedActivationAccount: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of
the device within the Mesh account
11.4.20. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
11.4.21. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
11.4.22. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
11.5. Publications
11.5.1. Structure: DevicePreconfiguration
A data structure that is passed
EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device profile
EnvelopedConnectionDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device
connection
ConnectUri: String (Optional) The connection URI. This would
normally be printed on the device as a QR code.
11.6. Messages
11.6.1. Structure: Message
MessageId: String (Optional) Unique per-message ID. When
encapsulating a Mesh Message in a DARE envelope, the envelope
EnvelopeID field MUST be a UDF fingerprint of the MessageId value.
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Sender: String (Optional)
Recipient: String (Optional)
11.6.2. Structure: MessageError
Inherits: Message
ErrorCode: String (Optional)
11.6.3. Structure: MessageComplete
Inherits: Message
References: Reference [0..Many]
11.6.4. Structure: MessagePinValidated
Inherits: Message
AuthenticatedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) Enveloped data that is
authenticated by means of the PIN
ClientNonce: Binary (Optional) Nonce provided by the client to
validate the PIN
PinId: String (Optional) Pin identifier value calculated from the
PIN code, action and account address.
PinWitness: Binary (Optional) Witness value calculated as KDF
(Device.Udf + AccountAddress, ClientNonce)
11.6.5. Structure: MessagePin
Account: String (Optional)
Inherits: Message
Expires: DateTime (Optional)
Automatic: Boolean (Optional) If true, authentication against the
PIN code is sufficient to complete the associated action without
further authorization.
SaltedPin: String (Optional) PIN code bound to the specified action.
Action: String (Optional) The action to which this PIN code is
bound.
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11.6.6. Structure: RequestConnection
Connection request message. This message contains the information
Inherits: MessagePinValidated
AccountAddress: String (Optional)
11.6.7. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection
Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a
valid MessageConnectionRequestClient
Inherits: Message
EnvelopedRequestConnection: Enveloped (Optional) The client
connection request.
ServerNonce: Binary (Optional)
Witness: String (Optional)
11.6.8. Structure: RespondConnection
Respond to RequestConnection message to grant or refuse the
connection request.
Inherits: Message
Result: String (Optional) The response to the request. One of
"Accept", "Reject" or "Pending".
CatalogedDevice: CatalogedDevice (Optional) The device information.
MUST be present if the value of Result is "Accept". MUST be
absent or null otherwise.
11.6.9. Structure: MessageContact
Inherits: MessagePinValidated
Reply: Boolean (Optional) If true, requests that the recipient
return their own contact information in reply.
Subject: String (Optional) Optional explanation of the reason for
the request.
PIN: String (Optional) One time authentication code supplied to a
recipient to allow authentication of the response.
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11.6.10. Structure: GroupInvitation
Inherits: Message
Text: String (Optional)
11.6.11. Structure: RequestConfirmation
Inherits: Message
Text: String (Optional)
11.6.12. Structure: ResponseConfirmation
Inherits: Message
Request: Enveloped (Optional)
Accept: Boolean (Optional)
11.6.13. Structure: RequestTask
Inherits: Message
[No fields]
11.6.14. Structure: MessageClaim
Inherits: Message
PublicationId: String (Optional)
ServiceAuthenticate: String (Optional)
DeviceAuthenticate: String (Optional)
Expires: DateTime (Optional)
11.6.15. Structure: ProcessResult
For future use, allows logging of operations and results
Inherits: Message
Success: Boolean (Optional)
ErrorReport: String (Optional) The error report code.
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12. Security Considerations
The security considerations for use and implementation of Mesh
services and applications are described in the Mesh Security
Considerations guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security].
13. IANA Considerations
All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in
this document
14. Acknowledgements
A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is
presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
15. Normative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I:
Architecture Guide", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-18, 20 September 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-architecture-18>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-callsign]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: Mesh
Callsign Service", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-callsign-01, 23 October 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-callsign-01>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part III : Data
At Rest Encryption (DARE)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare-13, 20 September 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-dare-13>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VI: Mesh
Discovery Service", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery-01, 13 January 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-discovery-01>.
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[draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part V: Protocol
Reference", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-protocol-10, 20 September 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-protocol-10>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-security]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IX Security
Considerations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-security-08, 20 September 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-security-08>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part II: Uniform
Data Fingerprint.", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf-14, 20 September 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-udf-14>.
[draft-hallambaker-threshold]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Threshold Modes in Elliptic Curves",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-
threshold-06, 5 August 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
threshold-06>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
16. Informative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-developer-10, 27 July 2020,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-developer-10>.
[draft-irtf-cfrg-frost]
Komlo, C., Goldberg, I., and T. Wilson-Brown, "Two-Round
Threshold Signatures with FROST", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-frost-01, 11 August 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
frost-01>.
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[draft-komlo-frost]
Komlo, C. and I. Goldberg, "FROST: Flexible Round-
Optimized Schnorr Threshold Signatures", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-komlo-frost-00, 7 August 2020,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-komlo-frost-
00>.
[RFC2426] Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile",
RFC 2426, DOI 10.17487/RFC2426, September 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2426>.
[RFC5545] Desruisseaux, B., "Internet Calendaring and Scheduling
Core Object Specification (iCalendar)", RFC 5545,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5545, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5545>.
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