Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IV: Schema Reference
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-06
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| Last updated | 2020-11-02 | ||
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draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-06
Network Working Group P. M. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft ThresholdSecrets.com
Intended status: Informational 2 November 2020
Expires: 6 May 2021
Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IV: Schema Reference
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-06
Abstract
The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure
infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and
credential data between multiple user devices. The core protocols of
the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and
reference data.
[Note to Readers]
Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list
(mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh.
This document is also available online at
http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema.html.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Catalogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2. Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.1. Mesh Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.2. SSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.3. Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3. Bookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.4. Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.5. Credential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.6. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.7. Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.8. Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.9. Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Spools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1. Outbound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2. Inbound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.3. Local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.1. Key Derivation from Seed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.2. Message Response Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.3. Proof of Knowledge of PIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.4. EARL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.5. Key Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.6. Service Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7. Mesh Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.2. Mesh Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.3. Mesh Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
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8.1. Device Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.1.1. Master Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.1.2. Mesh Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.2. Mesh Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.2.1. Creating a ProfileAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.2.2. Connecting a Device to an Account . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.2.3. Binding and Account to a Service . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.3. Mesh Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.3.1. Creating a ProfileService . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.3.2. Creating a ProfileHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.3.3. Creating a ConnectionHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.4. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.4.1. Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9. Mesh Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.1. PIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.2. Completion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.3. Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
9.4. Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
9.5. Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
10. Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.1. Contact Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.2. Device Preconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
11. Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
11.1. Shared Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
11.1.1. Classes describing keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
11.1.2. Structure: KeyData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
11.1.3. Structure: CompositePrivate . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11.2. Assertion classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11.2.1. Structure: Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11.2.2. Structure: Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11.2.3. Base Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11.2.4. Structure: Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
11.2.5. Structure: Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
11.2.6. Structure: ActivationEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
11.2.7. Mesh Profile Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
11.2.8. Structure: Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
11.2.9. Structure: ProfileDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
11.2.10. Structure: ProfileAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11.2.11. Structure: ProfileUser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11.2.12. Structure: ProfileGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.2.13. Structure: ProfileService . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.2.14. Structure: ProfileHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.2.15. Connection Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.2.16. Structure: ConnectionDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.2.17. Structure: ConnectionApplication . . . . . . . . . . 59
11.2.18. Structure: ConnectionGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
11.2.19. Structure: ConnectionService . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
11.2.20. Structure: ConnectionHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
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11.2.21. Activation Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
11.2.22. Structure: ActivationDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
11.2.23. Structure: ActivationAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
11.2.24. Structure: ActivationApplication . . . . . . . . . . 60
11.3. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
11.3.1. Structure: Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
11.3.2. Structure: Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.3.3. Structure: TaggedSource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.3.4. Structure: ContactGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.3.5. Structure: ContactPerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.3.6. Structure: ContactOrganization . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.3.7. Structure: OrganizationName . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.3.8. Structure: PersonName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.3.9. Structure: NetworkAddress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.3.10. Structure: NetworkProtocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.3.11. Structure: Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.3.12. Structure: Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.3.13. Structure: Bookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.3.14. Structure: Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.3.15. Structure: Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.4. Catalog Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.4.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.4.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.4.3. Structure: CatalogedPublication . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.4.4. Structure: CatalogedCredential . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.4.5. Structure: CatalogedNetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.4.6. Structure: CatalogedContact . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.4.7. Structure: CatalogedAccess . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.4.8. Structure: CryptographicCapability . . . . . . . . . 66
11.4.9. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.4.10. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial . . . . . . . . 67
11.4.11. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced . . . . . . . . 67
11.4.12. Structure: CapabilitySign . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.4.13. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.4.14. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange . . . . . . . . . 68
11.4.15. Structure: CatalogedBookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.4.16. Structure: CatalogedTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.4.17. Structure: CatalogedApplication . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.4.18. Structure: CatalogedMember . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.4.19. Structure: CatalogedGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.4.20. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH . . . . . . . . . 69
11.4.21. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail . . . . . . . . 69
11.4.22. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork . . . . . . . 69
11.5. Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.5.1. Structure: DevicePreconfiguration . . . . . . . . . 69
11.6. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.6.1. Structure: Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.6.2. Structure: MessageError . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
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11.6.3. Structure: MessageComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.6.4. Structure: MessagePinValidated . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.6.5. Structure: MessagePin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.6.6. Structure: RequestConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.6.7. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.6.8. Structure: RespondConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.6.9. Structure: MessageContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.6.10. Structure: GroupInvitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.6.11. Structure: RequestConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.6.12. Structure: ResponseConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.6.13. Structure: RequestTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.6.14. Structure: MessageClaim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.6.15. Structure: ProcessResult . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
15. Appendix A: Example Container Organization (not normative) . 73
15.1. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
15.1.1. Creating a new Mesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
15.1.2. Adding an Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
15.1.3. Adding a Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
15.2. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
15.2.1. Creating a Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
15.2.2. Adding an Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
16. Appendix B: Collected Authentication and Encryption
Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
16.1. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
17. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
18. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1. Introduction
This document describes the data structures of the Mathematical Mesh
with illustrative examples. For an overview of the Mesh objectives
and architecture, consult the accompanying _Architecture Guide_
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. For information on the
implementation of the Mesh Service protocol, consult the accompanying
_Protocol Reference_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]
This document has two main sections. The first section presents
examples of the Mesh assertions, catalog entry and messages in use.
The second section contains the schema reference. All the material
in both sections is generated from the Mesh reference implementation
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].
Although some of the services described in this document could be
used to replace existing Internet protocols including FTP and SMTP,
the principal value of any communication protocol lies in the size of
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the audience it allows them to communicate with. Thus, while the
Mesh Messaging service is designed to support efficient and reliable
transfer of messages ranging in size from a few bytes to multiple
terabytes, the near-term applications of these services will be to
applications that are not adequately supported by existing protocols
if at all.
2. Definitions
This section presents the related specifications and standard, the
terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the
terms used as requirements language.
2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2.2. Defined Terms
The terms of art used in this document are described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
2.3. Related Specifications
The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. The Mesh
documentation set and related specifications are described in this
document.
2.4. Implementation Status
The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].
3. Actors
The Mesh mediates interactions between three principal actors:
*Accounts*, *Devices*, and *Services*.
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Currently two account types are specified, *user accounts* which
belong to an individual user and *group accounts* that are used to
share access to confidential information between a group of users.
It may prove useful to define new types of account over time or to
eliminate the distinction entirely. When active a Mesh account is
bound to a Mesh Service. The service to which an account is bound
MAY be changed over time but an account can only be bound to a single
service at a time.
A Mesh account is an abstract construct that (when active) is
instantiated across one or more physical machines called a device.
Each device that is connected to an account has a separate set of
cryptographic keys that are used to interact with other devices
connected to the account and MAY be provisioned with access to the
account private keys which MAY or MAY NOT be mediated by the current
Mesh Service.
A Mesh Service is an abstract construct that is provided by one or
more physical machines called Hosts. A Mesh Host is a device that is
attached to a service rather than an account.
3.1. Accounts
A Mesh Account is described by a Profile descended from Profile
Account and contains a set of Mesh stores. Currently two account
profiles are defined:
ProfileUser Describes a user account.
ProfileGroup Describes a group account used to share confidential
information between a group of users.
Both types of profile specify the following fields:
ProfileSignature The public signature key used to authenticate the
profile itself
AccountAddress The account name to which the account is currently
bound. (e.g. "alice@example.com", "@alice").
ServiceUdf If the account is active, specifies the fingerprint of
the service profile to which the account is currently bound.
AdministratorSignature The public signature key used to verify
administrative actions on the account. In particular addition of
devices to a user account or members to a group account.
AccountEncryption The public encryption key for the account. All
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messages sent to the account MUST be encrypted under this key. By
definition, all data encrypted under this account is encrypted
under this key.
User accounts specify two additional public keys, "AccountSignature"
and "AccountAuthentication" which allow signature and authentication
operations under the account context.
Every account contains a set of catalogs and spools that are managed
by the service as directed by the contents of the associated "Access"
catalog.
For example, the personal account profile Alice created is:
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{
"ProfileUser":{
"ProfileSignature":{
"Udf":"MAIH-QF2M-PVD3-NQJO-CWGX-G67S-JYEQ",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"LP6f4A0WTGxBGwVQxHEdm0nZEWk3_OlsDscWs9QjGMT82ka
7_TDJEqQ_pGto8260PD7AXEdsxUUA"}}},
"AccountAddress":"alice@example.com",
"ServiceUdf":"MBSL-H45P-PM3W-NTYI-NMKG-L46T-5HWM",
"AccountEncryption":{
"Udf":"MC2D-WX25-JK5S-6R7R-NPK5-XNQ7-O334",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"aBbYhik-VDUPmZ3Xh7N5Lppkn_f504MN6-YWmMnQAyiIJnK
aWvPTTA889IgD3dx3GfBHmLj1iXMA"}}},
"AdministratorSignature":{
"Udf":"MAIH-QF2M-PVD3-NQJO-CWGX-G67S-JYEQ",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"LP6f4A0WTGxBGwVQxHEdm0nZEWk3_OlsDscWs9QjGMT82ka
7_TDJEqQ_pGto8260PD7AXEdsxUUA"}}},
"AccountAuthentication":{
"Udf":"MAGU-WLGH-QX7L-RQKS-KHP4-C5LR-5RG2",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"yoIi0dvQBNI4UtiUCA5LvYBirDHjlEQXHOgzV4ktsqQKPwh
-lN4cEjCIinyi8J5GU_R94CF5he0A"}}},
"AccountSignature":{
"Udf":"MBVN-UC2H-EKC2-GLZA-CLSC-6XQ2-QZIA",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"EvPYHGRCJsZ0kmbBMu_sxcGuUIOHFXc4iz0oCyY19fpYUG5
qJyn467Wq85zuVWviBl8zd3-9X_wA"}}}}}
3.2. Device
Every Mesh device has a set of private keys that are unique to that
device. These keys MAY be installed during manufacture, installed
from an external source after manufacture or generated on the device.
If the platform capabilities allow, device private keys SHOULD be
bound to the device so that they cannot be extracted or exported
without substantial effort.
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The public keys corresponding to the device private keys are
specified in a ProfileDevice. This MUST contain at least the
following fields:
ProfileSignature The public signature key used to authenticate the
profile itself.
BaseEncryption Public encryption key used as a share contribution to
generation of device encryption keys to be used in the context of
an account and to decrypt data during the process of connecting to
an account.
BaseAuthentication Public authentication key used as a share
contribution to generation of device authentication keys to be
used in the context of an account and to authenticate the device
to a service during the process of connecting to an account.
BaseSignature Public signature key used as a share contribution to
generation of device authentication keys to be used in the context
of an account.
For example, the device profile corresponding to Alice's coffee pot
device is:
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{
"ProfileDevice":{
"ProfileSignature":{
"Udf":"MCQ7-FFN4-3WCY-NDYU-CPFQ-XFH4-EHNV",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"dyQgDeZX0Y7u5FElerLbzFhbGUTj3jrkO5biutnd9CuhtUP
npNM7UDTk5otmloreiJ9OBln70L0A"}}},
"BaseEncryption":{
"Udf":"MAFF-4P54-ORYF-SBAN-6XQ7-CO6S-OXWQ",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"7rEjlTclEPAoytZLGJbf5-eO8mBWLlNaevJ3YAt_aRhJAhe
-ROYL_ASfBuKEL9d0O8pCDlWzwA2A"}}},
"BaseAuthentication":{
"Udf":"MANB-DYXE-7CNC-W6LW-3R6I-BLAB-2TKC",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"BoY_wxLtxK1MsFOhOEs8LkY6HY6N6x46i0L_MJLMAMkqwsA
yiymRk6pV4vvtCc6DzBO8LF_MWYgA"}}},
"BaseSignature":{
"Udf":"MAW7-YIO3-5A7M-55YU-OZ7W-BJFT-QTHW",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"Psf8tojE6O4Q7JYBXe4r-bdLQdy4E8tzMTE3ADCs4OwXKyn
WrvlqO7cyGcX1Wn6bd2V5hLF48R8A"}}}}}
3.2.1. Activation
The device private keys are only used to perform cryptographic
operations during the process of connecting a device to an account.
During that connection process, a threshold key generation scheme is
used to generate a second set of device keys bound to the account by
combining the base key held by the device with a second device
private key provided by the administration device approving the
connection of the device to the account. The resulting key is
referred to as the device key. The process of combining the base
keys with the contributions to form the device keys is called
Activation.
The activation record for Alice's coffee pot device is:
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{
"ActivationDevice":{
"ActivationKey":"ZAAQ-GBHF-AKLZ-WMGO-NWLQ-CYAB-ZLLY-6MLD-6QYJ-6
MR3-A4OV-YHMH-JLL7-URSL",
"AccountUdf":"MCQ7-FFN4-3WCY-NDYU-CPFQ-XFH4-EHNV"}}
The Mesh protocols are designed so that there is never a need to
export or escrow private keys of any type associated with a device,
neither the base key, nor the device key nor the contribution from
the administration device.
This approach to device configuration ensures that the keys that are
used by the device when operating within the context of the account
are entirely separate from those originally provided by the device
manufacturer or generated on the device, provided only that the key
contributions from the administration device are sufficiently random
and unguessable.
The public keys corresponding to the composite keys generated during
the connection process are described in a "ConnectionUser" assertion
signed by the administration key of the corresponding account.
The connection record for Alice's coffee pot device is:
{
"ConnectionDevice":{
"DeviceSignature":{
"Udf":"MBTO-NNFK-P6K2-4FW4-WTKW-OLGU-GAZS",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"NXxkDFuagDESh6-FD7LSkkOSVgIW-S4E3TDHR9c5qbW4AUV
kJMEh1nZlnVO2xwcGI8SNfov6RR8A"}}},
"DeviceEncryption":{
"Udf":"MAUU-Q2JT-BHOM-ZEPX-HOFG-XYU7-FGCJ",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"eSh00dco-Ee4X1sb96S9lkcdso7Qu8Uz6NnuDZSu7ww59JJ
xF7lEZtWkkELe10cGfpeQZ-qxdkYA"}}},
"DeviceAuthentication":{
"Udf":"MCAY-A6DR-FSY6-2T4K-UD2B-OJHA-MT3H",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"XyBegJt8kgVMzFTcQWyathYay6aT5C3ubb_ktZc0Gevcz4x
u0y9aJlEPNV-siXJxqwdr6bBgySIA"}}}}}
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The "ConnectionUser" assertion MAY be used in the same fashion as an
X.509v3/PKIX certificate to mediate interactions between devices
connected to the same account without the need for interaction with
the Mesh service. Thus, a coffee pot device connected to the account
can receive and authenticate instructions issued by a voice
recognition device connected to that account.
While the "ConnectionUser" assertion MAY be used to mediate external
interactions, this approach is typically undesirable as it provides
the external parties with visibility to the internal configuration of
the account, in particular which connected devices are being used on
which occasions. Furthermore, the lack of the need to interact with
the service means that the service is necessarily unable to mediate
the exchange and enforce authorization policy on the interactions.
Device keys are intended to be used to secure communications between
devices connected to the same account. All communication between
Mesh accounts SHOULD be mediated by a Mesh service. This enables
abuse mitigation by applying access control to every outbound and
every inbound message.
Since Alice's coffee pot does not require the external communication
right, the activation record for the coffee pot does not provide
access to the account keys required to perform external
communications. Alice's watch device does require access to the
account keys so it can receive messages and task updates. But since
it is a device that Alice has to carry on her person to use, it is a
device that might easily be lost or stolen. Accordingly, the
activation record for Alice's watch provides access to the account
decryption and signature keys but in the form of threshold key shares
mediated by the Mesh service. Thus, Alice's watch can sign and read
message sent to the account but only under the control of the Mesh
service.
3.3. Service
Mesh services are described by a "ProfileService". This specifies
the encryption, and signature authentication keys used to interact
with the abstract service.
Since Mesh accounts and services are both abstract constructs, they
cannot interact directly. A device connected to an account can only
interact with a service by interacted with a device authorized to
provide services on behalf of one or more accounts connected to the
service. Such a device is called a Mesh Host.
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Mesh hosts MAY be managed using the same ProfileDevice and device
connection mechanism provided for management of user devices or by
whatever other management protocols prove convenient. The only part
of the Service/Host interaction that is visible to devices connected
to a profile and to hosts connected to other services is the
ConnectionHost structure that describes the set of device keys to use
in interactions with that specific host.
4. Catalogs
Catalogs track sets of persistent objects associated with a Mesh
Service Account. The Mesh Service has no access to the entries in
any Mesh catalog except for the Device and Contacts catalog which are
used in device authentication and authorization of inbound messages.
Each Mesh Catalog managed by a Mesh Account has a name of the form:
"<prefix>_<name>"
Where "<prefix>" is the IANA assigned service name. The assigned
service name for the Mathematical Mesh is mmm. Thus, all catalogs
specified by the Mesh schema have names prefixed with the sequence
"mmm_".
The following catalogs are currently specified within the
Mathematical Mesh.
Access: mmm_Access Describes access control policy for performing
operations on the account. The Access catalog is the only Mesh
catalog whose contents are readable by the Mesh Service under
normal circumstances.
Application: "mmm_Application" Describes configuration information
for applications including mail (SMTP, IMAP, OpenPGP, S/MIME, etc)
and SSH and for the MeshAccount application itself.
Bookmark: "mmm_Bookmark" Describes Web bookmarks and other citations
allowing them to be shared between devices connected to the
profile.
Contact: "mmm_Contact" Describes logical and physical contact
information for people and organizations.
Credential: "mmm_Credential" Describes credentials used to access
network resources.
Device: "mmm_Device" Describes the set of devices connected to the
account and the permissions assigned to them
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Network: "mmm_Network" Describes network settings such as WiFi
access points, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc.
Member: mmm_Member Describes the set of members connected to a group
account.
Publication: mmm_Publication Describes data published under the
account context. The data MAY be stored in the publication
catalog itself or on a separate service (e.g. a Web server).
Task: "mmm_CatalogTask" Describes tasks assigned to the user
including calendar entries and to do lists.
The Access, Publication, Device and Member catalogs are involved in
Mesh Service Protocol interactions. These interactions are further
described in the Protocol Reference
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
In many cases, the Mesh Catalog offers capabilities that represent a
superset of the capabilities of an existing application. For
example, the task catalog supports the appointment tracking functions
of a traditional calendar application and the task tracking function
of the traditional 'to do list' application. Combining these
functions allows tasks to be triggered by other events other than the
passage of time such as completion of other tasks, geographical
presence, etc.
In such cases, the Mesh Catalog entries are designed to provide a
superset of the data representation capabilities of the legacy
formats and (where available) recent extensions. Where a catalog
entry is derived from input presented in a legacy format, the
original data representation MAY be attached verbatim to facilitate
interoperability.
4.1. Access
The access catalog "mmm_Access" contains a list of access control
entries granting a party authenticated using a particular
cryptographic credential a specific privilege such as:
* Accept Mesh Messages of particular types
* Perform an operation on a private key known to the service.
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As with the publication catalog, the access catalog provides
information that is necessary for the Mesh Service to act on behalf
of the user. It is therefore necessary to grant a decryption
capability for this catalog during the process of binding the account
to a service.
4.2. Application
The application catalog "mmm"_"Application" contains
"CatalogEntryApplication" entries which describe the use of specific
applications under the Mesh Service Account. Multiple application
accounts for a single application MAY be connected to a single Mesh
Service Account. Each account being specified in a separate entry.
The "CatalogEntryApplication" entries only contain configuration
information for the application as it applies to the account as a
whole. If the application requires separate configuration for
individual devices, this is specified in separate activation records
specified in the corresponding "ConnectionDevice".
4.2.1. Mesh Account
Mesh Accounts are described by "CatalogEntryAccount" entries. The
corresponding activation records for the connected devices contain
the contributions used to derive the private keys for use of the
account.
The "CatalogEntryAccount" entry is described in the section
describing Mesh accounts above.
4.2.2. SSH
SSH configuration profiles are described by
"CatalogEntryApplicationSSH" entries. The corresponding activation
records for the connected devices contain the contributions used to
derive the private keys.
A user may have separate SSH configurations for separate purposes
within a single Mesh Account. This allows a system administrator
servicing multiple clients to maintain separate SSH profiles for each
of her customers allowing credentials to be easily (and verifiably)
revoked at contract termination.
The SSH profile contains the information that is stored in the
"known_hosts" and "authorized_keys" files of SSH clients and servers.
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4.2.3. Mail
Mail configuration profiles are described by one or more
"CatalogEntryApplicationMail" entries, one for each email account
connected to the Mesh profile. The corresponding activation records
for the connected devices contain information used to provide the
device with the necessary decryption information.
Entries specify the email account address(es), the inbound and
outbound server configuration and the cryptographic keys to be used
for S/MIME and OpenPGP encryption.
4.3. Bookmark
The bookmark catalog "mmm_bookmark" contains "CatalogEntryBookmark"
entries which describe Web bookmarks and other citations allowing
them to be shared between devices connected to the profile.
The fields currently supported by the Bookmarks catalog are currently
limited to the fields required for tracking Web bookmarks.
Specification of additional fields to track full academic citations
is a work in progress.
{
"CatalogedBookmark":{
"Uri":"http://www.site1.com",
"Title":"site1",
"Path":"Sites.1"}}
4.4. Contact
The contact catalog "mmm_contact" contains "CatalogEntryContact"
entries which describe
{
"CatalogedContact":{
"Key":"MAIH-QF2M-PVD3-NQJO-CWGX-G67S-JYEQ",
"Self":true,
"Contact":{
"ContactPerson":{
"Id":"MAIH-QF2M-PVD3-NQJO-CWGX-G67S-JYEQ",
"Anchors":[{
"Udf":"MAIH-QF2M-PVD3-NQJO-CWGX-G67S-JYEQ",
"Validation":"Self"}
],
"NetworkAddresses":[{
"Address":"alice@example.com",
"EnvelopedProfileAccount":[{
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"EnvelopeID":"MAIH-QF2M-PVD3-NQJO-CWGX-G67S-JYEQ",
"dig":"S512",
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"signatures":[{
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],
"Protocols":[{
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"Protocol":"mmm"}
]}
],
"Sources":[{
"Validation":"Self",
"EnvelopedSource":[{
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NBZ0lDSlFkV0pzYVdNaU9pQWlSWFpRV1VoSFVrTktjMW93YTIxaVEKICBrMTFYM04
0WTBkMVZVbFBTRVpZWXpScGVqQnZRM2xaTVRsbWNGbFZSelZ4U25sdU5Bb2dJRFkz
VjNFNE5YcAogIDFWbGQyYVVKc09IcGtNeTA1V0Y5M1FTSjlmWDE5ZlEiLAogICAgI
CAgICAgewogICAgICAgICAgICAic2lnbmF0dXJlcyI6IFt7CiAgICAgICAgICAgIC
AgICAiYWxnIjogIlM1MTIiLAogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgImtpZCI6ICJNQUlILVF
GMk0tUFZEMy1OUUpPLUNXR1gtRzY3Uy1KWUVRIiwKICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICJz
aWduYXR1cmUiOiAiUHVHM00xMFFjcU5YeFV0SnprODNDMkxrRXhoTzFqWXFmQnhfc
GNnbC1fTUg5bEJQZAogIFQ1Sk1pTlN5VkxzSFJNOVpNVU8tR1ZjRE1pQUlUUFV0NW
pHNnQtR1AzLTZiZHlFZDZoREthdkZVSllyNHRXCiAgakt2cm8tM1VoN0tQNUJ2RkN
6MVZOb2NjQ2FpTmhzckNmNnVpZTR3a0EifV0sCiAgICAgICAgICAgICJQYXlsb2Fk
RGlnZXN0IjogIk9tR2VZVDFHWmE1LW1OeDVmWW1LMEprMkF6cVB4dUVKLWRSblR1b
1BMU2dPUwogIGpITXpMbnU4eTFxNk5UWXhab21NSzBaZmt1UHRmRDlVeWVteS1ucE
hRIn1dLAogICAgICAgICJQcm90b2NvbHMiOiBbewogICAgICAgICAgICAiUHJvdG9
jb2wiOiAibW1tIn1dfV19fQ",
{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MBVN-UC2H-EKC2-GLZA-CLSC-6XQ2-QZIA",
"signature":"ueOrjyE-0-zJ_DRQW-zJIH0ZLcxvsjhzKV
tNOnUYV116UBm740XP4gfHwkqR1WvL2Lpb25SWi66Aj7lTZtaSOFreEm9i0TgIBco
g4_O49DFf7s4HK6wo53KUe8J5pbjvYCnY8bsRWA6ZNAtTbyT_YDEA"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"h4lFjVf0eiHdZT1eg0iBK8eXYAXvB1dLo7
7beFR8LbEuFULlYds0eGH85HWrcZXyIZtzAZtv866fIqRWI2ARqQ"}
]}
]}}}}
The fields of the contact catalog provide a superset of the
capabilities of vCard [RFC2426].
The Contact catalog is typically used by the MeshService as a source
of authorization information to perform access control on inbound and
outbound message requests. For this reason, Mesh Service SHOULD be
granted read access to the contacts catalog by providing a decryption
entry for the service.
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4.5. Credential
The credential catalog "mmm_credential" contains
"CatalogEntryCredential" entries which describe credentials used to
access network resources.
{
"CatalogedCredential":{
"Service":"ftp.example.com",
"Username":"alice1",
"Password":"password"}}
Only username/password credentials are stored in the credential
catalog. If public key credentials are to be used, these SHOULD be
managed as an application profile allowing separate credentials to be
created for each device.
4.6. Device
The device catalog "mmm_Device" contains "CatalogEntryDevice" entries
which describe the devices connected to the account and the
permissions assigned to them.
Each device connected to a Mesh Account has an associated
CatalogEntryDevice entry that includes the activation and connection
records for the account. These records are described in further
detail in section REF _Ref54628559 \r \h 0.
4.7. Network
The network catalog contains "CatalogEntryNetwork" entries which
describe network settings, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc.
{
"CatalogedNetwork":{
"Service":"myWiFi",
"Password":"securePassword"}}
4.8. Publication
The publication catalog "mmm_Publication" contains
"CatalogEntryPublication" entries which describe content published
through the account.
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4.9. Task
The Task catalog "mmm_Task" contains "CatalogEntryTask" entries which
describe tasks assigned to the user including calendar entries and to
do lists.
The fields of the task catalog currently reflect those offered by the
iCalendar specification [RFC5545]. Specification of additional
fields to allow task triggering on geographic location and/or
completion of other tasks is a work in progress.
{
"CatalogedTask":{
"Title":"SomeItem",
"Key":"NCYK-YRNO-OHE5-3KZQ-IPS5-T3W4-WFHB"}}
5. Spools
Spools are DARE Containers containing an append only list of messages
sent or received by an account. Three spools are currently defined:
Inbound Messages sent to the account. These are encrypted under the
account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were
current at the time the message was sent.
Outbound Messages sent from the account. These are encrypted under
the account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were
current at the time the message was sent.
Local Messages sent from the account for internal use. These are
encrypted under the encryption key of the intended recipient
alone. This is either the account administration encryption key
or a device encryption key.
Every Mesh Message has a unique message identifier. Messages created
at the beginning of a new messaging protocol interaction are assigned
a random message identifier. Responses to previous messages are
assigned message identifiers formed from the message identifier to
which they respond by means of a message digest function.
Every Mesh Message stored in a spool is encapsulated in an envelope
which bears a unique identifier that is formed by applying a message
digest function to the message identifier. Each stored message has
an associated state which is initially set to the state "Initial" and
MAY be subsequently altered by one or more "MessageComplete" messages
subsequently appended to the spool. The allowable message states
depending upon the spool in question.
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5.1. Outbound
The outbound spool stores messages that are to be or have been sent
and "MessageComplete" messages reporting changes to the status of the
messages stored on the spool.
Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Sent,
Received or Refused:
Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool.
Sent The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to the
Mesh Service of the recipient which accepted it.
Received The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to
the Mesh Service of the recipient and the recipient has
acknowledged receipt.
Refused The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to
the Mesh Service of the recipient which refused to accept it.
"MessageComplete" messages are only valid when posted to the spool by
the service.
5.2. Inbound
The inbound spool stores messages that have been received by the Mesh
service servicing the account and MessageComplete messages reporting
changes to the status of the messages stored on the spool.
Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Read:
Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool.
Read The message has been read.
A message previously marked as read MAY be returned to the unread
state by marking it as being in the Initial state.
5.3. Local
The local spool stores messages that are used for administrative
functions. In normal circumstances, only administrator devices and
the Mesh Service require access to the local spool.
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The local spool is used to store MessagePin messages used to notify
administration devices that a PIN code has been registered for some
purpose and RespondConnection messages used to inform a device of the
result of a connection request.
The local spool is used in a device connection operation to provide a
device with the activation and connection records required to access
the service as an authorized client. Servicing these requests
requires that the service be able to access messages stored in the
spool by envelope id.
Messages posted to the outbound spool have the states Initial,
Closed:
Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool.
Closed The action associated with the message has been completed.
6. Cryptographic Operations
The Mesh makes use of various cryptographic operations including
threshold operations. For convenience, these are gathered here and
specified as functions that are referenced by other parts of the
specification.
6.1. Key Derivation from Seed
Mesh Keys that derived from a seed value use the mechanism described
in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]. Use of the "keyname" parameter
allows multiple keys for different uses to be derived from a single
key. Thus escrow of a single seed value permits recovery of all the
private keys associated with the profile.
The keyname parameter is a string formed by concatenating identifiers
specifying the key type, the actor that will use the key and the key
operation:
6.2. Message Response Identifier
Every Mesh message has a unique "MessageId". When encapsulated in a
DARE Envelope, the EnvelopeId field of the envelope header is the UDF
Content Digest of the enclosed MessageId as a string:
public static string GetEnvelopeId(string messageID) =>
UDF.ContentDigestOfUDF(messageID);
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When processing a Mesh message results in the creation of a response
to the sender, the MessageId of the response is UDF Content Digest of
the Binary Data Sequence of the original MessageId:
static string MakeID(string udf, string content) {
var (code, bds) = UDF.Parse(udf);
return code switch
{
UdfTypeIdentifier.Digest_SHA_3_512 =>
UDF.ContentDigestOfDataString(
bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId:
CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_3_512),
_ => UDF.ContentDigestOfDataString(
bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId:
CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_2_512),
};
For example:
[To be specified]
6.3. Proof of Knowledge of PIN
Mesh Message classes that are subclasses of "MessagePinValidated" MAY
be authenticated by means of a PIN. Currently two such messages are
defined: "MessageContact" used in contact exchange and
"RequestConnection" message used in device connection.
The PIN codes used to authenticate "MessagePinValidated" messages are
UDF Authenticator strings. The type code of the identifier specifies
the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code and the Binary
Data Sequence value specifies the key.
The inputs to the PIN proof of knowledge functions are:
PIN: string A UDF Authenticator. The type code of the identifier
specifies the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code
and the Binary Data Sequence value specifies the key.
Action: string A code determining the specific action that the PIN
code MAY be used to authenticate. By convention this is the name
of the Mesh message type used to perform the action.
Account: string The account for which the PIN code is issued.
ClientNonce: binary Nonce value generated by the client using the
PIN code to authenticate its message.
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PayloadDigest: binary The PayloadDigest of a DARE Envelope that
contains the message to be authenticated. Note that if the
envelope is encrypted, this value is calculated over the
ciphertext and does not provide proof of knowledge of the
plaintext.
The following values of Action are currently defined:
+=====================+===================+===================+
| Code | Mesh Message | Purpose |
+=====================+===================+===================+
| "MessageContact" | MessageContact | Contact exchange |
+---------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
| "RequestConnection" | RequestConnection | Device connection |
+---------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
Table 1
These inputs are used to derive values as follows:
alg = UdfAlg (PIN)
pinData = UdfBDS (PIN)
saltedPINData = MAC (Action, pinData)
saltedPIN = UDFPresent (Authenticator_HMAC_SHA_2_512 + saltedPINData)
PinId = UDFPresent (MAC (Account, saltedPINData))
witnessData = Account.ToUTF8() + ClientNonce + PayloadDigest
witnessValue = MAC (witnessData , saltedPINData)
Eg.
[To be specified]
Where "MAC(data, key)" is the message authentication code algorithm
specified by the value of "alg".
When an administrative device issues a PIN code, a Message PIN is
appended to the local spool. This has the MessageId PinId and
specifies the value "saltedPIN" in the field of that name.
When PIN code authentication is used, a message of type
MessagePinValidated specifies the values ClientNonce, PinWitness and
PinId in the fields of those names.
[To be specified]
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6.4. EARL
The UDF Encrypted Authenticated Resource Locator mechanism is used to
publish data and provide means of authentication and access through a
static identifier such as a QR code.
This mechanism is used to allow contact exchange by means of a QR
code printed on a business card and to connect a device to an account
using a static identifier printed on the device in the form of a QR
code.
In both cases, the information is passed using the EARL format
described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf].
6.5. Key Agreement
All Mesh Protocol requests except for the HelloRequest and every
response MUST be authenticated under the device key of the host or
device making the request.
Initial authentication is achieved by performing a Key agreement
under the "DeviceAuthentication" key of each of the hosts and
combining the result with nonce values provided by the requestor and
respondent using a KDF function as follows:
Two bindings are currently planned.
DARE Envelope over HTTPS The request or response is encapsulated in
a DARE Envelope that is exchanged by means of a HTTP POST method
over a TLS transport. The shared secret is used as the key on
Message Authentication Code that authenticates the request
payload.
UDP Transport Presents the same information as for the DARE Envelope
over HTTPS case but in a compact encoding using the shared secret
and an authenticated encryption scheme to pass the required
information.
Once authentication has been performed, the same pair of devices MAY
re-authenticate using the previously agreed key. To facilitate
stateless implementation, a host specifies an opaque identifier to be
used to identify the shared secret on subsequent uses which MAY be
used to recover the shared secret from the opaque identifier.
[To be specified]
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6.6. Service Cryptographic Operations
A Mesh Service acts as the counterparty for threshold operations
allowing mitigation of the risk of compromise of an individual device
connected to a user account or an insider threat from an individual
member of a group account.
When acting in this role, the Mesh service controls the use of the
cryptographic function but does not have the ability to perform the
action either by itself or by collaborating with other services to
which the account has been bound in the past.
Note that this approach limits rather than eliminates trust in the
service. As with services presenting themselves as 'zero trust', a
Mesh service becomes a trusted service after a sufficient number of
breaches in other parts of the system have occurred. And the user
trusts the service to provide availability of the service.
Three service cryptographic operations are currently specified:
Threshold Key Share A private key share _s_, held by the service is
split into key shares _x_, _y_ such that _a_ = _x_ + _y_. One key
share is encrypted under a decryption key held by the service.
The other is encrypted under a public key specified by the party
making the request.
Threshold Key Agreement A private key share s, held by the service
is used to calculate the value (_sl_+ _c_)._P_ where _l_, _c_ are
integers specified by the requestor and _P_ is a point on the
curve.
Threshold Signature A private key share s, held by the service is
used to calculate a contribution to a threshold signature scheme.
The implementation of the cryptographic operations described above is
described in [draft-hallambaker-threshold] and
[draft-hallambaker-threshold-sigs].
7. Mesh Assertions
Mesh Assertions are signed DARE Envelopes that contain one of more
claims. Mesh Assertions provide the basis for trust in the
Mathematical Mesh.
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Mesh Assertions are divided into two classes. Mesh Profiles are
self-signed assertions. Assertions that are not self-signed are
called declarations. The only type of declaration currently defined
is a Connection Declaration describing the connection of a device to
an account.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-06.html for artwork.)
Figure 1
7.1. Encoding
The payload of a Mesh Assertion is a JSON encoded object that is a
subclass of the Assertion class which defines the following fields:
Identifier An identifier for the assertion.
Updated The date and time at which the assertion was issued or last
updated
NotaryToken An assertion may optionally contain one or more notary
tokens issued by a Mesh Notary service. These establish a proof
that the assertion was signed after the date the notary token was
created.
Conditions A list of conditions that MAY be used to verify the
status of the assertion if the relying party requires.
The implementation of the NotaryToken and Conditions mechanisms is to
be specified in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-notary] at a future date.
Note that the implementation of Conditions differs significantly from
that of SAML. Relying parties are required to process condition
clauses in a SAML assertion to determine validity. Mesh Relying
parties MAY verify the conditions clauses or rely on the
trustworthiness of the provider.
The reason for weakening the processing of conditions clauses in the
Mesh is that it is only ever possible to validate a conditions clause
of any type relative to a ground truth. In SAML applications, the
relying party almost invariably has access to an independent source
of ground truth. A Mesh device connected to a Mesh Service does not.
Thus the types of verification that can be achieved in practice are
limited to verifying the consistency of current and previous
statements from the Mesh Service.
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7.2. Mesh Profiles
Mesh Profiles perform a similar role to X.509v3 certificates but with
important differences:
* Profiles describe credentials, they do not make identity
statements
* Profiles do not expire, there is therefore no need to support
renewal processing.
* Profiles may be modified over time, the current and past status of
a profile being recorded in an append only log.
Profiles provide the axioms of trust for the Mesh PKI. Unlike in the
PKIX model in which all trust flows from axioms of trust held by a
small number of Certificate Authorities, every part in the Mesh
contributes their own axiom of trust.
It should be noted however that the role of Certificate Authorities
is redefined rather than eliminated. Rather than making assertions
whose subject is represented by identities which are inherently
mutable and subjective, Certificate Authorities can now make
assertions about immutable cryptographic keys.
Every Profile MUST contain a "SignatureKey" field and MUST be signed
by the key specified in that field.
A Profile is valid if and only if:
* There is a "SignatureKey" field.
* The profile is signed under the key specified in the
"SignatureKey" field.
A profile has the status "current" if and only if:
* The Profile is valid
* Every Conditions clause in the profile is understood by the
relying party and evaluates to "true".
7.3. Mesh Connections
A Mesh connection is an assertion describing the connection of a
device or a member to an account.
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Mesh connections provide similar functionality to 'end-entity'
certificates in PKIX but with the important proviso that they are
only used to provide trust between a device connected to an account
and the service to which that account is bound and between the
devices connected to an account.
A connection is valid with respect to an account with profile _P_ if
and only if:
* The profile _P_ is valid
* The "AuthorityUdf" field of the connection is consistent with the
UDF of _P_
* The profile is signed under the key specified in the
"AdministrationKey" field of _P_.
* Any conditions specified in the profile are met
A connection has the status current with respect to an account with
profile if and only if:
* The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile
_P_.
* The profile "P" is current.
A device is authenticated with respect to an account with profile P
if and only if:
* The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile
_P_.
* The device has presented an appropriate proof of knowledge of the
"DeviceAuthentication" key specified in the connection.
8. Architecture
$$$$$$$$$$$ This has plenty or areas that need to be upgraded to the
single master/account approach.
The Mesh architecture has four principal components:
Mesh Device Management Binds a collection of devices that the owner
of the Mesh uses together to function as a single personal Mesh.
Mesh Account Contains all the information (contacts, calendar
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entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) related to a
particular persona used by the owner.
Mesh Service Provides a service identifier (e.g.
"alice@example.com") through which devices and other Mesh users
may interact with a Mesh Account.
Mesh Messaging Allows short messages (less than 32KB) to be
exchanged between Mesh devices connected to an account and between
Mesh Accounts.
Device management and Accounts components are defined by a data
schema alone. The Service and Messaging components are defined by a
data schema and a service protocol.
The separation of accounts and services as separate components is a
key distinction between the Mesh and earlier Internet applications.
A Mesh account belongs to the owner of the Mesh and not the Mesh
Service Provider which the user may change at any time of their
choosing.
A Mesh Account May be active or inactive. By definition, an active
Mesh account is serviced by exactly one Mesh Service, an inactive
Mesh account is not serviced by a Mesh Service. A Mesh Service
Provider MAY offer a backup service for accounts hosted by other
providers. In this case the backup provider is connected to the
account as a Mesh device, thus allowing the backup provider to
maintain a copy of the stores contained in the account and
facilitating a rapid transfer of responsibility for servicing the
account should that be desired. The use of backup providers is
described further in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery].
8.1. Device Management
Device Management provides the foundation for all Mesh functions
allowing a collection of devices belonging to a user to function as a
single personal Mesh.
The device management layer of a personal Mesh consists of exactly
one Master Profile and a catalog containing the entries describing
the connected devices.
8.1.1. Master Profile
A Mesh master profile provides the axiom of trust for a mesh user.
It contains a Master Signature Key and one or more Administration
Signature Keys. The unique identifier of the master profile is the
UDF of the Master Signature Key.
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A Master Profile MUST specify an "EscrowEncryption" key. This key
MAY be used to escrow private keys used for encryption of stored
data. They SHOULD NOT be used to escrow authentication keys and MUST
NOT be used to escrow signature keys.
A user should not need to replace their account profile unless they
intend to establish a separate identity. To minimize the risk of
disclosure, the Profile Signature Key is only ever used to sign
updates to the account profile itself. This allows the user to
secure their Profile Signature Key by either keeping it on hardware
token or device dedicated to that purpose or by using the escrow
mechanism and paper recovery keys as described in this document.
8.1.1.1. Creating a ProfileMaster
Creating a "ProfileMaster" comprises the steps of:
0. Creating a Master Signature key.
1. Creating an Online Signing Key
2. Signing the "ProfileMaster" using the Master Signature Key
3. Persisting the "ProfileMaster" on the administration device to
the "CatalogHost".
4. (Optional) Connecting at least one Administration Device and
granting it the "ActivationAdministration" activation.
8.1.1.2. Updating a ProfileMaster
Updating a "ProfileMaster" comprises the steps of:
0. Making the necessary changes.
1. Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key
2. Persisting the ProfileMaster on the administration device to the
CatalogHost.
8.1.1.3. The Device Catalog
Each personal Mesh has a Device Catalog "CatalogDevice" associated
with it. The Device Catalog is used to manage the connection of
devices to the Personal Mesh and has a "CatalogEntryDevice" for each
device currently connected to the catalog.
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Each Administration Device MUST have access to an up to date copy of
the Device Catalog in order to manage the devices connected to the
Mesh. The Mesh Service protocol MAY be used to synchronize the
Device Catalog between administration devices in the case that there
is more than one administration device.
The "CatalogEntryDevice" contains fields for the device profile,
device private and device connection.
8.1.2. Mesh Devices
The principle of radical distrust requires us to consider the
possibility that a device might be compromised during manufacture.
Once consequence of this possibility is that when an administration
device connects a new device to a user's personal Mesh, we cannot put
our full trust in either the device being connected or the
administration device connecting it.
This concern is resolved by (at minimum) combining keying material
generated from both sources to create the keys to be used in the
context of the user's personal Mesh with the process being fully
verified by both parties.
Additional keying material sources could be added if protection
against the possibility of compromise at both devices was required
but this is not supported by the current specifications.
A device profile provides the axiom of trust and the key
contributions of the device. When bound to an account, the base keys
specified in the Device Profile are combined with the key data
provided in the Activation device to construct the keys the device
will use in the context of the account.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-06.html for artwork.)
Figure 2
Unless exceptional circumstances require, a device should not require
more than one Device profile even if the device supports use by
multiple users under different accounts. But a device MAY have
multiple profiles if this approach is more convenient for
implementation.
The derivation of the Connection encryption and signature keys from
the Profile and Private contributions in this example is shown in
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography].
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8.1.2.1. Creating a ProfileDevice
Creating a "ProfileDevice" comprises the steps of:
0. Creating the necessary key
1. Signing the "ProfileDevice" using the Master Signature Key
2. Once created, a "ProfileDevice" is never changed. In the
unlikely event that any modification is required, a completely
new "ProfileDevice" MUST be created.
8.1.2.2. Connection to a Personal Mesh
Devices are only connected to a personal Mesh by administration
device. This comprises the steps of:
0. Generating the PrivateDevice keys.
1. Creating the ConnectionDevice data from the public components of
the ProfileDevice and PrivateDevice keys and signing it using the
administration key.
2. Creating the Activations for the device and signing them using
the administration key.
3. Creating the "CatalogEntryDevice" for the device and adding it to
the "CatalogDevice" of the Personal Mesh.
4. If the Personal Mesh has accounts that are connected to a Mesh
Service, synchronizing the "CatalogEntryDevice" to those
services.
8.2. Mesh Accounts
Mesh Accounts contains all the stateful information (contacts,
calendar entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) related to a
particular persona used by the owner.
A Mesh Profile MAY be connected to multiple accounts at the same time
allowing the user to maintain separate personas for separate
purposes.
Unlike traditional Internet application accounts, Mesh accounts are
created by and belong to the user, not the Mesh Service provider. A
user MAY change their Mesh Service provider at any time and
disconnect the profile from all Mesh Services (e.g. to archive the
account).
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Alice's personal account is connected to two Mesh services:
The account profile specifies the online and offline signature keys
used to maintain the profile and the encryption key to be used by the
account.
Each device connected to the account requires an activation record.
This specifies the key contribtions added to the manufacturer device
profile keys:
The resulting key set is specified in the device connection:
All the above plus the ProfileDevice are combined to form the
CatalogedDevice entry:
8.2.1. Creating a ProfileAccount
Creating a "ProfileAccount" comprises the steps of:
0. [TBS]
1. .
2. Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key
8.2.2. Connecting a Device to an Account
Adding a device to an account comprises the steps of:
0. Creating a PrivateAccount instance for the device.
1. Creating a ConnectionAccountDevice for the device using the
public keys from the PrivateAccount instance and the
ProfileDevice.
2. Creating an ActivationAccount for the device containing the
PrivateAccount and ConnectionAccountDevice instances.
3. Adding the ActivationAccount to the "CatalogEntryDevice" of the
device.
4. If the Personal Mesh has accounts that are connected to a Mesh
Service, synchronizing the "CatalogEntryDevice" to those
services.
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8.2.3. Binding and Account to a Service
Binding a "ProfileAccount" to a Mesh Service the steps of:
0. [TBS]
1. .
2. Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key
8.3. Mesh Services
A service profile provides the axiom of trust and cryptographic keys
for a Mesh Service. A Mesh Service Host SHOULD return a copy of its
ProfileHost and the parent ProfileService in response to a Hello
transaction request.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-06.html for artwork.)
Figure 3
The credentials provided by the ProfileService and ProfileHost are
distinct from those provided by the WebPKI that typically services
TLS requests. WebPKI credentials provide service introduction and
authentication while a Mesh ProfileHost only provides authentication.
Unless exceptional circumstances require, a service should not need
to revise its Service Profile unless it is intended to change its
identity. Service Profiles MAY be countersigned by Trusted Third
Parties to establish accountability.
The service profile
The host also has a profile
And there should be a connection of the host to the service but this
isn't implemented yet:
8.3.1. Creating a ProfileService
[TBS]
Creating a "ProfileService" comprises the steps of:
0. [TBS]
1. .
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2. [TBS]
4. Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key
8.3.2. Creating a ProfileHost
Creating a "ProfileHost" comprises the steps of:
0. [TBS]
1. .
2. [TBS]
4. Signing the "ConnectionHost" using the Master Signature Key of
the "ProfileService".
8.3.3. Creating a ConnectionHost
Creating a "ConnectionHost" comprises the steps of:
0. [TBS]
1. .
2. Signing the "ConnectionHost" using the Master Signature Key of
the "ProfileService".
8.4. Mesh Messaging
Mesh Messaging is an end-to-end secure messaging system used to
exchange short (32KB) messages between Mesh devices and services. In
cases where exchange of longer messages is required, Mesh Messaging
MAY be used to provide a control plane to advise the intended message
recipient(s) of the type of data being offered and the means of
retrieval (e.g an EARL).
A four-corner messaging model is enforced. Mesh Services only accept
outbound messages from devices connected to accounts that it
services. Inbound messages are only accepted from other Mesh
Services. This model enables access control at both the outbound and
inbound services
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-06.html for artwork.)
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Figure 4
The outbound Mesh Service checks to see that the request to send a
message does not violate its acceptable use policy. Accounts that
make a large number of message requests that result in complaints
SHOULD be subject to consequences ranging from restriction of the
number and type of messages sent to suspending or terminating
messaging privileges. Services that fail to implement appropriate
controls are likely to be subject to sanctions from either their
users or from other services.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-06.html for artwork.)
Figure 5
The inbound Mesh Service also checks to see that messages received
are consistent with the service Acceptable Use Policy and the user's
personal access control settings.
Mesh Services that fail to police abuse by their account holders
SHOULD be subject to consequences in the same fashion as account
holders.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-06.html for artwork.)
Figure 6
8.4.1. Traffic Analysis
The Mesh Messaging protocol as currently specified provides only
limited protection against traffic analysis attacks. The use of TLS
to encrypt communication between Mesh Services limits the
effectiveness of na?ve traffic analysis mechanisms but does not
prevent timing attacks unless dummy traffic is introduced to
obfuscate traffic flows.
The limitation of the message size is in part intended to facilitate
use of mechanisms capable of providing high levels of traffic
analysis such as mixmaster and onion routing but the current Mesh
Service Protocol does not provide support for such approaches and
there are no immediate plans to do so.
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9. Mesh Messages
All communications between Mesh accounts takes the form of a Mesh
Message carried in a Dare Envelope. Mesh Messages are stored in two
spools associated with the account, the "SpoolOutbound" and the
"SpoolInbound" containing the messages sent and received
respectively.
This document only describes the representation of the messages
within the message spool. The Mesh Service protocol by which the
messages are exchanged between devices and services and between
services is described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
9.1. PIN
One-time use 'PIN' codes are used to provide a means of out of band
authentication in many Mesh Message applications. In particular the
device connection and contact exchange message flows.
For example, when Alice reads the connection request from the device
in the architecture examples, a completion message is added to
Alice's inbound spool so that the device is not activated a second
time by mistake:
{
"MessagePin":{
"MessageId":"ADWE-3XBF-GGLA-AMCX-XVDM-KMXB-BQRN",
"Account":"alice@example.com",
"Expires":"2020-11-03T17:25:57Z",
"Automatic":true,
"SaltedPin":"ADPA-GPKO-V6TG-BPWJ-42YS-V5K7-NCZD",
"Action":"Device"}}
The details of the presentation and verification of the PIN code are
further described in the section below.
9.2. Completion
Completion messages are dummy messages that are added to a Mesh Spool
to change the status of messages previously posted. Any message that
is in the inbound spool and has not been erased or redacted MAY be
marked as "read", "unread" or "deleted". Any message in the outbound
spool MAY be marked as "sent", "received" or "deleted".
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Services MAY erase or redact messages in accordance with local site
policy. Since messages are not removed from the spool on being
marked deleted, they may be undeleted by marking them as read or
unread. Marking a message deleted MAY make it more likely that the
Service will purge the message however.
Having processed a message, a completion message is added to the
spool so that other devices can see that it has been read.
For example, when Alice's administration device uses the PIN
registered above to authenticate a device connection request, a
completion message is added to Alice's inbound spool so that the PIN
cannot be reused to authenticate a second device:
Missing example 25
9.3. Connection
Connection requests are sent by a device requesting connection to a
Mesh Service Account.
The "MessageConnectionRequest" is originally sent by the device
requesting connection to the Mesh Service associated with the
account.
If the connection request is accepted by the Mesh Service, it creates
a "MessageConnectionResponse" containing the ServerNonce and Witness
values used in the authentication of the response together with a
verbatim copy of the original request. The
"MessageConnectionResponse" is then returned to the device that made
the original request and placed on the SpoolInbound of the account to
which the request was directed.
Further details of this mechanism are described in
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
Alice connects a watch to her account. Since the watch has a camera
(to allow for video calls) she can use the dynamic QR code connection
mechanism.
The watch reads the QR code generated on Alice's watch. This
contains the device connection URI.
QR = {Connect.ConnectQRURI}
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The URI tells the device the Mesh account to connect to and the PIN
Code to be used to authenticate the request. The device requesting
the connection adds its Profile device to create a RequestConnection
message that will be presented to the service as a Connect
transaction request.
{
"RequestConnection":{
"MessageId":"NB2K-E33D-IXPK-LR7X-DL5R-7GJW-FLEP",
"AuthenticatedData":[{
"EnvelopeID":"MDJD-7EJB-LBMZ-MAO5-CGIE-DDEB-LQVH",
"dig":"S512",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJRCI6ICJNREpELTdFSkItTEJN
Wi1NQU81LUNHSUUtRERFQi1MUVZIIiwKICAiTWVzc2FnZVR5cGUiOiAiUHJvZmlsZ
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JlYXRlZCI6ICIyMDIwLTExLTAyVDE3OjI1OjU3WiJ9"},
"ewogICJQcm9maWxlRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIlByb2ZpbGVTaWduYXR1cmUi
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MXdsc1d4X1ZxYWIwd0cwc0JNd21mCiAgbkx2ZFMydWFTTVpBN1RuYTNvWUItdENBI
n19fX19",
{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MDJD-7EJB-LBMZ-MAO5-CGIE-DDEB-LQVH",
"signature":"ZXggJgXzooa2Ui5zxNXrY6UCNXFFUBgGgpPl5Qe_OC
1o_oJKHJkwEIDBEj45OHQZPGhn1TEl5UwAJxemsop7Rnr5U3DdNc2ERYL4hYHGVVx
5W2PzeQk4U1mviwYdfqp_5V80vRL4RcZiTozviK6sWwwA"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"JRadknNMvezXjCMPoluxtnw8sUX4QXZ1oSG6HANsJn
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IAZwXEzvTjbZwrngywjG82UJ8p6DXBMfcYTR0AhJIBBg"}
],
"ClientNonce":"-suxzsj-OEQhgNZeuQFfiQ",
"PinId":"ADWE-3XBF-GGLA-AMCX-XVDM-KMXB-BQRN",
"PinWitness":"cRP1Zv5O5NH-GRJi1qv0rZNPJEsix0RyXMxgPLz5XzXsMQOzd
OOgSVDeFrZWoyY2DitMfZdjIharXUL_cWovJA",
"AccountAddress":"alice@example.com"}}
The service generates an AcknowledgeConnection message which is
returned to the device requesting the connection (via the Connect
transaction response) and adds it to the inbound spool of the account
for Alice's approval (or not).
{
"AcknowledgeConnection":{
"MessageId":"T365-C62P-LUPX-76V5-CUND-IB5M-OE7P",
"EnvelopedRequestConnection":[{
"EnvelopeID":"MCPK-XGW3-624O-UVCF-G33S-I6VX-U2P7",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJRCI6ICJOQjJLLUUzM0QtSVhQ
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GljYXRlZERhdGEiOiBbewogICAgICAgICJFbnZlbG9wZUlEIjogIk1ESkQtN0VKQi
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MTlMQW9nSUNBZ0lrSmhjMlZCZFhSb1pXNTBhV05oZEdsdmJpSTZJSHNLSUNBZ0lDQ
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WdJbFZrWmlJNklDSgogIE5RMVJWTFVWQ1IxUXRRalZEUlMxRVVscEJMVWhPU0ZFdF
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],
"ServerNonce":"1yJIRnfjOC0JFCCQZAFznw",
"Witness":"T365-C62P-LUPX-76V5-CUND-IB5M-OE7P"}}
Alice's administration device synchronizes to the service and
receives the connection request acknowledgement from the service.
Since the request is authenticated by a PIN code that has been marked
for automatic execution, the service can generate the assertions the
device to participate in the account and appends the corresponding
RespondConnection message to the local delivery spool.
{
"RespondConnection":{
"MessageId":"MAE6-HCD5-CTU3-T4LW-HW7N-C3SQ-F2OI",
"Result":"Accept",
"CatalogedDevice":{
"Udf":"MCCR-2BLZ-ME27-SWM4-I73R-A7IA-MTYN",
"DeviceUdf":"MDJD-7EJB-LBMZ-MAO5-CGIE-DDEB-LQVH",
"EnvelopedProfileUser":[{
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"EnvelopeID":"MAIH-QF2M-PVD3-NQJO-CWGX-G67S-JYEQ",
"dig":"S512",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJRCI6ICJNQUlILVFGMk0tUF
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{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MAIH-QF2M-PVD3-NQJO-CWGX-G67S-JYEQ",
"signature":"PuG3M10QcqNXxUtJzk83C2LkExhO1jYqfBx_pcgl
-_MH9lBPdT5JMiNSyVLsHRM9ZMUO-GVcDMiAITPUt5jG6t-GP3-6bdyEd6hDKavFU
JYr4tWjKvro-3Uh7KP5BvFCz1VNoccCaiNhsrCf6uie4wkA"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"OmGeYT1GZa5-mNx5fYmK0Jk2AzqPxuEJ-dRnTuoP
LSgOSjHMzLnu8y1q6NTYxZomMK0ZfkuPtfD9Uyemy-npHQ"}
],
"EnvelopedProfileDevice":[{
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"EnvelopeID":"MDJD-7EJB-LBMZ-MAO5-CGIE-DDEB-LQVH",
"dig":"S512",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJRCI6ICJNREpELTdFSkItTE
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"ewogICJQcm9maWxlRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIlByb2ZpbGVTaWduYXR1cm
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BIn19fX19",
{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MDJD-7EJB-LBMZ-MAO5-CGIE-DDEB-LQVH",
"signature":"ZXggJgXzooa2Ui5zxNXrY6UCNXFFUBgGgpPl5Qe_
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Vx5W2PzeQk4U1mviwYdfqp_5V80vRL4RcZiTozviK6sWwwA"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"JRadknNMvezXjCMPoluxtnw8sUX4QXZ1oSG6HANs
JnIAZwXEzvTjbZwrngywjG82UJ8p6DXBMfcYTR0AhJIBBg"}
],
"EnvelopedConnectionUser":[{
"dig":"S512",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb25uZWN0aW
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HTi1FN1ZYIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1
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YmxpY0tleUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIkVkNDQ4IiwKICAgICAgI
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{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MBXO-5JKI-OWJH-UH5T-C4SU-YKEE-D3FP",
"signature":"kLHglBYqL6rZPz6Fo7Jz2-pGZMlt6DG1zQVWu-nJ
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-BrsjG3YsjuBg7_N98uJOyWoIdQ6j0upKZX6XV2re7JpzwA"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"5gZs1tch-I8eCUcLBhNLGwv_YFl11hKt-I6rstjF
Xe90lfi4z2KsLmKKcAGY7KpTejpYmGXUVHC1H7ns4YGDkw"}
],
"EnvelopedActivationDevice":[{
"enc":"A256CBC",
"dig":"S512",
"kid":"EBQO-I6OP-D6SH-Q2MD-QBBQ-PUKG-BBCE",
"Salt":"Vc0qvABdCE6vS8G3orAiNA",
"recipients":[{
"kid":"MCPX-ZHP4-56SO-ZLOI-7QHM-H2A4-GXPM",
"epk":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"rdeKkVGxewmd5848kt6ysRkl8Fbnjez7Va-TcRb
-acX83owoCknyb9joo38vs_vzBkgEW5yPxXwA"}},
"wmk":"DnzzAha8AY_-kkv6Qq3M6rvM3LXTH9yQLSujqOkDEyBXnr
ajY4BoUA"}
],
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJBY3RpdmF0aW
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THP",
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{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MBXO-5JKI-OWJH-UH5T-C4SU-YKEE-D3FP",
"signature":"BZMkm5R4Emy2M5Xljebbvwlu94FWRIvV23zi5Yzt
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"witness":"H8uCeAQI1Nffql1X4qGqK_i9-sgQaDshpTebNsBQr_
w"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"u8hmjJAqV014X0KwhOvZpcSxbRevKMuBWJgBA1qy
Q7VyF78Iux68V447pfrUa8iLjD2T32LHJv0u9zCzaJQkhQ"}
],
"EnvelopedActivationAccount":[{
"dig":"S512",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJBY3RpdmF0aW
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{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MBXO-5JKI-OWJH-UH5T-C4SU-YKEE-D3FP",
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],
"PayloadDigest":"xgR5j7NiUbDvKWjP7IjI4HuMAPLD8-ru3cMITmgI
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]}}}
9.4. Contact
A contact request presents a proposed contact entry and requests that
it be added to the Contacts catalog of the specified Mesh Service
Account. A contact request is usually sent by the party requesting
that their contact be added but this is not necessarily the case.
The MessageContact contains a DARE Envelope containing the Contact
information of the requester. If the request is accepted, this
information will be added to the contact catalog of the relevant
account. If the Reply field has the value 'true', this indicates
that the sender is asking for the recipient to return their own
credentials in reply.
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Since the sender requires the user's contact information before the
request can be made, the MessageContact message MAY be encrypted
under either the user's account encryption key (if known) or the Mesh
Service encryption key (which may be obtained from the service on
request.
Bob asks Alice to send her contact details and sends his.
{
"MessageContact":{
"MessageId":"ND5Y-QMOY-42ZW-TE2Z-HJL2-7G3L-EQQB",
"Sender":"bob@example.com",
"Recipient":"alice@example.com",
"AuthenticatedData":[{
"dig":"S512",
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ICBHVkRkRGFUZE9SRlJ2UWtsNlZVRWlmWDE5ZlgwIiwKICAgICAgICAgIHsKICAgI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",
{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MBWZ-G22B-BFAT-FWAG-N3EW-ZSQW-36OH",
"signature":"wN4bBu-tL_qZ1v74Teo2ZRQnwlxciiQOMRCf_Dgewq
kuqGoWW22CLeDc7HJoYg22pTxKC7gCWFsAJm_kgR64jxSwZCb3JBAoDzuLQ-Qnb9B
c4r4r4ZEDIQgvH45TFdhb5yRP7yqurQds2UMgVOemMS0A"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"ofJhr9i1k27VRu81sCKWy7qEahxpuw0rtvwrQaYkag
PBvVLkoNY2F6jLGCQ5Y42_9jMYVglcMVXhkB_AvYG52Q"}
],
"Reply":true,
"Subject":"alice@example.com",
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"PIN":"AA3V-CH7O-FGHI-W2DP-VCCY-IRXB-IO2A"}}
Alice responds with her own contact information. Since she already
has Bob's contact information, there is no need to request a response
or provide a PIN code.
The current protocol assumes that all contact management will be
performed end-to-end through the Mesh Services themselves. If the
number of Mesh users were to become exceptionally large, additional
infrastructure to facilitate contact management will be required.
These topics are discussed at a high level in
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-trust].
In situations where a user is well known and has a very large number
of contacts, they are likely to make use of a tiered approach to
contact management in which they keep separate accounts for their
'public' and 'restricted' personas and delegate management of their
public account to a subordinate or to their Mesh Service provider.
9.5. Confirmation
Confirmation messages are used to provide an improved form of second
factor authentication capability.
Two confirmation messages are specified, a request and response.
A confirmation request is initiated by sending a
"MessageConfirmationRequest" to the Mesh Service hosting the
recipient Mesh Service Account. The request specifies the question
that is to be put to the user.
To respond to a confirmation request, a user generates a
"MessageConfirmationResponse". This MUST be signed by a device
authorized to respond to confirmation requests by a Device Connection
Assertion with the "Confirmation" privilege.
The console generates a confirmation request message:
{
"RequestConfirmation":{
"MessageId":"NC2K-XDLE-KNN2-GSLN-AEUX-WJXF-RA5B",
"Sender":"console@example.com",
"Recipient":"alice@example.com",
"Text":"start"}}
Alice accepts the request and returns a ResponseConfirmation
confirmation containing both the request and the response:
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Missing example 26
10. Publications
Static QR codes MAY be used to allow contact exchange or device
connection. In either case, the QR code contains an EARL providing
the means of locating, decrypting and authenticating the published
data.
10.1. Contact Exchange
When used for contact exchange, the envelope payload is a
CatalogedContact record.
Besides allowing for exchange of contact information on a business
card, a user might have their contact information printed on personal
property to facilitate return of lost property.
10.2. Device Preconfiguration
The static QR code device connection interaction allows a device with
no keyboard, display or other user affordances to be connected to a
Mesh account.
The information necessary to establish communication with the device
and to complete a device connection workflow is provided by means of
a DevicePreconfiguration record accessed by means of an EARL.
For example, Alice's coffee pot was preconfigured for connection to a
Mesh account at the factory and the following DevicePreconfiguration
record created:
{
"DevicePreconfiguration":{
"EnvelopedProfileDevice":[{
"EnvelopeID":"MCQ7-FFN4-3WCY-NDYU-CPFQ-XFH4-EHNV",
"dig":"S512",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJRCI6ICJNQ1E3LUZGTjQtM1dD
WS1ORFlVLUNQRlEtWEZINC1FSE5WIiwKICAiTWVzc2FnZVR5cGUiOiAiUHJvZmlsZ
URldmljZSIsCiAgImN0eSI6ICJhcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9tbW0vb2JqZWN0IiwKICAiQ3
JlYXRlZCI6ICIyMDIwLTExLTAyVDE3OjI2OjAwWiJ9"},
"ewogICJQcm9maWxlRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIlByb2ZpbGVTaWduYXR1cmUi
OiB7CiAgICAgICJVZGYiOiAiTUNRNy1GRk40LTNXQ1ktTkRZVS1DUEZRLVhGSDQtR
UhOViIsCiAgICAgICJQdWJsaWNQYXJhbWV0ZXJzIjogewogICAgICAgICJQdWJsaW
NLZXlFQ0RIIjogewogICAgICAgICAgImNydiI6ICJFZDQ0OCIsCiAgICAgICAgICA
iUHVibGljIjogImR5UWdEZVpYMFk3dTVGRWxlckxiekZoYkdVVGozanJrTzViaXV0
bmQ5Q3VodFVQbnBOTTcKICBVRFRrNW90bWxvcmVpSjlPQmxuNzBMMEEifX19LAogI
CAgIkJhc2VFbmNyeXB0aW9uIjogewogICAgICAiVWRmIjogIk1BRkYtNFA1NC1PUl
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lGLVNCQU4tNlhRNy1DTzZTLU9YV1EiLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVycyI
6IHsKICAgICAgICAiUHVibGljS2V5RUNESCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICJjcnYiOiAi
WDQ0OCIsCiAgICAgICAgICAiUHVibGljIjogIjdyRWpsVGNsRVBBb3l0WkxHSmJmN
S1lTzhtQldMbE5hZXZKM1lBdF9hUmhKQWhlLVJPWUwKICBfQVNmQnVLRUw5ZDBPOH
BDRGxXendBMkEifX19LAogICAgIkJhc2VBdXRoZW50aWNhdGlvbiI6IHsKICAgICA
gIlVkZiI6ICJNQU5CLURZWEUtN0NOQy1XNkxXLTNSNkktQkxBQi0yVEtDIiwKICAg
ICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY0tleUVDREgiO
iB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6IC
JCb1lfd3hMdHhLMU1zRk9oT0VzOExrWTZIWTZONng0NmkwTF9NSkxNQU1rcXdzQXl
peW1SCiAgazZwVjR2dnRDYzZEekJPOExGX01XWWdBIn19fSwKICAgICJCYXNlU2ln
bmF0dXJlIjogewogICAgICAiVWRmIjogIk1BVzctWUlPMy01QTdNLTU1WVUtT1o3V
y1CSkZULVFUSFciLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVycyI6IHsKICAgICAgIC
AiUHVibGljS2V5RUNESCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICJjcnYiOiAiRWQ0NDgiLAogICA
gICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJQc2Y4dG9qRTZPNFE3SllCWGU0ci1iZExRZHk0RTh0
ek1URTNBRENzNE93WEt5bldydmxxCiAgTzdjeUdjWDFXbjZiZDJWNWhMRjQ4UjhBI
n19fX19",
{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MCQ7-FFN4-3WCY-NDYU-CPFQ-XFH4-EHNV",
"signature":"lVcSWqEEVvr-AsnhUeUQ4OwnIa-enZ3ZXre4sc3M3b
JY_tre8U0e_AfM-VFERgN7OQ67OBatfj8AqZLU6SxhaJHira3uZbw1Ha8yQXMXSed
pPm9hefDHb0-zwT80Pr0530SByJmW2uU5sQUh1rxmhiAA"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"KflhE7fsBB_6jk4XP2sFRVtoqIj5zZ2j3QISDfuLTw
se9bZBKTY8IPcGTlXtnaBTEH4P9smbO6AB6EDy8Nnegw"}
],
"EnvelopedConnectionDevice":[{
"dig":"S512",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb25uZWN0aW9u
RGV2aWNlIiwKICAiY3R5IjogImFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL21tbS9vYmplY3QiLAogICJDc
mVhdGVkIjogIjIwMjAtMTEtMDJUMTc6MjY6MDBaIn0"},
"ewogICJDb25uZWN0aW9uRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIkRldmljZVNpZ25hdHVy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oSkFoZS1ST1lMCiAgX0FTZkJ1S0VMOWQwTzhwQ0RsV3p3QTJBIn19fX19",
{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"S512",
"kid":"MDJN-Y22I-NBWS-TF2I-7HJV-N4JS-T5GU",
"signature":"3dKPeRJ1OFB-h3Mt99GDJf4slU8XjkmkrmucvEbdlm
dbxl7pf_7Wi8PxjtH2xwCDD8IqamVPGaiAmK6slj2-dHfQfpOAl7hMkyKFE3W5sR2
t9DGrYCqZU9J-rUd1eLc8wUh3kSZ08MDVGEcCcLEZuD4A"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"rIuHcY2LV8tgbaFHN88oYDGytN5Giv1KTyQGDifkwX
-HBK1IsApCD_pJ4h5jpG9fx9TSIqEiuMIb7iHqheByWg"}
],
"PrivateKey":{
"PrivateKeyUDF":{
"PrivateValue":"ZAAQ-AAQT-ZDDI-IU7M-ORQA-YRRR-MMEH-D4PN-3YP
W-HGJH-FXSR-BZXH-PYMG-KZBC",
"KeyType":"MeshProfileDevice"}},
"ConnectUri":"mcu://maker@example.com/ECO6-IN3T-HZYJ-S7W4-T4XZ-
JX6R-Y5SO-ATKN-TU2E-MDAF-VJEA-JV6Z-BOXE-G"}}
To connect to the coffee pot, Alice first scans the QR code with her
administrative device which uses the PIN code and service to
retrieve, decrypt and authenticate the DevicePreconfiguration record.
Future versions of the specification will allow this record to
specify means by which the administration device can establish direct
peer-to-peer communication to complete the connection process by any
communication modality supported by both devices (e.g. IR,
Bluetooth, WiFi-Direct, etc.)
11. Schema
11.1. Shared Classes
The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile
specifications.
11.1.1. Classes describing keys
11.1.2. Structure: KeyData
The KeyData class is used to describe public key pairs and trust
assertions associated with a public key.
Udf: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the public key parameters
X509Certificate: Binary (Optional) List of X.509 Certificates
X509Chain: Binary [0..Many] X.509 Certificate chain.
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X509CSR: Binary (Optional) X.509 Certificate Signing Request.
NotBefore: DateTime (Optional) If present specifies a time instant
that use of the private key is not valid before.
NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional) If present specifies a time
instant that use of the private key is not valid on or after.
11.1.3. Structure: CompositePrivate
Inherits: Key
DeviceKeyUdf: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the bound device
key (if used).
11.2. Assertion classes
Classes that are derived from an assertion.
11.2.1. Structure: Assertion
Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived
Names: String [0..Many] Fingerprints of index terms for profile
retrieval. The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the
name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other
forms of abuse.
Updated: DateTime (Optional) The time instant the profile was last
modified.
NotaryToken: String (Optional) A Uniform Notary Token providing
evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was
created.
11.2.2. Structure: Condition
Parent class from which all condition classes are derived.
[No fields]
11.2.3. Base Classes
Abstract classes from which the Profile, Activation and Connection
classes are derrived.
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11.2.4. Structure: Connection
Inherits: Assertion
SubjectUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the connection target.
AuthorityUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the connection source.
11.2.5. Structure: Activation
Inherits: Assertion
Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application
running on a specific device
ActivationKey: String (Optional) Secret seed used to derive keys
that are not explicitly specified.
Entries: ActivationEntry [0..Many] Activation of named resources.
11.2.6. Structure: ActivationEntry
Resource: String (Optional) Name of the activated resource
Key: KeyData (Optional) The activation key or key share
11.2.7. Mesh Profile Classes
Classes describing Mesh Profiles. All Profiles are Assertions
derrived from Assertion.
11.2.8. Structure: Profile
Inherits: Assertion
Parent class from which all profile classes are derived
ProfileSignature: KeyData (Optional) The permanent signature key
used to sign the profile itself. The UDF of the key is used as
the permanent object identifier of the profile. Thus, by
definition, the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change
under any circumstance.
11.2.9. Structure: ProfileDevice
Inherits: Profile
Describes a mesh device.
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Description: String (Optional) Description of the device
BaseEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for
encryption keys. Also used to decrypt activation data sent to the
device during connection to an account.
BaseAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for
authentication keys. Also used to authenticate the device during
connection to an account.
BaseSignature: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for
signature keys.
11.2.10. Structure: ProfileAccount
Base class for the account profiles ProfileUser and ProfileGroup.
These subclasses may be merged at some future date.
Inherits: Profile
AccountAddress: String (Optional) The account address. This is
either a DNS service address (e.g. alice@example.com) or a Mesh
Name (@alice).
ServiceUdf: String (Optional) The fingerprint of the service profile
to which the account is currently bound.
EscrowEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Escrow key associated with the
account.
AccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key currently used to encrypt
data under this profile
AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign
connection assertions to the account.
11.2.11. Structure: ProfileUser
Inherits: ProfileAccount
Account assertion. This is signed by the service hosting the
account.
AccountAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
requests made under this user account.
AccountSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign data under the
account.
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11.2.12. Structure: ProfileGroup
Inherits: ProfileAccount
Describes a group. Note that while a group is created by one person
who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to
other administrators over time.
[No fields]
11.2.13. Structure: ProfileService
Inherits: Profile
Profile of a Mesh Service
ServiceAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
service connections.
ServiceEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to encrypt data under
this profile
ServiceSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign data under the
account.
11.2.14. Structure: ProfileHost
Inherits: Profile
KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
service connections.
KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to pass encrypted data to
the device such as a
11.2.15. Connection Assertions
Connection assertions are used to authenticate and authorize
interactions between devices and the service currently servicing the
account. They SHOULD NOT be visible to external parties.
11.2.16. Structure: ConnectionDevice
Inherits: Connection
Connection assertion used to authenticate service requests made by a
device.
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AccountAddress: String (Optional) The account address
DeviceSignature: KeyData (Optional) The signature key for use of the
device under the profile
DeviceEncryption: KeyData (Optional) The encryption key for use of
the device under the profile
DeviceAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) The authentication key for
use of the device under the profile
11.2.17. Structure: ConnectionApplication
Inherits: Connection
Connection assertion stating that a particular device is
[No fields]
11.2.18. Structure: ConnectionGroup
Describes the connection of a member to a group.
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
11.2.19. Structure: ConnectionService
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
11.2.20. Structure: ConnectionHost
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
11.2.21. Activation Assertions
11.2.22. Structure: ActivationDevice
Contains activation data for device specific keys used in the context
of a Mesh account.
Inherits: Activation
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AccountUdf: String (Optional) The UDF of the account
11.2.23. Structure: ActivationAccount
Inherits: Activation
ProfileSignature: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to profile online
signing key used to sign updates to the profile.
AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to Profile
administration key used to make changes to administrator catalogs.
AccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to ProfileUser
account encryption key
AccountAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to
ProfileUser account authentication key
AccountSignature: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to ProfileUser
account signature key
11.2.24. Structure: ActivationApplication
Inherits: Activation
[No fields]
11.3. Data Structures
Classes describing data used in cataloged data.
11.3.1. Structure: Contact
Inherits: Assertion
Base class for contact entries.
Id: String (Optional) The globally unique contact identifier.
Anchors: Anchor [0..Many] Mesh fingerprints associated with the
contact.
NetworkAddresses: NetworkAddress [0..Many] Network address entries
Locations: Location [0..Many] The physical locations the contact is
associated with.
Roles: Role [0..Many] The roles of the contact
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Bookmark: Bookmark [0..Many] The Web sites and other online
presences of the contact
Sources: TaggedSource [0..Many] Source(s) from which this contact
was constructed.
11.3.2. Structure: Anchor
Trust anchor
Udf: String (Optional) The trust anchor.
Validation: String (Optional) The means of validation.
11.3.3. Structure: TaggedSource
Source from which contact information was obtained.
LocalName: String (Optional) Short name for the contact information.
Validation: String (Optional) The means of validation.
BinarySource: Binary (Optional) The contact data in binary form.
EnvelopedSource: Enveloped (Optional) The contact data in enveloped
form. If present, the BinarySource property is ignored.
11.3.4. Structure: ContactGroup
Inherits: Contact
Contact for a group, including encryption groups.
[No fields]
11.3.5. Structure: ContactPerson
Inherits: Contact
CommonNames: PersonName [0..Many] List of person names in order of
preference
11.3.6. Structure: ContactOrganization
Inherits: Contact
CommonNames: OrganizationName [0..Many] List of person names in
order of preference
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11.3.7. Structure: OrganizationName
The name of an organization
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
RegisteredName: String (Optional) The registered name.
DBA: String (Optional) Names that the organization uses including
trading names and doing business as names.
11.3.8. Structure: PersonName
The name of a natural person
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
FullName: String (Optional) The preferred presentation of the full
name.
Prefix: String (Optional) Honorific or title, E.g. Sir, Lord, Dr.,
Mr.
First: String (Optional) First name.
Middle: String [0..Many] Middle names or initials.
Last: String (Optional) Last name.
Suffix: String (Optional) Nominal suffix, e.g. Jr., III, etc.
PostNominal: String (Optional) Post nominal letters (if used).
11.3.9. Structure: NetworkAddress
Provides all means of contacting the individual according to a
particular network address
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
Address: String (Optional) The network address, e.g.
alice@example.com
NetworkCapability: String [0..Many] The capabilities bound to this
address.
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EnvelopedProfileAccount: Enveloped (Optional) The account profile
Protocols: NetworkProtocol [0..Many] Public keys associated with the
network address
11.3.10. Structure: NetworkProtocol
Protocol: String (Optional) The IANA protocol|identifier of the
network protocols by which the contact may be reached using the
specified Address.
11.3.11. Structure: Role
OrganizationName: String (Optional) The organization at which the
role is held
Titles: String [0..Many] The titles held with respect to that
organization.
Locations: Location [0..Many] Postal or physical addresses
associated with the role.
11.3.12. Structure: Location
Appartment: String (Optional)
Street: String (Optional)
District: String (Optional)
Locality: String (Optional)
County: String (Optional)
Postcode: String (Optional)
Country: String (Optional)
11.3.13. Structure: Bookmark
Uri: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Role: String [0..Many]
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11.3.14. Structure: Reference
MessageId: String (Optional) The received message to which this is a
response
ResponseId: String (Optional) Message that was generated in response
to the original (optional).
Relationship: String (Optional) The relationship type. This can be
Read, Unread, Accept, Reject.
11.3.15. Structure: Task
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
Start: DateTime (Optional)
Finish: DateTime (Optional)
StartTravel: String (Optional)
FinishTravel: String (Optional)
TimeZone: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Description: String (Optional)
Location: String (Optional)
Trigger: String [0..Many]
Conference: String [0..Many]
Repeat: String (Optional)
Busy: Boolean (Optional)
11.4. Catalog Entries
11.4.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry
Base class for cataloged Mesh data.
Labels: String [0..Many] The set of labels describing the entry
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11.4.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Public device entry, indexed under the device ID Hello
Udf: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device in the
Mesh
DeviceUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the offline signature key of the
device
SignatureUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the account online signature
key
EnvelopedProfileUser: Enveloped (Optional) The Mesh profile
EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device profile
EnvelopedConnectionUser: Enveloped (Optional) The public assertion
demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh
EnvelopedActivationDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of
the device within the Mesh account
EnvelopedActivationAccount: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of
the device within the Mesh account
EnvelopedActivationApplication: Enveloped [0..Many] Application
activations granted to the device.
11.4.3. Structure: CatalogedPublication
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
A publication.
Id: String (Optional) Unique identifier code
Authenticator: String (Optional) The witness key value to use to
request access to the record.
EnvelopedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) Dare Envelope containing the
entry data. The data type is specified by the envelope metadata.
NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional) Epiration time (inclusive)
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11.4.4. Structure: CatalogedCredential
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Protocol: String (Optional)
Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)
11.4.5. Structure: CatalogedNetwork
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Protocol: String (Optional)
Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)
11.4.6. Structure: CatalogedContact
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
Self: Boolean (Optional) If true, this catalog entry is for the user
who created the catalog.
11.4.7. Structure: CatalogedAccess
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
[No fields]
11.4.8. Structure: CryptographicCapability
Id: String (Optional) The identifier of the capability. If this is
a user capability, MUST match the KeyData identifier. If this is
a serviced capability, MUST match the value of ServiceId on the
corresponding service capability.
KeyData: KeyData (Optional) The key that enables the capability
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EnvelopedKeyShares: Enveloped [0..Many] One or more enveloped key
shares.
SubjectId: String (Optional) The identifier of the resource that is
controlled using the key.
SubjectAddress: String (Optional) The address of the resource that
is controlled using the key.
11.4.9. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a decryption key
[No fields]
11.4.10. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial
Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt
The corresponding key is an encryption key
ServiceId: String (Optional) The identifier used to claim the
capability from the service.[Only present for a partial
capability.]
ServiceAddress: String (Optional) The service account that supports
a serviced capability. [Only present for a partial capability.]
11.4.11. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced
Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt
The corresponding key is an encryption key
AuthenticationId: String (Optional) UDF of trust root under which
request to use a serviced capability must be authorized. [Only
present for a serviced capability]
11.4.12. Structure: CapabilitySign
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is an administration key
[No fields]
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11.4.13. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a key that may be used to generate key
shares.
[No fields]
11.4.14. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a decryption key to be used in accordance
with the Micali Fair Electronic Exchange with Invisible Trusted
Parties protocol.
[No fields]
11.4.15. Structure: CatalogedBookmark
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Uri: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Path: String (Optional)
11.4.16. Structure: CatalogedTask
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
EnvelopedTask: Enveloped (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
11.4.17. Structure: CatalogedApplication
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Key: String (Optional)
EnvelopedCapabilities: DareEnvelope [0..Many] Enveloped keys for use
with Application
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11.4.18. Structure: CatalogedMember
ContactAddress: String (Optional)
MemberCapabilityId: String (Optional)
ServiceCapabilityId: String (Optional)
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
11.4.19. Structure: CatalogedGroup
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
EnvelopedProfileGroup: Enveloped (Optional) The Mesh profile
EnvelopedActivationAccount: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of
the device within the Mesh account
11.4.20. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
11.4.21. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
11.4.22. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
11.5. Publications
11.5.1. Structure: DevicePreconfiguration
A data structure that is passed
EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device profile
EnvelopedConnectionDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device
connection
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ConnectUri: String (Optional) The connection URI. This would
normally be printed on the device as a QR code.
11.6. Messages
11.6.1. Structure: Message
MessageId: String (Optional) Unique per-message ID. When
encapsulating a Mesh Message in a DARE envelope, the envelope
EnvelopeID field MUST be a UDF fingerprint of the MessageId value.
Sender: String (Optional)
Recipient: String (Optional)
11.6.2. Structure: MessageError
Inherits: Message
ErrorCode: String (Optional)
11.6.3. Structure: MessageComplete
Inherits: Message
References: Reference [0..Many]
11.6.4. Structure: MessagePinValidated
Inherits: Message
AuthenticatedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) Enveloped data that is
authenticated by means of the PIN
ClientNonce: Binary (Optional) Nonce provided by the client to
validate the PIN
PinId: String (Optional) Pin identifier value calculated from the
PIN code, action and account address.
PinWitness: Binary (Optional) Witness value calculated as KDF
(Device.Udf + AccountAddress, ClientNonce)
11.6.5. Structure: MessagePin
Account: String (Optional)
Inherits: Message
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Expires: DateTime (Optional)
Automatic: Boolean (Optional) If true, authentication against the
PIN code is sufficient to complete the associated action without
further authorization.
SaltedPin: String (Optional) PIN code bound to the specified action.
Action: String (Optional) The action to which this PIN code is
bound.
11.6.6. Structure: RequestConnection
Connection request message. This message contains the information
Inherits: MessagePinValidated
AccountAddress: String (Optional)
11.6.7. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection
Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a
valid MessageConnectionRequestClient
Inherits: Message
EnvelopedRequestConnection: Enveloped (Optional) The client
connection request.
ServerNonce: Binary (Optional)
Witness: String (Optional)
11.6.8. Structure: RespondConnection
Respond to RequestConnection message to grant or refuse the
connection request.
Inherits: Message
Result: String (Optional) The response to the request. One of
"Accept", "Reject" or "Pending".
CatalogedDevice: CatalogedDevice (Optional) The device information.
MUST be present if the value of Result is "Accept". MUST be
absent or null otherwise.
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11.6.9. Structure: MessageContact
Inherits: MessagePinValidated
Reply: Boolean (Optional) If true, requests that the recipient
return their own contact information in reply.
Subject: String (Optional) Optional explanation of the reason for
the request.
PIN: String (Optional) One time authentication code supplied to a
recipient to allow authentication of the response.
11.6.10. Structure: GroupInvitation
Inherits: Message
Text: String (Optional)
11.6.11. Structure: RequestConfirmation
Inherits: Message
Text: String (Optional)
11.6.12. Structure: ResponseConfirmation
Inherits: Message
Request: Enveloped (Optional)
Accept: Boolean (Optional)
11.6.13. Structure: RequestTask
Inherits: Message
[No fields]
11.6.14. Structure: MessageClaim
Inherits: Message
PublicationId: String (Optional)
ServiceAuthenticate: String (Optional)
DeviceAuthenticate: String (Optional)
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Expires: DateTime (Optional)
11.6.15. Structure: ProcessResult
For future use, allows logging of operations and results
Inherits: Message
Success: Boolean (Optional)
ErrorReport: String (Optional) The error report code.
12. Security Considerations
The security considerations for use and implementation of Mesh
services and applications are described in the Mesh Security
Considerations guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security].
13. IANA Considerations
All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in
this document
14. Acknowledgements
A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is
presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
15. Appendix A: Example Container Organization (not normative)
The means by which profiles are stored on devices is outside the
scope of the specification. Only catalogs that are required to be
shared between machines by means of accounts need to be standardized.
15.1. Device
Host Catalog: Host.dare Catalog of all the Mesh Profiles that the
user has registered with the device and the latest version of the
device profile for this device.
MeshCatalog: [UDF-Mesh].dcat Catalog containing the Account Entries
for the Mesh [UDF-Mesh].
Account Catalogs: [UDF-Account]/mmm_Device.dcat The device catalog
associated with the specified account
Account Catalogs: [UDF-Account]/[Catalog name].dcat The set of
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account catalogs that are shared verbatim between the devices
connected to the account.
15.1.1. Creating a new Mesh
Create new Mesh Profile, Device Profile, Add to Host Catalog
Create MeshCatalog
15.1.2. Adding an Account
Create new Account Profile, Add to MeshCatalog
Create new Account Device Catalog
For each device to be added to the account: Create Account Connection
Assertion, add to Account Device Catalog.
15.1.3. Adding a Device
Create a Device Connection Assertion.
For each account the device is to be added to: Create Account
Connection Assertion, add to Account Device Catalog.
15.2. Service
Master Catalog Catalog of all services on machine
Service Catalog Catalog of accounts in the service.
15.2.1. Creating a Service
Create a Service Description, add to Master Catalog
15.2.2. Adding an Account
Create the account entry, add to Service Catalog
Create the Account Directory
16. Appendix B: Collected Authentication and Encryption Requirements
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16.1. Mesh Messaging
+=======================+=========+==================+
| Message | Signer | Recipients |
+=======================+=========+==================+
| RequestConnection | Device | Service |
+-----------------------+---------+------------------+
| AcknowledgeConnection | Service | Device, Receiver |
+-----------------------+---------+------------------+
| OfferGroup | Sender | Receiver |
+-----------------------+---------+------------------+
| RequestContact | Sender | Receiver |
+-----------------------+---------+------------------+
| ReplyContact | Sender | Receiver |
+-----------------------+---------+------------------+
| RequestConfirmation | Sender | Receiver |
+-----------------------+---------+------------------+
| ResponseConfirmation | Sender | Receiver |
+-----------------------+---------+------------------+
| RequestTask | Sender | Receiver |
+-----------------------+---------+------------------+
| ResponseTask | Sender | Receiver |
+-----------------------+---------+------------------+
Table 2
17. Normative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I:
Architecture Guide", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-14, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
architecture-14>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VIII:
Cryptographic Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography-06, 27 July
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
cryptography-06>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery]
"[Reference Not Found!]".
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[draft-hallambaker-mesh-notary]
"[Reference Not Found!]".
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part V: Protocol
Reference", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-protocol-06, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
protocol-06>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-security]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII:
Security Considerations", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-05, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
security-05>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part II: Uniform
Data Fingerprint.", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf-10, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf-
10>.
[draft-hallambaker-threshold]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Threshold Modes in Elliptic Curves",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-
threshold-03, 3 September 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-threshold-
03>.
[draft-hallambaker-threshold-sigs]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Threshold Signatures in Elliptic
Curves", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-threshold-sigs-04, 3 September 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-threshold-
sigs-04>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
18. Informative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
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hallambaker-mesh-developer-10, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
developer-10>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-trust]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VI: The
Trust Mesh", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-trust-06, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-trust-
06>.
[RFC2426] Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile",
RFC 2426, DOI 10.17487/RFC2426, September 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2426>.
[RFC5545] Desruisseaux, B., "Internet Calendaring and Scheduling
Core Object Specification (iCalendar)", RFC 5545,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5545, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5545>.
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