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A Lightweight Approach to Node-to-Node Security in Diameter
draft-zorn-dime-n2n-sec-lite-02

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Authors Glen Zorn , Qin Wu
Last updated 2012-01-25 (Latest revision 2011-04-12)
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draft-zorn-dime-n2n-sec-lite-02
Network Working Group                                            G. Zorn
Internet-Draft                                               Network Zen
Intended status: Standards Track                                   Q. Wu
Expires: July 28, 2012                                            Huawei
                                                        January 25, 2012

      A Lightweight Approach to Node-to-Node Security in Diameter
                    draft-zorn-dime-n2n-sec-lite-02

Abstract

   This document describes a lightweight method for cryptographically
   protecting a portion of the contents of a Diameter message in transit
   between an arbitrary pair of Diameter nodes.  The scheme assumes that
   the destination node possesses an X.509 certificate containing an RSA
   public key and that that certificate is retrievable through a DNS
   query by the node originating the message.

   In addition to describing the operation of the protocol, this note
   specifies an Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) for the encapsulation of
   encrypted AVPs.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.  This document may not be modified,
   and derivative works of it may not be created, and it may not be
   published except as an Internet-Draft.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 28, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal

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   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Protocol Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.1.  Client Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
       3.1.1.  Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
       3.1.2.  Protected Data Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.2.  Server Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
       3.2.1.  Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
       3.2.2.  Protected Data Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  Attribute-Value Pair Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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1.  Introduction

   Historically, Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA)
   network traffic has been secured on a hop-by-hop basis: messages
   between AAA entities (such as Diameter clients, agents and servers)
   have been protected on the wire but those entities have had
   unfettered access to the message contents.  This has not typically
   been considered to be a concern when all of the entities in question
   were within the same sphere of administrative control, but may be
   problematic if the messages pass through an outside system (for
   example, an agent residing in an intermediate domain in a roaming
   situation).  This document describes a lightweight method for
   cryptographically protecting a portion of the contents of a Diameter
   message while in transit between an arbitrary pair of Diameter nodes.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3.  Protocol Operation

   The following sections describe the operation of the proposed end-to-
   end security scheme.  Although key establishment and data transfer
   are discussed separately, both will usually take place in the same
   message.

3.1.  Client Operation

3.1.1.  Key Establishment

   TBC.

3.1.2.  Protected Data Transfer

   TBC.

3.2.  Server Operation

3.2.1.  Key Establishment

   TBC.

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3.2.2.  Protected Data Transfer

   TBC.

4.  Attribute-Value Pair Definitions

   This section defines a container AVP for the transport of encrypted
   AVPs in Diameter applications.

5.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations applicable to the Diameter Base Protocol
   [RFC3588] are also applicable to this document.

6.  IANA Considerations

   TBC.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3588]  Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
              Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [RFC4072]  Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
              August 2005.

   [RFC4398]  Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name
              System (DNS)", RFC 4398, March 2006.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

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7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem]
              Brainard, J., Turner, S., Randall, J., and B. Kaliski,
              "Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in CMS",
              draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-13 (work in progress),
              May 2010.

   [RFC5216]  Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
              Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.

   [RFC5247]  Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
              RFC 5247, August 2008.

   [RFC5295]  Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri,
              "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an
              Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295,
              August 2008.

   [RFC5296]  Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP Extensions for EAP Re-
              authentication Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, August 2008.

Authors' Addresses

   Glen Zorn
   Network Zen
   227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
   Bang Na, Bangkok  10260
   Thailand

   Phone: +66 (0) 87-040-4617
   Email: glenzorn@gmail.com

   Qin Wu
   Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
   101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
   Nanjing, Jiangsu  21001
   China

   Phone: +86-25-84565892
   Email: sunseawq@huawei.com

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