Simple Authentication Schemes for the ALC and NORM Protocols
draft-roca-rmt-simple-auth-for-alc-norm-01
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Vincent Roca | ||
| Last updated | 2007-11-19 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-rmt-simple-auth-for-alc-norm | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-rmt-simple-auth-for-alc-norm | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document introduces two schemes that provide a per-packet authentication and integrity service in the context of the ALC and NORM protocols. The first scheme is based on digital signatures. Because it relies on asymmetric cryptography, this scheme generates a high processing load at the sender and to a lesser extent at a receiver, as well as a significant transmission overhead. It is therefore well suited to low data rate sessions. The second scheme relies on a group Message Authentication Code (MAC). Because this scheme relies symmetric cryptography, MAC calculation and verification are fast operations, which makes it suited to high data rate sessions. However it only provides a group authentication and integrity service, which means that it only protects against attackers that are not group members.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)