TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm
draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-08
Revision differences
Document history
Date | Rev. | By | Action |
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2012-08-22
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08 | (System) | post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Robert Sparks |
2012-08-22
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08 | (System) | post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Dan Romascanu |
2011-03-08
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08 | Cindy Morgan | State changed to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent. |
2011-03-07
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08 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to No IC from In Progress |
2011-03-07
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08 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress |
2011-03-07
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08 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent |
2011-03-07
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08 | Amy Vezza | IESG has approved the document |
2011-03-07
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08 | Amy Vezza | Closed "Approve" ballot |
2011-03-07
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08 | Amy Vezza | Approval announcement text regenerated |
2011-03-07
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08 | Amy Vezza | Ballot writeup text changed |
2011-03-07
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08 | Dan Romascanu | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Dan Romascanu has been changed to No Objection from Discuss |
2011-02-26
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08 | Alexey Melnikov | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Alexey Melnikov has been changed to No Objection from Discuss |
2011-02-24
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08 | (System) | Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed |
2011-02-24
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08 | (System) | New version available: draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-08.txt |
2011-02-23
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08 | Robert Sparks | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Robert Sparks has been changed to No Objection from Discuss |
2011-02-17
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08 | Cindy Morgan | Removed from agenda for telechat |
2011-02-17
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08 | Cindy Morgan | State changed to IESG Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from IESG Evaluation. |
2011-02-17
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08 | Ralph Droms | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded |
2011-02-17
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08 | Cindy Morgan | Ballot writeup text changed |
2011-02-17
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08 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Some comments from Ari Keränen who helped me with some of the reviews today: 3. Algorithm Requirements R1 - The prover (e.g. … [Ballot comment] Some comments from Ari Keränen who helped me with some of the reviews today: 3. Algorithm Requirements R1 - The prover (e.g. token, soft token) and verifier (authentication or validation server) MUST have access to the Unix Time A reference to, or explicit definition of, Unix Time would be good already here. "MUST have access to" sounds a bit misleading since any time reference where one can derive the unix time should be OK. Also, should mention how well synchronized the clocks need to be (or at least refer to sec 6). Perhaps could say something like "MUST know or be able to derive the current Unix Time (explanation-of-unix-time-here) with precision of (precision-requirements-here)". R8 - The TOTP algorithm SHOULD be used for online application. What does this requirement exactly mean? {All, Only, ?} on-line apps should use TOTP? 5.2. Validation and Time-step Size Secondly, the next different OTP must be generated in the next Time- step window. A user must wait till the clock moves to the next Time- step window from the last submission. s/must be generated/can only be generated/ ? Should also mention/warn about the Year 2038 problem with 32-bit unix time stamps. 6. Resynchronization Why is this section after the security considerations? I would switch the order of sections 5 and 6. |
2011-02-17
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08 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded |
2011-02-17
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08 | Gonzalo Camarillo | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded |
2011-02-16
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08 | Ron Bonica | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded |
2011-02-16
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08 | Russ Housley | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded |
2011-02-16
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08 | Russ Housley | [Ballot comment] Please consider the questions raised on the Gen-ART Review by Ben Campbell on 14-Feb-2011. He asks about Section 5.2: Is there … [Ballot comment] Please consider the questions raised on the Gen-ART Review by Ben Campbell on 14-Feb-2011. He asks about Section 5.2: Is there a requirement that the proover must not make a second attempt inside a given time window? If so, that was not clear from the text. If there is not such a requirement, are there security implications if the proover does send multiple messages inside the same tick? It is not really a one time pad if that happens is it? |
2011-02-15
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08 | Peter Saint-Andre | [Ballot comment] I concur with with the discusses from Dan Romascanu, Robert Sparks, and Alexey Melnikov. |
2011-02-15
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08 | Peter Saint-Andre | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded |
2011-02-15
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08 | Robert Sparks | [Ballot comment] Stronger rationalization for the default of 30s for X would be welcome. From the existing text, it seems to have been selected expecting … [Ballot comment] Stronger rationalization for the default of 30s for X would be welcome. From the existing text, it seems to have been selected expecting that the only use will be humans logging into websites. If that's accurate, it would help to explicitly state it in the document. If it's not accurate, more explanation is needed. |
2011-02-15
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08 | Robert Sparks | [Ballot discuss] 1) This document contains a sizable "Code Component" in Appendix A, but does not appear to be following the TLP recommendations for stating … [Ballot discuss] 1) This document contains a sizable "Code Component" in Appendix A, but does not appear to be following the TLP recommendations for stating copyright. Is that intentional? 2) What are the consequences of the generator and consumer of a TOTP having different system parameter values configured for X (say the recommended 30s at a generator, and 90s at a consumer)? X does not appear to be transmitted. Can this mismatch be detected? Similarly, what are the consequences of mismatched T0 values? |
2011-02-15
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08 | Robert Sparks | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded |
2011-02-14
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08 | Dan Romascanu | [Ballot discuss] 1. The IANA Considerations section states: > The OTP algorithm defined in this document can be referred by a URI defined in … [Ballot discuss] 1. The IANA Considerations section states: > The OTP algorithm defined in this document can be referred by a URI defined in a separate document. [ALGP] is such an attempt that defines various OTP related algorithm URIs. There is no registration needed in this document. However [ALGP] is according to Section 9.2 draft-hoyer-keyprov-pskc-algorithm-profiles-01.txt which I could not find in the tracker. Is there some kind of mistake, maybe a typo or a change of name of the document? 2. The Time-step size is RECOMMENDED and has a default value of 30 seconds. Are there cases when this value can be different, how is it changed if such cases exist and how can a network operator know what is the Time-step size value on a client? |
2011-02-14
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08 | Dan Romascanu | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded |
2011-02-12
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08 | Alexey Melnikov | [Ballot comment] Abstract This document describes an extension of one-time password (OTP) algorithm, namely the HAMC-Based typo: HMAC-Based 1.2. Background The default … [Ballot comment] Abstract This document describes an extension of one-time password (OTP) algorithm, namely the HAMC-Based typo: HMAC-Based 1.2. Background The default HMAC-SHA-1 function could be replaced by HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-512 to leverage HMAC implementations based on SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash functions. Missing references for SHA-256/512. 5.1. General All the communications SHOULD take place over a secure channel e.g. SSL/TLS, IPsec connections. Missing informative references for TLS and IPSec. |
2011-02-12
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08 | Alexey Melnikov | [Ballot discuss] I am generally in favor of getting this document published. However I would like to clarify a couple of things before recommending approval … [Ballot discuss] I am generally in favor of getting this document published. However I would like to clarify a couple of things before recommending approval of this document. 3. Algorithm Requirements R8 - The TOTP algorithm SHOULD be used for online application. Can you please explain this requirement? 6. Resynchronization Also, it is important to note that the longer a prover has not sent an OTP to a validation system, the longer (potentially) the accumulated clock drift between the prover and the verifier. In such cases, the default synchronization may not be proper when the drift exceeds beyond allowed threshold. Additional authentication measures SHOULD be used for the validation system to safely authenticate the prover. What are these measures? I.e. how can the SHOULD be satisfied. |
2011-02-12
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08 | Alexey Melnikov | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded |
2011-02-11
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08 | Sean Turner | State changed to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for AD Go-Ahead. |
2011-02-08
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08 | Sean Turner | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Sean Turner |
2011-02-08
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08 | Sean Turner | Ballot has been issued |
2011-02-08
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08 | Sean Turner | Created "Approve" ballot |
2011-02-08
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08 | (System) | State changed to Waiting for AD Go-Ahead from In Last Call. |
2011-02-03
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08 | Amanda Baber | We understand that this document does not require any IANA actions. |
2011-01-18
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08 | Samuel Weiler | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Eric Rescorla |
2011-01-18
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08 | Samuel Weiler | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Eric Rescorla |
2011-01-11
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08 | Sean Turner | Placed on agenda for telechat - 2011-02-17 |
2011-01-11
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08 | Sean Turner | Status Date has been changed to 2011-01-11 from None |
2011-01-11
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08 | Amy Vezza | Last call sent |
2011-01-11
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08 | Amy Vezza | State changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested. The following Last Call Announcement was sent out: From: The IESG To: IETF-Announce Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org … State changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested. The following Last Call Announcement was sent out: From: The IESG To: IETF-Announce Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org Subject: Last Call: (TOTP: Time-based One-time Password Algorithm) to Informational RFC The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider the following document: - 'TOTP: Time-based One-time Password Algorithm' as an Informational RFC The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2011-02-08. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. The file can be obtained via http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mraihi-totp-timebased/ IESG discussion can be tracked via http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mraihi-totp-timebased/ Note that there are 3 IPR statements related to this draft that can be found at: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/1095/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/1100/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/1104/ |
2011-01-11
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08 | Sean Turner | Last Call was requested |
2011-01-11
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08 | (System) | Ballot writeup text was added |
2011-01-11
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08 | (System) | Last call text was added |
2011-01-11
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08 | (System) | Ballot approval text was added |
2011-01-11
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08 | Sean Turner | State changed to Last Call Requested from Publication Requested. |
2011-01-11
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08 | Sean Turner | Last Call text changed |
2011-01-11
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08 | Sean Turner | Last Call text changed |
2011-01-11
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08 | Sean Turner | Ballot writeup text changed |
2011-01-11
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08 | Cindy Morgan | (1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the document and, in particular, does he … (1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the document and, in particular, does he or she believe this version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication? The document shepherd is Hannes Tschofenig (Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net). I have personally reviewed the document and I believe it is ready for publication. (1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? The document has not been developed within an IETF working group. Instead, it was brought forward by KEYPROV WG participants who are also active in the OATH community. In fact, the work started in OATH with the goal to extend HOTP [RFC 4226] to support time based moving factor. Several companies have already implementing this draft and would like to get it published as an RFC. Testimonials supporting this work from a small subset of OATH members can be found at http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/keyprov/TOTP_Industry_Support.doc A complete list of OATH members can be found at http://www.openauthentication.org/members. Brief Timeline of this document: - 00 (March 2008) + Original submission. - 01 (January 2009) + Updated IETF template. - 02 (May 2009) + Added hash algorithm agility, support for SHA256 & SHA512 to be used for HMAC operation. + Updated sample code and test vectors. - 03 (May 2009) + Added security consideration around key length. - 04 (Dec 2009) + Updated source code and test vectors. - 05 (Mar 2010) + Review comments by document shepherd addressed. (1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document needs more review from a particular or broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with AAA, internationalization, or XML? There are no concerns with this document. Additional reviews will be provided by the members of the SECDIR review team. (1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document been filed? If so, please include a reference to the disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on this issue. There are no concerns with this document. No IPR disclosures have been filed. (1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? This specification was developed by the OATH community and implementations exist. This is not the product of an IETF working group. (1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is entered into the ID Tracker.) To my knowledge nobody has expressed discontent with this document. (1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the document satisfies all ID nits? (See http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/.) Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews? If the document does not already indicate its intended status at the top of the first page, please indicate the intended status here. The document does not contain nits. (1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and informative? Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative references exist, what is the strategy for their completion? Are there normative references that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967]. The document has been split into normative and informative references. The intended status of this document is an Informational RFC. (1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document's IANA Considerations section exists and is consistent with the body of the document? If the document specifies protocol extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If the document creates a new registry, does it define the proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC2434]. If the document describes an Expert Review process, has the Document Shepherd conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG can appoint the needed Expert during IESG Evaluation? This document does not require actions by IANA. (1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the document that are written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in an automated checker? There is Java code in this document (along with test vectors). The PROTO shepherd has verified the code. The test vectors produce the desired output shown in the document. (1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections: Technical Summary This document describes an extension of one-time password (OTP) algorithm, namely the HAMC-Based One-Time Password (HOTP) Algorithm as defined in RFC 4226, to support time-based moving factor. The HOTP algorithm specifies an event based OTP algorithm where the moving factor is an event counter. The present work bases the moving factor on a time value. A time-based variant of the OTP algorithm provides short-lived OTP values, which are desirable for enhanced security. The authors believe that a common and shared algorithm will facilitate adoption of two-factor authentication on the Internet by enabling interoperability across commercial and open-source implementations. Working Group Summary This document was developed outside the IETF, namely in the OATH community. A number of OATH members participated in the IETF KEYPROV working group and brought this work forward to the IETF. Document Quality This document is an AD-sponsored submission and has enjoyed review within the OATH community. Implementations of the specification exist. Personnel Hannes Tschofenig is the document shepherd for this document. Sean Turner is the sponsoring Area Director. |
2011-01-11
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08 | Cindy Morgan | [Note]: 'Hannes Tschofenig (Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net) is the document shepherd.' added |
2011-01-11
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08 | Cindy Morgan | State Change Notice email list has been changed to smachani@diversinet.com, mpei@verisign.com, johan.rydell@portwise.com, draft-mraihi-totp-timebased@tools.ietf.org, Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net from smachani@diversinet.com, mpei@verisign.com, johan.rydell@portwise.com, … State Change Notice email list has been changed to smachani@diversinet.com, mpei@verisign.com, johan.rydell@portwise.com, draft-mraihi-totp-timebased@tools.ietf.org, Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net from smachani@diversinet.com, mpei@verisign.com, johan.rydell@portwise.com, draft-mraihi-totp-timebased@tools.ietf.org |
2011-01-04
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07 | (System) | New version available: draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-07.txt |
2010-12-21
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08 | Sean Turner | Responsible AD has been changed to Sean Turner from Tim Polk |
2010-12-21
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08 | Sean Turner | Status Date has been changed to 2010-12-21 from None |
2010-12-21
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08 | Sean Turner | Intended Status has been changed to Informational from None |
2010-09-20
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08 | Tim Polk | Draft added in state Publication Requested by Tim Polk |
2010-09-09
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06 | (System) | New version available: draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-06.txt |
2010-03-08
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05 | (System) | New version available: draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-05.txt |
2009-12-10
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04 | (System) | New version available: draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-04.txt |
2009-11-12
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08 | (System) | Document has expired |
2009-05-15
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03 | (System) | New version available: draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-03.txt |
2009-05-12
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02 | (System) | New version available: draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-02.txt |
2009-02-25
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(System) | Posted related IPR disclosure: VeriSign's Statement about IPR related to draft-mraihi-mutual-oath-hotp-variants, draft-mraihi-totp-timebased, draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp, draft-ietf-keyprov-pskc, and RFC 4226 | |
2009-02-18
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(System) | Posted related IPR disclosure: VeriSign's Statement about IPR related to draft-ietf-keyprov-pskc, draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp, draft-mraihi-totp-timebased, draft-mraihi-mutual-oath-hotp-variants, and RFC 4226 | |
2009-01-14
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01 | (System) | New version available: draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-01.txt |
2008-04-04
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00 | (System) | New version available: draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-00.txt |