Chempat: Generic Instantiated PQ/T Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
draft-josefsson-chempat-01
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Simon Josefsson | ||
| Last updated | 2024-04-14 | ||
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draft-josefsson-chempat-01
CFRG S. Josefsson
Internet-Draft 14 April 2024
Intended status: Informational
Expires: 16 October 2024
Chempat: Generic Instantiated PQ/T Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
draft-josefsson-chempat-01
Abstract
This document specify Chempat as a generic family of instantiated
Post-Quantum/Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Key Exchange Methods (KEMs).
The goal is to provide a generic combiner construct that can be
analysed separately for security assurance, and to offer concrete
instantiated algorithms for integration into protocol and
implementations. Identified instances are provided based on
traditional Diffie-Hellman key agreement using curves P-256, P-384,
X25519, X448, brainpoolP256, brainpoolP384 combined with post quantum
methods ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024, Streamlined NTRU Prime sntrup761,
and Classic McEliece.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-josefsson-chempat/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Crypto Forum Research
Group (CFRG) Research Group mailing list (mailto:cfrg@ietf.org),
which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://gitlab.com/jas/ietf-chempat.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Comparison to X-Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Comparison to HPKE X25519Kyber768Draft00 . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Comparison to KEM Generic Combiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Chempat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. Use in HPKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. Chempat-X25519-sntrup761 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12. Chempat with Classic McEliece with X448 and X25519 . . . . . 9
13. Chempat-X25519-ML-KEM-768 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
14. Chempat-X448-ML-KEM-1024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
15. Chempat-P256-ML-KEM-768 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
16. Chempat-P384-ML-KEM-1024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
17. Chempat-brainpoolP256-ML-KEM-768 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
18. Chempat-brainpoolP384-ML-KEM-1024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
19. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
20. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
21. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
22. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
22.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
22.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
To hedge against attacks on a traditional key agreement algorithm
such as X25519 [RFC7748] and a post-quantum key encapsulation
mechanism (KEM) such as ML-KEM-768 [MLKEM], it is possible to combine
both algorithms to derive a shared secret [GHP18] and define the
combination mechanism as a new KEM. Using the terminology of
[I-D.driscoll-pqt-hybrid-terminology], this combination forms a PQ/T
Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanism.
Chempat is a generic pattern to create a PQ/T Hybrid Key
Encapsulation Mechanism based on at least one post-quantum algorithm
and at least one traditional algorithm. The idea is that the Chempat
combiner can be analyzed generally and some assurance can be had that
it behaves well. For ease of presentation, this document combine one
traditional DH-Based KEM algorithm with one post-quantum KEM
algorithm.
While a natural approach would be to integrate the generic key
combiner construct into protocols and have the protocol and
implementation negotiate parameters, that leads to complexity
detrimental to security. Therefor this document describe specific
instances of Chempat applied on selected algorithms.
2. Motivation
There are many choices that can be made when specifying a hybrid KEM:
the constituent KEMs; their security levels; the combiner; and the
hash within, to name but a few. Having too many similar options are
a burden to the ecosystem.
The above argues for having carefully selected instantiated hybrid
KEMs. Each hybrid KEM should be analysed to meet security targets.
If that analysis assume specific behaviour of the combiner, or if the
analysis become more complex due to the combiner, that leads to more
work to re-use the analysis for other combinations. While it would
be preferrable to only specify one hybrid KEM and analyse that, such
as [XWING], cryptographic history suggests that algorithm preferences
varies over time.
The argument then is to establish a generic method that can be
analysed independent of its component algorithms, such as
[KEMCOMBINER]. Generic methods can lead to parametrized protocols
and implementations that is more difficult to analyse, and a lack of
instantiated algorithm identifiers.
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While non-hybrid approaches may eventually be preferrable, there are
doubts on what properties protocols demand from cryptographic
primitives, and some of the properties are different from what have
been expected from traditional algorithms [CDM23]. This suggests
that some post-quantum KEM's should be used together with a other
algorithms to strengthen the properties.
Finally this leads up to our approach to describe a generic method
that can be analysed independently of the individual components, with
as few parameters as possible in the generic combiner, and to
instantiate it with common algorithm choices that make sense for
protocols and implementations. That is the essence of Chempat.
3. Comparison to X-Wing
X-Wing [XWING] is a Hybrid PQ/T KEM based on X25519 and ML-KEM-768.
Main differences:
* Chempat is applicable to other algorithm combinations, X-Wing's
combiner does not extend securely to other KEM combinations.
* Chempat on X25519 with ML-KEM-768 will hash the ML-KEM ciphertext
and public key.
* Chempat on X25519 with ML-KEM-768 can provide a per-protocol key-
domain separation context string.
4. Comparison to HPKE X25519Kyber768Draft00
HPKE's X25519Kyber768Draft00 [XYBERHPKE] is similar to X-Wing. Main
differences to Chempat:
* Chempat is applicable to other algorithm combinations,
X25519Kyber768Draft00's combiner does not extend securely to other
KEM combinations.
* Chempat hashes the shared secret, to be usable outside of HPKE.
* Chempat hashes the combined ciphertext and public keys.
There is also a different KEM called X25519Kyber768Draft00 [XYBERTLS]
which is used in TLS. This one should not be used outside of TLS, as
it assumes the presence of the TLS transcript to ensure non
malleability.
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5. Comparison to KEM Generic Combiner
Chempat is most similar to the generic combiner in [KEMCOMBINER].
Main differences:
* Chempat offers instantiated identified Hybrid KEMs for direct use
in protocols and implementations.
* Chempat offers the possibility of a generic simpler security
argument for the combiner, whereas [KEMCOMBINER] is parametrized
with several algorithm choices and any security analysis needs to
be parametrized over the numerous options permitted.
* Chempat has a fixed 32 byte shared secret instead of a variable
length shared secret.
* Chempat hashes the public keys of the component KEM's.
6. Design Goals
While Chempat share a lot with [XWING], [XYBERHPKE] and [KEMCOMBINER]
the following goals set it apart:
* Allow generic security analysis independent of combinations.
* Provide concrete instantiated algorithm identifiers for several
anticipated uses of Hybrid KEM combinations.
We aim for instantiated algorithms of Chempat to be usable for most
applications, including specifically HPKE [RFC9180], TLS [RFC8446],
OpenPGP [RFC4880] and SSH [RFC4251].
7. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The following terms are used throughout this document:
string - array of bytes
func1(), func2(a,b) - denote functions called FUNC1 and FUNC2 that
takes no parameters and two parameters a and b, respectively.
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concat(x0, ..., xN): returns the concatenation of byte strings.
concat(0x01, 0x0203, 0x040506) = 0x010203040506.
random(n): return a pseudorandom byte string of length n bytes
produced by a cryptographically-secure random number generator.
8. Chempat
Chempat is defined as follows:
H = SHA3-256
hybrid_pk = concat(receiver_pk_TKEM, receiver_pk_PQKEM)
hybrid_ct = concat(sender_ct_TKEM, sender_ct_PQKEM)
hybrid_ss = H(concat(ss_TKEM,
ss_PQKEM,
H(hybrid_ct),
H(hybrid_pk),
context))
The hash function SHA3-256 is defined in [NIST.FIPS.202].
The hybrid_pk string is the concatenation of the serialized public-
key output from the traditional (receiver_pk_TEM) and post-quantum
(receiver_pk_PQKEM) respectively. To reduce memory usage it is
possible to hash the public keys to pre-compute H(hybrid_pk) directly
when hybrid_pk is received.
The hybrid_ct string is the concatenation of the serialized
ciphertext output from the traditional (receiver_ct_TEM) and post-
quantum (receiver_ct_PQKEM) respectively. To reduce memory usage it
is possible to hash the ciphertext to pre-compute H(hybrid_ct)
directly when hybrid_ct is received.
The hybrid_ss string is the 32-byte output shared secret, formed as
the output of the SHA3-256 hash function. The inputs to the hash
function is a concatenation of the shared secrets from the
traditional (ss_TKEM) and post-quantum (ss_PQKEM) KEMs with the
hashes of the ciphertexts (H(hybrid_ct)) and public keys
(H(hybrid_pk)) together with a variable-length protocol-specific
context string.
The context string can be chosen uniquely by the protocol referencing
this document. The purpose is to provide protocol domain separation
of the generated keys. The content is arbitrary, and in practice the
name of the protocol will suffice. Since this results in a new
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Chempat instance, to reduce combinatorical complexity of parameters,
we provide one instance with the context variable set to the name of
the Chempat instance, for example "Chempat-X25519-sntrup761".
9. Naming
Protocols wishing to utilize a PQ/T Hybrid KEM described in this
document MUST refer to one of the derived instantiated algorithm
identifiers and MUST NOT specify a generic construction where the
individual algorithms are parameters.
The convention for identifiers is "Chempat-TKEM-PQKEM" replacing
"TKEM" and "PQKEM" with a brief mnemonic identifying the traditional
and post-quantum algorithm respectively.
10. Use in HPKE
Each Chempat instance satisfy the HPKE KEM interface as follows.
The SerializePublicKey, DeserializePublicKey, SerializePrivateKey and
DeserializePrivateKey are concatenation and splitting of the known-
length component strings.
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H = SHA3-256
def GenerateKeyPair():
(pk_T, sk_T) = DHKEM.KeyGen()
(pk_PQ, sk_PT) = PQKEM.KeyGen()
return (concat(sk_T, sk_PQ, pk_T, pk_PQ), concat(pk_T, pk_PQ))
# TBA DeriveKeyPair
def Chempat(ss_T, ss_PQ, ct_T, ct_PQ, pk_T, pk_PQ):
return H(concat(ss_T,
ss_PQ,
H(concat(ct_T, ct_PQ)),
H(concat(pk_T, pk_PQ)),
Context))
def Encapsulate(pk):
pk_T = pk[0:DHKEM.Npk]
pk_PQ = pk[DHKEM.Npk:PQKEM.Npk-DHKEM.Npk]
(ss_T, ct_T) = DHKEM.Encap(pk_T)
(ss_PQ, ct_PQ) = PQKEM.Encap(pk_PQ)
ss = Chempat(ss_T, ss_PQ, ct_T, ct_PQ, pk_T, pk_PQ)
ct = concat(ct_T, ct_PQ)
return (ss, ct)
def Decapsulate(ct, sk):
ct_T = ct[0:DHKEM.Nenc]
ct_T = ct[DHKEM.Nenc:PQKEM.Nenc-DHKEM.Nenc]
sk_PQ = sk[0:DHKEM.Nsecret]
sk_T = sk[DHKEM.Nsecret:PQKEM.Nsecret-DHKEM.Nsecret]
pk_T = sk[0:DHKEM.Npk]
pk_PQ = sk[DHKEM.Npk:PQKEM.Npk-DHKEM.Npk]
ss_T = DHKEM.Decap(ct_T, sk_T)
ss_PQ = PQKEM.Decap(ct_PQ, sk_PQ)
return Chempat(ss_T, ss_PQ, ct_T, ct_PQ, pk_T, pk_PQ)
Chempat does not provide authenticeted KEMs and does not support
AuthEncap() or AuthDecap() of [RFC9180].
Context is a string provided by the protocol referencing this
document, or if not provided corresponds to the name of the Chempat
instance, such as "Chempat-X25519-sntrup761".
Nsecret is 32 for all Chempat instances, and Nenc, Npk, and Nsk
depends on the underlying components.
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11. Chempat-X25519-sntrup761
This algorithm is instantiated using the TKEM as DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-
SHA256) from [RFC9180] and PQKEM as a HPKE variant of sntrup761 from
[NTRUPrimePQCS] [NTRUPrime].
The DHKEM.Nsecret, DHKEM.Nenc, DHKEM.Npk, DHKEM.Nsk are all 32 for
X25519 per Section 7.1 of [RFC9180].
The PQKEM.Nsecret is 32, PQKEM.Nenc is 1039, PQKEM.Npk is 1158 and
PQKEM.Nsk is 1763 for sntrup761 per [NTRUPrimePQCS].
Thus Nenc is 1071, Npk is 1190 and Nsk is 1795 for Chempat-
X25519-sntrup761.
12. Chempat with Classic McEliece with X448 and X25519
This is a set of mechanisms implemented the same way but with
different component algorithms and parameter lengths.
This algorithm is instantiated using the TKEM as DHKEM(X, HKDF-
SHA512) from [RFC9180] and PQKEM as a HPKE variant of M from
[MCELIECE] [CM-spec], substituting X and M for the particular
algorithm from the tables below. Sizes for DHKEM for X25519 and X448
as per Section 7.1 of [RFC9180], and sizes for PQKEM as per
[CM-spec].
The f and non-f versions are interoperable. The f versions have
faster key generation, while the non-f versions have simpler key
generation. For example, a key generated with mceliece6688128f can
decapsulate ciphertexts that were encapsulated with mceliece6688128,
and vice versa. The secret-key sizes (and formats) are the same, the
encapsulation functions are the same, and the decapsulation functions
are the same. Implementations of this protocol can chose between f
and non-f variants, however the name of the hybrid will use the non-f
names.
+===============+=========+======+=====+=====+
| DHKEM variant | Nsecret | Nenc | Npk | Nsk |
+===============+=========+======+=====+=====+
| X25519 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 |
+---------------+---------+------+-----+-----+
| X448 | 64 | 56 | 56 | 56 |
+---------------+---------+------+-----+-----+
Table 1: X25519/X448 DHKEM size
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+=================+=========+======+=========+=======+
| PQKEM variant | Nsecret | Nenc | Npk | Nsk |
+=================+=========+======+=========+=======+
| mceliece348864 | 32 | 96 | 261120 | 6492 |
+-----------------+---------+------+---------+-------+
| mceliece460896 | 32 | 156 | 524160 | 13608 |
+-----------------+---------+------+---------+-------+
| mceliece6688128 | 32 | 208 | 1044992 | 13932 |
+-----------------+---------+------+---------+-------+
| mceliece6960119 | 32 | 194 | 1047319 | 13948 |
+-----------------+---------+------+---------+-------+
| mceliece8192128 | 32 | 208 | 1357824 | 14120 |
+-----------------+---------+------+---------+-------+
Table 2: Classic McEliece sizes
Names and sizes of the Chempat hybrids are per table below.
+================================+======+=========+=======+
| Variant | Nenc | Npk | Nsk |
+================================+======+=========+=======+
| Chempat-X25519-mceliece348864 | 128 | 261152 | 6524 |
+--------------------------------+------+---------+-------+
| Chempat-X25519-mceliece460896 | 188 | 524192 | 13640 |
+--------------------------------+------+---------+-------+
| Chempat-X25519-mceliece6688128 | 240 | 1045024 | 13964 |
+--------------------------------+------+---------+-------+
| Chempat-X25519-mceliece6960119 | 226 | 1047351 | 13980 |
+--------------------------------+------+---------+-------+
| Chempat-X25519-mceliece8192128 | 240 | 1357856 | 14152 |
+--------------------------------+------+---------+-------+
| Chempat-X448-mceliece348864 | 160 | 261176 | 6548 |
+--------------------------------+------+---------+-------+
| Chempat-X448-mceliece460896 | 220 | 524216 | 13664 |
+--------------------------------+------+---------+-------+
| Chempat-X448-mceliece6688128 | 272 | 1045048 | 13988 |
+--------------------------------+------+---------+-------+
| Chempat-X448-mceliece6960119 | 258 | 1047375 | 14004 |
+--------------------------------+------+---------+-------+
| Chempat-X448-mceliece8192128 | 272 | 1357880 | 14176 |
+--------------------------------+------+---------+-------+
Table 3: Classic McEliece with X25519/X448
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13. Chempat-X25519-ML-KEM-768
This algorithm is instantiated using the TKEM as DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-
SHA256) from [RFC9180] and PQKEM as a HPKE variant of ML-KEM-768 from
[MLKEM].
Protocols and implementation MAY consider [XWING] instead of Chempat-
X25519-ML-KEM-768, and the definition of Chempat-X25519-ML-KEM-768 is
here for situations when some property of X-Wing is not wanted.
Informally and non-conclusively, X-Wing offers better performance and
Chempat-X25519-ML-KEM-768 offers re-use of the generic security
claims on Chempat and a per-protocol key-separation context string.
The DHKEM.Nsecret, DHKEM.Nenc, DHKEM.Npk, DHKEM.Nsk are all 32 for
X25519 per Section 7.1 of [RFC9180].
The PQKEM.Nsecret is 32, PQKEM.Nenc is 1088, PQKEM.Npk is 1184 and
PQKEM.Nsk is 2400 for ML-KEM-768 per [MLKEM].
Thus Nenc is 1120, Npk is 1216 and Nsk is 2432 for Chempat-X25519-ML-
KEM-768.
14. Chempat-X448-ML-KEM-1024
This algorithm is instantiated using the TKEM as DHKEM(X448, HKDF-
SHA512) from [RFC9180] and PQKEM as a HPKE variant of ML-KEM-1024
from [MLKEM].
For X448 DHKEM.Nsecret is 64, DHKEM.Nenc is 56, DHKEM.Npk is 56,
DHKEM.Nsk is 56 per Section 7.1 of [RFC9180].
The PQKEM.Nsecret is 32, PQKEM.Nenc is 864, PQKEM.Npk is 1568 and
PQKEM.Nsk is 2400 for ML-KEM-1024 per [MLKEM].
Thus Nenc is 1120, Npk is 1624 and Nsk is 2456 for Chempat-X25519-ML-
KEM-1024.
15. Chempat-P256-ML-KEM-768
This algorithm is instantiated using the TKEM as DHKEM(P-256, HKDF-
SHA256) from [RFC9180] and PQKEM as a HPKE variant of ML-KEM-768 from
[MLKEM].
For P256 DHKEM.Nsecret is 32, DHKEM.Nenc is 65, DHKEM.Npk is 65,
DHKEM.Nsk is 32 per Section 7.1 of [RFC9180].
The PQKEM.Nsecret is 32, PQKEM.Nenc is 1088, PQKEM.Npk is 1184 and
PQKEM.Nsk is 2400 for ML-KEM-768 per [MLKEM].
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Thus Nenc is 1153, Npk is 1249 and Nsk is 2432 for Chempat-P256-ML-
KEM-768.
16. Chempat-P384-ML-KEM-1024
This algorithm is instantiated using the TKEM as DHKEM(P-384, HKDF-
SHA384) from [RFC9180] and PQKEM as a HPKE variant of ML-KEM-1024
from [MLKEM].
For P384 DHKEM.Nsecret is 48, DHKEM.Nenc is 97, DHKEM.Npk is 97,
DHKEM.Nsk is 48 per Section 7.1 of [RFC9180].
The PQKEM.Nsecret is 32, PQKEM.Nenc is 864, PQKEM.Npk is 1568 and
PQKEM.Nsk is 2400 for ML-KEM-1024 per [MLKEM].
Thus Nenc is 961, Npk is 1665 and Nsk is 2448 for Chempat-P384-ML-
KEM-1024.
17. Chempat-brainpoolP256-ML-KEM-768
This algorithm is instantiated using the TKEM as DHKEM(brainpoolP256,
HKDF-SHA256) from [RFC9180] [RFC5639] and PQKEM as a HPKE variant of
ML-KEM-768 from [MLKEM].
For brainpoolP256 DHKEM.Nsecret is 32, DHKEM.Nenc is 65, DHKEM.Npk is
65, DHKEM.Nsk is 32.
The PQKEM.Nsecret is 32, PQKEM.Nenc is 1088, PQKEM.Npk is 1184 and
PQKEM.Nsk is 2400 for ML-KEM-768 per [MLKEM].
Thus Nenc is 1153, Npk is 1249 and Nsk is 2432 for Chempat-
brainpoolP256-ML-KEM-768.
18. Chempat-brainpoolP384-ML-KEM-1024
This algorithm is instantiated using the TKEM as DHKEM(brainpoolP384,
HKDF-SHA384) from [RFC9180] [RFC5639] and PQKEM as a HPKE variant of
ML-KEM-1024 from [MLKEM].
For brainpoolP384 DHKEM.Nsecret is 48, DHKEM.Nenc is 97, DHKEM.Npk is
97, DHKEM.Nsk is 48. The PQKEM.Nsecret is 32, PQKEM.Nenc is 864,
PQKEM.Npk is 1568 and PQKEM.Nsk is 2400 for ML-KEM-1024 per [MLKEM].
Thus Nenc is 961, Npk is 1665 and Nsk is 2448 for Chempat-
brainpoolP384-ML-KEM-1024.
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19. Security Considerations
Chempat is intended to be secure if SHA3 is secure and either the
traditional algorithm is secure or the post-quantum algorithm is
secure.
The security considerations of each component algorithm are
inherited.
Cryptographic algorithms and parameters will be broken or weakened
over time. Blindly implementing supported groups listed here is not
advised. Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic
algorithms listed continue to provide the expected level of security.
20. IANA Considerations
Protocols that provide a Context variable will need to register their
own key-domain separate identifiers. The registrations below are
when Chempat instances are used with their default value of Context.
This document requests/registers new entries to the "HPKE KEM
Identifiers" registry as follows.
+=====+======================+=======+====+=======+=====+====+=========+
|Value|KEM |Nsecret|Nenc|Npk |Nsk |Auth|Reference|
+=====+======================+=======+====+=======+=====+====+=========+
| TBD|Chempat- |32 |1071|1190 |1795 |No |THISRFC |
| |X25519-sntrup761 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat- |32 |128 |261152 |6524 |No |THISRFC |
| |X25519-mceliece348864 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat- |32 |188 |524192 |13640|No |THISRFC |
| |X25519-mceliece460896 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat- |32 |240 |1045024|13964|No |THISRFC |
| |X25519-mceliece6688128| | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat- |32 |226 |1047351|13980|No |THISRFC |
| |X25519-mceliece6960119| | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat- |32 |240 |1357856|14152|No |THISRFC |
| |X25519-mceliece8192128| | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat- |32 |160 |261176 |6548 |No |THISRFC |
| |X448-mceliece348864 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat- |32 |220 |524216 |13664|No |THISRFC |
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| |X448-mceliece460896 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat- |32 |272 |1045048|13988|No |THISRFC |
| |X448-mceliece6688128 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat- |32 |258 |1047375|14004|No |THISRFC |
| |X448-mceliece6960119 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat- |32 |272 |1357880|14176|No |THISRFC |
| |X448-mceliece8192128 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat-X25519-ML- |32 |1120|1216 |2432 |No |THISRFC |
| |KEM-768 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat-X448-ML- |32 |1120|1624 |2456 |No |THISRFC |
| |KEM-1024 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat-P256-ML- |32 |1153|1249 |2432 |No |THISRFC |
| |KEM-768 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat-P384-ML- |32 |961 |1665 |2448 |No |THISRFC |
| |KEM-1024 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat-brainpoolP256-|32 |1153|1249 |2432 |No |THISRFC |
| |ML-KEM-768 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
| TBD|Chempat-brainpoolP384-|32 |961 |1665 |2448 |No |THISRFC |
| |ML-KEM-1024 | | | | | | |
+-----+----------------------+-------+----+-------+-----+----+---------+
Table 4: Chempat HPKE KEM Identifiers
This document requests/registers a new entry to the TLS Supported
Group registry as follows.
+=====+==================+=====+=============+=========+============+
|Value| Description |DTLS-| Recommended |Reference| Comment |
| | |OK | | | |
+=====+==================+=====+=============+=========+============+
| TBD| Chempat- |Y | Y |THISRFC | PQ/T |
| | X25519-sntrup761 | | | | hybrid of |
| | | | | | X25519 |
| | | | | | and |
| | | | | | sntrup761 |
+-----+------------------+-----+-------------+---------+------------+
Table 5: Chempat TLS Supported Groups
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21. Acknowledgments
The combiner function was suggested by Daniel J. Bernstein. The
document re-use ideas and some text from [XWING], [KEMCOMBINER],
[XYBERHPKE] and [RFC9180].
22. References
22.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
22.2. Informative References
[CDM23] Cremers, C., Dax, A., and N. Medinger, "Keeping Up with
the KEMs: Stronger Security Notions for KEMs and automated
analysis of KEM-based protocols", 2023,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1933>.
[CM-spec] Classic McEliece Team, "Classic McEliece: conservative
code-based cryptography: cryptosystem specification",
October 2022,
<https://classic.mceliece.org/mceliece-spec-20221023.pdf>.
[GHP18] Giacon, F., Heuer, F., and B. Poettering, "KEM Combiners",
2018, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76578-5_7>.
[I-D.driscoll-pqt-hybrid-terminology]
D, F., "Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid
Schemes", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
driscoll-pqt-hybrid-terminology-02, 7 March 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-driscoll-pqt-
hybrid-terminology-02>.
[KEMCOMBINER]
Ounsworth, M., Wussler, A., and S. Kousidis, "Combiner
function for hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms (Hybrid
KEMs)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ounsworth-
cfrg-kem-combiners-05, 31 January 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ounsworth-
cfrg-kem-combiners-05>.
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[MCELIECE] Josefsson, S., "Classic McEliece", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-josefsson-mceliece-01, 14 April
2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
josefsson-mceliece-01>.
[MLKEM] National Institute of Standards and Technology, ., "FIPS
203 (Initial Draft): Module-Lattice-Based Key-
Encapsulation Mechanism Standard", n.d.,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/ipd>.
[NIST.FIPS.202]
Dworkin, M., Dworkin, M. J., and NIST, "SHA-3 Standard:
Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions",
FIPS PUB 202, NIST Federal Information Processing
Standards Publications 202, DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.202,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202, August 2015,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.
[NTRUPrime]
Bernstein, D.J., Chuengsatiansup, C., Lange, T., and C.
van Vredendaal, "NTRU Prime: reducing attack surface at
low cost", August 2017,
<https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/ntruprime-20170816.pdf>.
[NTRUPrimePQCS]
Bernstein, Daniel J., Billy Bob Brumley, ., Ming-Shing
Chen, ., Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup, ., Tanja Lange, .,
Adrian Marotzke, ., Bo-Yuan Peng, ., Nicola Tuveri, .,
Christine van Vredendaal, ., and . Bo-Yin Yang, "NTRU
Prime: round 3, Submission to the NIST PQC Standardization
Round 3 Process", October 2020,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/post-quantum-
cryptography/documents/round-3/submissions/NTRU-Prime-
Round3.zip>.
[RFC4251] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251>.
[RFC4880] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4880, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4880>.
[RFC5639] Lochter, M. and J. Merkle, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation",
RFC 5639, DOI 10.17487/RFC5639, March 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5639>.
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[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9180] Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, "Hybrid
Public Key Encryption", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180,
February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9180>.
[XWING] Connolly, D., Schwabe, P., and B. Westerbaan, "X-Wing:
general-purpose hybrid post-quantum KEM", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-connolly-cfrg-xwing-kem-
02, 26 March 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-connolly-cfrg-xwing-kem-02>.
[XYBERHPKE]
Westerbaan, B. and C. A. Wood, "X25519Kyber768Draft00
hybrid post-quantum KEM for HPKE", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-westerbaan-cfrg-hpke-xyber768d00-02,
4 May 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
westerbaan-cfrg-hpke-xyber768d00-02>.
[XYBERTLS] Westerbaan, B. and D. Stebila, "X25519Kyber768Draft00
hybrid post-quantum key agreement", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-tls-westerbaan-xyber768d00-03, 24
September 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-tls-westerbaan-xyber768d00-03>.
Author's Address
Simon Josefsson
Email: simon@josefsson.org
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