Integrity Measurement for Network File System version 4
draft-ietf-nfsv4-integrity-measurement-04
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2019-03-27
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Network File System Version 4 C. Lever
Internet-Draft Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track March 27, 2019
Expires: September 28, 2019
Integrity Measurement for Network File System version 4
draft-ietf-nfsv4-integrity-measurement-04
Abstract
This document specifies an OPTIONAL extension to NFS version 4 minor
version 2 that enables Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture
metadata (IMA) to be conveyed between NFS version 4.2 servers and
clients. Integrity measurement authenticates the creator of a file's
content and helps guarantee the content's integrity end-to-end from
creation to use.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
Lever Expires September 28, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft IMA over NFS March 2019
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. The Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Protocol Extension Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. XDR Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Managing IMA Metadata on NFS Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. XDR Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Storing IMA Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Retrieving IMA Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Instantiating IMA Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2.1. Authorizing Updates to IMA Metadata . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Interaction With Non-Participating Implementations . . . 8
6. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Linux NFS server and client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
The security of software distribution systems is complex and
challenging, especially as software distribution has become
increasingly decentralized. An end administrator needs to trust that
she is running executables just as they are supplied by a software
vendor; in other words, that they have not been modified by malicious
actors, contracted system administration services, or broken hardware
or software. Software vendors want a guarantee that customer-
installed executables that fall under support contracts have
similarly not been modified.
There already exist mechanisms that protect file data during certain
portions of a file's life cycle:
o Whole file system checksumming can verify so-called Golden Master
installation media before it is used to install the software it
contains.
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