File Content Provenance for Network File System version 4
draft-ietf-nfsv4-integrity-measurement-02

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Network File System Version 4                                   C. Lever
Internet-Draft                                                    Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track                         October 8, 2018
Expires: April 11, 2019

       File Content Provenance for Network File System version 4
               draft-ietf-nfsv4-integrity-measurement-02

Abstract

   This document specifies an OPTIONAL extension to NFS version 4 minor
   version 2 that enables file provenance information to be conveyed
   between NFS version 4.2 servers and clients.  File provenance
   information authenticates the creator of a file's content and helps
   guarantee the content's integrity from creation to use.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Protocol Extension Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Managing File Provenance Information on NFS Files . . . . . .   5
   5.  Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   The security of software distribution systems is complex and
   challenging, especially as software distribution has become
   increasingly decentralized.  An end administrator needs to trust that
   she is running executables just as they are supplied by a software
   vendor; in other words, that they have not been modified by malicious
   actors, contracted system administration services, or broken hardware
   or software.  Software vendors want a guarantee that customer-
   installed executables that fall under support contracts have
   similarly not been modified.

   There already exist mechanisms that protect file data during certain
   portions of a file's life cycle:

   o  Whole file system checksumming can verify so-called Golden Master
      installation media before it is used to install the software it
      contains.

   o  File or block integrity mechanisms can protect data at rest on
      storage servers.

   o  For a distributed file system such as NFS, transport layer
      security or a GSS integrity service (as described in [RFC7861])
      can protect data while it traverses a network between a storage
      server and a client.

   A more extensive mechanism is needed to guarantee that no
   modification of a particular file has occurred since it was created,
   perhaps even after several generations of copies have been made of
   the file's content.

   This guarantee can be accomplished by separately preserving a keyed
   hash, such as an HMAC [RFC2104], of a file's content.  The checksum
   and its signature are verified as the file's content is read into

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   memory immediately before it is used.  If verification fails, access
   to the file's content is prevented.  The hash is updated and re-
   signed only when the file is legitimately modified.