Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data
draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-01
The information below is for an old version of the document.
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| Authors | Pierre Pfister , Éric Vyncke , Tommy Pauly , David Schinazi | ||
| Last updated | 2018-02-09 | ||
| Replaces | draft-bruneau-intarea-provisioning-domains | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-01
intarea P. Pfister
Internet-Draft E. Vyncke, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco
Expires: August 13, 2018 T. Pauly
D. Schinazi
Apple
February 9, 2018
Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data
draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-01
Abstract
An increasing number of hosts access the Internet via multiple
interfaces or, in IPv6 multi-homed networks, via multiple IPv6 prefix
configurations.
This document describes a way for hosts to identify such means,
called Provisioning Domains (PvDs), with Fully Qualified Domain Names
(FQDN). Those identifiers are advertised in a new Router
Advertisement (RA) option and, when present, are associated with the
set of information included within the RA.
Based on this FQDN, hosts can retrieve additional information about
their network access characteristics via an HTTP over TLS query.
This allows applications to select which Provisioning Domains to use
as well as to provide configuration parameters to the transport layer
and above.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 13, 2018.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Provisioning Domain Identification using Router
Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. PvD ID Option for Router Advertisements . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Router Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Host Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.1. DHCPv6 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3.2. DHCPv4 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3.3. Interconnection Sharing by the Host . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Operational Consideration to Providing the PvD Additional
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. PvD Additional Information Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.1. Private Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3.2. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Operation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.1. Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.2. Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.3. Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.4. WG Document version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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A.5. WG Document version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
It has become very common in modern networks for hosts to access the
internet through different network interfaces, tunnels, or next-hop
routers. To describe the set of network configurations associated
with each access method, the concept of Provisioning Domain (PvD) was
defined in [RFC7556].
This document specifies a way to identify PvDs with Fully Qualified
Domain Names (FQDN), called PvD IDs. Those identifiers are
advertised in a new Router Advertisement (RA) [RFC4861] option called
the PvD ID Router Advertisement option which, when present,
associates the PvD ID with all the information present in the Router
Advertisement as well as any configuration object, such as addresses,
deriving from it. The PVD ID Router Advertisement option may also
contain a set of other RA options. Since such options are only
considered by hosts implementing this specification, network
operators may configure hosts that are 'PvD-aware' with PvDs that are
ignored by other hosts.
Since PvD IDs are used to identify different ways to access the
internet, multiple PvDs (with different PvD IDs) could be provisioned
on a single host interface. Similarly, the same PvD ID could be used
on different interfaces of a host in order to inform that those PvDs
ultimately provide identical services.
This document also introduces a way for hosts to retrieve additional
information related to a specific PvD by means of an HTTP over TLS
query using an URI derived from the PvD ID. The retrieved JSON
object contains additional information that would typically be
considered unfit, or too large, to be directly included in the Router
Advertisement, but might be considered useful to the applications, or
even sometimes users, when choosing which PvD and transport should be
used.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
In addition, this document uses the following terminology:
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Provisioning Domain (PvD): A set of network configuration
information; for more information, see [RFC7556].
PvD ID: A Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) used to identify a
PvD.
Explicit PvD: A PvD uniquely identified with a PvD ID. For more
information, see [RFC7556].
Implicit PvD: A PvD that, in the absence of a PvD ID, is identified
by the host interface to which it is attached and the address of
the advertising router.
3. Provisioning Domain Identification using Router Advertisements
Explicit PvDs are identified by a PvD ID. The PvD ID is a Fully
Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) which MUST belong to the network
operator in order to avoid naming collisions. The same PvD ID MAY be
used in several access networks when they ultimately provide
identical services (e.g., in all home networks subscribed to the same
service).
3.1. PvD ID Option for Router Advertisements
This document introduces a Router Advertisement (RA) option called
PvD ID Router Advertisement option. It is used to convey the FQDN
identifying a given PvD (see Figure 1), bind the PvD ID with
configuration information received over DHCPv4 (see Section 3.3.2),
enable the use of HTTP over TLS to retrieve the PvD Additional
Information JSON object (see Section 4), as well as contain any other
RA options which would otherwise be valid in the RA.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |H|L|A| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number | ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ...
... PvD ID FQDN ...
... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
... | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ...
... Router Advertisement message header ...
... (Only present when A-flag is set) ...
... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Figure 1: PvD ID Router Advertisements Option format
Type : (8 bits) To be defined by IANA. Current
experimentation uses the value of 254.
Length : (8 bits) The length of the option in units of 8
octets, including the Type and Length fields, the Router
Advertisement message header, if any, as well as the RA options
that are included within the PvD ID Option.
H-flag : (1 bit) 'HTTP' flag stating whether some PvD
Additional Information is made available through HTTP over TLS, as
described in Section 4.
L-flag : (1 bit) 'Legacy' flag stating whether the router is
also providing IPv4 information using DHCPv4 (see Section 3.3.2).
A-flag : (1 bit) 'Advertisement' flag stating whether the PvD
ID Option is followed (right after padding to the next 64 bits
boundary) by a Router Advertisement message header (See section
4.2 of target="RFC4861"/>).
Reserved : (13 bits) Reserved for later use. It MUST be set to
zero by the sender and ignored by the receiver.
Sequence Number: (16 bits) Sequence number for the PvD Additional
Information, as described in Section 4.
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PvD ID FQDN : The FQDN used as PvD ID encoded in DNS format, as
described in Section 3.1 of [RFC1035]. Domain names compression
described in Section 4.1.4 of [RFC1035] MUST NOT be used.
Padding : Zero or more padding octets to the next 8 octets
boundary. It MUST be set to zero by the sender, and ignored by
the receiver.
RA message header : (16 octets) When the A-flag is set, a full
Router Advertisement message header as specified in [RFC4861].
The 'Type', 'Code' and 'Checksum' fields (i.e. the first 32 bits),
MUST be set to zero by the sender and ignored by the receiver.
The other fields are to be set and parsed as specified in
[RFC4861] or any updating documents.
Options : Zero or more RA options that would otherwise be valid as
part of the Router Advertisement main body, but are instead
included in the PvD ID Option such as to be ignored by hosts that
are not 'PvD-aware'.
Here is an example of a PvD ID option with example.org as the PvD ID
FQDN and including a RDNSS and prefix information options:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| Type: 254 | Length: 12 |0|0|0| Reserved |
+---------------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| Sequence Number | 7 | e |
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| m | a | m | p |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| l | e | 3 | o |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| r | g | 0 | 0 (padding) |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| RDNSS option (RFC 6106) length: 5 ...
... ...
... |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix Information Option (RFC 4861) length: 4 ...
... |
... |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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3.2. Router Behavior
A router MAY send RAs containing at most one PvD ID RA option, but
MUST NOT include more than one PvD ID RA option in each RA. In
particular, the PvD ID RA option MUST NOT contain further PvD ID RA
options.
The PvD ID Option MAY contain zero, one, or more RA options which
would otherwise be valid as part of the same RA. Such options are
processed by PvD-aware hosts, while ignored by others.
In order to provide multiple different PvDs, a router MUST send
multiple RAs. Different explicit PvDs MAY be advertised with RAs
using the same IPv6 source address; but different implicit PvDs,
advertised with different RAs, MUST use different link local
addresses.
Whenever an RA, for a single PvD, would need to be sent via multiple
packets, the PvD ID RA option header (i.e., all fields except the
'Options' field) MUST be repeated in all the transmitted RAs. But
the options within the 'Options' field, MAY be transmitted only once,
included in one of the transmitted PvD ID RA options.
3.3. Host Behavior
Hosts MUST associate received RAs and included configuration
information (e.g., Router Valid Lifetime, Prefix Information
[RFC4861], Recursive DNS Server [RFC8106], Routing Information
[RFC4191] options) with the explicit PvD identified by the first PvD
ID Option present in the received RA, if any, or with the implicit
PvD identified by the host interface and the source address of the
received RA otherwise.
In case multiple PvD ID options are found in a given RA, hosts MUST
ignore all but the first PvD ID option.
Similarly, hosts MUST associate all network configuration objects
(e.g., default routers, addresses, more specific routes, DNS
Recursive Resolvers) with the PvD associated with the RA which last
updated the object. For example, addresses that are generated using
a received Prefix Information option (PIO) are associated with the
PvD of the last received RA which included the given PIO.
PvD IDs MUST be compared in a case-insensitive manner (i.e., A=a),
assuming ASCII with zero parity while non-alphabetic codes must match
exactly (see also Section 3.1 of [RFC1035]). For example,
pvd.example.com or PvD.Example.coM would refer to the same PvD.
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While resolving names, executing the default address selection
algorithm [RFC6724] or executing the default router selection
algorithm ([RFC2461], [RFC4191] and [RFC8028]), hosts MAY consider
only the configuration associated with an arbitrary set of PvDs.
For example, a host MAY associate a given process with a specific
PvD, or a specific set of PvDs, while associating another process
with another PvD. A PvD-aware application might also be able to
select, on a per-connection basis, which PvDs should be used. In
particular, constrained devices such as small battery operated
devices (e.g. IoT), or devices with limited CPU or memory resources
may purposefully use a single PvD while ignoring some received RAs
containing different PvD IDs.
The way an application expresses its desire to use a given PvD, or a
set of PvDs, or the way this selection is enforced, is out of the
scope of this document. Useful insights about these considerations
can be found in [I-D.kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs].
3.3.1. DHCPv6 configuration association
When a host retrieves configuration elements using DHCPv6 (e.g.,
addresses or DNS recursive resolvers), they MUST be associated with
the explicit or implicit PvD of the RA received on the same
interface, sent from the same LLA, and with the O-flag or M-flag set
[RFC4861]. If no such PvD is found, or whenever multiple different
PvDs are found, the host behavior is unspecified.
This process requires hosts to keep track of received RAs, associated
PvD IDs, and routers LLA; it also assumes that the router either acts
as a DHCPv6 server or relay and uses the same LLA for DHCPv6 and RA
traffic (which may not be the case when the router uses VRRP to send
its RA).
3.3.2. DHCPv4 configuration association
When a host retrieves configuration elements from DHCPv4, they MUST
be associated with the explicit PvD received on the same interface,
whose PVD ID Options L-flag is set and, in the case of a non point-
to-point link, using the same datalink address. If no such PvD is
found, or whenever multiple different PvDs are found, the
configuration elements coming from DHCPv4 MUST be associated with the
implicit PvD identified by the interface on which the DHCPv4
transaction happened. The case of multiple explicit PvD for an IPv4
interface is undefined.
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The END-POINTS object body has a variable length. These are
o multiples of 4 bytes for IPv4
o multiples of 16 bytes, plus 4 bytes, for IPv6
3.4. Request Message Format
As per [RFC5440], a Path Computation Request message (also referred
to as a PCReq message) is a PCEP message sent by a PCC to a PCE to
request a path computation. A PCReq message may carry more than one
path computation request.
As per [RFC5541], the OF object MAY be carried within a PCReq
message. If an objective function is to be applied to a set of
synchronized path computation requests, the OF object MUST be carried
just after the corresponding SVEC (Synchronization Vector) object and
MUST NOT be repeated for each elementary request.
The PCReq message is encoded as follows using RBNF as defined in
[RFC5511].
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Below is the message format for the request message:
<PCReq Message> ::= <Common Header>
[<svec-list>]
<request-list>
where:
<svec-list> ::= <SVEC>
[<OF>]
[<metric-list>]
[<svec-list>]
<request-list> ::= <request>[<request-list>]
<request> ::= <RP>
<end-point-rro-pair-list>
[<OF>]
[<LSPA>]
[<BANDWIDTH>]
[<metric-list>]
[<IRO>|<BNC>]
[<LOAD-BALANCING>]
where:
<end-point-rro-pair-list> ::=
<END-POINTS>[<RRO-List>[<BANDWIDTH>]]
[<end-point-rro-pair-list>]
<RRO-List> ::= (<RRO>|<SRRO>)[<RRO-List>]
<metric-list> ::= <METRIC>[<metric-list>]
Figure 3: The Message Format for the Request Message
Note that we preserve compatibility with the definition of <request>
provided in [RFC5440]. At least one instance of <END-POINTS> MUST be
present in this message.
We have documented the IANA assignment of additional END-POINTS
Object-Type values in Section 6.5 ("PCEP Objects") of this document.
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3.5. Reply Message Format
The PCEP Path Computation Reply message (also referred to as a
PCRep message) is a PCEP message sent by a PCE to a requesting PCC in
response to a previously received PCReq message. PCEP supports the
bundling of multiple replies to a set of path computation requests
within a single PCRep message.
The PCRep message is encoded as follows using RBNF as defined in
[RFC5511].
Below is the message format for the reply message:
<PCRep Message> ::= <Common Header>
<response-list>
where:
<response-list> ::= <response>[<response-list>]
<response> ::= <RP>
[<end-point-path-pair-list>]
[<NO-PATH>]
[<UNREACH-DESTINATION>]
[<attribute-list>]
<end-point-path-pair-list> ::=
[<END-POINTS>]<path>
[<end-point-path-pair-list>]
<path> ::= (<ERO>|<SERO>) [<path>]
where:
<attribute-list> ::= [<OF>]
[<LSPA>]
[<BANDWIDTH>]
[<metric-list>]
[<IRO>]
Figure 4: The Message Format for the Reply Message
The optional END-POINTS object in the reply message is used to
specify which paths are removed, changed, not changed, or added for
the request. The path is only needed for the end points that are
added or changed.
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If the E-bit (ERO-Compress bit) was set to 1 in the request, then the
path will be formed by an ERO followed by a list of SEROs.
Note that we preserve compatibility with the definition of <response>
provided in [RFC5440] and with the optional
<end-point-path-pair-list> and <path>.
3.6. P2MP Objective Functions and Metric Types
3.6.1. Objective Functions
Six objective functions have been defined in [RFC5541] for P2P path
computation.
This document defines two additional objective functions -- namely,
SPT (Shortest-Path Tree) and MCT (Minimum-Cost Tree) -- that apply to
P2MP path computation. Hence, two objective function codes are
defined as follows:
Objective Function Code: 7
Name: Shortest-Path Tree (SPT)
Description: Minimize the maximum source-to-leaf cost with respect
to a specific metric or to the TE metric used as the default
metric when the metric is not specified (e.g., TE or IGP metric).
Objective Function Code: 8
Name: Minimum-Cost Tree (MCT)
Description: Minimize the total cost of the tree (i.e., the sum of
the costs of tree links) with respect to a specific metric or to
the TE metric used as the default metric when the metric is not
specified.
Processing these two objective functions is subject to the rules
defined in [RFC5541].
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3.3.3. Interconnection Sharing by the Host
The situation when a node receives an RA on one interface (e.g.
cellular) and shares this connectivity by also acting as a router by
transmitting RA on another interface (e.g. WiFi) is known as
'tethering'. It can be done as ND proxy. The exact behavior is TBD
but it is expected that the one or several PvD associated to the
shared interface (e.g. cellular) will also be advertised to the
clients on the other interface (e.g. WiFi).
4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information
Additional information about the network characteristics can be
retrieved based on the PvD ID. This set of information is called PvD
Additional Information, and is encoded as a JSON object [RFC7159].
The purpose of this additional set of information is to securely
provide additional information to applications about the connectivity
that is provided using a given interface and source address pair. It
typically includes data that would be considered too large, or not
critical enough, to be provided within an RA option. The information
contained in this object MAY be used by the operating system, network
libraries, applications, or users, in order to decide which set of
PvDs should be used for which connection, as described in
Section 3.3.
4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information
When the H-flag of the PvD ID Option is set, hosts MAY attempt to
retrieve the PvD Additional Information associated with a given PvD
by performing an HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] GET query to https://<PvD-
ID>/.well-known/pvd [RFC5785]. Inversely, hosts MUST NOT do so
whenever the H-flag is not set.
Note that the DNS name resolution of the PvD ID, the PKI checks as
well as the actual query MUST be performed using the considered PvD.
In other words, the name resolution, PKI checks, source address
selection, as well as the next-hop router selection MUST be performed
while using exclusively the set of configuration information attached
with the PvD, as defined in Section 3.3. In some cases, it may
therefore be necessary to wait for an address to be available for use
(e.g., once the Duplicate Address Detection or DHCPv6 processes are
complete) before initiating the HTTP over TLS query. If the PvD
allows for temporary address per [RFC4941], then hosts SHOULD use a
temporary address to fetch the PvD Additional Information and SHOULD
deprecate the used temporary address and generate a new temporary
address afterward.
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If the HTTP status of the answer is greater than or equal to 400 the
host MUST abandon and consider that there is no additional PvD
information. If the HTTP status of the answer is between 300 and
399, inclusive, it MUST follow the redirection(s). If the HTTP
status of the answer is between 200 and 299, inclusive, the host MAY
get a file containing a single JSON object. When a JSON object could
not be retrieved, an error message SHOULD be logged and/or displayed
in a rate-limited fashion.
After retrieval of the PvD Additional Information, hosts MUST keep
track of the Sequence Number value received in subsequent RAs
including the same PvD ID. In case the new value is greater than the
value that was observed when the PvD Additional Information object
was retrieved (using serial number arithmetic comparisons [RFC1982]),
or whenever the validity time included in the PVD Additional
Information JSON object is expired, hosts MUST either perform a new
query and retrieve a new version of the object, or, failing that,
deprecate the object and stop using the additional information
provided in the JSON object.
Hosts retrieving a new PvD Additional Information object MUST check
for the presence and validity of the mandatory fields specified in
Section 4.3. A retrieved object including an expiration time that is
already past or missing a mandatory element MUST be ignored. In
order to avoid synchronized queries toward the server hosting the PvD
Additional Information when an object expires, a host which last
retrieved an object at a time A, including a validity time B, SHOULD
renew the object at a uniformly random time in the interval
[(B-A)/2,A].
The PvD Additional Information object includes a set of IPv6 prefixes
(under the key "prefixes") which MUST be checked against all the
Prefix Information Options advertised in the RA. If any of the
prefixes included in the PIO is not covered by at least one of the
listed prefixes, the PvD associated with the tested prefix MUST be
considered unsafe and MUST NOT be used. While this does not prevent
a malicious network provider, it does complicate some attack
scenarios, and may help detecting misconfiguration.
4.2. Operational Consideration to Providing the PvD Additional
Information
Whenever the H-flag is set in the PvD RA Option, a valid PvD
Additional Information object MUST be made available to all hosts
receiving the RA by the network operator. In particular, when a
captive portal is present, hosts MUST still be allowed to perform
DNS, PKI and HTTP over TLS operations related to the retrieval of the
object, even before logging into the captive portal.
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Routers MAY increment the PVD ID Sequence number in order to inform
host that a new PvD Additional Information object is available and
should be retrieved.
The server providing the JSON files SHOULD also check whether the
client address is part of the prefixes listed into the additional
information and SHOULD return a 403 response code if there is no
match.
4.3. PvD Additional Information Format
The PvD Additional Information is a JSON object.
The following table presents the mandatory keys which MUST be
included in the object:
+----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+
| JSON key | Description | Type | Example |
+----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+
| name | Human-readable | UTF-8 | "Awesome Wifi" |
| | service name | string | |
| | | [RFC3629] | |
| expires | Date after | [RFC3339] | "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z" |
| | which this | | |
| | object is not | | |
| | valid | | |
| prefixes | Array of IPv6 | Array of | ["2001:db8:1::/48", |
| | prefixes valid | strings | "2001:db8:4::/48"] |
| | for this PVD | | |
+----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+
A retrieved object which does not include a valid string associated
with the "name" key at the root of the object, or a valid date
associated with the "expires" key, also at the root of the object,
MUST be ignored. In such cases, an error message SHOULD be logged
and/or displayed in a rate-limited fashion. If the PIO of the
received RA is not covered by at least one of the "prefixes" key, the
retrieved object SHOULD be ignored.
The following table presents some optional keys which MAY be included
in the object.
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+---------------+-----------------+---------+-----------------------+
| JSON key | Description | Type | Example |
+---------------+-----------------+---------+-----------------------+
| localizedName | Localized user- | UTF-8 | "Wifi Genial" |
| | visible service | string | |
| | name, language | | |
| | can be selected | | |
| | based on the | | |
| | HTTP Accept- | | |
| | Language header | | |
| | in the request. | | |
| dnsZones | DNS zones | array | ["example.com","sub.e |
| | searchable and | of DNS | xample.org"] |
| | accessible | zones | |
| noInternet | No Internet, | boolean | true |
| | set when the | | |
| | PvD only | | |
| | provides | | |
| | restricted | | |
| | access to a set | | |
| | of services | | |
+---------------+-----------------+---------+-----------------------+
It is worth noting that the JSON format allows for extensions.
Whenever an unknown key is encountered, it MUST be ignored along with
its associated elements.
4.3.1. Private Extensions
JSON keys starting with "x-" are reserved for private use and can be
utilized to provide information that is specific to vendor, user or
enterprise. It is RECOMMENDED to use one of the patterns "x-FQDN-
KEY" or "x-PEN-KEY" where FQDN is a fully qualified domain name or
PEN is a private enterprise number [PEN] under control of the author
of the extension to avoid collisions.
4.3.2. Example
Here are two examples based on the keys defined in this section.
{
"name": "Foo Wireless",
"localizedName": "Foo-France Wifi",
"expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z",
"prefixes" : ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"],
}
RFC 8306 Extensions to PCEP for P2MP TE LSPs November 2017
3.6.2. METRIC Object-Type Values
There are three types defined for the METRIC object in [RFC5440] --
namely, the IGP metric, the TE metric, and Hop Counts. This document
defines three additional types for the METRIC object: the P2MP IGP
metric, the P2MP TE metric, and the P2MP hop count metric. They
encode the sum of the metrics of all links of the tree. The
following values for these metric types have been assigned; see
Section 6.4.
o P2MP IGP metric: T=8
o P2MP TE metric: T=9
o P2MP hop count metric: T=10
3.7. Non-Support of P2MP Path Computation
o If a PCE receives a P2MP path computation request and it
understands the P2MP flag in the RP object, but the PCE is not
capable of P2MP computation, the PCE MUST send a PCErr message
with a PCEP-ERROR object and corresponding Error-value. The
request MUST then be cancelled at the PCC. The Error-Types and
Error-values have been assigned; see Section 6 ("IANA
Considerations") of this document.
o If the PCE does not understand the P2MP flag in the RP object,
then the PCE would send a PCErr message with Error-Type=2
(Capability not supported) as per [RFC5440].
3.8. Non-Support by Back-Level PCE Implementations
If a PCE receives a P2MP request and the PCE does not understand the
P2MP flag in the RP object, and therefore the PCEP P2MP extensions,
then the PCE SHOULD reject the request.
3.9. P2MP TE Path Reoptimization Request
A reoptimization request for a P2MP TE path is specified by the use
of the R-bit within the RP object as defined in [RFC5440] and is
similar to the reoptimization request for a P2P TE path. The only
difference is that the PCC MUST insert the list of Record Route
Objects (RROs) and SRROs after each instance of the END-POINTS object
in the PCReq message, as described in Section 3.4 ("Request Message
Format") of this document.
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An example of a reoptimization request and subsequent PCReq message
is described below:
Common Header
RP with P2MP flag/R-bit set
END-POINTS for leaf type 3
RRO list
OF (optional)
Figure 5: PCReq Message Example 1 for Optimization
In this example, we request reoptimization of the path to all leaves
without adding or pruning leaves. The reoptimization request would
use an END-POINTS object with leaf type 3. The RRO list would
represent the P2MP LSP before the optimization, and the modifiable
path leaves would be indicated in the END-POINTS object.
It is also possible to specify distinct leaves whose path cannot be
modified. An example of the PCReq message in this scenario would be:
Common Header
RP with P2MP flag/R-bit set
END-POINTS for leaf type 3
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 4
RRO list
OF (optional)
Figure 6: PCReq Message Example 2 for Optimization
3.10. Adding and Pruning Leaves to/from the P2MP Tree
When adding new leaves to or removing old leaves from the existing
P2MP tree, by supplying a list of existing leaves, it is possible to
optimize the existing P2MP tree. This section explains the methods
for adding new leaves to or removing old leaves from the existing
P2MP tree.
To add new leaves, the PCC MUST build a P2MP request using END-POINTS
with leaf type 1.
To remove old leaves, the PCC MUST build a P2MP request using
END-POINTS with leaf type 2. If no type-2 END-POINTS exist, then the
PCE MUST send Error-Type 17, Error-value 1: the PCE cannot satisfy
the request due to no END-POINTS with leaf type 2.
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When adding new leaves to or removing old leaves from the existing
P2MP tree, the PCC MUST also provide the list of old leaves, if any,
including END-POINTS with leaf type 3, leaf type 4, or both.
Specific PCEP-ERROR objects and types are used when certain
conditions are not satisfied (i.e., when there are no END-POINTS with
leaf type 3 or 4, or in the presence of END-POINTS with leaf type 1
or 2). A generic "Inconsistent END-POINTS" error will be used if a
PCC receives a request that has an inconsistent END-POINTS setting
(i.e., if a leaf specified as type 1 already exists). These IANA
assignments are documented in Section 6.6 ("PCEP-ERROR Objects and
Types") of this document.
For old leaves, the PCC MUST provide the old path as a list of RROs
that immediately follows each END-POINTS object. This document
specifies Error-values when specific conditions are not satisfied.
The following examples demonstrate full and partial reoptimization of
existing P2MP LSPs:
Case 1: Adding leaves with full reoptimization of existing paths
Common Header
RP with P2MP flag/R-bit set
END-POINTS for leaf type 1
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 3
RRO list
OF (optional)
Case 2: Adding leaves with partial reoptimization of existing paths
Common Header
RP with P2MP flag/R-bit set
END-POINTS for leaf type 1
END-POINTS for leaf type 3
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 4
RRO list
OF (optional)
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Case 3: Adding leaves without reoptimization of existing paths
Common Header
RP with P2MP flag/R-bit set
END-POINTS for leaf type 1
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 4
RRO list
OF (optional)
Case 4: Pruning leaves with full reoptimization of existing paths
Common Header
RP with P2MP flag/R-bit set
END-POINTS for leaf type 2
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 3
RRO list
OF (optional)
Case 5: Pruning leaves with partial reoptimization of existing paths
Common Header
RP with P2MP flag/R-bit set
END-POINTS for leaf type 2
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 3
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 4
RRO list
OF (optional)
Case 6: Pruning leaves without reoptimization of existing paths
Common Header
RP with P2MP flag/R-bit set
END-POINTS for leaf type 2
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 4
RRO list
OF (optional)
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Case 7: Adding and pruning leaves with full reoptimization of
existing paths
Common Header
RP with P2MP flag/R-bit set
END-POINTS for leaf type 1
END-POINTS for leaf type 2
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 3
RRO list
OF (optional)
Case 8: Adding and pruning leaves with partial reoptimization of
existing paths
Common Header
RP with P2MP flag/R-bit set
END-POINTS for leaf type 1
END-POINTS for leaf type 2
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 3
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 4
RRO list
OF (optional)
Case 9: Adding and pruning leaves without reoptimization of existing
paths
Common Header
RP with P2MP flag/R-bit set
END-POINTS for leaf type 1
END-POINTS for leaf type 2
RRO list
END-POINTS for leaf type 4
RRO list
OF (optional)
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3.11. Discovering Branch Nodes
Before computing the P2MP path, a PCE may need to be provided means
to know which nodes in the network are capable of acting as branch
LSRs. A PCE can discover such capabilities by using the mechanisms
defined in [RFC5073].
3.11.1. Branch Node Object
The PCC can specify a list of nodes that can be used as branch nodes
or a list of nodes that cannot be used as branch nodes by using the
Branch Node Capability (BNC) object. The BNC object has the same
format as the Include Route Object (IRO) as defined in [RFC5440],
except that it only supports IPv4 and IPv6 prefix sub-objects. Two
Object-Type parameters are also defined:
o Branch node list: List of nodes that can be used as branch nodes.
o Non-branch node list: List of nodes that cannot be used as branch
nodes.
The object can only be carried in a PCReq message. A path
computation request may carry at most one Branch Node object.
The Object-Class and Object-Type values have been allocated by IANA.
The IANA assignments are documented in Section 6.5 ("PCEP Objects").
3.12. Synchronization of P2MP TE Path Computation Requests
There are cases when multiple P2MP LSPs' computations need to be
synchronized. For example, one P2MP LSP is the designated backup of
another P2MP LSP. In this case, path diversity for these dependent
LSPs may need to be considered during the path computation.
The synchronization can be done by using the existing SVEC
functionality as defined in [RFC5440].
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An example of synchronizing two P2MP LSPs, each having two leaves for
Path Computation Request messages, is illustrated below:
Common Header
SVEC for sync of LSP1 and LSP2
OF (optional)
RP for LSP1
END-POINTS1 for LSP1
RRO1 list
RP for LSP2
END-POINTS2 for LSP2
RRO2 list
Figure 7: PCReq Message Example for Synchronization
This specification also defines two flags for the SVEC Object Flag
Field for P2MP path-dependent computation requests. The first flag
allows the PCC to request that the PCE should compute a secondary
P2MP path tree with partial path diversity for specific leaves or a
specific S2L sub-path to the primary P2MP path tree. The second flag
allows the PCC to request that partial paths should be
link direction diverse.
The following flags are added to the SVEC object body in this
document:
o P (Partial Path Diverse bit - 1 bit):
When set, this would indicate a request for path diversity for a
specific leaf, a set of leaves, or all leaves.
o D (Link Direction Diverse bit - 1 bit):
When set, this would indicate a request that a partial path or
paths should be link direction diverse.
The IANA assignments are referenced in Section 6.8 of this document.
3.13. Request and Response Fragmentation
The total PCEP message length, including the common header, is
16 bytes. In certain scenarios, the P2MP computation request may not
fit into a single request or response message. For example, if a
tree has many hundreds or thousands of leaves, then the request or
response may need to be fragmented into multiple messages.
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The F-bit is outlined in Section 3.3.1 ("The Extension of the RP
Object") of this document. The F-bit is used in the RP object to
signal that the initial request or response was too large to fit into
a single message and will be fragmented into multiple messages. In
order to identify the single request or response, each message will
use the same request ID.
3.13.1. Request Fragmentation Procedure
If the initial request is too large to fit into a single request
message, the PCC will split the request over multiple messages. Each
message sent to the PCE, except the last one, will have the F-bit set
in the RP object to signify that the request has been fragmented into
multiple messages. In order to identify that a series of request
messages represents a single request, each message will use the same
request ID.
The assumption is that request messages are reliably delivered and in
sequence, since PCEP relies on TCP.
3.13.2. Response Fragmentation Procedure
Once the PCE computes a path based on the initial request, a response
is sent back to the PCC. If the response is too large to fit into a
single response message, the PCE will split the response over
multiple messages. Each message sent by the PCE, except the last
one, will have the F-bit set in the RP object to signify that the
response has been fragmented into multiple messages. In order to
identify that a series of response messages represents a single
response, each message will use the same response ID.
Again, the assumption is that response messages are reliably
delivered and in sequence, since PCEP relies on TCP.
3.13.3. Fragmentation Example
The following example illustrates the PCC sending a request message
with Req-ID1 to the PCE, in order to add one leaf to an existing tree
with 1200 leaves. The assumption used for this example is that one
request message can hold up to 800 leaves. In this scenario, the
original single message needs to be fragmented and sent using two
smaller messages, which have Req-ID1 specified in the RP object, and
with the F-bit set on the first message and the F-bit cleared on the
second message.
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Common Header
RP1 with Req-ID1 and P2MP=1 and F-bit=1
OF (optional)
END-POINTS1 for P2MP
RRO1 list
Common Header
RP2 with Req-ID1 and P2MP=1 and F-bit=0
OF (optional)
END-POINTS1 for P2MP
RRO1 list
Figure 8: PCReq Message Fragmentation Example
To handle a scenario where the last fragmented message piece is lost,
the receiver side of the fragmented message may start a timer once it
receives the first piece of the fragmented message. If the timer
expires and it still has not received the last piece of the
fragmented message, it should send an error message to the sender to
signal that it has received an incomplete message. The relevant
error message is documented in Section 3.15 ("P2MP PCEP-ERROR Objects
and Types").
3.14. UNREACH-DESTINATION Object
The PCE path computation request may fail because all or a subset of
the destinations are unreachable.
In such a case, the UNREACH-DESTINATION object allows the PCE to
optionally specify the list of unreachable destinations.
This object can be present in PCRep messages. There can be up to one
such object per RP.
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{
"name": "Bar 4G",
"localizedName": "Bar US 4G",
"expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z",
"prefixes": ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"],
}
4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse
When a host retrieves the PvD Additional Information, it MUST verify
that the TLS server certificate is valid for the performed request
(e.g., that the Subject Name is equal to the PvD ID expressed as an
FQDN). This authentication creates a secure binding between the
information provided by the trusted Router Advertisement, and the
HTTPS server. But this does not mean the Advertising Router and the
PvD server belong to the same entity.
Hosts MUST verify that all prefixes in the RA PIO are covered by a
prefix from the PvD Additional Information. An adversarial router
willing to fake the use of a given explicit PvD, without any access
to the actual PvD Additional Information, would need to perform NAT66
in order to circumvent this check.
It is also RECOMMENDED that the HTTPS server checks the source
addresses of incoming connections (see Section 4.1). This check give
reasonable assurance that neither NPTv6 [RFC6296] nor NAT66 were used
and restricts the information to the valid network users.
5. Operation Considerations
This section describes some use cases of PvD. For sake of
simplicity, the RA messages will not be described in the usual ASCII
art but rather in an indented list. For example, a RA message
containing some options and a PvD ID option that also contains other
options will be described as:
o RA Header: router lifetime = 6000
o Prefix Information Option: length = 4, prefix = 2001:db8:cafe::/64
o PvD ID header: length = 3+ 5 +4 , PvD ID FQDN = example.org,
A-flag = 0 (actual length of the header with padding 24 bytes = 3
* 8 bytes)
* Recursive DNS Server: length = 5, addresses=
[2001:db8:cafe::53, 2001:db8:f00d::53]
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* Prefix Information Option: length = 4, prefix =
2001:db8:f00d::/64
It is expected that for some years, networks will have a mix of PvD-
aware hosts and PvD-ignorant hosts. If there is a need to give
specific information to PvD-aware hosts only, then it is recommended
to send TWO RA messages: one for each class of hosts. For example,
here is the RA for PvD-ignorant hosts:
o RA Header: router lifetime = 6000 (PvD-ignorant hosts will use
this router as a default router)
o Prefix Information Option: length = 4, prefix = 2001:db8:cafe::/64
o Recursive DNS Server Option: length = 3, addresses=
[2001:db8:cafe::53]
o PvD ID header: length = 3+ 2, PvD ID FQDN = foo.example.org,
A-flag = 1 (actual length of the header 24 bytes = 3 * 8 bytes)
* RA Header: router lifetime = 0 (PvD-aware hosts will not use
this router as a default router), implicit length = 2
And here is a RA example for PvD-aware hosts:
o RA Header: router lifetime = 0 (PvD-ignorant hosts will not use
this router as a default router)
o PvD ID header: length = 3+ 2 + 4 + 3, PvD ID FQDN = example.org,
A-flag = 1 (actual length of the header 24 bytes = 3 * 8 bytes)
* RA Header: router lifetime = 1600 (PvD-aware hosts will use
this router as a default router), implicit length = 2
* Prefix Information Option: length = 4, prefix =
2001:db8:f00d::/64
* Recursive DNS Server Option: length = 3, addresses=
[2001:db8:f00d::53]
In the above example, PvD-ignorant hosts will only use the first RA
sent from their default router and using the 2001:db8:cafe::/64
prefix. PvD-aware hosts will autonomously configure addresses from
both PIOs, but will only use the source address in 2001:db8:f00d::/64
to communicate past the first hop router since only the router
sending the second RA will be used as default router; similarly, they
will use the DNS server 2001:db8:f00d::53 when communicating with
this adress.
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6. Security Considerations
Although some solutions such as IPsec or SeND [RFC3971] can be used
in order to secure the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol, actual
deployments largely rely on link layer or physical layer security
mechanisms (e.g. 802.1x [IEEE8021X]) in conjunction with RA Guard
[RFC6105].
This specification does not improve the Neighbor Discovery Protocol
security model, but extends the purely link-local trust relationship
between the host and the default routers with HTTP over TLS
communications which servers are authenticated as rightful owners of
the FQDN received within the trusted PvD ID RA option.
It must be noted that Section 4.4 of this document only provides
reasonable assurance against misconfiguration but does not prevent an
hostile network access provider to wrong information that could lead
applications or hosts to select an hostile PvD. Users should always
apply caution when connecting to an unknown network.
7. Privacy Considerations
Retrieval of the PvD Additional Information over HTTPS requires early
communications between the connecting host and a server which may be
located further than the first hop router. Although this server is
likely to be located within the same administrative domain as the
default router, this property can't be ensured. Therefore, hosts
willing to retrieve the PvD Additional Information before using it
without leaking identity information, SHOULD make use of an IPv6
Privacy Address and SHOULD NOT include any privacy sensitive data,
such as User Agent header or HTTP cookie, while performing the HTTP
over TLS query.
From a privacy perspective, retrieving the PvD Additional Information
is not different from establishing a first connexion to a remote
server, or even performing a single DNS lookup. For example, most
operating systems already perform early queries to well known web
sites, such as http://captive.example.com/hotspot-detect.html, in
order to detect the presence of a captive portal.
There may be some cases where hosts, for privacy reasons, should
refrain from accessing servers that are located outside a certain
network boundary. In practice, this could be implemented as a
whitelist of 'trusted' FQDNs and/or IP prefixes that the host is
allowed to communicate with. In such scenarios, the host SHOULD
check that the provided PvD ID, as well as the IP address that it
resolves into, are part of the allowed whitelist.
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8. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to assign the value TBD from the IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery Option Formats registry for the PvD ID Router Advertisement
option.
IANA is asked to assign the value "pvd" from the Well-Known URIs
registry.
IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry entitled
"Additional Information PvD Keys" containing ASCII strings. The
initial content of this registry are given in Section 4.3; future
assignments are to be made through Expert Review [BCP36].
Finally, IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry entitled
"PvD ID Router Advertisement option Flags" reserving bit positions
from 0 to 15 to be used in the PvD ID Router Advertisement option
bitmask. Bit position 0, 1 and 2 are reserved by this document (as
specified in Figure 1). Future assignments require a Standard Track
RFC document.
9. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to M. Stenberg and S. Barth for their earlier work:
[I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns], as well as to Basile Bruneau who was
author of an early version of this document.
Thanks also to Marcus Keane, Mikael Abrahamson, Ray Bellis, Lorenzo
Colitti, Bob Hinden, Tatuya Jinmei, Erik Kline, Ted Lemon, Jen
Lenkova, Mark Townsley and James Woodyatt for useful and interesting
discussions.
Finally, special thanks to Thierry Danis and Wenqin Shao for their
valuable inputs and implementation efforts ([github]), Tom Jones for
his integration effort into the NEAT project and Rigil Salim for his
implementation work.
10. References
10.1. Normative references
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1982, August 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1982>.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2461] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2461, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2461>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
10.2. Informative references
[github] Cisco, "IPv6-mPvD github repository",
<https://github.com/IPv6-mPvD>.
[I-D.kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs]
Kline, E., "Multiple Provisioning Domains API
Requirements", draft-kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs-00 (work in
progress), November 2015.
[I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns]
Stenberg, M. and S. Barth, "Multiple Provisioning Domains
using Domain Name System", draft-stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns-00
(work in progress), October 2015.
Pfister, et al. Expires August 13, 2018 [Page 17]
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[IEEE8021X]
IEEE, "IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area
Networks: Port based Network Access Control, IEEE Std".
[PEN] IANA, "Private Enterprise Numbers",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
"SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>.
[RFC4191] Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and
More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, DOI 10.17487/RFC4191,
November 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4191>.
[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC6105] Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J.
Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6105, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6105>.
[RFC6296] Wasserman, M. and F. Baker, "IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix
Translation", RFC 6296, DOI 10.17487/RFC6296, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6296>.
[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.
[RFC7556] Anipko, D., Ed., "Multiple Provisioning Domain
Architecture", RFC 7556, DOI 10.17487/RFC7556, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7556>.
The following UNREACH-DESTINATION objects (for IPv4 and IPv6) are
defined:
UNREACH-DESTINATION Object-Class is 28.
UNREACH-DESTINATION Object-Type for IPv4 is 1.
UNREACH-DESTINATION Object-Type for IPv6 is 2.
The format of the UNREACH-DESTINATION object body for IPv4
(Object-Type=1) is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination IPv4 address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ ... ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination IPv4 address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 9: UNREACH-DESTINATION Object Body for IPv4
The format of the UNREACH-DESTINATION object body for IPv6
(Object-Type=2) is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Destination IPv6 address (16 bytes) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ ... ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Destination IPv6 address (16 bytes) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 10: UNREACH-DESTINATION Object Body for IPv6
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3.15. P2MP PCEP-ERROR Objects and Types
To indicate an error associated with a policy violation, the
Error-value "P2MP Path computation is not allowed" has been added to
the existing error code for Error-Type 5 ("Policy violation") as
defined in [RFC5440] (see also Section 6.6 of this document):
Error-Type=5; Error-value=7: if a PCE receives a P2MP path
computation request that is not compliant with administrative
privileges (i.e., "The PCE policy does not support P2MP path
computation"), the PCE MUST send a PCErr message with a PCEP-ERROR
object (Error-Type=5) and an Error-value of 7. The corresponding
P2MP path computation request MUST also be cancelled.
To indicate capability errors associated with the P2MP path
computation request, Error-Type (16) and subsequent Error-values are
defined as follows for inclusion in the PCEP-ERROR object:
Error-Type=16; Error-value=1: if a PCE receives a P2MP path
computation request and the PCE is not capable of satisfying the
request due to insufficient memory, the PCE MUST send a PCErr
message with a PCEP-ERROR object (Error-Type=16) and an
Error-value of 1. The corresponding P2MP path computation request
MUST also be cancelled.
Error-Type=16; Error-value=2: if a PCE receives a P2MP path
computation request and the PCE is not capable of P2MP
computation, the PCE MUST send a PCErr message with a PCEP-ERROR
object (Error-Type=16) and an Error-value of 2. The corresponding
P2MP path computation request MUST also be cancelled.
To indicate P2MP message fragmentation errors associated with a P2MP
path computation request, Error-Type (18) and subsequent Error-values
are defined as follows for inclusion in the PCEP-ERROR object:
Error-Type=18; Error-value=1: if a PCE has not received the last
piece of the fragmented message, it should send an error message
to the sender to signal that it has received an incomplete message
(i.e., "Fragmented request failure"). The PCE MUST send a PCErr
message with a PCEP-ERROR object (Error-Type=18) and an
Error-value of 1.
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3.16. PCEP NO-PATH Indicator
To communicate the reasons for not being able to find a P2MP path
computation, the NO-PATH object can be used in the PCRep message.
One bit is defined in the NO-PATH-VECTOR TLV carried in the NO-PATH
object:
bit 24: when set, the PCE indicates that there is a reachability
problem with all or a subset of the P2MP destinations.
Optionally, the PCE can specify the destination or list of
destinations that are not reachable using the UNREACH-DESTINATION
object defined in Section 3.14.
4. Manageability Considerations
[RFC5862] describes various manageability requirements in support of
P2MP path computation when applying PCEP. This section describes how
manageability requirements mentioned in [RFC5862] are supported in
the context of PCEP extensions specified in this document.
Note that [RFC5440] describes various manageability considerations
for PCEP, and most of the manageability requirements mentioned in
[RFC5862] are already covered there.
4.1. Control of Function and Policy
In addition to PCE configuration parameters listed in [RFC5440], the
following additional parameters might be required:
o The PCE may be configured to enable or disable P2MP path
computations.
o The PCE may be configured to enable or disable the advertisement
of its P2MP path computation capability. A PCE can advertise its
P2MP capability via the IGP discovery mechanism discussed in
Section 3.1.1 ("IGP Extensions for P2MP Capability Advertisement")
or during the Open Message Exchange discussed in Section 3.1.2
("Open Message Extension").
4.2. Information and Data Models
A number of MIB objects have been defined in [RFC7420] for general
PCEP control and monitoring of P2P computations. [RFC5862] specifies
that MIB objects will be required to support the control and
monitoring of the protocol extensions defined in this document. A
new document will be required to define MIB objects for PCEP control
and monitoring of P2MP computations.
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The "ietf-pcep" PCEP YANG module is specified in [PCEP-YANG]. The
P2MP capability of a PCEP entity or a configured peer can be set
using this YANG module. Also, support for P2MP path computation can
be learned using this module. The statistics are maintained in the
"ietf-pcep-stats" YANG module as specified in [PCEP-YANG]. This YANG
module will be required to be augmented to also include the
P2MP-related statistics.
4.3. Liveness Detection and Monitoring
There are no additional considerations beyond those expressed in
[RFC5440], since [RFC5862] does not address any additional
requirements.
4.4. Verifying Correct Operation
There are no additional requirements beyond those expressed in
[RFC4657] for verifying the correct operation of the PCEP sessions.
It is expected that future MIB objects will facilitate verification
of correct operation and reporting of P2MP PCEP requests, responses,
and errors.
4.5. Requirements for Other Protocols and Functional Components
The method for the PCE to obtain information about a PCE capable of
P2MP path computations via OSPF and IS-IS is discussed in
Section 3.1.1 ("IGP Extensions for P2MP Capability Advertisement") of
this document.
The relevant IANA assignment is documented in Section 6.9 ("OSPF PCE
Capability Flag") of this document.
4.6. Impact on Network Operation
It is expected that the use of PCEP extensions specified in this
document will not significantly increase the level of operational
traffic. However, computing a P2MP tree may require more PCE state
compared to a P2P computation. In the event of a major network
failure and multiple recovery P2MP tree computation requests being
sent to the PCE, the load on the PCE may also be significantly
increased.
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5. Security Considerations
As described in [RFC5862], P2MP path computation requests are more
CPU-intensive and also utilize more link bandwidth. In the event of
an unauthorized P2MP path computation request or a denial-of-service
attack, the subsequent PCEP requests and processing may be disruptive
to the network. Consequently, it is important that implementations
conform to the relevant security requirements that specifically help
to minimize or negate unauthorized P2MP path computation requests and
denial-of-service attacks. These mechanisms include the following:
o Securing the PCEP session requests and responses is RECOMMENDED
using TCP security techniques such as the TCP Authentication
Option (TCP-AO) [RFC5925] or using Transport Layer Security (TLS)
[RFC8253], as per the recommendations and best current practices
in [RFC7525].
o Authenticating the PCEP requests and responses to ensure that the
message is intact and sent from an authorized node using the
TCP-AO or TLS is RECOMMENDED.
o Policy control could be provided by explicitly defining which PCCs
are allowed to send P2MP path computation requests to the PCE via
IP access lists.
PCEP operates over TCP, so it is also important to secure the PCE and
PCC against TCP denial-of-service attacks.
As stated in [RFC6952], PCEP implementations SHOULD support the
TCP-AO [RFC5925] and not use TCP MD5 because of TCP MD5's known
vulnerabilities and weakness.
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6. IANA Considerations
IANA maintains a registry of PCEP parameters. A number of IANA
considerations have been highlighted in previous sections of this
document. IANA made the allocations as per [RFC6006].
6.1. PCEP TLV Type Indicators
As described in Section 3.1.2, the P2MP capability TLV allows the PCE
to advertise its P2MP path computation capability.
IANA had previously made an allocation from the "PCEP TLV Type
Indicators" subregistry, where RFC 6006 was the reference. IANA has
updated the reference as follows to point to this document.
Value Description Reference
6 P2MP capable RFC 8306
6.2. Request Parameter Bit Flags
As described in Section 3.3.1, three RP Object Flags have been
defined.
IANA had previously made allocations from the PCEP "RP Object Flag
Field" subregistry, where RFC 6006 was the reference. IANA has
updated the reference as follows to point to this document.
Bit Description Reference
18 Fragmentation (F-bit) RFC 8306
19 P2MP (N-bit) RFC 8306
20 ERO-compression (E-bit) RFC 8306
6.3. Objective Functions
As described in Section 3.6.1, this document defines two objective
functions.
IANA had previously made allocations from the PCEP "Objective
Function" subregistry, where RFC 6006 was the reference. IANA has
updated the reference as follows to point to this document.
Code Point Name Reference
7 SPT RFC 8306
8 MCT RFC 8306
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6.4. METRIC Object-Type Values
As described in Section 3.6.2, three METRIC object T fields have been
defined.
IANA had previously made allocations from the PCEP "METRIC Object
T Field" subregistry, where RFC 6006 was the reference. IANA has
updated the reference as follows to point to this document.
Value Description Reference
8 P2MP IGP metric RFC 8306
9 P2MP TE metric RFC 8306
10 P2MP hop count metric RFC 8306
6.5. PCEP Objects
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, two END-POINTS Object-Type values are
defined.
IANA had previously made the Object-Type allocations from the "PCEP
Objects" subregistry, where RFC 6006 was the reference. IANA has
updated the reference as follows to point to this document.
Object-Class Value 4
Name END-POINTS
Object-Type 3: IPv4
4: IPv6
5-15: Unassigned
Reference RFC 8306
As described in Sections 3.2, 3.11.1, and 3.14, four PCEP
Object-Class values and six PCEP Object-Type values have been
defined.
IANA had previously made allocations from the "PCEP Objects"
subregistry, where RFC 6006 was the reference. IANA has updated the
reference to point to this document.
Zhao, et al. Standards Track [Page 32]
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Also, for the following four PCEP objects, codepoint 0 for the
Object-Type field is marked "Reserved", as per Erratum ID 4956 for
RFC 5440. IANA has updated the reference to point to this document.
Object-Class Value 28
Name UNREACH-DESTINATION
Object-Type 0: Reserved
1: IPv4
2: IPv6
3-15: Unassigned
Reference RFC 8306
Object-Class Value 29
Name SERO
Object-Type 0: Reserved
1: SERO
2-15: Unassigned
Reference RFC 8306
Object-Class Value 30
Name SRRO
Object-Type 0: Reserved
1: SRRO
2-15: Unassigned
Reference RFC 8306
Object-Class Value 31
Name BNC
Object-Type 0: Reserved
1: Branch node list
2: Non-branch node list
3-15: Unassigned
Reference RFC 8306
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6.6. PCEP-ERROR Objects and Types
As described in Section 3.15, a number of PCEP-ERROR Object
Error-Types and Error-values have been defined.
IANA had previously made allocations from the PCEP "PCEP-ERROR Object
Error Types and Values" subregistry, where RFC 6006 was the
reference. IANA has updated the reference as follows to point to
this document.
Error
Type Meaning Reference
5 Policy violation
Error-value=7: RFC 8306
P2MP Path computation is not allowed
16 P2MP Capability Error
Error-value=0: Unassigned RFC 8306
Error-value=1: RFC 8306
The PCE cannot satisfy the request
due to insufficient memory
Error-value=2: RFC 8306
The PCE is not capable of P2MP computation
17 P2MP END-POINTS Error
Error-value=0: Unassigned RFC 8306
Error-value=1: RFC 8306
The PCE cannot satisfy the request
due to no END-POINTS with leaf type 2
Error-value=2: RFC 8306
The PCE cannot satisfy the request
due to no END-POINTS with leaf type 3
Error-value=3: RFC 8306
The PCE cannot satisfy the request
due to no END-POINTS with leaf type 4
Error-value=4: RFC 8306
The PCE cannot satisfy the request
due to inconsistent END-POINTS
18 P2MP Fragmentation Error
Error-value=0: Unassigned RFC 8306
Error-value=1: RFC 8306
Fragmented request failure
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6.7. PCEP NO-PATH Indicator
As discussed in Section 3.16, the NO-PATH-VECTOR TLV Flag Field has
been defined.
IANA had previously made an allocation from the PCEP "NO-PATH-VECTOR
TLV Flag Field" subregistry, where RFC 6006 was the reference. IANA
has updated the reference as follows to point to this document.
Bit Description Reference
24 P2MP Reachability Problem RFC 8306
6.8. SVEC Object Flag
As discussed in Section 3.12, two SVEC Object Flags are defined.
IANA had previously made allocations from the PCEP "SVEC Object Flag
Field" subregistry, where RFC 6006 was the reference. IANA has
updated the reference as follows to point to this document.
Bit Description Reference
19 Partial Path Diverse RFC 8306
20 Link Direction Diverse RFC 8306
6.9. OSPF PCE Capability Flag
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the OSPF Capability Flag is defined to
indicate P2MP path computation capability.
IANA had previously made an assignment from the OSPF Parameters "Path
Computation Element (PCE) Capability Flags" registry, where RFC 6006
was the reference. IANA has updated the reference as follows to
point to this document.
Bit Description Reference
10 P2MP path computation RFC 8306
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7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3209] Awduche, D., Berger, L., Gan, D., Li, T., Srinivasan, V.,
and G. Swallow, "RSVP-TE: Extensions to RSVP for LSP
Tunnels", RFC 3209, DOI 10.17487/RFC3209, December 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3209>.
[RFC3473] Berger, L., Ed., "Generalized Multi-Protocol Label
Switching (GMPLS) Signaling Resource ReserVation
Protocol-Traffic Engineering (RSVP-TE) Extensions",
RFC 3473, DOI 10.17487/RFC3473, January 2003,
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[RFC8028] Baker, F. and B. Carpenter, "First-Hop Router Selection by
Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network", RFC 8028,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8028, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8028>.
[RFC8106] Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
"IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
RFC 8106, DOI 10.17487/RFC8106, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8106>.
Appendix A. Changelog
Note to RFC Editors: Remove this section before publication.
A.1. Version 00
Initial version of the draft. Edited by Basile Bruneau + Eric Vyncke
and based on Basile's work.
A.2. Version 01
Major rewrite intended to focus on the the retained solution based on
corridors, online, and WG discussions. Edited by Pierre Pfister.
The following list only includes major changes.
PvD ID is an FQDN retrieved using a single RA option. This option
contains a sequence number for push-based updates, a new H-flag,
and a L-flag in order to link the PvD with the IPv4 DHCP server.
A lifetime is included in the PvD ID option.
Detailed Hosts and Routers specifications.
Additional Information is retrieved using HTTP-over-TLS when the
PvD ID Option H-flag is set. Retrieving the object is optional.
The PvD Additional Information object includes a validity date.
DNS-based approach is removed as well as the DNS-based encoding of
the PvD Additional Information.
Major cut in the list of proposed JSON keys. This document may be
extended later if need be.
Monetary discussion is moved to the appendix.
Clarification about the 'prefixes' contained in the additional
information.
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Clarification about the processing of DHCPv6.
A.3. Version 02
The FQDN is now encoded with ASCII format (instead of DNS binary)
in the RA option.
The PvD ID option lifetime is removed from the object.
Use well known URI "https://<PvD-ID>/.well-known/pvd"
Reference RFC3339 for JSON timestamp format.
The PvD ID Sequence field has been extended to 16 bits.
Modified host behavior for DHCPv4 and DHCPv6.
Removed IKEv2 section.
Removed mention of RFC7710 Captive Portal option. A new I.D.
will be proposed to address the captive portal use case.
A.4. WG Document version 00
Document has been accepted as INTAREA working group document
IANA considerations follow RFC8126 [RFC8126]
PvD ID FQDN is encoded as per RFC 1035 [RFC1035]
PvD ID FQDN is prepended by a one-byte length field
Marcus Keane added as co-author
dnsZones key is added back
draft of a privacy consideration section and added that a
temporary address should be used to retrieve the PvD additional
information
per Bob Hinden's request: the document is now aiming at standard
track and security considerations have been moved to the main
section
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A.5. WG Document version 01
Removing references to 'metered' and 'characteristics' keys.
Those may be in scope of the PvD work, but this document will
focus on essential parts only.
Removing appendix section regarding link quality and billing
information.
The PvD RA Option may now contain other RA options such that PvD-
aware hosts may receive configuration information otherwise
invisible to non-PvD-aware hosts.
Clarify that the additional PvD Additional Information is not
intended to modify host's networking stack behavior, but rather
provide information to the Application, used to select which PvDs
must be used and provide configuration parameters to the transport
layer.
The RA option padding is used to increase the option size to the
next 64 (was 32) bits boundary.
Better detail the Security model and Privacy considerations.
Authors' Addresses
Pierre Pfister
Cisco
11 Rue Camille Desmoulins
Issy-les-Moulineaux 92130
France
Email: ppfister@cisco.com
Eric Vyncke (editor)
Cisco
De Kleetlaan, 6
Diegem 1831
Belgium
Email: evyncke@cisco.com
Tommy Pauly
Apple
Email: tpauly@apple.com
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David Schinazi
Apple
Email: dschinazi@apple.com
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