IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys (Revised)
draft-harkins-ipsra-crack-00
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Dan Harkins , Derrell Piper | ||
Last updated | 2000-08-25 | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This memo describes a new IKE authentication method ([HC98]) which provides for mutual authentication when one side is using a legacy- based secret-key authentication technique such as RADIUS, SecurID, or OTP and the other side is using public-key authentication, with optional digital certificates. The generic protocol described herein is an open-ended IKE phase 1 exchange ([HC98]). The result of this exchange is a mutually authenticated IKE security association ([HC98]). The keys that are derived from this SA are also authenticated and thereby convey this state to any SA's created from it for any other security service, such as IPsec [Pip98].
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)