Use of the IPv6 Flow Label as a Transport-Layer Nonce to Defend Against Off-Path Spoofing Attacks
draft-blake-ipv6-flow-label-nonce-02
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Steven Blake | ||
Last updated | 2009-10-26 | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
TCP and other transport-layer protocols are vulnerable to spoofing attacks from off-path hosts. These attacks can be prevented through the use of cryptographic authentication. However, it is difficult to use cryptographic authentication in all circumstances. A variety of obfuscation techniques -- such as initial sequence number randomization and source port randomization -- increase the effort required of an attacker to successfully guess the packet header fields which uniquely identify a transport connection. This memo proposes the use of the IPv6 Flow Label field as a random, per- connection nonce value, to add entropy to the set of packet header fields used to identify a transport connection. This mechanism is easily implementable, allows for incremental deployment, and is fully compliant with the rules for Flow Label use defined in RFC 3697.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)