TLS Downgrade protection extension for TLS DNSSEC Authentication Chain Extension
draft-asmithee-tls-dnssec-downprot-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2018-05-15
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text xml pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
TLS                                                         Alan Smithee
Internet-Draft
Updates: 10000 (if approved)                                Alan Smithee
Intended status: Standards Track                            May 15, 2018
Expires: November 16, 2018

 TLS Downgrade protection extension for TLS DNSSEC Authentication Chain
                               Extension
                 draft-asmithee-tls-dnssec-downprot-00

Abstract

   This draft specifies a TLS extension that adds downgrade protection
   for another TLS extension, [dnssec-chain-extension].  Without the
   downgrade protection specified in this TLS extension, the only effect
   of deploying [dnssec-chain-extension] is to reduce TLS security from
   the standard "WebPKI security" to "WebPKI or DANE, whichever is
   weaker".

   This draft dictates that [dnssec-chain-extension] MUST only be used
   in combination with this TLS extension, whose only content is a two
   octet SupportLifetime value.  A value of 0 prohibits the TLS client
   from unilaterally requiring ongoing use of both TLS extensions based
   on prior observation of their use (pinning).  A non-zero value is the
   value in hours for which this TLS extension as well as
   [dnssec-chain-extension] MUST appear in subsequent TLS handshakes to
   the same TLS hostname and port.  If this TLS extention or
   [dnssec-chain-extension] is missing from the TLS handshake within
   this observed pinning time, the TLS client MUST assume it is under
   attack and abort the TLS connection.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 16, 2018.

Alan Smithee & Alan SmitExpires November 16, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    TLS DNSSEC Chain Downgrade Protection         May 2018

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  TLS DNSSEC Extension Downgrade Protection Extension format  .   3
   4.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Introduction

   This draft specifies a TLS extension that adds downgrade protection
   for another TLS extension, [dnssec-chain-extension].  Without the
   downgrade protection specified in this TLS extension, the only effect
   of deploying [dnssec-chain-extension] is to reduce TLS security from
   the standard "WebPKI security" to "WebPKI or DANE, whichever is
   weaker".

   This draft dictates that [dnssec-chain-extension] MUST only be used
   in combination with this TLS extension, whose only content is a two
   byte SupportLifetime value.  A value of 0 prohibits the TLS client
   from unilaterally requiring ongoing use of both TLS extensions based
   on prior observation of their use (pinning).  A non-zero value is the

Alan Smithee & Alan SmitExpires November 16, 2018               [Page 2]
Internet-Draft    TLS DNSSEC Chain Downgrade Protection         May 2018

   value in hours for which this TLS extension as well as
Show full document text