DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 2
RFC 6781
Document | Type |
RFC - Informational
(December 2012; Errata)
Obsoletes RFC 4641
|
|
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Authors | Olaf Kolkman , Matthijs Mekking , R. Gieben | ||
Last updated | 2020-01-21 | ||
Stream | Internent Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized with errata bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | Peter Koch | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2012-07-23) | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 6781 (Informational) | |
Action Holders |
(None)
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||
Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Ron Bonica | ||
IESG note | Peter Koch (pk@ISOC.DE) is the document shepherd. | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) O. Kolkman Request for Comments: 6781 W. Mekking Obsoletes: 4641 NLnet Labs Category: Informational R. Gieben ISSN: 2070-1721 SIDN Labs December 2012 DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 2 Abstract This document describes a set of practices for operating the DNS with security extensions (DNSSEC). The target audience is zone administrators deploying DNSSEC. The document discusses operational aspects of using keys and signatures in the DNS. It discusses issues of key generation, key storage, signature generation, key rollover, and related policies. This document obsoletes RFC 4641, as it covers more operational ground and gives more up-to-date requirements with respect to key sizes and the DNSSEC operations. Status of This Memo This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6781. Kolkman, et al. Informational [Page 1] RFC 6781 DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 2 December 2012 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................4 1.1. The Use of the Term 'key' ..................................5 1.2. Time Definitions ...........................................6 2. Keeping the Chain of Trust Intact ...............................6 3. Key Generation and Storage ......................................7 3.1. Operational Motivation for Zone Signing Keys and Key Signing Keys ...........................................8 3.2. Practical Consequences of KSK and ZSK Separation ..........10 3.2.1. Rolling a KSK That Is Not a Trust Anchor ...........10 3.2.2. Rolling a KSK That Is a Trust Anchor ...............11 3.2.3. The Use of the SEP Flag ............................12 3.3. Key Effectivity Period ....................................12 3.4. Cryptographic Considerations ..............................14 3.4.1. Signature Algorithm ................................14 3.4.2. Key Sizes ..........................................14 3.4.3. Private Key Storage ................................16 3.4.4. Key Generation .....................................17 3.4.5. Differentiation for 'High-Level' Zones? ............17 Kolkman, et al. Informational [Page 2] RFC 6781 DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 2 December 2012 4. Signature Generation, Key Rollover, and Related Policies .......18 4.1. Key Rollovers .............................................18 4.1.1. Zone Signing Key Rollovers .........................18Show full document text