Traceable Anonymous Certificate
RFC 5636
Document | Type |
RFC - Experimental
(August 2009; Errata)
Was draft-ietf-pkix-tac (pkix WG)
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Authors | Sanghwan Park , Yoojae Won , Jaeil Lee , Stephen Kent , Haeryong Park | ||
Last updated | 2019-12-13 | ||
Stream | IETF | ||
Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | (None) | |
Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 5636 (Experimental) | |
Action Holders |
(None)
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||
Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Tim Polk | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
Network Working Group S. Park Request for Comments: 5636 H. Park Category: Experimental Y. Won J. Lee KISA S. Kent BBN Technologies August 2009 Traceable Anonymous Certificate Abstract This document defines a practical architecture and protocols for offering privacy for a user who requests and uses an X.509 certificate containing a pseudonym, while still retaining the ability to map such a certificate to the real user who requested it. The architecture is compatible with IETF certificate request formats such as PKCS10 (RFC 2986) and CMC (RFC 5272). The architecture separates the authorities involved in issuing a certificate: one for verifying ownership of a private key (Blind Issuer) and the other for validating the contents of a certificate (Anonymity Issuer). The end entity (EE) certificates issued under this model are called Traceable Anonymous Certificates (TACs). Status of This Memo This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Park, et al. Experimental [Page 1] RFC 5636 Traceable Anonymous Certificate August 2009 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................2 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................4 2. General Overview ................................................4 3. Requirements ....................................................5 4. Traceable Anonymous Certificate Model ...........................6 5. Issuing a TAC ...................................................7 5.1. Steps in Issuing a TAC .....................................8 5.2. Mapping a TAC to a User's Real Identity ...................15 5.3. TAC Request Message Format Profile ........................17 5.3.1. PKCS10 Profile .....................................17 5.3.2. CMC Profile ........................................18 6. Security Considerations ........................................19 7. Acknowledgments ................................................21 8. References .....................................................21 8.1. Normative References ......................................21 8.2. Informative References ....................................22 Appendix A. Traceable Anonymous Certificate ASN.1 Modules .........24 Appendix B. TAC Message Exchanges over Transport Layer Security ...26 B.1. Message Exchanges between a User and the BI or the AI .....26 B.2. Message Exchanges between the BI and the AI ...............27 B.3. Message Exchanges between the Aggrieved Party and the AI or the BI .................................................27 Appendix C. Cryptographic Message Syntax Profile for TAC Token ....28 C.1. Signed-Data Content Type ..................................28 C.1.1. encapContentInfo ...................................29 C.1.2. signerInfos ........................................29 1. Introduction Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides a powerful means of authenticating individuals, organizations, and computers (e.g., web servers). However, when individuals use certificates to access resources on the public Internet, there are legitimate concerns about personal privacy, and thus there are increasing demands for privacy- enhancing techniques on the Internet. In a PKI, an authorized entity such as a Certification Authority (CA) or a Registration Authority (RA) may be perceived, from a privacy perspective, as a "big brother", even when a CA issues a certificate containing a Subject name that is a pseudonym. This is because such entities can always map a pseudonym in a certificate they issued to the name of the real user to whom it was issued. This documentShow full document text