The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
RFC 3711
| Document | Type |
RFC - Proposed Standard
(March 2004; Errata)
Was draft-ietf-avt-srtp (avt WG)
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2013-03-02 | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Formats | plain text pdf htmlized with errata bibtex | ||
| Stream | WG state | (None) | |
| Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 3711 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Allison Mankin | ||
| Send notices to | <csp@csperkins.org>, <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com> | ||
Network Working Group M. Baugher
Request for Comments: 3711 D. McGrew
Category: Standards Track Cisco Systems, Inc.
M. Naslund
E. Carrara
K. Norrman
Ericsson Research
March 2004
The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
(SRTP), a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which
can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay
protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the
Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP).
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Goals and Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. SRTP Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Secure RTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. SRTP Cryptographic Contexts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. Transform-independent parameters . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.2. Transform-dependent parameters . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.3. Mapping SRTP Packets to Cryptographic Contexts . 10
3.3. SRTP Packet Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.1. Packet Index Determination, and ROC, s_l Update. 13
3.3.2. Replay Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4. Secure RTCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Baugher, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 3711 SRTP March 2004
4. Pre-Defined Cryptographic Transforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1.1. AES in Counter Mode. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.2. AES in f8-mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1.3. NULL Cipher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2. Message Authentication and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.1. HMAC-SHA1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3. Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3.1. Key Derivation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3.2. SRTCP Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3.3. AES-CM PRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5. Default and mandatory-to-implement Transforms. . . . . . . . . 28
5.1. Encryption: AES-CM and NULL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.2. Message Authentication/Integrity: HMAC-SHA1. . . . . . . 29
5.3. Key Derivation: AES-CM PRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6. Adding SRTP Transforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7. Rationale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1. Key derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.2. Salting key. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.3. Message Integrity from Universal Hashing . . . . . . . . 31
7.4. Data Origin Authentication Considerations. . . . . . . . 31
7.5. Short and Zero-length Message Authentication . . . . . . 32
8. Key Management Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.1. Re-keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1.1. Use of the <From, To> for re-keying. . . . . . . 34
8.2. Key Management parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
9.1. SSRC collision and two-time pad. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
9.2. Key Usage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
9.3. Confidentiality of the RTP Payload . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9.4. Confidentiality of the RTP Header. . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.5. Integrity of the RTP payload and header. . . . . . . . . 40
9.5.1. Risks of Weak or Null Message Authentication. . . 42
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