The PPP Encryption Control Protocol (ECP)
RFC 1968
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RFC - Proposed Standard
(June 1996; No errata)
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Gerry Meyer
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2013-03-02
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Network Working Group G. Meyer
Request for Comments: 1968 Spider Systems
Category: Standards Track June 1996
The PPP Encryption Control Protocol (ECP)
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [1] provides a standard method for
transporting multi-protocol datagrams over point-to-point links. PPP
also defines an extensible Link Control Protocol.
This document defines a method for negotiating data encryption over
PPP links.
Conventions
The following language conventions are used in the items of
specification in this document:
o MUST -- the item is an absolute requirement of the specification.
MUST is only used where it is actually required for interopera-
tion, not to try to impose a particular method on implementors
where not required for interoperability.
o SHOULD -- the item should be followed for all but exceptional cir-
cumstances.
o MAY or optional -- the item is truly optional and may be followed
or ignored according to the needs of the implementor.
The words "should" and "may" are also used, in lower case, in
their more ordinary senses.
Meyer Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 1968 PPP Encryption June 1996
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ........................................... 2
2. Encryption Control Protocol (ECP) ...................... 2
2.1 Sending Encrypted Datagrams ....................... 3
3. Additional Packets ..................................... 4
3.1 Reset-Request and Reset-Ack ....................... 5
4. ECP Configuration Options .............................. 6
4.1 Proprietary Encryption OUI ........................ 7
4.2 Publicly Available Encryption Types ............... 8
4.3 Negotiating an Encryption Algorithm ............... 9
5. Security Considerations ................................ 10
1. Introduction
In order to establish communications over a PPP link, each end of the
link must first send LCP packets to configure and test the data link
during Link Establishment phase. After the link has been
established, optional facilities may be negotiated as needed.
One such facility is data encryption. A wide variety of encryption
methods may be negotiated, although typically only one method is used
in each direction of the link.
A different encryption algorithm may be negotiated in each direction,
for speed, cost, memory or other considerations.
2. Encryption Control Protocol (ECP)
The Encryption Control Protocol (ECP) is responsible for configuring
and enabling data encryption algorithms on both ends of the point-
to-point link.
ECP uses the same packet exchange mechanism as the Link Control
Protocol (LCP). ECP packets may not be exchanged until PPP has
reached the Network-Layer Protocol phase. ECP packets received
before this phase is reached should be silently discarded.
The Encryption Control Protocol is exactly the same as LCP [1] with
the following exceptions:
Frame Modifications
The packet may utilise any modifications to the basic frame
format which have been negotiated during the Link Establishment
phase.
Meyer Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 1968 PPP Encryption June 1996
Data Link Layer Protocol Field
Exactly one ECP packet is encapsulated in the PPP Information
field, where the PPP Protocol field indicates type hex 8053
(Encryption Control Protocol).
When individual link data encryption is used in a multiple link
connection to a single destination [2], the PPP Protocol field
indicates type hex 8055 (Individual link Encryption Control
Protocol).
Code field
ECP uses (decimal) codes 1 through 7 (Configure-Request,
Configure-Ack, Configure-Nak, Configure-Reject, Terminate-
Request, Terminate-Ack and Code-Reject); And may also use code
14 (Reset-Request) and code 15 (Reset-Ack). Other codes should
be treated as unrecognised and should result in Code-Rejects.
Negotiation
ECP packets may not be exchanged until PPP has reached the
Network-Layer Protocol phase. An implementation should be
prepared to wait for Authentication and Link Quality
Determination to finish before timing out waiting for a
Configure-Ack or other response.
An implementation MUST NOT transmit data until ECP negotiation
has completed successfully. If ECP negotiation is not
successful the link SHOULD be brought down.
Configuration Option Types
ECP has a distinct set of Configuration Options.
2.1 Sending Encrypted Datagrams
Before any encrypted packets may be communicated, PPP must reach the
Network-Layer Protocol phase, and the Encryption Control Protocol
must reach the Opened state.
An encrypted packet is encapsulated in the PPP Information field,
where the PPP Protocol field indicates type hex 0053 (Encrypted
datagram).
When using multiple PPP links to a single destination [2], there are
two methods of employing data encryption:
Meyer Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 1968 PPP Encryption June 1996
o The first method is to encrypt the data prior to sending it out
through the multiple links.
The PPP Protocol field MUST indicate type hex 0053.
o The second is to treat each link as a separate connection, that
may or may not have encryption enabled.
On links which have negotiated encryption, the PPP Protocol field
MUST be type hex 0055 (Individual link encrypted datagram).
Only one encryption algorithm in each direction is in use at a time,
and that is negotiated prior to sending the first encrypted frame.
The PPP Protocol field of the encrypted datagram indicates that the
frame is encrypted, but not the algorithm with which it was
encrypted.
The maximum length of an encrypted packet transmitted over a PPP link
is the same as the maximum length of the Information field of a PPP
encapsulated packet. If the encryption algorithm is likely to
increase the size of the message beyond that, multilink should also
be negotiated to allow fragmentation of the frames (even if only
using a single link).
If the encryption algorithm carries history between frames, the
encryption algorithm must supply a way of determining if it is
passing data reliably, or it must require the use of a reliable
transport such as LAPB [3].
Compression may also be negotiated using the Compression Control
Protocol [5]. To ensure interoperability, plain text MUST be:
o First compressed.
o Then encrypted.
This order has been chosen since it should result in smaller output
and more secure encryption.
3. Additional Packets
The Packet format and basic facilities are already defined for LCP
[1].
Up-to-date values of the ECP Code field are specified in the most
recent "Assigned Numbers" RFC [4]. This specification concerns the
following values:
Meyer Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 1968 PPP Encryption June 1996
14 Reset-Request
15 Reset-Ack
3.1 Reset-Request and Reset-Ack
Description
ECP includes Reset-Request and Reset-Ack Codes in order to provide
a mechanism for indicating a decryption failure in one direction
of a decrypted link without affecting traffic in the other
direction. Some encryption algorithms may not require this
mechanism.
Individual algorithms need to specify a mechanism for determining
how to detect a decryption failure. On initial detection of a
decryption failure, an ECP implementation SHOULD transmit an ECP
packet with the Code field set to 14 (Reset-Request). The Data
field may be filled with any desired data.
Once a Reset-Request has been sent, any encrypted packets received
are discarded. Further Reset-Requests MAY be sent with the same
Identifier, until a valid Reset-Ack is received.
When the link is busy, one decryption error is usually followed by
several more before the Reset-Ack can be received. It is
undesirable to transmit Reset-Requests more frequently than the
round-trip-time of the link, since this will result in redundant
Reset-Requests and Reset-Acks being transmitted and processed.
The receiver MAY elect to limit transmission of Reset-Requests (to
say one per second) while a Reset-Ack is outstanding.
Upon reception of a Reset-Request, the transmitting encrypter is
reset to an initial state. An ECP packet MUST be transmitted with
the Code field set to 15 (Reset-Ack), the Identifier field copied
from the Reset-Request packet, and the Data field filled with any
desired data.
On receipt of a Reset-Ack, the receiving decrypter is reset to an
initial state. Since there may be several Reset-Acks in the pipe,
the decrypter MUST be reset for each Reset-Ack which matches the
currently expected identifier.
A summary of the Reset-Request and Reset-Ack packet formats is
shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
Meyer Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 1968 PPP Encryption June 1996
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data ...
+-+-+-+-+
Code
14 for Reset-Request;
15 for Reset-Ack.
Identifier
On transmission, the Identifier field MUST be changed whenever the
content of the Data field changes, and whenever a valid reply has
been received for a previous request. For retransmissions, the
Identifier SHOULD remain unchanged.
On reception, the Identifier field of the Reset-Request is copied
into the Identifier field of the Reset-Ack packet.
Data
The Data field is zero or more octets and contains uninterpreted
data for use by the sender. The data may consist of any binary
value and may be of any length from zero to the peer's established
MRU minus four.
4. ECP Configuration Options
ECP Configuration Options allow negotiation of encryption algorithms
and their parameters. ECP uses the same Configuration Option format
defined for LCP [1], with a separate set of Options.
Configuration Options, in this protocol, indicate algorithms that the
receiver is willing or able to use to decrypt data sent by the
sender. Systems may offer to accept several algorithms, and
negotiate a single one that will be used.
Up-to-date values of the ECP Option Type field are specified in the
most recent "Assigned Numbers" RFC [4]. Current values are assigned
as follows:
Meyer Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 1968 PPP Encryption June 1996
ECP Option Encryption type
0 OUI
1 DESE
All compliant ECP implementations SHOULD implement ECP option 1 - the
PPP DES Encryption Protocol (DESE) [6].
Vendors who want to use proprietary encryption MAY use the OUI
mechanism to negotiate these without recourse to requesting an
assigned option number from the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.
All other encryption options are registered by IANA. At the time of
writing only DESE (option 1) is registered. Other registered options
may be found by referring to future versions of the Assigned Numbers
RFC.
4.1 Proprietary Encryption OUI
Description
This Configuration Option provides a way to negotiate the use of a
proprietary encryption protocol.
Vendor's encryption protocols are distinguished from each other by
means of an Organisationally Unique Identifier (OUI), namely the
first three octets of a Vendor's Ethernet address assigned by IEEE
802.
Since the first matching encryption will be used, it is
recommended that any known OUI encryption options be transmitted
first, before the common options are used.
Before accepting this option, the implementation must verify that
the OUI identifies a proprietary algorithm that the implementation
can decrypt, and that any vendor specific negotiation values are
fully understood.
A summary of the Proprietary Encryption OUI Configuration Option
format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to
right.
Meyer Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 1968 PPP Encryption June 1996
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | OUI ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
OUI | Subtype | Values...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
0
Length
>= 6
IEEE OUI
The IEEE OUI is the most significant three octets of an Ethernet
Physical Address, assigned to the vendor by IEEE 802. This
identifies the option as being proprietary to the indicated
vendor. The bits within the octet are in canonical order, and the
most significant octet is transmitted first.
Subtype
This field is specific to each OUI, and indicates an encryption
type for that OUI. There is no standardisation for this field.
Each OUI implements its own values.
Values
This field is zero or more octets, and contains additional data as
determined by the vendor's encryption protocol.
4.2 Publicly Available Encryption Types
Description
These Configuration Options provide a way to negotiate the use of
a publicly defined encryption algorithm.
These protocols should be made available to interested parties,
but may have certain licencing or export restrictions associated
with them. For additional information, refer to the encryption
protocol documents that define each of the encryption types.
Meyer Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 1968 PPP Encryption June 1996
A summary of the Encryption Type Configuration Option format is
shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Values...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
1 to 254, indicating the encryption protocol option
being negotiated. DESE [6] is option type 1. Refer to the
latest Assigned Numbers RFC for other encryption protocols.
Length
>= 2
Values
This field is zero or more octets, and contains additional data as
determined by the encryption protocol.
4.3 Negotiating an Encryption Algorithm
ECP uses LCP option negotiation techniques to negotiate encryption
algorithms. In contrast with most other LCP or NCP negotiation of
multiple options, ECP negotiation is expected to converge on a single
mutually agreeable option (encryption algorithm) - or none.
Encryption SHOULD be negotiated in both directions, but the
algorithms MAY be different.
An implementation willing to decrypt using a particular encryption
algorithm (or one of a set of algorithms) offers the algorithm(s) as
an option (or options) in an ECP Configure-Request - call this end
the Decrypter; call the peer the Encrypter.
A Decrypter supporting more than one encryption algorithm may send a
Configure-Request containing either:
o an ordered list of options, with the most-preferred encryption
algorithm coming first.
o Or may just offer its preferred (not already Rejected) option.
Meyer Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 1968 PPP Encryption June 1996
An Encrypter wishing to accept the first option (of several) MAY
Configure-Ack ALL Options to indicate complete acceptance of the
first-listed, preferred, algorithm.
Otherwise, if the Encrypter does not recognise - or is unwilling to
support - an option it MUST send a Configure-Reject for that option.
Where more than one option is offered, the Encrypter SHOULD
Configure-Reject all but a single preferred option.
If the Encrypter Configure-Rejects all offered ECP options - and the
Decrypter has no further (non-rejected) options it can offer in a
Configure-Request - the Encrypter SHOULD take the link down.
If the Encrypter recognises an option, but it is not acceptable due
to values in the request (or optional parameters not in the request),
it MUST send a Configure-Nak with the option modified appropriately.
The Configure-Nak MUST contain only those options that will be
acceptable. The Decrypter SHOULD send a new Configure-Request with
only the single preferred option, adjusted as specified in the
Configure-Nak.
5. Security Considerations
Negotiation of encryption using PPP is designed to provide protection
against eavesdropping on that link. The strength of the protection
is dependent on the encryption algorithm used and the care with which
any 'secret' used by the encryption algorithm is protected.
It must be recognised that complete security can only be obtained
through end-to-end security between hosts.
References
[1] Simpson, W., Editor; "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD
51, RFC 1661, Daydreamer, July 1994.
[2] Sklower, K., Lloyd, B., McGregor, G. and and D. Carr, "The PPP
Multilink Protocol (MP)", RFC 1717, University of California,
Berkeley, November 1994.
[3] Rand, D., "PPP Reliable Transmission", RFC 1663, Novell, July
1994.
[4] Reynolds, J., and Postel, J.; "ASSIGNED NUMBERS", STD 2,
RFC 1700, USC/Information Sciences Institute, October 1994.
[5] Rand, D., "The PPP Compression Control Protocol (CCP)", RFC
1962, Novell, June 1996.
Meyer Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 1968 PPP Encryption June 1996
[6] Sklower, K., and G. Meyer, "The PPP DES Encryption Protocol
(DESE)", RFC 1969, University of California, Berkeley, June
1996.
Acknowledgements
The style and approach of this proposal owes much to the work on the
Compression CP [5].
Chair's Address
The working group can be contacted via the current chair:
Karl Fox
Ascend Communications
3518 Riverside Drive, Suite 101
Columbus, Ohio 43221
EMail: karl@ascend.com
Author's Address
Gerry Meyer
Spider Systems
Stanwell Street
Edinburgh EH6 5NG
Scotland, UK
Phone: (UK) 131 554 9424
Fax: (UK) 131 554 0649
EMail: gerry@spider.co.uk
Meyer Standards Track [Page 11]