Last Call Review of draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-07

Request Review of draft-ietf-karp-ops-model
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 10)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2013-08-18
Requested 2013-08-02
Authors Sam Hartman, Dacheng Zhang
Draft last updated 2013-08-16
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -07 by Ben Campbell (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -09 by Ben Campbell (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -07 by Radia Perlman (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -09 by Radia Perlman (diff)
Opsdir Telechat review of -09 by Benoît Claise (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Radia Perlman 
State Completed
Review review-ietf-karp-ops-model-07-secdir-lc-perlman-2013-08-16
Reviewed rev. 07 (document currently at 10)
Review result Has Issues
Review completed: 2013-08-16


I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

This is a useful document as an informational RFC. The technical content is interesting and useful.

I think the document would be much improved with an introduction about what is different for "routing protocol security" rather than, say, an endnode authenticating to an access point, or nodes forming a peer relationship in an overlay network.  So, for instance, "normal security issues" (i.e., outside the scope of KARP) might assume the network is up, so that it's possible to get CRLs, or be available to be managed, whereas perhaps KARP is targetting cases which depend on less infrastructure.  It would be nice if this document were to have an introduction that talks about things like that.

As for typos...3rd line up from bottom of page 14 has a glitch involving a bunch of spaces and an extra comma after the word "peers".  And I can't parse the last sentence of the 1st paragraph of section 7. "...complexity of and update and risk...."

Speaking of PKI...the document talks about certificates expiring, but not being revoked (CRL, OCSP).