Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-12
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Internet Engineering Task Force H. Wang, Ed.
Internet-Draft Y. Yang
Intended status: Informational X. Kang
Expires: October 11, 2020 Huawei International Pte. Ltd.
Z. Cheng
Shenzhen Olym Info. Security Tech. Ltd.
M. Chen
China Mobile
April 9, 2020
Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-12
Abstract
This document specifies the use of identity as a raw public key in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS). The TLS protocol procedures are kept unchanged, but
signature algorithms are extended to support Identity-based signature
(IBS). A typical Identity-based signature algorithm, the ECCSI
signature algorithm defined in RFC 6507, is supported in the current
version.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 11, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Wang, et al. Expires October 11, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft TLS-RAW-Public-Key-IBC April 2020
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Extension of RAW Public Key to IBC-based Public Key . . . . . 4
4. New Signature Algorithms for IBS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Identity Fromat and Key Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. TLS Client and Server Handshake Behavior . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. TLS Client and Server Use IBS algorithm . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. Combined Usage of Raw Public Keys and X.509 Certificates 15
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction
DISCLAIMER: This is a personal draft and a limited security analysis
is provided.
Traditionally, TLS client and server exchange public keys endorsed by
PKIX [PKIX] certificates. It is considered complicated and may cause
security weaknesses with the use of PKIX certificates
[Defeating-SSL]. To simplify certificates exchange, using RAW public
key with TLS/DTLS has been specified in [RFC 7250] and has been
included in the TLS 1.3 [RFC 8446]. Instead of transmitting a full
certificate or a certificate chain in the TLS messages, only public
keys are exchanged between client and server. However, using RAW
public key requires out-of-band mechanisms to verify the purported
public key to the claimed entity.
Recently, 3GPP has adopted the EAP authentication framework for 5G
and EAP-TLS is considered as one of the candidate authentication
methods for private networks, especially for networks with a large
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