Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10

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Internet Engineering Task Force                             H. Wang, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                   Y. Yang
Intended status: Informational                                   X. Kang
Expires: October 18, 2019                 Huawei International Pte. Ltd.
                                                                Z. Cheng
                                 Shenzhen Olym Info. Security Tech. Ltd.
                                                          April 16, 2019

 Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
                Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
               draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-10

Abstract

   This document specifies the use of identity as a raw public key in
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
   (DTLS).  The TLS protocol procedures are kept unchanged, but
   signature algorithms are extended to support Identity-based signature
   (IBS).  A typical Identity-based signature algorithm, the ECCSI
   signature algorithm defined in RFC 6507, is supported in the current
   version.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 18, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

Wang, et al.            Expires October 18, 2019                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           TLS-RAW-Public-Key-IBC               April 2019

   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Extension of RAW Public Key to IBC-based Public Key . . . . .   4
   4.  New Signature Algorithms for IBS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Identity Fromat and Key Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  TLS Client and Server Handshake Behavior  . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.1.  TLS Client and Server Use IBS algorithm . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.2.  Combined Usage of Raw Public Keys and X.509 Certificates   15
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   DISCLAIMER: This is a personal draft and a limited security analysis
   is provided.

   Traditionally, TLS client and server exchange public keys endorsed by
   PKIX [PKIX] certificates.  It is considered complicated and may cause
   security weaknesses with the use of PKIX certificates Defeating-SSL
   [Defeating-SSL].  To simplify certificates exchange, using RAW public
   key with TLS/DTLS has been specified in [RFC 7250] and has been
   included in the TLS 1.3 [RFC 8446].  With RAW public key, instead of
   transmitting a full certificate or a certificate chain in the TLS
   messages, only public keys are exchanged between client and server.
   However, using RAW public key requires out-of-band mechanisms to
   verify the purported public key to the claimed entity.

   Recently, 3GPP has adopted the EAP authentication framework for 5G
   and EAP-TLS is considered as one of the candidate authentication
   methods for private networks, especially for networks with a large
   number of IoT devices.  For IoT networks, TLS/DTLS with RAW public
   key is particularly attractive, but binding identities with public