Encrypting ICE candidates to improve privacy and connectivity
draft-wang-mmusic-encrypted-ice-candidates-00

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Alex Drake  , Justin Uberti  , Qingsi Wang 
Last updated 2020-05-04 (latest revision 2019-11-01)
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Expired & archived
pdf htmlized bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-wang-mmusic-encrypted-ice-candidates-00.txt

Abstract

WebRTC applications collect ICE candidates as part of the process of creating peer-to-peer connections. To maximize the probability of a direct peer-to-peer connection, client private IP addresses can be included in this candidate collection, but this has privacy implications. This document describes a way to share local IP addresses with local peers without compromising client privacy. During the ICE process, local IP addresses are encrypted and authenticated using a pre-shared key and cipher suite before being put into ICE candidates as hostnames with an ".encrypted" pseudo-top- level domain. Other peers who also have the PSK are able to decrypt these addresses and use them normally in ICE processing.

Authors

Alex Drake (alexdrake@google.com)
Justin Uberti (juberti@google.com)
Qingsi Wang (qingsi@google.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)