Network Time Protocol
MAC/Last Extension Fields
draft-stenn-ntp-mac-last-ef-02
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Expired & archived
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Authors | Harlan Stenn , Danny Mayer | ||
Last updated | 2018-08-26 (Latest revision 2018-02-22) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Additional resources | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
NTPv4 is defined by RFC 5905 [RFC5905], and it and earlier versions of the NTP Protocol have supported symmetric private key Message Authentication Code (MAC) authentication. MACs were first described in Appendix C of RFC 1305 [RFC1305] and are further described in RFC 5905 [RFC5905]. As the number of Extension Fields grows there is an increasing chance of a parsing ambiguity when deciding if the "next" set of data is an Extension Field or a legacy MAC. This proposal defines two new Extension Fields which may be used to avoid this ambiguity. One, LAST-EF, is used to signify that it is the last Extension Field in the packet. If the LAST-EF is present, any subsequent data MUST be considered to be a legacy MAC. The other, MAC-EF, allows one or more MACs to be encapsulated in an Extension Field. If all parties in an association support MAC-EF, the use of a legacy MAC may be avoided.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)