A Taxonomy of operational security of manufacturer installed keys and anchors
draft-richardson-t2trg-idevid-considerations-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Michael Richardson  , Jie Yang 
Last updated 2020-08-27
Replaces draft-richardson-secdispatch-idevid-considerations
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anima Working Group                                        M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Informational                                   J. Yang
Expires: 28 February 2021                  Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
                                                          27 August 2020

 A Taxonomy of operational security of manufacturer installed keys and
                                anchors
            draft-richardson-t2trg-idevid-considerations-01

Abstract

   This document provides a toxonomy of methods by manufacturers of
   silicon and devices secure private keys and public trust anchors.
   This deals with two related activities: how trust anchors and private
   keys are installed into devices during manufacturing, and how the
   related manufacturer held private keys are secured against
   disclosure.

   This document does not evaluate the different mechanisms, but rather
   just serves to name them in a consistent manner in order to aid in
   communication.

   RFCEDITOR: please remove this paragraph.  This work is occurring in
   https://github.com/mcr/idevid-security-considerations

Status of This Memo

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Richardson & Yang       Expires 28 February 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            IDevID Considerations              August 2020

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Applicability Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  A reference manufacturing/boot process  . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Types of Trust Anchors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Secured First Boot Trust Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Software Update Trust Anchor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Trusted Application Manager anchor  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Public WebPKI anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  DNSSEC root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.6.  What else?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Types of Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Manufacturer installed IDevID certificates  . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.1.  Operational Considerations for Manufacturer IDevID
               Public Key Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.2.  Key Generation process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Public Key Infrastructures (PKI)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.1.  Number of levels of certification authorities . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  Protection of CA private keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.3.  Supporting provisioned anchors in devices . . . . . . . .  17
   6.  Evaluation Questions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.1.  Integrity and Privacy of on-device data . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.2.  Integrity and Privacy of device identify
           infrastructure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     6.3.  Integrity and Privacy of included trust anchors . . . . .  18
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   11. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
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