Composite Keys and Signatures For Use In Internet PKI
draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs-03
LAMPS M. Ounsworth (Editor)
Internet-Draft Entrust Datacard
Intended status: Standards Track M. Pala
Expires: January 29, 2021 CableLabs
July 28, 2020
Composite Keys and Signatures For Use In Internet PKI
draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs-03
Abstract
With the widespread adoption of post-quantum cryptography will come
the need for an entity to possess multiple public keys on different
cryptographic algorithms. Since the trustworthiness of individual
post-quantum algorithms is at question, a multi-key cryptographic
operation will need to be performed in such a way that breaking it
requires breaking each of the component algorithms individually.
This requires defining new structures for holding composite public
keys and composite signature data.
This document defines the structures CompositePublicKey,
CompositeSignatureValue, and CompositeParams, which are sequences of
the respective structure for each component algorithm. This document
also defines algorithms for generating and verifying composite
signatures. This document makes no assumptions about what the
component algorithms are, provided that their algorithm identifiers
and signature generation and verification algorithms are defined.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 29, 2021.
Ounsworth (Editor) & PalExpires January 29, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft PQ Composite Certs July 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Composite Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Algorithm Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Composite Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1. Key Usage Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Composite Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Composite Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. Composite Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6. Encoding Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Composite Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Composite Signature Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Composite Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. In Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. PEM Storage of Composite Private Keys . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Asymmetric Key Packages (CMS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Cryptographic protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Policy for Deprecated and Acceptable Algorithms . . . . . 13
6.2. Protection of Private Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3. Checking for Compromised Key Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.4. Composite Encryption and KEMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. Intellectual Property Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Contributors and Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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