Composite Keys and Signatures For Use In Internet PKI
draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs-02

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LAMPS                                              M. Ounsworth (Editor)
Internet-Draft                                          Entrust Datacard
Intended status: Standards Track                                 M. Pala
Expires: July 19, 2020                                         CableLabs
                                                        January 16, 2020

         Composite Keys and Signatures For Use In Internet PKI
                  draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs-02

Abstract

   With the widespread adoption of post-quantum cryptography will come
   the need for an entity to possess multiple public keys on different
   cryptographic algorithms.  Since the trustworthiness of individual
   post-quantum algorithms is at question, a multi-key cryptographic
   operation will need to be performed in such a way that breaking it
   requires breaking each of the component algorithms individually.
   This requires defining new structures for holding composite public
   keys and composite signature data.

   This document defines the structures CompositePublicKey,
   CompositeSignatureValue, and CompositeParams, which are sequences of
   the respective structure for each component algorithm.  This document
   also defines algorithms for generating and verifying composite
   signatures.  This document makes no assumptions about what the
   component algorithms are, provided that their algorithm identifiers
   and signature generation and verification algorithms are defined.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 19, 2020.

Ounsworth (Editor) & Pala Expires July 19, 2020                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs               January 2020

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Composite Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Algorithm Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Composite Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.1.  Key Usage Bits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Composite Public Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  Composite Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.5.  Composite Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.6.  Encoding Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   3.  Composite Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  Composite Signature Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.2.  Composite Signature Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  In Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.1.  PEM Storage of Composite Private Keys . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.2.  Asymmetric Key Packages (CMS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.3.  Cryptographic protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.1.  Policy for Deprecated and Acceptable Algorithms . . . . .  16
     6.2.  Protection of Private Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.3.  Checking for Compromised Key Reuse  . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.4.  Composite Encryption and KEMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  Appendices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  ASN.1 Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.2.  Intellectual Property Considerations  . . . . . . . . . .  19
   8.  Contributors and Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19