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Mapping the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) to Common Presence and Instant Messaging (CPIM)
draft-ietf-xmpp-cpim-05

Approval announcement
Draft of message to be sent after approval:

Announcement

From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Cc: Internet Architecture Board <iab@iab.org>,
    RFC Editor <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>, 
    xmpp mailing list <xmppwg@xmpp.org>, 
    xmpp chair <xmpp-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Protocol Action: 'Mapping the Extensible Messaging and 
         Presence Protocol (XMPP) to Common Presence and Instant 
         Messaging (CPIM)' to Proposed Standard 

The IESG has approved the following document:

- 'Mapping the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) to 
   Common Presence and Instant Messaging (CPIM) '
   <draft-ietf-xmpp-cpim-06.txt> as a Proposed Standard

This document is the product of the Extensible Messaging and Presence 
Protocol Working Group. 

The IESG contact persons are Scott Hollenbeck and Lisa Dusseault.

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-xmpp-cpim-06.txt

Ballot Text

Technical Summary

The "Mapping XMPP to CPIM" document gives instructions for moving 
instant messages and presence information between an XMPP system and 
a CPIM compatible system. It lays out specific instructions for 
translating addresses between the systems (essentially, escaping 
characters that don't appear in the other system), translating 
between XMPP elements and attributes and CPIM headers and PIDF 
objects, adding appropriate syntax when such is not present, and 
describing how to do subscription service between the two systems.

There are internationalization concerns in this document, especially 
because XMPP allows UTF-8 in its identifiers and certain characters 
are allowed in CPIM addresses that are not allowed in XMPP 
identifiers. They seem to be addressed well. Security concerns are 
mostly those out of the base spec and out of the end-to-end 
encryption spec.

Working Group Summary

The working group has done a reasonable amount of review of this 
document. There is little controversial in this document, so 
consensus was relatively straightforward.

Protocol Quality

Pete Resnick and Lisa Dusseault reviewed this document for the IESG.

RFC Editor Note