Secure Reporting of Update Status
draft-ietf-suit-report-08

SUIT                                                            B. Moran
Internet-Draft                                               Arm Limited
Intended status: Informational                               H. Birkholz
Expires: 5 September 2024                                 Fraunhofer SIT
                                                            4 March 2024

                   Secure Reporting of Update Status
                       draft-ietf-suit-report-08

Abstract

   The Software Update for the Internet of Things (SUIT) manifest
   provides a way for many different update and boot workflows to be
   described by a common format.  However, this does not provide a
   feedback mechanism for developers in the event that an update or boot
   fails.

   This specification describes a lightweight feedback mechanism that
   allows a developer in possession of a manifest to reconstruct the
   decisions made and actions performed by a manifest processor.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 September 2024.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights

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   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The SUIT Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  The SUIT_Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Capability Reporting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  EAT Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  SUIT_Report container . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   A SUIT manifest processor can fail to install or boot an update for
   many reasons.  Frequently, the error codes generated by such systems
   fail to provide developers with enough information to find root
   causes and produce corrective actions, resulting in extra effort to
   reproduce failures.  Logging the results of each SUIT command can
   simplify this process.

   While it is possible to report the results of SUIT commands through
   existing logging or attestation mechanisms, this comes with several
   drawbacks:

   *  data inflation, particularly when designed for text-based logging

   *  missing information elements

   *  missing support for multiple components

   The CBOR objects defined in this document allow devices to:

   *  report a trace of how an update was performed

   *  report expected vs. actual values for critical checks

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   *  describe the installation of complex multi-component architectures

   *  describe the measured properties of a system

   *  report the exact reason for a parsing failure

   This document provides a definition of a SUIT-specific logging
   container that may be used in a variety of scenarios.

2.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Terms used in this specification include:

   *  Boot: initialization of an executable image.  Although this
      specification refers to boot, any boot-specific operations
      described are equally applicable to starting an executable in an
      OS context.

3.  The SUIT Record

   If the developer can be assumed to have a copy of the manifest, then
   they need little information to reconstruct what the manifest
   processor has done.  They simply need any data that influences the
   control flow of the manifest.  The manifest only supports the
   following control flow primitives:

   *  Set Component

   *  Set/Override Parameters

   *  Try-Each

   *  Run Sequence

   *  Conditions

   Of these, only conditions change the behavior of the processor from
   the default, and then only when the condition fails.

   Then, to reconstruct the flow of a manifest, all a developer needs is
   a list of metadata about failed conditions:

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   *  the current manifest

   *  the current section

   *  the offset into the current section

   *  the current component index

   *  the "reason" for failure

   Most conditions compare a parameter to an actual value, so the
   "reason" is typically simply the actual value.

   Since it is possible that a non-condition command (directive) may
   fail in an exceptional circumstance, this must be included as well.
   However, a failed directive will terminate processing of the
   manifest.  To accommodate for a failed command and for explicit
   "completion," an additional "result" element is added as well.  In
   the case of a command failure, the failure reason is typically a
   numeric error code.  However, these error codes need to be
   standardised in order to be useful.

   Reconstructing what a device has done in this way is compact, however
   it requires some reconstruction effort.  This is an issue that can be
   solved by tooling.

   SUIT_Record = [
       suit-record-manifest-id        : [* uint ],
       suit-record-manifest-section   : int,
       suit-record-section-offset     : uint,
       suit-record-component-index    : uint,
       suit-record-properties         : SUIT_Parameters,
       $$SUIT_Record_Extensions
   ]

   suit-record-manifest-id is used to identify which manifest contains
   the command that caused the record to be generated.  The manifest id
   is a list of integers that form a walk of the manifest tree, starting
   at the root.  An empty list indicates that the command was contained
   in the root manifest.  If the list is not empty, the command was
   contained in one of the root manifest's dependencies, or nested even
   further below that.

   For example, suppose that the root manifest has 3 dependencies and
   each of those dependencies has 2 dependencies of its own:

   *  Root

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      -  Dependency A

         o  Dependency A0

         o  Dependency A1

      -  Dependency B

         o  Dependency B0

         o  Dependency B1

      -  Dependency C

         o  Dependency C0

         o  Dependency C1

   A manifest-id of [1,0] would indicate that the current command was
   contained within Dependency B0.  Similarly, a manifest-id of [2,1]
   would indicate Dependency C1

   suit-record-manifest-section indicates which section of the manifest
   was active.  This is used in addition to an offset so that the
   developer can index into severable sections in a predictable way.
   The value of this element is the value of the key that identified the
   section in the manifest.

   suit-record-section-offset is the number of bytes into the current
   section at which the current command is located.

   suit-record-component-index is the index of the component that was
   specified at the time that the report was generated.  This field is
   necessary due to the availability of set-current-component values of
   True and a list of components.  Both of these values cause the
   manifest processor to loop over commands using a series of component-
   ids, so the developer needs to know which was selected when the
   command executed.

   suit-record-properties contains any measured properties that led to
   the command failure.  For example, this could be the actual value of
   a SUIT_Digest or class identifier.  This is encoded in a
   SUIT_Parameters block as defined in [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest].

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4.  The SUIT_Report

   Some metadata is common to all records, such as the root manifest:
   the manifest that is the entry-point for the manifest processor.
   This metadata is aggregated with a list of SUIT_Records.  The
   SUIT_Report may also contain a list of any system properties that
   were measured and reported, and a reason for a failure if one
   occured.

SUIT_Report = {
  suit-reference              => SUIT_Reference,
  ? suit-report-nonce         => bstr,
  suit-report-records         => [ * SUIT_Record / system-property-claims ],
  suit-report-result          => true / {
    suit-report-result-code   => int,
    suit-report-result-record => SUIT_Record,
    suit-report-result-reason => SUIT_Report_Reasons,
  },
  ? suit-report-capability-report => SUIT_Capability_Report,
  $$SUIT_Report_Extensions
}
system-property-claims = {
  system-component-id => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
  + SUIT_Parameters,
}

   The suit-reference provides a reference URI and digest for a suit
   manifest.  The uri SHOULD be the canonical URI that is provided in
   the manifest.  The digest is the digest of the manifest.

   NOTE: The digest is used in preference to other identifiers in the
   manifest because it allows a manifest to be uniquely identified
   (collision resistance) whereas other identifiers, such as the
   sequence number, can collide, particularly in scenarios with multiple
   trusted signers.

   The following CDDL describes a SUIT_Reference.

   SUIT_Reference = {
       suit-report-manifest-uri  : tstr,
       suit-report-manifest-digest : SUIT_Digest,
   }

   suit-report-manifest-digest provides a SUIT_Digest (as defined in
   [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]) that is the characteristic digest of the
   Root manifest.

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   suit-report-manifest-uri provides the reference URI that was provided
   in the root manifest.

   suit-report-nonce provides a container for freshness or replay
   protection information.  This field MAY be omitted where the suit-
   report is authenticated within a container that provides freshness
   already.  For example, attestation evidence typically contains a
   proof of freshness.

   suit-report-records is a list of 0 or more SUIT Records or system-
   property-claims.  Because SUIT Records are only generated on failure,
   in simple cases this can be an empty list.  SUIT_Records and suit-
   system-property-claims are merged into a single list because this
   reduces the overhead for a constrained node that generates this
   report.  The use of a single append-only log allows report generators
   to use simple memory management.  Because the system-property-claims
   are encoded as maps and SUIT_Records are encoded as lists, a
   recipient need only filter the CBOR Type-5 entries from suit-report-
   records to obtain all system-property-claims.

   System properties can be extracted from suit-report-records by
   filtering suit-report-records for maps.  System Properties are a list
   of measured or asserted properties of the system that creates the
   SUIT_Report.  These properties are scoped by component identifier.
   Because this list is expected to be constructed on the fly by a
   constrained node, component identifiers may appear more than once.  A
   recipient may convert the result to a more conventional structure:

   SUIT_Record_System_Properties = {
     * component-id => {
       + SUIT_Parameters,
     }
   }

   suit-report-result provides a mechanism to show that the SUIT
   procedure completed successfully (value is true) or why it failed
   (value is a map of an error code and a SUIT_Record).

   suit-report-result-reason gives a high-level explanation of the
   failure.  These reasons are intended for interoperable
   implementations.  The reasons are divided into a small number of
   groups:

   *  suit-report-reason-cbor-parse: a parsing error was encountered by
      the CBOR parser.

   *  suit-report-reason-cose-unsupported: an unusupported COSE
      structure or header was encountered.

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   *  suit-report-reason-alg-unsupported: an unsupported COSE algorithm
      was encountered.

   *  suit-report-reason-unauthorised: Signature/MAC verification
      failed.

   *  suit-report-reason-command-unsupported: an unsupported command was
      encountered.

   *  suit-report-reason-component-unsupported: The manifest declared a
      component/prefix that does not exist.

   *  suit-report-reason-component-unauthorised: The manifest declared a
      component that is not accessible by the signer.

   *  suit-report-reason-parameter-unsupported: The manifest used a
      parameter that does not exist.

   *  suit-report-severing-unsupported: The manifest uses severable
      fields but the Manifest Processor doesn't support them.

   *  suit-report-reason-condition-failed: A condition failed with soft-
      failure off.

   *  suit-report-reason-operation-failed: A command failed (e.g.,
      download/copy/swap/write)

   The suit-report-result-code reports an internal error code that is
   provided for debugging reasons.  This code is not intended for
   interoperability.

   The suit-report-result-record indicates the exact point in the
   manifest or manifest dependency tree where the error occured.

   suit-report-capability-report provides a mechanism to report the
   capabilities of the Manifest Processor.  The SUIT_Capability_Report
   is described in Section 6.  The capability report is optional to
   include in the SUIT_Report, according to an application-specific
   policy.  While the SUIT_Capability_Report is not expected to be very
   large, applications should ensure that they only report capabilities
   when necessary in order to conserve bandwidth.  A capability report
   is not necessary except when:

   1.  A client explicitly requests the capability report, or

   2.  A manifest attempts to use a capability that the Manifest
       Processor does not implement.

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5.  Attestation

   This document describes how a well-informed verifier can infer the
   trustworthiness of a remote device.  Remote attestation is done by
   using the SUIT_Manifest_Envelope along with the SUIT_Report to
   reconstruct the state of the device at boot time.  By embedding data
   used for remote attestation in the SUIT_Report, a remote device can
   use an append-only log to collect both measurements and debug/failure
   information into the same document.  This document can then be
   conveyed to a verifier as a part of the attestation evidence.  A
   remote attestation format to convey attestation evidence, such as an
   Entity Attestation Token (EAT, see [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]), that
   contains a SUIT_Report MUST also include an integrity measurement of
   the Manifest Processor & Report Generator.

   When a Concise Reference Integrity Manifest (CoRIM, see
   [I-D.birkholz-rats-corim] is delivered in a SUIT_Manifest_Envelope,
   this codifies the delivery of verification information to the
   verifier:

   *  The Firmware Distributor:

      -  sends the SUIT_Manifest_Envelope to the Verifier without
         payload or text, but with CoRIM

      -  sends the SUIT_Manifest_Envelope to the recipient without
         CoRIM, or text, but with payload

   *  The Recipient:

      -  Installs the firmware as described in the SUIT_Manifest and
         generates a SUIT_report, which is encapsulated in an EAT by the
         installer and sent to the Firmware Distributor.

      -  Boots the firmware as described in the SUIT_Manifest and
         creates a SUIT_report, which is encapsulated in an EAT by the
         installer and sent to the Firmware Distributor.

   *  The Firmware Distributor sends both reports to the verifier
      (separately or together)

   *  The Verifier:

      -  Reconstructs the state of the device using the manifest

      -  Compares this state to the CoRIM

      -  Returns an Attestation Report to the Firmware Distributor

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   This approach simplifies the design of the bootloader since it is
   able to use an append-only log.  It allows a verifier to validate
   this report against a signed CoRIM that is provided by the firmware
   author, which simplifies the delivery chain of verification
   information to the verifier.

   This information is not intended as Attestation Evidence and while an
   Attestation Report MAY provide this information for conveying error
   codes and/or failure reports, it SHOULD be translated into general-
   purpose claims for use by the Relying Party.

6.  Capability Reporting

   Because SUIT is extensible, a manifest author must know what
   capabilities a device has available.  To enable this, a capability
   report is a set of lists that define which commands, parameters,
   algorithms, and component IDs are supported by a manifest processor.

   The CDDL for a SUIT_Capability_Report follows:

   SUIT_Capability_Report = {
     suit-component-capabilities        => [+ SUIT_Component_Capability ]
     suit-command-capabilities          => [+ int],
     suit-parameters-capabilities       => [+ int],
     suit-crypt-algo-capabilities       => [+ int],
     ? suit-envelope-capabilities       => [+ int],
     ? suit-manifest-capabilities       => [+ int],
     ? suit-common-capabilities         => [+ int],
     ? suit-text-component-capabilities => [+ int],
     ? suit-text-capabilities           => [+ int],
     ? suit-dependency-capabilities     => [+ int],
     * [+int]                           => [+ int],
     $$SUIT_Capability_Report_Extensions
   }

   SUIT_Component_Capability = [*bstr,?true]

   A SUIT_Component_Capability is similar to a SUIT_Component_ID, with
   one difference: it may optionally be terminated by a CBOR 'true'
   which acts as a wild-card match for any component with a prefix
   matching the SUIT_Component_Capability leading up to the 'true.'
   This feature is for use with filesystem storage, key value stores, or
   any other arbitrary-component-id storage systems.

   When reporting capabilities, it is OPTIONAL to report capabilities
   that are declared mandatory by the SUIT Manifest
   [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest].  Capabilities defined by extensions MUST be
   reported.

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   Additional capability reporting can be added as follows: if a
   manifest element does not exist in this map, it can be added by
   specifying the CBOR path to the manifest element in an array and
   using this as the key.  For example SUIT_Dependencies, as described
   in [I-D.ietf-suit-trust-domains] could have an extension added, which
   was key 3 in the SUIT_Dependencies map.  This capability would be
   reported as: [3, 3, 1] => [3], where the key consists of the key for
   SUIT_Manifest (3), the key for SUIT_Common (3), and the key for
   SUIT_Dependencies (1).  Then the value indicates that this manifest
   processor supports the extension (3).

7.  EAT Claim

   The SUIT_Report is a form of measurement done by the SUIT Manifest
   Processor as it attempts to invoke a manifest or install a manifest.
   As a result, the SUIT_Report can be captured in an EAT measurements
   type.  The Verifier MAY convert a SUIT_Report into a more consumable
   version of the EAT claim by, for example, constructing a measres
   claim that contains the digest of a component, the vendor ID & class
   ID of a component, etc.

8.  SUIT_Report container

   The SUIT_Report MUST be carried in a container or transport that
   ensures authenticity.  The SUIT_Report MUST be transported using one
   of the following options:

   *  As an element of an existing document that ensures authenticity,
      such as in a measurements claim in an EAT.

   *  As the payload of a message delivered over secure transport, such
      as a CoAP or LwM2M message.

   *  Contained within a secure container that conforms to the current
      recommendations of [I-D.ietf-suit-mti].

   In this case, the SUIT_Report is carried as sole payload of a
   COSE_Encrypt0 or COSE_Sign1 as shown in the CDDL snippet below.

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   SUIT_Report_Protected /= SUIT_Report_COSE_Sign1 .and SUIT_COSE_Profiles
   SUIT_Report_Protected /= SUIT_Report_COSE_Sign1_Tagged .and SUIT_COSE_Profiles
   SUIT_Report_Protected /= SUIT_Report_COSE_MAC0 .and SUIT_COSE_Profiles
   SUIT_Report_Protected /= SUIT_Report_COSE_MAC0_Tagged .and SUIT_COSE_Profiles

   SUIT_Report_COSE_Sign1_Tagged = #6.18(SUIT_Report_COSE_Sign1)
   SUIT_Report_COSE_Sign1 = [
       protected : bstr,
       unprotected : {* int => any},
       payload : bstr .cbor SUIT_Report_Unprotected,
       signature : bstr
   ]
   SUIT_Report_COSE_MAC0_Tagged = #6.17(SUIT_Report_COSE_MAC0)
   SUIT_Report_COSE_MAC0 = [
       protected : bstr,
       unprotected : {* int => any},
       payload : bstr .cbor SUIT_Report_Unprotected,
       tag : bstr
   ]
   SUIT_Report_Unprotected = SUIT_Report / SUIT_Report_COSE_Encrypt0
   SUIT_Report_COSE_Encrypt0 = COSE_Encrypt0

   Note that SUIT_Report_COSE_Sign1 and SUIT_Report_COSE_MAC0 MUST be
   combined with a SUIT_COSE_Profile from [I-D.ietf-suit-mti] using the
   CDDL .and directive.  The SUIT_Report_COSE_Encrypt0 carries a
   ciphertext payload that MUST contain just the ciphertext obtained by
   encrypting the following CDDL:

   SUIT_Report_plaintext = bstr .cbor SUIT_Report

   SUIT_COSE_Profiles define only AES-CTR encryption due to its
   suitability for firmware distribution.  Because AES-CTR is not
   authenticated, SUIT_Report_Protected defines authenticated containers
   with an encrypted payload.

9.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to allocate a CBOR tag and a coap content-type each
   for the SUIT_Report, SUIT_Reference, and SUIT_Capability_Report CBOR
   data structures.

   IANA is also requested to add a table to the SUIT page for
   SUIT_Capability_Report_Extensions.

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10.  Security Considerations

   There are two aspects to the security considerations for SUIT
   reports: authenticity and confidentiality.  SUIT reports must have
   guaranteed authenticity for them to be useful.  Several options are
   available to ensure the authenticity of a SUIT report.  The report
   MAY be bundled as the payload of a cryptographic container as
   described in Section 8. communicated over a secure transport.  It may
   also be communicated as part of an existing authenticated protocol,
   such as within an EAT token.  Ideally, the SUIT_Report SHOULD be
   communicated as part of an attestation flow, such as within an EAT
   token, since this proves the authenticity of the environment
   (hardware, software, or both) in which the SUIT_Report was generated.

   The SUIT_Report MAY require confidentiality as well.  A SUIT_Report
   could potentially reveal confidential information about the kinds of
   device that a particular user has.  It could also reveal confidential
   information about intellectual property contained in a device.  Where
   these concerns are relevant, the SUIT_Report MUST be encrypted, for
   example using a COSE_Encrypt as described in Section 8, or by using
   secure transport.  When reporting failures, particularly in the
   cryptographic primitives, there is a risk that over-reporting can
   provide an attacker with better visibility.  Therefore, SUIT_Reports
   SHOULD be encrypted wherever possible.

   There are also operational considerations that intersect with these
   security considerations.  In situations where the SUIT report is
   encrypted as an element of a message within another protocol, care
   must be taken to ensure that this does not leak information and that
   the principle of least privilege is respected.  For example, in an
   EAT-based attestation workflow, the Verifier often will not need the
   full SUIT Report.  Similarly, the Relying Party may also not need the
   SUIT_Report.  In this case, the SUIT_Report MUST be encrypted even if
   the EAT token that contains it is also encrypted.

   In contrast, however, there are scenarios where the EAT Verifier
   consumes the SUIT report and translates it into one or more other EAT
   claims.  For example, a SUIT report that shows a particular digest
   was matched using an suit-condition-image can be translated into a
   EAT measres (Measurement Results) claim.  In this scenario, the
   Verifier must have access to the full SUIT_Report.

11.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Dave Thaler for his feedback.

12.  References

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12.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
              Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., Zandberg, K., and
              O. Rønningstad, "A Concise Binary Object Representation
              (CBOR)-based Serialization Format for the Software Updates
              for Internet of Things (SUIT) Manifest", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-manifest-25, 5 February
              2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              suit-manifest-25>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.birkholz-rats-corim]
              Birkholz, H., Fossati, T., Deshpande, Y., Smith, N., and
              W. Pan, "Concise Reference Integrity Manifest", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-rats-corim-03, 11
              July 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              birkholz-rats-corim-03>.

   [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
              Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C.
              Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-25, 15
              January 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-rats-eat-25>.

   [I-D.ietf-suit-mti]
              Moran, B., Rønningstad, O., and A. Tsukamoto, "Mandatory-
              to-Implement Algorithms for Authors and Recipients of
              Software Update for the Internet of Things manifests",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-mti-05,
              12 February 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-suit-mti-05>.

Moran & Birkholz        Expires 5 September 2024               [Page 14]
Internet-Draft      Secure Reporting of Update Status         March 2024

   [I-D.ietf-suit-trust-domains]
              Moran, B. and K. Takayama, "SUIT Manifest Extensions for
              Multiple Trust Domains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-suit-trust-domains-06, 4 March 2024,
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              trust-domains-06>.

Authors' Addresses

   Brendan Moran
   Arm Limited
   Email: brendan.moran.ietf@gmail.com

   Henk Birkholz
   Fraunhofer SIT
   Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de

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