Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests-16

[Ballot discuss]
At this point, I think that these reviews have been adequately handled, and that
only two  changes are needed in response to the secdir review as listed below.
Those could be handled in a new revision or an RFC editor note.

The secdir review responses requiring some action seem to me to be:

>> 5.2.  Considerations for Manifest Generation
>> >>
>> >>  A new manifest MUST be issued on or before the nextUpdate time.
> >
> > Well, a new manifest must be published on or before the nextUpdate time.
> > Since RPs clocks will have some skew, new manifests should really be
> > published some time ahead of the nextUpdate time.  A few seconds or
> > minutes will do.  See comments on section 6.2.

RESPONSE:

We'll change this to “issued and published.”

>>  then the RP can conclude that no attack against the repository system
>> >>  has compromised the given signed object, and the signed object MUST
>> >>  be treated as valid.
> >
> > No scope for local policy exemptions to the above MUST?
RESPONSE:

Not at this level of validity checking. The signed objects are subjected
to additional checks that are object-specific (encompassed by the text
you elided that includes the constraint "the signed object is valid").
The manifest check adds the additional constraint that "and the issuer
of the signed object has a current intention that this is publically
accessible via its publication". To remove ambiguity here we'll add
"valid (relative to manifest checking)." to that sentence.

[Original discuss text is below]

The secdir and apps reviews raise a few issues that are worth checking/addressing.
I'd expect these should be addressed fairly quickly via a few email exchanges.

The secdir review is at [1], the apps review is at [2].

[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg02651.html
[2] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/apps-discuss/current/msg02510.html

[Ballot discuss]
At this point, I think that these reviews have been adequately handled, and that
only two  changes are needed in response to the secdir review as listed below.
Those could be handled in a new revision or an RFC editor note.

The secdir review responses requiring some action seem to me to be:

>> 5.2.  Considerations for Manifest Generation
>> >>
>> >>  A new manifest MUST be issued on or before the nextUpdate time.
> >
> > Well, a new manifest must be published on or before the nextUpdate time.
> > Since RPs clocks will have some skew, new manifests should really be
> > published some time ahead of the nextUpdate time.  A few seconds or
> > minutes will do.  See comments on section 6.2.

RESPONSE:

We'll change this to “issued and published.”

>>  then the RP can conclude that no attack against the repository system
>> >>  has compromised the given signed object, and the signed object MUST
>> >>  be treated as valid.
> >
> > No scope for local policy exemptions to the above MUST?
RESPONSE:

Not at this level of validity checking. The signed objects are subjected
to additional checks that are object-specific (encompassed by the text
you elided that includes the constraint "the signed object is valid").
The manifest check adds the additional constraint that "and the issuer
of the signed object has a current intention that this is publically
accessible via its publication". To remove ambiguity here we'll add
"valid (relative to manifest checking)." to that sentence.






The secdir and apps reviews raise a few issues that are worth checking/addressing.
I'd expect these should be addressed fairly quickly via a few email exchanges.

The secdir review is at [1], the apps review is at [2].

[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg02651.html
[2] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/apps-discuss/current/msg02510.html

[Ballot discuss]
The secdir and apps reviews raise a few issues that are worth checking/addressing.
I'd expect these should be addressed fairly quickly via a few email exchanges.

The secdir review is at [1], the apps review is at [2].

[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg02651.html
[2] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/apps-discuss/current/msg02510.html

[Ballot comment]
A couple of typos:
- period missing at end of first sentence in section 3
- at end of section 5.2 "CAs" should be "CA"

State changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested.

The following Last Call Announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC:
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Last Call:  (Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the Secure Inter-Domain Routing WG
(sidr) to consider the following document:
- 'Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure'
  as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2011-03-24. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests/


Abstract

  This document defines a "manifest" for use in the Resource Public Key
  Infrastructure (RPKI).  A manifest is a signed object (file) that
  contains a listing of all the signed objects (files) in the
  repository publication point (directory) associated with an authority
  responsible for publishing in the repository.  For each certificate,
  Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or other type of signed objects
  issued by the authority, that are published at this repository
  publication point, the manifest contains both the name of the file
  containing the object, and a hash of the file content.  Manifests are
  intended to enable a relying party (RP) to detect certain forms of
  attacks against a repository.  Specifically, if an RP checks a
  manifest's contents against the signed objects retrieved from a
  repository publication point, then the RP can detect "stale" (valid)
  data and deletion of signed objects.

  (1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
        Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
        document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
        version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

The document shepherd is Sandra Murphy, sidr co-chair.  The document
shepherd has personally reviewed the document.  No issues were
discovered that would prevent advancement.  This document is ready
for forwarding to the IESG.

  (1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
        and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have
        any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
        have been performed?
        have been performed?

The document has had adequate review.  It was presented at working
group meetings at the IETF70, IETF72, IETF76, IETF77, and IETF79
meetings and went through last call in Nov 2010 in the working group.
Comments received uniformly positive with one nit noted not worth
holding up the document.  There was adequate support from the working
group to indicate broad interest.

  (1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
        needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
        e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
        AAA, internationalization or XML?

No, the document shepherd has no concerns about this document.

  (1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
        issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
        and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he
        or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
        has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any
        event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
        that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
        concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
        been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
        disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
        this issue.

The document shepherd has no concerns with advancing this document. No
IPR claims have been filed against this document.

  (1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
        represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
        others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
        agree with it?

The working group has participated in presentations of this document.
The last call response indicated broad interest.  The certificate
profile document mandates that each certificate contain a reference
to the manifest object this document specifies.  Multiple
implementations of the RPKI exist, so multiple implementations of
this object exist.

  (1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
        discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
        separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
        should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
        entered into the ID Tracker.)

No appeals have been issued or threatened for this document.

  (1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
        document satisfies all ID nits? (See the Internet-Drafts Checklist
        and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are
        not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document
        met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
        Doctor, media type and URI type reviews?

The tools site idnits tool reports:
      Summary: 0 errors (**), 6 warnings (==), 2 comments (--).

The warnings have to do with outdated draft versions in the reference
list and with the pre-5378 status.

  (1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
        informative? Are there normative references to documents that
        are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
        state? If such normative references exist, what is the
        strategy for their completion? Are there normative references
        that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If
        so, list these downward references to support the Area
        Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].


Yes, the document has split its references into normative and informative
sections.  This document relies normatively on several other
working group documents that are advancing at the same time or
have been through last call and are awaiting a final version addressing
minor comments.  This document is intended for Standards status and there
are no downward references.

  (1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
        consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
        of the document? If the document specifies protocol
        extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
        registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If
        the document creates a new registry, does it define the
        proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
        procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
        reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC5226]. If the
        document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
        conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
        can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?

The IANA Considerations section exists, is consistent with the document,
and does not create a new registry or entries in an existing registry.

  (1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
        document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
        code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
        an automated checker?

This document uses ASN.1 in describing portions of the signed object.
The Appendix A is an ASN.1 module and it parses correctly. The syntax
was checked using asn1Parser from the libtasn1-tools package (v2.7.1).


  (1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
        Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
        Announcement Write-Up? Recent examples can be found in the
        "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
        announcement contains the following sections:
      Technical Summary
        Relevant content can frequently be found in the abstract
        and/or introduction of the document. If not, this may be
        an indication that there are deficiencies in the abstract
        or introduction.
      Working Group Summary
        Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For
        example, was there controversy about particular points or
        were there decisions where the consensus was particularly
        rough?
      Document Quality
        Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a
        significant number of vendors indicated their plan to
        implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that
        merit special mention as having done a thorough review,
        e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a
        conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If
        there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review,
        what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type
        review, on what date was the request posted?


Technical Summary

This document defines a "manifest" for use in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI).  A manifest is a signed object (file) that
contains a listing of all the signed objects (files) in the
repository publication point (directory) associated with an authority
responsible for publishing in the repository.  For each certificate,
Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or other type of signed object
issued by the authority that are published at this repository
publication point, the manifest contains both the name of the file
containing the object and a hash of the file content.  Manifests are
intended to enable a relying party (RP) to detect certain forms of
attacks against a repository.  Specifically, if an RP checks a
manifest's contents against the signed objects retrieved from a
repository publication point, then the RP can detect "stale" (valid)
data and deletion of signed objects.

Working Group Summary

This document specifies an object that is needed to protect against
some attacks (deletion, replay, etc.) on repositories in the
distributed RPKI.  The need for this object was recognized by RPKI
implementors and conveyed to the working group.  The working group
supported making this a mandatory part of the repository system.

Document Quality

The document is well written and clear. Implementations of the RPKI
exist, which must include this mandatory object, indicating a detailed
coding level review. Implemenation experience has been reflected in
changes to this document.

There is no MIB and there is no Media Type.