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Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) over IP Problem Statement
draft-ietf-rddp-problem-statement-05

Revision differences

Document history

Date Rev. By Action
2012-08-22
05 (System) post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Harald Alvestrand
2004-11-11
05 Amy Vezza State Changes to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent by Amy Vezza
2004-11-05
05 Amy Vezza IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent
2004-11-05
05 Amy Vezza IESG has approved the document
2004-11-05
05 Amy Vezza Closed "Approve" ballot
2004-11-05
05 Amy Vezza State Changes to Approved-announcement to be sent from IESG Evaluation::AD Followup by Amy Vezza
2004-10-27
05 Harald Alvestrand [Ballot Position Update] Position for Harald Alvestrand has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Harald Alvestrand
2004-10-27
05 Harald Alvestrand [Ballot comment]
Reviewed by John Loughney, Gen-ART
2004-10-26
05 (System) Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed
2004-10-26
05 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-rddp-problem-statement-05.txt
2004-07-24
05 Harald Alvestrand Version -04 did not address all issues raised in IESG evaluation. The authors know this, and will revise later.
2004-07-15
05 Jon Peterson State Changes to IESG Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from IESG Evaluation::AD Followup by Jon Peterson
2004-07-13
05 (System) Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed
2004-07-13
04 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-rddp-problem-statement-04.txt
2004-02-06
05 (System) Removed from agenda for telechat - 2004-02-05
2004-02-05
05 Amy Vezza State Changes to IESG Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from IESG Evaluation by Amy Vezza
2004-02-05
05 Ned Freed [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Ned Freed by Ned Freed
2004-02-05
05 Thomas Narten [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Thomas Narten by Thomas Narten
2004-02-05
05 Alex Zinin [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alex Zinin by Alex Zinin
2004-02-05
05 Bert Wijnen [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Bert Wijnen by Bert Wijnen
2004-02-05
05 Allison Mankin [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Allison Mankin by Allison Mankin
2004-02-05
05 Bill Fenner [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Bill Fenner by Bill Fenner
2004-02-04
05 Margaret Cullen [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Margaret Wasserman by Margaret Wasserman
2004-02-04
05 Russ Housley
[Ballot comment]
The Introduction provides a clear description of the situation.  However,
  I find the Abstract very confusing.  I believe that some wordsmithing will …
[Ballot comment]
The Introduction provides a clear description of the situation.  However,
  I find the Abstract very confusing.  I believe that some wordsmithing will
  greatly improve the Abstract.

  The use of IPsec, TLS, or any other protocol that provides authentication
  will not fit well into the proposed architecture.  The integrity check
  cannot be performed until the entire packet (or record in the case of TLS)
  is available in memory.  So, the data must be copied from the I/O interface
  to memory, which may involve some reassembly, before the integrity check
  can be performed.  This issue should be discussed in the second paragraph
  of the security considerations.

  The security considerations section talks about 'threats.'  The use does
  not align with the definitions in RFC 2828.  I suggest some rewording. I
  think the authors ought to look review the definition of 'vulnerability'
  in RFC 2828.

  s/IPSec/IPsec/

  s/privacy/confidentiality/
2004-02-04
05 Russ Housley [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Russ Housley by Russ Housley
2004-02-04
05 Steven Bellovin [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Steve Bellovin by Steve Bellovin
2004-02-04
05 Harald Alvestrand
[Ballot comment]
From John Louhghney, Gen-ART reviewer:

Less important and/or editorial
===============================

a) last sentence in Section 2.1 on page 6:

(Of course this argument …
[Ballot comment]
From John Louhghney, Gen-ART reviewer:

Less important and/or editorial
===============================

a) last sentence in Section 2.1 on page 6:

(Of course this argument would
    be specious if the amount of overhead were insignificant, but it
    has been shown to be substantial.)

  It would be nice to have some sort of reference to a document where it
  is shown that the amount of overhead has been shown to be substantial.

b) Page 9, in the table:
  s/Thruput/Throughput

c) Note to the RFC Editor on page 14 probably unnecessary.

d) In the references, I think "et al" should be "et al.* - i.e. - it is
  missing a period after "al".
2004-02-04
05 Harald Alvestrand
[Ballot discuss]
Needs an editing pass before being released.
From John Loughney, Gen-ART reviewer:

I would recommend the following changes:

Fairly important:
=================
a) Expand …
[Ballot discuss]
Needs an editing pass before being released.
From John Loughney, Gen-ART reviewer:

I would recommend the following changes:

Fairly important:
=================
a) Expand "RDMA" in draft title.
b) The draft is really crying out for a terminology section.  I am not well
  versed in this area, so RDMA, fibre channel, SAN, etc. should be added
  to a terminolgy section.
c) Related to point b, abbreviations / acronyms should be expanded on their
  first use. For example Gbits/s, SAN, RDMA and so forth. 
d) Section 4 does a good job at explaining the applicability of this particular
  problem to the internet architecture.  I think that part of this really needs
  to be summarized in section 1, perhaps under a 'Motivation' or 'Applicability
  to the Internet' section, so that this document is easier to understand to
  the lay-person.
e) It needs the IPR notices added.
f) In the security section, the discussion seems OK, but I think there needs to
  be some discussion about authorization / authentication for data copy.
  One can imagine that DoS attacks could be launched if applications / peers
  are not properly authenticated and authorized before a session takes place.

More comments in "comments" section.
2004-02-04
05 Ted Hardie [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Ted Hardie by Ted Hardie
2004-02-04
05 Harald Alvestrand [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Harald Alvestrand by Harald Alvestrand
2004-02-04
05 Jon Peterson [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Jon Peterson
2004-02-04
05 Jon Peterson Ballot has been issued by Jon Peterson
2004-02-04
05 Jon Peterson Created "Approve" ballot
2004-02-04
05 (System) Ballot writeup text was added
2004-02-04
05 (System) Last call text was added
2004-02-04
05 (System) Ballot approval text was added
2004-01-29
05 Jon Peterson Placed on agenda for telechat - 2004-02-05 by Jon Peterson
2004-01-29
05 Jon Peterson State Changes to IESG Evaluation from AD Evaluation by Jon Peterson
2004-01-19
03 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-rddp-problem-statement-03.txt
2003-11-25
05 Jon Peterson comments were sent to the authors; awaiting reply
2003-10-14
05 Jon Peterson State Changes to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested by Jon Peterson
2003-09-15
05 Natalia Syracuse Draft Added by Natalia Syracuse
2003-06-27
02 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-rddp-problem-statement-02.txt
2003-03-04
01 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-rddp-problem-statement-01.txt
2002-12-11
00 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-rddp-problem-statement-00.txt