LISP Control-Plane ECDSA Authentication and Authorization
draft-ietf-lisp-ecdsa-auth-02
Network Working Group D. Farinacci
Internet-Draft lispers.net
Intended status: Experimental E. Nordmark
Expires: March 19, 2020 Zededa
September 16, 2019
LISP Control-Plane ECDSA Authentication and Authorization
draft-ietf-lisp-ecdsa-auth-02
Abstract
This draft describes how LISP control-plane messages can be
individually authenticated and authorized without a a priori shared-
key configuration. Public-key cryptography is used with no new PKI
infrastructure required.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 19, 2020.
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Farinacci & Nordmark Expires March 19, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft LISP ECDSA Authentication and AuthorizationSeptember 2019
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Public-Key Hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Hash-EID Mapping Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Hash-EID Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Keys and Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Signed Map-Register Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Signed Map-Request Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Signed Map-Notify Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. Other Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. EID Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-ecdsa-auth-02 . . . . . . . . 16
B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-ecdsa-auth-01 . . . . . . . . 16
B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-ecdsa-auth-00 . . . . . . . . 16
B.4. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-03 . . . . . . 16
B.5. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-02 . . . . . . 16
B.6. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-01 . . . . . . 16
B.7. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-00 . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
The LISP architecture and protocols [RFC6830] introduces two new
numbering spaces, Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) and Routing Locators
(RLOCs) which provide an architecture to build overlays on top of the
underlying Internet. Mapping EIDs to RLOC-sets is accomplished with
a Mapping Database System. EIDs and RLOCs come in many forms than
just IP addresses, using a general syntax that includes Address
Family Identifier (AFI) [RFC1700]. Not only IP addresses, but other
addressing information have privacy requirements. Access to private
information is granted only to those who are authorized and
authenticated. Using asymmetric keying with public key cryptography
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