SMTP Security via Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-19
Revision differences
Document history
Date | Rev. | By | Action |
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2015-10-14
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19 | (System) | Notify list changed from draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane@ietf.org, draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane.shepherd@ietf.org, dane-chairs@ietf.org, ogud@ogud.com, draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane.ad@ietf.org to (None) |
2015-10-12
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19 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48-DONE from AUTH48 |
2015-10-08
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19 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48 from RFC-EDITOR |
2015-10-02
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19 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to RFC-EDITOR from REF |
2015-09-22
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19 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to REF from AUTH |
2015-09-18
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19 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to AUTH from EDIT |
2015-08-10
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19 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to EDIT from MISSREF |
2015-06-08
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19 | Gunter Van de Velde | Closed request for Last Call review by OPSDIR with state 'No Response' |
2015-06-05
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19 | Tero Kivinen | Closed request for Last Call review by SECDIR with state 'No Response' |
2015-06-02
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19 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent |
2015-06-01
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19 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to MISSREF |
2015-06-01
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19 | (System) | Announcement was received by RFC Editor |
2015-06-01
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19 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to No IC from In Progress |
2015-06-01
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19 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress |
2015-06-01
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19 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent from Approved-announcement to be sent::Point Raised - writeup needed |
2015-06-01
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19 | Amy Vezza | IESG has approved the document |
2015-06-01
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19 | Amy Vezza | Closed "Approve" ballot |
2015-06-01
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19 | Amy Vezza | Ballot approval text was generated |
2015-06-01
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19 | Amy Vezza | Ballot writeup was changed |
2015-05-29
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19 | Viktor Dukhovni | IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA OK - No Actions Needed |
2015-05-29
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19 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-19.txt |
2015-05-28
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18 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement to be sent::Point Raised - writeup needed from IESG Evaluation |
2015-05-28
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18 | Spencer Dawkins | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Spencer Dawkins |
2015-05-28
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18 | Benoît Claise | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Benoit Claise |
2015-05-27
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18 | Amanda Baber | IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - No Actions Needed from Version Changed - Review Needed |
2015-05-27
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18 | Alvaro Retana | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alvaro Retana |
2015-05-27
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18 | Dan Romascanu | Request for Telechat review by GENART Completed: Ready. Reviewer: Dan Romascanu. |
2015-05-27
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18 | Kathleen Moriarty | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Kathleen Moriarty |
2015-05-27
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18 | Ben Campbell | [Ballot comment] Thanks for this. I only have a few trivial comments: 2.1.3, first paragraph: The seems redundant to similar normative language in 2.1.1 2.1.3, … [Ballot comment] Thanks for this. I only have a few trivial comments: 2.1.3, first paragraph: The seems redundant to similar normative language in 2.1.1 2.1.3, last paragraph: "...it may need to issue a separate query..." I assume that means it also may _not_ need to do so. Is it worth elaborating on that case? Editorial: 2.3.3, first sentence: This is pretty convoluted. You might consider breaking it into a few simpler sentences. |
2015-05-27
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18 | Ben Campbell | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Ben Campbell |
2015-05-27
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18 | Deborah Brungard | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Deborah Brungard |
2015-05-27
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18 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Jari Arkko |
2015-05-27
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18 | Martin Stiemerling | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Martin Stiemerling |
2015-05-26
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18 | Viktor Dukhovni | IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA OK - No Actions Needed |
2015-05-26
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18 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-18.txt |
2015-05-26
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17 | Brian Haberman | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Brian Haberman |
2015-05-26
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17 | Barry Leiba | [Ballot comment] References and terminology: You use RFC 1034 to define "RR", and RFC 5598 to define "MSA", "MTA", and "MUA". And these are definitions … [Ballot comment] References and terminology: You use RFC 1034 to define "RR", and RFC 5598 to define "MSA", "MTA", and "MUA". And these are definitions that must be understood in order to properly understand this document. I think that makes those normative references, not informative ones, and they should be changed. (5598 is already in the downref registry, so,there's no problem with the downref here.) >> Author will move the references. In Section 2.2.1: When DANE TLS is mandatory (Section 6) for a given destination, delivery MUST be delayed when the MX RRSet is not "secure". This contradicts the "delivery MAY proceed" in the previous paragraph (and it also doesn't really fit into the paragraph about logging anyway). If you want to restrict things, I think you should put the most restrictive condition first, so move this sentence to the top of the previous paragraph. >> Author will make this change: OLD If the MX RRSet (or any CNAME leading to it) is "insecure" (see Section 2.1.1), DANE TLS need not apply, and delivery MAY proceed via pre-DANE opportunistic TLS. NEW If the MX RRSet (or any CNAME leading to it) is "insecure" (see Section 2.1.1), then if DANE TLS is mandatory (Section 6) for the given destination, delivery MUST be delayed. If DANE TLS is not mandatory, then DANE does not apply and delivery proceeds with pre-DANE opportunistic TLS (perhaps even in cleartext). END -- Section 2.2 -- contrast, DNSSEC validated TLSA records MUST NOT be published for servers that do not support TLS. Clients can safely interpret their presence as a commitment by the server operator to implement TLS and STARTTLS. I don't know that this needs any text changes, though perhaps a mention of this in the Security Considerations would be good: I'm not sure how "safely" they will be able to do that in practice. Remember that the people running the email severs often have no connection to the people who will insert or remove the TLSA records from the DNS. It's possible that a software change in the mail servers will remove support for DANE, and the TLSA record will not be correspondingly removed. I'm hoping that once this really gets rolled out, that won't be a real issue, but it could be for a while. It might be worth saying in the Security Considerations that such a situation needs to be avoided, and coordination is important, to make sure it doesn't happen. Otherwise, according to Section 2.2, mail delivery from DANE-aware MTAs will fail. >> Author will decide here -- probably not necessary to change anything: already sufficiently obvious. >> Author agrees with all of the following, and will adjust the text appropriately: -- Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 -- In 2.2.1: In the absence of DNS lookup errors (Section 2.1.1), if the MX RRset is not "insecure" then it is "secure", and the SMTP client MUST treat each MX hostname as a separate non-MX destination for opportunistic DANE TLS (as described in Section 2.2.2). In 2.2.2: This section describes the algorithm used to locate the TLSA records and associated TLSA base domain for an input domain that is not subject to MX resolution or that lacks MX records. I find this combination unnecessarily confusing -- it starts to sound a bit like Fizzbin . I know it's explained further (which is why this isn't a DISCUSS point), but I think clarity in the introduction would help a lot. I suggest this, but anything similar would be equally helpful: NEW In the absence of DNS lookup errors (Section 2.1.1), if the MX RRset is not "insecure" then it is "secure", and the SMTP client MUST treat each MX hostname as described in Section 2.2.2. END NEW This section describes the algorithm used to locate the TLSA records and associated TLSA base domain for an input domain that is not subject to MX resolution, that represents a hostname from a secure MX RRset, or that lacks MX records. END That latter ordering matches the order of the bullet list, and I think that's useful for making the text understandable. You might also re-think the title for Section 2.2.2, but I think that's less important. -- Section 2.2.3 -- If the ultimate response is a "secure" TLSA RRSet, then the candidate TLSA base domain will be the actual TLSA base domain and the TLSA RRSet will constitute the TLSA records for the destination. If none of the candidate TLSA base domains yield "secure" TLSA records then delivery MAY proceed via pre-DANE opportunistic TLS. SMTP clients MAY elect to use "insecure" TLSA records to avoid STARTTLS downgrades or even to skip SMTP servers that fail authentication, but MUST NOT misrepresent authentication success as either a secure connection to the SMTP server or as a secure delivery to the intended next-hop domain. When SMTP clients elect to use insecure TLSA records, this text implies, but doesn't make it completely clear, that they should only do that after checking all candidates. It would be good to be clear: check all candidates, stopping at the first secure TLSA. If no candidates produce secure TLSA, then you MAY use an insecure one, or you MAY use pre-DANE TLS. Is that right? In general, I strongly encourage you to review Section 2.2.3 and make sure that it reads smoothly to someone who's not already familiar with the DANE SMTP work. I'm not sure the organization of the thoughts in this section is very good as it's currently written. -- Section 3.1 -- In summary, we RECOMMEND the use of either "DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1) SHA2-256(1)" or "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) SHA2-256(1)" TLSA records depending on site needs. But later, in Section 3.1.1, you specifically single out the former: TLSA records published for SMTP servers SHOULD, in most cases, be "DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1) SHA2-256(1)" records. To be more consistent in your advice, I suggest changing the advice in 3.1 thus: NEW In summary, we RECOMMEND the use of "DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1) SHA2-256(1)", with "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) SHA2-256(1)" TLSA records as a second choice, depending on site needs. See the following two subsections for more details. END If that's not the advice you mean to give, then something is unclear. -- Section 3.1.1 -- Similarly, the expiration date of the server certificate MUST be ignored, the validity period of the TLSA record key binding is determined by the validity interval of the TLSA record DNSSEC signature. Editorial: "Similarly" to what? I'd remove the word. Also, the comma after "ignored" needs to be a colon (or a semicolon, but I think a colon is better here; the comma splice is just wrong). With DANE-EE(3) servers need not employ SNI (may ignore the client's SNI message) even when the server is known under independent names Editorial: This needs a comma after "DANE-EE(3)", and would do well with "they" before "may ignore"). -- Section 3.1.1 -- Such servers MUST either publish DANE-TA(2) records for an intermediate certificate or MUST instead use DANE- EE(3) TLSA records. The first "MUST" should be moved one word later, after "either" (or else the second "MUST" should be removed). -- Section 3.1.3 -- Note, this section applies to MTA-to-MTA SMTP on port 25. Earlier, in 2.2.3, you note that "the destination TCP port is typically 25, but this may be different with custom routes specified by the MTA administrator". I don't think you mean for this section not to apply in the latter case, so I suggest changing this to, "Note, this section applies to MTA-to-MTA SMTP, which is normally on port 25." Nothing is lost since the PKIX certificate usages cannot aid SMTP TLS security, they can only impede SMTP TLS interoperability. Editorial: You need a comma after "lost", and the existing comma needs to be a semicolon. The last paragraph of the section is missing a final period. -- Section 6 -- Administrators of mail servers that employ mandatory DANE TLS, need to carefully monitor their mail logs and queues. Nit: the comma should be removed. |
2015-05-26
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17 | Barry Leiba | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Barry Leiba has been changed to Yes from Discuss |
2015-05-24
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17 | Barry Leiba | [Ballot discuss] Nothing fundamental here; I just have three things I'd like to sort out before balloting "yes" on this, and they should all be … [Ballot discuss] Nothing fundamental here; I just have three things I'd like to sort out before balloting "yes" on this, and they should all be easy to resolve: 1. References and terminology: You use RFC 1034 to define "RR", and RFC 5598 to define "MSA", "MTA", and "MUA". And these are definitions that must be understood in order to properly understand this document. I think that makes those normative references, not informative ones, and they should be changed. (5598 is already in the downref registry, so,there's no problem with the downref here.) 2. Section 2.2.1 says this: That said, the protocol in this memo is an "opportunistic security" protocol, meaning that it strives to communicate with each peer as securely as possible, while maintaining broad interoperability. Therefore, the SMTP client MAY proceed to use DANE TLS (as described in Section 2.2.2 below) even with MX hosts obtained via an "insecure" MX RRSet. For example, when a hosting provider has a signed DNS zone and publishes TLSA records for its SMTP servers, hosted domains that are not signed may still benefit from the provider's TLSA records. That makes sense. Why doesn't the same thing apply for insecure TLSA records? Section 2.2 says that when TLSA records are insecure, you don't use them, and SHOULD use pre-DANE security. Please explain why they shouldn't use insecure TLSA records for opportunistic encryption. 3. In Section 2.2.1: When DANE TLS is mandatory (Section 6) for a given destination, delivery MUST be delayed when the MX RRSet is not "secure". This contradicts the "delivery MAY proceed" in the previous paragraph (and it also doesn't really fit into the paragraph about logging anyway). If you want to restrict things, I think you should put the most restrictive condition first, so move this sentence to the top of the previous paragraph this way: OLD If the MX RRSet (or any CNAME leading to it) is "insecure" (see Section 2.1.1), DANE TLS need not apply, and delivery MAY proceed via pre-DANE opportunistic TLS. NEW If the MX RRSet (or any CNAME leading to it) is "insecure" (see Section 2.1.1), then if DANE TLS is mandatory (Section 6) for the given destination, delivery MUST be delayed. If DANE TLS is not mandatory, then it need not apply, and delivery MAY proceed via pre-DANE opportunistic TLS. END |
2015-05-24
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17 | Barry Leiba | [Ballot comment] -- Section 2.2 -- contrast, DNSSEC validated TLSA records MUST NOT be published for servers that do not support TLS. Clients can safely … [Ballot comment] -- Section 2.2 -- contrast, DNSSEC validated TLSA records MUST NOT be published for servers that do not support TLS. Clients can safely interpret their presence as a commitment by the server operator to implement TLS and STARTTLS. I don't know that this needs any text changes, though perhaps a mention of this in the Security Considerations would be good: I'm not sure how "safely" they will be able to do that in practice. Remember that the people running the email severs often have no connection to the people who will insert or remove the TLSA records from the DNS. It's possible that a software change in the mail servers will remove support for DANE, and the TLSA record will not be correspondingly removed. I'm hoping that once this really gets rolled out, that won't be a real issue, but it could be for a while. It might be worth saying in the Security Considerations that such a situation needs to be avoided, and coordination is important, to make sure it doesn't happen. Otherwise, according to Section 2.2, mail delivery from DANE-aware MTAs will fail. -- Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 -- In 2.2.1: In the absence of DNS lookup errors (Section 2.1.1), if the MX RRset is not "insecure" then it is "secure", and the SMTP client MUST treat each MX hostname as a separate non-MX destination for opportunistic DANE TLS (as described in Section 2.2.2). In 2.2.2: This section describes the algorithm used to locate the TLSA records and associated TLSA base domain for an input domain that is not subject to MX resolution or that lacks MX records. I find this combination unnecessarily confusing -- it starts to sound a bit like Fizzbin . I know it's explained further (which is why this isn't a DISCUSS point), but I think clarity in the introduction would help a lot. I suggest this, but anything similar would be equally helpful: NEW In the absence of DNS lookup errors (Section 2.1.1), if the MX RRset is not "insecure" then it is "secure", and the SMTP client MUST treat each MX hostname as described in Section 2.2.2. END NEW This section describes the algorithm used to locate the TLSA records and associated TLSA base domain for an input domain that is not subject to MX resolution, that represents a hostname from a secure MX RRset, or that lacks MX records. END That latter ordering matches the order of the bullet list, and I think that's useful for making the text understandable. You might also re-think the title for Section 2.2.2, but I think that's less important. -- Section 2.2.3 -- If the ultimate response is a "secure" TLSA RRSet, then the candidate TLSA base domain will be the actual TLSA base domain and the TLSA RRSet will constitute the TLSA records for the destination. If none of the candidate TLSA base domains yield "secure" TLSA records then delivery MAY proceed via pre-DANE opportunistic TLS. SMTP clients MAY elect to use "insecure" TLSA records to avoid STARTTLS downgrades or even to skip SMTP servers that fail authentication, but MUST NOT misrepresent authentication success as either a secure connection to the SMTP server or as a secure delivery to the intended next-hop domain. When SMTP clients elect to use insecure TLSA records, this text implies, but doesn't make it completely clear, that they should only do that after checking all candidates. It would be good to be clear: check all candidates, stopping at the first secure TLSA. If no candidates produce secure TLSA, then you MAY use an insecure one, or you MAY use pre-DANE TLS. Is that right? In general, I strongly encourage you to review Section 2.2.3 and make sure that it reads smoothly to someone who's not already familiar with the DANE SMTP work. I'm not sure the organization of the thoughts in this section is very good as it's currently written. -- Section 3.1 -- In summary, we RECOMMEND the use of either "DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1) SHA2-256(1)" or "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) SHA2-256(1)" TLSA records depending on site needs. But later, in Section 3.1.1, you specifically single out the former: TLSA records published for SMTP servers SHOULD, in most cases, be "DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1) SHA2-256(1)" records. To be more consistent in your advice, I suggest changing the advice in 3.1 thus: NEW In summary, we RECOMMEND the use of "DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1) SHA2-256(1)", with "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) SHA2-256(1)" TLSA records as a second choice, depending on site needs. See the following two subsections for more details. END If that's not the advice you mean to give, then something is unclear. -- Section 3.1.1 -- Similarly, the expiration date of the server certificate MUST be ignored, the validity period of the TLSA record key binding is determined by the validity interval of the TLSA record DNSSEC signature. Editorial: "Similarly" to what? I'd remove the word. Also, the comma after "ignored" needs to be a colon (or a semicolon, but I think a colon is better here; the comma splice is just wrong). With DANE-EE(3) servers need not employ SNI (may ignore the client's SNI message) even when the server is known under independent names Editorial: This needs a comma after "DANE-EE(3)", and would do well with "they" before "may ignore"). -- Section 3.1.1 -- Such servers MUST either publish DANE-TA(2) records for an intermediate certificate or MUST instead use DANE- EE(3) TLSA records. The first "MUST" should be moved one word later, after "either" (or else the second "MUST" should be removed). -- Section 3.1.3 -- Note, this section applies to MTA-to-MTA SMTP on port 25. Earlier, in 2.2.3, you note that "the destination TCP port is typically 25, but this may be different with custom routes specified by the MTA administrator". I don't think you mean for this section not to apply in the latter case, so I suggest changing this to, "Note, this section applies to MTA-to-MTA SMTP, which is normally on port 25." Nothing is lost since the PKIX certificate usages cannot aid SMTP TLS security, they can only impede SMTP TLS interoperability. Editorial: You need a comma after "lost", and the existing comma needs to be a semicolon. The last paragraph of the section is missing a final period. -- Section 6 -- Administrators of mail servers that employ mandatory DANE TLS, need to carefully monitor their mail logs and queues. Nit: the comma should be removed. |
2015-05-24
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17 | Barry Leiba | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Barry Leiba |
2015-05-21
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17 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Telechat review by GENART is assigned to Dan Romascanu |
2015-05-21
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17 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Telechat review by GENART is assigned to Dan Romascanu |
2015-05-19
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17 | (System) | IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - No Actions Needed from Version Changed - Review Needed |
2015-05-16
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17 | Stephen Farrell | Notification list changed to draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane@ietf.org, draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane.shepherd@ietf.org, dane-chairs@ietf.org, ogud@ogud.com, draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane.ad@ietf.org from "Olafur Gudmundsson" <ogud@ogud.com> |
2015-05-16
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17 | Stephen Farrell | Changed consensus to Yes from Unknown |
2015-05-16
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17 | Stephen Farrell | Placed on agenda for telechat - 2015-05-28 |
2015-05-16
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17 | Stephen Farrell | IESG state changed to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for Writeup |
2015-05-16
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17 | Stephen Farrell | Ballot has been issued |
2015-05-16
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17 | Stephen Farrell | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Stephen Farrell |
2015-05-16
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17 | Stephen Farrell | Created "Approve" ballot |
2015-05-16
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17 | Stephen Farrell | Ballot writeup was changed |
2015-05-16
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17 | Viktor Dukhovni | IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA OK - No Actions Needed |
2015-05-16
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17 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-17.txt |
2015-05-07
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16 | (System) | IESG state changed to Waiting for Writeup from In Last Call |
2015-05-06
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16 | Dan Romascanu | Request for Last Call review by GENART Completed: Ready with Nits. Reviewer: Dan Romascanu. |
2015-05-04
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16 | Tero Kivinen | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Tobias Gondrom |
2015-05-04
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16 | Tero Kivinen | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Tobias Gondrom |
2015-05-04
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16 | (System) | IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - No Actions Needed from IANA - Review Needed |
2015-05-04
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16 | Pearl Liang | (Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs: IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-16, which is currently in Last Call, and has the following comments: We understand that, upon … (Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs: IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-16, which is currently in Last Call, and has the following comments: We understand that, upon approval of this document, there are no IANA Actions that need completion. While it is helpful for the IANA Considerations section of the document to remain in place upon publication, if the authors prefer to remove it, IANA doesn't object. If this assessment is not accurate, please respond as soon as possible. |
2015-04-26
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16 | Gunter Van de Velde | Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Victor Kuarsingh |
2015-04-26
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16 | Gunter Van de Velde | Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Victor Kuarsingh |
2015-04-23
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16 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Dan Romascanu |
2015-04-23
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16 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Dan Romascanu |
2015-04-23
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16 | Amy Vezza | IANA Review state changed to IANA - Review Needed |
2015-04-23
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16 | Amy Vezza | The following Last Call announcement was sent out: From: The IESG To: IETF-Announce CC: Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org Sender: Subject: Last Call: (SMTP security via opportunistic DANE … The following Last Call announcement was sent out: From: The IESG To: IETF-Announce CC: Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org Sender: Subject: Last Call: (SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS) to Proposed Standard The IESG has received a request from the DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities WG (dane) to consider the following document: - 'SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS' as Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2015-05-07. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. Abstract This memo describes a downgrade-resistant protocol for SMTP transport security between Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) based on the DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA DNS record. Adoption of this protocol enables an incremental transition of the Internet email backbone to one using encrypted and authenticated Transport Layer Security (TLS). The file can be obtained via http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane/ IESG discussion can be tracked via http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane/ballot/ No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D. |
2015-04-23
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16 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested |
2015-04-23
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16 | Stephen Farrell | Last call was requested |
2015-04-23
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16 | Stephen Farrell | Last call announcement was generated |
2015-04-23
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16 | Stephen Farrell | Ballot approval text was generated |
2015-04-23
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16 | Stephen Farrell | Ballot writeup was generated |
2015-04-23
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16 | Stephen Farrell | IESG state changed to Last Call Requested from AD Evaluation |
2015-04-21
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16 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-16.txt |
2015-04-15
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15 | Stephen Farrell | IESG state changed to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested |
2015-03-23
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15 | Ólafur Guðmundsson | (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? … (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in the title page header? Standards Track (2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections: Technical Summary: This document explians in detail how MTAs (Mail-Transfer-Agent) use TLSA records in setting up SSL proteced sessions. This document is based on implementation and deployment experience. The document covers offers guidance on many corner cases in both in DANE SSL setup as well in mail transport. This document has been implemented in two major MTA distributions, and there is growing usage base. Working Group Summary: There has been good solid discussion on this document, there is strong consensus about the whole document. Document Quality: The document is detailied and covers many corner cases some of with are DNS related to email. The protocol specified here is tested in practice and that is reflected in the document. The document educates the readers about choices to avoid pitfalls in implmentations and operations. Email people are encouraged to review the document. It is helpful to read this document along with its companion document draft-ietf-dane-srv-xx. The two document cross referene each other to avoid dupliaiton. Personnel: Document Shepherd: Olafur Gudmundsson Area Director: Stephen Farrell (3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by the Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not ready for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to the IESG. The document shepert has reviewed the document multiple times. This document is ready for publication. Editors have been responsive in addressesing issues. (4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? NO (5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS, DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that took place. No, but email people should take a look. (6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here. NONE. (7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why? YES (8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document? If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR disclosures. NO (9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? STRONG (10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.) No (11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this document. (See http://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be thorough. None left. (12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews. Not needed (13) Have all references within this document been identified as either normative or informative? YES (14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative references exist, what is the plan for their completion? There is one document that is normative that is in WG progress we will be attemtpting to advance it soon, thus the expection is that this document will wait for the missing document draft-ietf-dane-ops-xx to catch up in publication process. (15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)? If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure. NO (16) Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the part of the document where the relationship of this document to the other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document, explain why the WG considers it unnecessary. No (17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226). No IANA actions (18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries. NONE, (19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc. Does not apply |
2015-03-23
|
15 | Ólafur Guðmundsson | Responsible AD changed to Stephen Farrell |
2015-03-23
|
15 | Ólafur Guðmundsson | IESG state changed to Publication Requested |
2015-03-23
|
15 | Ólafur Guðmundsson | IESG process started in state Publication Requested |
2015-03-23
|
15 | Ólafur Guðmundsson | (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? … (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in the title page header? Standards Track (2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections: Technical Summary: This document explians in detail how MTAs (Mail-Transfer-Agent) use TLSA records in setting up SSL proteced sessions. This document is based on implementation and deployment experience. The document covers offers guidance on many corner cases in both in DANE SSL setup as well in mail transport. This document has been implemented in two major MTA distributions, and there is growing usage base. Working Group Summary: There has been good solid discussion on this document, there is strong consensus about the whole document. Document Quality: The document is detailied and covers many corner cases some of with are DNS related to email. The protocol specified here is tested in practice and that is reflected in the document. The document educates the readers about choices to avoid pitfalls in implmentations and operations. Email people are encouraged to review the document. It is helpful to read this document along with its companion document draft-ietf-dane-srv-xx. The two document cross referene each other to avoid dupliaiton. Personnel: Document Shepherd: Olafur Gudmundsson Area Director: Stephen Farrell (3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by the Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not ready for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to the IESG. The document shepert has reviewed the document multiple times. This document is ready for publication. Editors have been responsive in addressesing issues. (4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? NO (5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS, DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that took place. No, but email people should take a look. (6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here. NONE. (7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why? YES (8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document? If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR disclosures. NO (9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? STRONG (10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.) No (11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this document. (See http://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be thorough. None left. (12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews. Not needed (13) Have all references within this document been identified as either normative or informative? YES (14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative references exist, what is the plan for their completion? There is one document that is normative that is in WG progress we will be attemtpting to advance it soon, thus the expection is that this document will wait for the missing document draft-ietf-dane-ops-xx to catch up in publication process. (15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)? If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure. NO (16) Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the part of the document where the relationship of this document to the other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document, explain why the WG considers it unnecessary. No (17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226). No IANA actions (18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries. NONE, (19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc. Does not apply |
2015-03-23
|
15 | Ólafur Guðmundsson | Notification list changed to "Olafur Gudmundsson" <ogud@ogud.com> |
2015-03-23
|
15 | Ólafur Guðmundsson | Document shepherd changed to Olafur Gudmundsson |
2015-03-23
|
15 | Ólafur Guðmundsson | IETF WG state changed to Submitted to IESG for Publication from In WG Last Call |
2015-03-04
|
15 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-15.txt |
2015-02-20
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14 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-14.txt |
2014-10-25
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13 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-13.txt |
2014-08-17
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12 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-12.txt |
2014-08-02
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11 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-11.txt |
2014-05-25
|
10 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-10.txt |
2014-05-05
|
09 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-09.txt |
2014-04-23
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08 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-08.txt |
2014-02-14
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07 | Wes Hardaker | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-07.txt |
2014-02-13
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06 | Warren Kumari | Longer than normal WGLC so we can fight about^w^w discuss it in London. |
2014-02-13
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06 | Warren Kumari | IETF WG state changed to In WG Last Call from WG Document |
2014-02-13
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06 | Warren Kumari | Intended Status changed to Proposed Standard from None |
2014-02-12
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06 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-06.txt |
2014-02-09
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05 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-05.txt |
2013-11-23
|
04 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-04.txt |
2013-11-23
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03 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-03.txt |
2013-10-21
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02 | Wes Hardaker | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-02.txt |
2013-10-20
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01 | Viktor Dukhovni | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-01.txt |
2013-10-08
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00 | Wes Hardaker | New version available: draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-00.txt |