Oblivious DNS Over HTTPS
draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh-01

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Network Working Group                                         E. Kinnear
Internet-Draft                                                Apple Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                              P. McManus
Expires: May 4, 2020                                              Fastly
                                                                T. Pauly
                                                                 C. Wood
                                                              Apple Inc.
                                                       November 01, 2019

                        Oblivious DNS Over HTTPS
                  draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh-01

Abstract

   This document describes an extension to DNS Over HTTPS (DoH) that
   allows hiding client IP addresses via proxying encrypted DNS
   transactions.  This improves privacy of DNS operations by not
   allowing any one server entity to be aware of both the client IP
   address and the content of DNS queries and answers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

Kinnear, et al.            Expires May 4, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                Oblivious DoH                November 2019

   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Deployment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  HTTP Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  HTTP Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  HTTP Request Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3.  HTTP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  HTTP Response Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Public Key Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Oblivious DoH Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Oblivious DoH Message Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     7.1.  Oblivious Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     7.2.  Oblivious Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.1.  Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  Oblivious DoH Message Media Type  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.2.  Oblivious DoH Public Key DNS Parameter  . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   DNS Over HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484] defines a mechanism to allow DNS
   messages to be transmitted in encrypted HTTP messages.  This provides
   improved confidentiality and authentication for DNS interactions in
   various circumstances.

   While DoH can prevent eavesdroppers from directly reading the
   contents of DNS exchanges, it does not allow clients to send DNS
   queries and receive answers from servers without revealing their
   local IP address, and thus information about the identity or location
   of the client.

   Proposals such as Oblivious DNS ([I-D.annee-dprive-oblivious-dns])
   allow increased privacy by not allowing any single DNS server to be
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