Delegated Credentials for TLS
draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (tls WG)
Last updated 2019-07-08
Replaces draft-rescorla-tls-subcerts
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Network Working Group                                          R. Barnes
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track                              S. Iyengar
Expires: January 9, 2020                                        Facebook
                                                             N. Sullivan
                                                              Cloudflare
                                                             E. Rescorla
                                                              RTFM, Inc.
                                                           July 08, 2019

                     Delegated Credentials for TLS
                       draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-04

Abstract

   The organizational separation between the operator of a TLS endpoint
   and the certification authority can create limitations.  For example,
   the lifetime of certificates, how they may be used, and the
   algorithms they support are ultimately determined by the
   certification authority.  This document describes a mechanism by
   which operators may delegate their own credentials for use in TLS,
   without breaking compatibility with peers that do not support this
   specification.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Barnes, et al.           Expires January 9, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        Delegated Credentials for TLS            July 2019

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Related Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Delegated Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Client and Server behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.1.1.  Server authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.1.2.  Client authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.3.  Validating a Delegated Credential . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Certificate Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Security of delegated private key . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  Re-use of delegated credentials in multiple contexts  . .  11
     5.3.  Revocation of delegated credentials . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.4.  Privacy considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   Typically, a TLS server uses a certificate provided by some entity
   other than the operator of the server (a "Certification Authority" or
   CA) [RFC8446] [RFC5280].  This organizational separation makes the
   TLS server operator dependent on the CA for some aspects of its
   operations, for example:

   o  Whenever the server operator wants to deploy a new certificate, it
      has to interact with the CA.

   o  The server operator can only use TLS authentication schemes for
      which the CA will issue credentials.
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