Network Working Group B. Sarikaya
Internet-Draft Huawei
Intended status: Informational M. Sethi
Expires: January 2, 2017 Ericsson
July 1, 2016
Secure IoT Bootstrapping: A Survey
draft-sarikaya-t2trg-sbootstrapping-01
Abstract
This document presents a survey of secure bootstrapping mechanisms
available for smart objects that are part of an Internet of Things
(IoT) network. It aims to provide a structured classification of the
available mechanisms. The document does not prescribe any one secure
bootstrapping mechanism and rather presents IoT developers with
different options to choose from, depending on their use-case,
security requirements and the user interface available on their smart
objects.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2017.
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Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Classification of available mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. IoT Device Bootstrapping Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
An Internet of Things (IoT) network consists of connected things that
cooperate together to accomplish tasks such as smart buildings, smart
environment monitoring system, and intelligent transport systems.
The size of an IoT network varies from a couple of devices to tens of
thousands depending on the application. A smart object, or a thing,
or a device in an IoT network is typically produced by a variety of
vendors and are typically heterogeneous in terms of the constraints
on their power supply, communication capability, computation capacity
and memory available. Due to this heterogeneity, a wide variety of
bootstrapping mechanisms are proposed and used for these smart
objects.
Before classifying and describing the various methods of
bootstrapping, it is important discuss what is meant by the term
bootstrapping. In order to understand the term bootstrapping, we
need to discuss some important preliminaries first. We start by
discussing the meaning of identity and identifiers. The dictionary
defines identity as "something that distinguishes an entity form
other entities". Dick Hardt in his keynote talk on identity
describes human identity as "who you are, what you like, what you say
about yourself and what others say about you" [dickhardt]. In
addition to human beings, other entities in our physical environment
such as the electronic devices we use, our pets and wildlife also
have identities.
Just as in the real world, humans also have identities in the digital
world. For example, a digital identity may be used by online service
to verify the identity of a registered user and provide it with
secure personalized service. This process of identity verification
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is also known as authentication. An attribute that can be used to
identify and distinguish one entity from another is referred to as an
identifier. The passport number of a citizen is an example of an
real-world identifier. Similarly, an email address is an example of
a digital identifier. Often the digital identifier of a human user
and the digital identifier of its electronic devices are used
interchangeably and one may subsume the other for authentication
purposes. For instance, when performing network access
authentication, the user may enter its identity credentials on the
device that should connect to the network. In this case, the device
assumes the user identity on its behalf and authenticates to obtain
network access. Ubiquitous computing devices increasingly interact
with each other without human intervention. This essentially
requires the devices to have their own identifiers for authentication
and secure communication.
With these preliminaries in mind, we try to decipher the meaning of
bootstrapping. The term itself has often been used in many different
contexts. For instance, [RFC4640] describes bootstrapping as the
process by which a mobile IPv6 node obtains information about the
home address, the home agent address, and a security association.
The IoT@Work project defines bootstrapping in the context of Internet
of Things (IoT) as the process by which the state of a device, a
subsystem, a network, or an application changes from not operational
to operational [iotwork]. [I-D.oflynn-core-bootstrapping] also
discusses the problem of secure bootstrapping for resource-
constrained devices and highlights the role of IETF in defining
suitable solutions. The authors of this document define
bootstrapping as any process that is required before the resource-
constrained device network can operate. Similarly, Vermillard
[vermillard] describes bootstrapping as the procedure by which an IoT
device gets the secret keys and URL for reaching the necessary
servers. Vermillard notes that this procedure is also useful for re-
keying, upgrading the security schemes and for redirecting the
devices to other servers. The term device onboarding refers to
similar ideas and is often used interchangeably with the term
bootstrapping. As an example, the AllSeen Alliance [allseen] defines
onboarding as a service that provides a common and simple way for new
devices to be brought onto an existing WiFi network. Some solutions
and standards organizations distinguish the processes involved in
bootstrapping into the following sub-processes:
a. initial establishment of keys and configuration information
b. subsequent provisioning of keys and configuration information
The Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF), for example, uses the term
onboarding for (a) and bootstrapping for (b). Some specifications
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consider (a) out of scope and assume that this information is
manufacturer provisioned. However, in many cases the two processes
are interdependent and may require business agreements and/or
protocols to ensure security for both the sub-processes. Instead of
providing yet another definition of bootstrapping, here we list the
different goals that bootstrapping may be used to fulfill:
o Authentication of a pre-established identity or creation of a new
identity: To illustrate this with an example, consider the case
where a user wishes to use one of the many free online mail
services. The user in this case needs to first register and
create a unique identifier (email address) for its identity.
Thereafter, the user will use this email address along with the
password to authenticate and access the mails. Both these
processes can be considered as a part of bootstrapping.
o Authorization for network access that may include configuration of
communication parameters: Bootstrapping also includes the process
by which a device authenticates to the network and receives
authorization and credentials for subsequent secure communication.
o Registration or joining a domain or group: The process by which a
windows device joins a windows domain can also be seen as
bootstrapping.
o Pairing with a specific node, or connecting to a cloud service:
Securely pairing two personal computing devices that have no
a-priori information about each other, and securely connecting a
device to an online cloud service are both different forms of
bootstrapping.
It is evident that bootstrapping maybe used in many diverse scenarios
to fulfill different goals. Thus, it is not surprising that there
are many different bootstrapping protocols and methods available.
Rather than trying to achieve the impossible target of enlisting all
the different bootstrapping solutions, we instead classify them into
the following categories in section 3.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
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3. Classification of available mechanisms
While some bootstrapping approaches are more user-intensive and
require extensive user-involvement by scanning QR codes or entering
passwords; others maybe more automated, such as those that rely on
mobile networks [I-D.sethi-gba-constrained]. We classify available
bootstrapping solutions into the following major categories:
o Managed methods: These bootstrapping methods rely on pre-
established trust relations and authentication credentials. They
typically utilize centralized servers for authentication, although
several such servers may join to form a distributed federation.
Example methods include Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
[RFC3748], Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) [gba],
Kerberos [RFC4120], and vendor certificates [vendorcert]. EAP
Transport Layer Security EAP-TLS [RFC5216] for instance assumes
that both the client and the server have certificates to
authenticate each other. Based on this authentication, the server
would then authorize the client for network access. The Eduroam
federation [RFC7593] uses a network of such servers to support
roaming clients.
o Peer-to-Peer (P2P) and Ad-hoc methods: These bootstrapping methods
do not rely on any pre-established credentials. Instead, the
bootstrapping protocol results in credentials being established
for subsequent secure communication. Such bootstrapping methods
typically perform an unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange [dh]
and then use an out-of-band (OOB) communication channel to prevent
a man-in-the-middle attack (MitM). Various secure device pairing
protocols fall in this category. Another example P2P or Ad-hoc
method is EAP-NOOB [I-D.aura-eap-noob] that specifies out-of-band
authentication for EAP. Based on how the OOB channel is used, the
P2P methods can be further classified into two sub categories:
* Key derivation: Contextual information received over the OOB
channel is used for shared key derivation. For example,
[proximate] relies on the common radio environment of the
devices being paired to derive the shared secret which would
then be used for secure communication.
* Key confirmation: A Diffie-Hellman key exchange occurs over the
insecure network and the established key is authenticate with
the help of the OOB channel. For example, Bluetooth simple
pairing [SimplePairing] use the OOB channel to ask the user to
compare pins and approve the completed exchange.
o Opportunistic and leap-of-faith methods: In these bootstrapping
methods, rather than verifying the initial authentication, the
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continuity of the initial identity or connection is verified.
Some of these methods assume that the attacker is not present
during the initial setup. Example methods include Secure Neighbor
Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971] and Cryptographically Generated
Addresses (CGA) [RFC3972], Wifi Protected Setup (WPS) push button
[wps], and Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4253]. Additionally, various
online services such as Gmail and Facebook allow anyone to create
a new identity during the initial setup and later only verify the
continuity of the same identity.
o Hybrid methods: Most deployed methods are hybrid and use
components from both managed and ad-hoc methods. For instance,
central management may be used for devices after they have been
registered with the server using ad-hoc registration methods.
It is important to note here that categorization of different
bootstrapping methods is not always easy or clear. For example, all
the opportunistic and leap-of-faith methods become managed methods
after the initial vulnerability window. The choice of bootstrapping
method used for devices depends heavily on the business case.
Questions that may govern the choice include: What third parties are
available? Who wants to retain control or avoid work? In each
category, there are many different methods of secure bootstrapping
available. The choice of the method may also be governed by the type
of device being bootstrapped. Depending on the link-layer technology
used, and the User Interface (UI) available, one or more of the above
mentioned methods might be suitable.
4. IoT Device Bootstrapping Methods
In this section we look at some of the recent bootstrapping proposals
for IoT devices both at the IETF and elsewhere. Needless to say, if
the devices are capable in terms of their computation power and UI
available, they can always rely on many existing methods such as
username and password combinations and various EAP methods.
We first discuss some examples of managed bootstrapping methods.
EAP-TLS is a widely used EAP method for network access authentication
[RFC7250]. It allows mutual authentication and distributes the
keying material for secure subsequent communications. However it
only supports certificate-based mutual authentication, and therefore
a public key infrastructure is required. The ZigBee Alliance has
specified an IPv6 stack aimed at IEEE 802.15.4 [IEEE802.15.4] devices
mainly used in smart meters developed primarily for SEP 2.0 (Smart
Energy Profile) application layer traffic [SEP2.0]. The ZigBee IP
stack uses EAP-TLS for secure bootstrapping of devices.
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EAP-PSK [RFC4764] is another EAP method. It realizes mutual
authentication and session key derivation using a Pre-Shared Key
(PSK). Normally four messages are exchanged in the authentication
process. Once the authentication is successful, EAP-PSK provides a
protected communication channel. Given the light-weight nature of
EAP-PSK, it can often be a good choice on constrained devices.
EAP-COAP [I-D.marin-ace-wg-coap-eap] uses EAP transported over CoAP
[RFC7252] messages for authenticating two CoAP endpoints and
configuring key material to protect CoAP messages exchanged between
them. They discuss the use of EAP-PSK in the draft, but state that
any EAP method that results in generation of cryptographic material
is suitable.
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
[RFC5191] is a network layer protocol with which a node can
authenticate itself to gain access to the network. PANA does not
define a new authentication protocol and rather uses EAP over User
Datagram Protocol (UDP) for authentication. Colin
[I-D.oflynn-core-bootstrapping]proposes the use of PANA for secure
bootstrapping of resource constrained devices. He demonstrates how a
6LowPAN Border Router (PANA Authentication Agent (PAA)) can
authenticate the identity of a joining constrained device (PANA
Client). Once the constrained device has been successfully
authenticated, the border router can also provide network and
security parameters to the joining device. Hernandez-Ramos et al.
[panaiot] also use EAP-TLS over PANA for secure bootstrapping of
smart objects. They also extend their bootstrapping scheme for
configuring additional keys that are used for secure group
communication.
Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) is another bootstrapping
method that falls in centralized category. GBA is part of the 3GPP
standard [gba] and is based on 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement
(3GPP AKA). GBA is an application independent mechanism to provide a
client application (running on the User equipment (UE)) and any
application server with a shared session secret. This shared session
secret can subsequently be used to authenticate and protect the
communication between the client application and the application
server. GBA authentication is based on the permanent secret shared
between the UE's Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), for
example SIM card, and the corresponding profile information stored
within the cellular network operator's Home Subscriber System (HSS)
database. [I-D.sethi-gba-constrained] describes a resource-
constrained implementation of GBA for IoT applications.
Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) Light-weight M2M standard also defines
secure bootstrapping for resource-constrained IoT devices with a
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centralized Bootstrapping Server (BS). The current standard defines
the following four bootstrapping modes:
o Factory Bootstrap: An IoT device in this case is configured with
all the necessary bootstrap information during manufacturing and
prior to its deployment.
o Bootstrap from Smartcard: An IoT device retrieves and processes
all the necessary bootstrap data from a Smartcard.
o Client Initiated Bootstrap: This mode provides a mechanism for an
IoT client device to retrieve the bootstrap information from a
Bootstrap Server. This requires the client device to have an
account at the Bootstrap Server and credentials to obtain the
necessary information securely.
o Server Initiated Bootstrap: In this bootstrapping mode, the
bootstrapping server configures all the bootstrap information on
the IoT device without receiving a request from the client. This
means that the bootstrap server needs to know if a client IoT
Device is ready for bootstrapping before it can be configured.
For example, a network may inform the bootstrap server of a new
connecting IoT client device.
The Kerberos protocol [RFC4120] is a network authentication protocol
that allows several endpoints to communicate over an insecure
network. Kerberos relies on a symmetric cryptography scheme and
requires a trusted third party, that guarantees the identities of the
various actors. It relies on the use of "tickets" for nodes to prove
identity to one another in a secure manner. There has been research
work on using Kereberos for IoT devices[kerberosiot].
The ANIMA working group is also working on a bootstrapping solution
for resource-constrained devices that relies on 802.1AR vendor
certificates [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]. In addition to
vendor installed IEEE 802.1AR certificates, a vendor based service on
the Internet is required. Before being authenticated, a new device
only needs link-local connectivity, and does not require a routable
address. When a vendor provides an Internet based service, devices
can be forced to join only specific domains. The draft highlights
that the described solution is aimed in general at non-constrained
(i.e. class 2+ defined in [RFC7228]) devices operating in a non-
Challenged network. It claims to scale to thousands of devices
located in hostile environments, such as ISP provided CPE devices
which are drop-shipped to the end user.
[I-D.kumar-6lo-selective-bootstrap] presents a selective
bootstrapping/commissioning method by introducing the concept of
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Commissioning Tool (CT). In this method the devices are let to
connect to the network and execute 6LowPAN neighbor discovery
protocol and have an IPv6 address before they are authenticated.
Then the devices are selected one by one in some order to communicate
with the CT via untrusted constructed route. Once the ID of joining
device is authenticated, the CT sends the layer-2 key material to the
device via secured channel. This secure channel is established with
DTLS with credential material that has to be installed onto the
device during its manufacture.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch] defines a bootstrapping strategy for
enabling devices to securely obtain all the configuration information
with no installer input, beyond the actual physical placement and
connection of cables. Their goal is to enable a secure NETCONF
[RFC6241] or RESTCONF [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf] connection to the
deployment specific network management system (NMS). This
bootstrapping method requires the devices to be manufactured with
trust anchors in the form of X.509 certificates.
Before closing the discussion on managed methods, it is also
important to mention some of the work done on implicit certificates
and identity-based cryptographic schemes [himmo],[implicit]. While
these are interesting and novel schemes that can be a part of
securely bootstrapping devices, at this point, it is hard to
speculate on whether such schemes would see large-scale deployment in
the future.
While managed methods are viable for many IoT devices, they may not
be suitable or desirable in all scenarios. All the managed methods
assume that some credentials are provisioned into the device. This
credentials may be in the device micro-controller or in a replaceable
smart cards such as a SIM card. The methods also sometimes assume
that the manufacturer embeds these credentials during the device
manufacture on the factory floor. However, in many cases the
manufacturer may not have sufficient incentive to do this. In other
scenarios, it may be hard to completely trust and rely on the device
manufacturer to securely perform this task. Therefore, many times,
P2P or Adhoc methods of bootstrapping are used. We discuss a few
example next.
P2P or ad-hoc bootstrapping methods are used for establishing keys
and credential information for secure communication without any pre-
provisioned information. These bootstrapping mechanisms typically
rely on an out-of-band (OOB) channel in order to prevent man-in-the-
middle (MitM) attacks. P2P and ad-hoc methods have typically been
used for securely pairing personal computing devices such as smart
phones. [devicepairing] provides a survey of such secure device
pairing methods. Many original pairing schemes required the user to
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enter the same key string or authentication code to both devices or
to compare and approve codes displayed by the devices. While these
methods can provide reasonable security, they require user
interaction that is relatively unnatural and often considered a
nuisance. Thus, there is ongoing research for more natural ways of
pairing devices. To reduce the amount of user-interaction required
in the pairing process, several proposals use contextual or location-
dependent information, or natural use input such as sound or
movement, for device pairing [proximate].
The local association created between two devices may later be used
for connecting/introducing one of the devices to a centralized
server. Such methods would however be classified as hybrids.
EAP-NOOB [I-D.aura-eap-noob] is an example of P2P and ad-hoc
bootstrapping method that establishes a security association between
an IoT device (node) and an online server (unlike pairing two devices
for local connections over WiFi or bluetooth). EAP-NOOB defines an
EAP method where the authentication is based on a user-assisted out-
of-band (OOB) channel between the server and peer. It is intended as
a generic bootstrapping solution for Internet-of-Things devices which
have no pre-configured authentication credentials and which are not
yet registered on the authentication server. This method claims to
be more generic than most ad-hoc bootstrapping solutions in that it
supports many types of OOB channels. The exact in-band messages and
OOB message contents are specified and not the OOB channel details.
Also, EAP-NOOB supports IoT devices with only output (e.g. display)
or only input (e.g. camera). It makes combined use of both secrecy
and integrity of the OOB channel for more robust security than the
ad-hoc solutions.
Next, we look at a leap-of-faith/opportunistic bootstrapping method
for IoT devices.
Bergmann et al. [simplekey] develop a secure bootstrapping mechanism
that does not rely on pre-provisioned credentials using resurrecting-
duckling imprinting scheme. Their bootstrapping protocol involves
three distinct phases: discover (the duckling node searches for
network nodes that can act as mother node), imprint (the mother node
imprints a shared secret establishing a secure channel once a
positive response is received for the imprinting request) and
configure (additional configuration information such as network
prefix and default gateway are configured). In this model for
bootstrapping, a small initial vulnerability window is acceptable and
can be mitigated using techniques such as a Faraday Cage to protect
the environment of the mother and duck nodes, though this may be
inconvenient for the user.
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[RFC7250] defines how raw public keys can be used to authenticate
constrained devices for mutual authentication using EAP-TLS or DTLS.
Raw public key TLS/DTLS extension simplifies client_certificate_type
and server_certificate_type to carry only SubjectPublicKeyInfo
structure with the raw public key instead of many other parameters
found in the certificates. The device and the authentication server
(AS) exchange client_hello and server_hello messages and send their
raw public keys. The device and AS validate the keys by comparing
the pre-configured values [I-D.sarikaya-6lo-bootstrapping-solution].
This bootstrapping method can be seen as a hybrid. This is because
it generally requires an out-of-band (OOB) band step (P2P/Ad-hoc)
where the raw public keys are provided to the authenticating
entities, after which the actual authentication occurs online
(managed). Raw public key approach when used with DTLS offers a
simple secure bootstrapping solution especially for smart energy and
building automation applications. It can be easily integrated with
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP).
5. Security Considerations
The whole draft deals with security considerations.
6. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations for this document.
7. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Tuomas Aura and Hannes Tschofenig for
providing extensive feedback.
8. Informative References
[allseen] AllSeen Alliance, "Onboarding service",
<https://allseenalliance.org/framework/documentation/
learn/base-services/onboarding>.
[devicepairing]
Mirzadeh, S., Cruickshank, H., and R. Tafazolli, "Secure
Device Pairing: A Survey", IEEE Communications Surveys and
Tutorials , pp. 17-40, 2014.
[dh] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New directions in
cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information Theory ,
vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 644-654, 1976.
[dickhardt]
Hardt, D., "Identity 2.0", OSCON , 2005.
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[gba] 3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Generic
Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping
Architecture (GBA) (Release 12)", March 2013,
<http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/33220.htm>.
[himmo] Garcia-Morchon, O., Rietman, R., Sharma, S., Tolhuizen,
L., and J. Torre-Arce, "DTLS-HIMMO: Efficiently Securing a
Post-Quantum World with a Fully-Collusion Resistant KPS",
Submitted to NIST Workshop on Cybersecurity in a Post-
Quantum World , version 20141225:065757, December 2014,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/1008>.
[I-D.aura-eap-noob]
Aura, T. and M. Sethi, "Nimble out-of-band authentication
for EAP (EAP-NOOB)", draft-aura-eap-noob-00 (work in
progress), February 2016.
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., and S.
Bjarnason, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
keyinfra-03 (work in progress), June 2016.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf]
Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-14 (work in
progress), June 2016.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch]
Watsen, K. and M. Abrahamsson, "Zero Touch Provisioning
for NETCONF or RESTCONF based Management", draft-ietf-
netconf-zerotouch-08 (work in progress), April 2016.
[I-D.kumar-6lo-selective-bootstrap]
Kumar, S. and P. Stok, "Security Bootstrapping over IEEE
802.15.4 in selective order", draft-kumar-6lo-selective-
bootstrap-00 (work in progress), March 2015.
[I-D.marin-ace-wg-coap-eap]
Sanchez, R., Lopez, R., and D. Garcia, "EAP-based
Authentication Service for CoAP", draft-marin-ace-wg-coap-
eap-03 (work in progress), April 2016.
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[I-D.oflynn-core-bootstrapping]
Sarikaya, B., Ohba, Y., Cao, Z., and R. Cragie, "Security
Bootstrapping of Resource-Constrained Devices", draft-
oflynn-core-bootstrapping-03 (work in progress), November
2010.
[I-D.sarikaya-6lo-bootstrapping-solution]
Sarikaya, B., "Secure Bootstrapping Solution for Resource-
Constrained Devices", draft-sarikaya-6lo-bootstrapping-
solution-00 (work in progress), June 2013.
[I-D.sethi-gba-constrained]
Sethi, M., Lehtovirta, V., and P. Salmela, "Using Generic
Bootstrapping Architecture with Constrained Devices",
draft-sethi-gba-constrained-01 (work in progress),
February 2014.
[IEEE802.15.4]
IEEE Standard, , "IEEE Std. 802.15.4-2011", October 2011,
<http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.15.4-2011.html>.
[implicit]
Porambage, P., Schmitt, C., Kumar, P., Gurtov, A., and M.
Ylianttila, "Pauthkey: A pervasive authentication protocol
and key establishment scheme for wireless sensor networks
in distributed iot applications", International Journal of
Distributed Sensor Networks , Hindawi Publishing
Corporation , 2014.
[iotwork] European Commision FP7, "IoT@Work bootstrapping
architecture Deliverable D2.2", June 2011.
[kerberosiot]
Hardjono, , "Kerberos for Internet-of-Things", February
2014, <https://kit.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/
Kerberos_Internet_of%20Things.pdf>.
[panaiot] Hernandez-Ramos, J., Carrillo, D., Marin-Lopez, R., and A.
Skarmeta, "Dynamic Security Credentials PANA-based
Provisioning for IoT Smart Objects", 2nd World Forum on
Internet of Things (WF-IoT) , IEEE , 2015.
[proximate]
Mathur, , Miller, , Varshavsky, , Trappe, , and Mandayam,
"Proximate: proximity-based secure pairing using ambient
wireless signals.", June 2011.
Sarikaya & Sethi Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 13]
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
"SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3972>.
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4120, July 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4120>.
[RFC4253] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253,
January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.
[RFC4640] Patel, A., Ed. and G. Giaretta, Ed., "Problem Statement
for bootstrapping Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6)", RFC 4640,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4640, September 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4640>.
[RFC4764] Bersani, F. and H. Tschofenig, "The EAP-PSK Protocol: A
Pre-Shared Key Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
Method", RFC 4764, DOI 10.17487/RFC4764, January 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4764>.
[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Ed., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H.,
and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, DOI 10.17487/RFC5191,
May 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5191>.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
March 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5216>.
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[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7593] Wierenga, K., Winter, S., and T. Wolniewicz, "The eduroam
Architecture for Network Roaming", RFC 7593,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7593, September 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7593>.
[SEP2.0] ZigBee Alliance, "ZigBee IP Specification", March 2014,
<hhttp://www.zigbee.org/non-menu-pages/
zigbee-ip-download/>.
[simplekey]
Bergmann, O., Gerdes, S., and C. Bormann, "Simple Keys for
Simple Smart Objects", Smart Object Security Workshop,
IETF 83 , March 2012.
[SimplePairing]
Bluetooth, SIG, "Simple pairing whitepaper", Technical
report , 2007.
[vendorcert]
IEEE std. 802.1ar-2009, "Standard for local and
metropolitan area networks - secure device identity",
December 2009.
[vermillard]
Vermillard, J., "Bootstrapping device security with
lightweight M2M", February 2015.
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[wps] IEEE Standard, , "Wi-fi protected setup", 2007.
Authors' Addresses
Behcet Sarikaya
Huawei
5340 Legacy Dr. Building 3
Plano, TX 75024
USA
Email: sarikaya@ieee.org
Mohit Sethi
Ericsson
Hirsalantie 11
Jorvas 02420
Finland
Email: mohit@piuha.net
Sarikaya & Sethi Expires January 2, 2017 [Page 16]