IDR Working Group W. Wang
Internet-Draft A. Wang
Intended status: Standards Track China Telecom
Expires: September 4, 2022 H. Wang
Huawei Technologies
G. Mishra
Verizon Inc.
S. Zhuang
J. Dong
Huawei Technologies
March 3, 2022
VPN Prefix Outbound Route Filter (VPN Prefix ORF) for BGP-4
draft-wang-idr-vpn-prefix-orf-02
Abstract
This draft defines a new Outbound Route Filter (ORF) type, called the
VPN Prefix ORF. The described VPN Prefix ORF mechanism is applicable
when the VPN routes from different VRFs are exchanged via one shared
BGP session (e.g., routers in a single-domain connect via Route
Reflector).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 4, 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Operation process of VPN Prefix ORF mechanism on sender . . . 4
4.1. Intra-domain Scenarios and Solutions . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.1. Scenario-1 and Solution (Unique RD, One RT) . . . . . 5
4.1.2. Scenario-2 and Solution (Unique RD, Multiple RTs) . . 7
4.1.3. Scenario-3 and Solution (Universal RD) . . . . . . . 8
5. Operation process of VPN Prefix ORF mechanism on receiver . . 8
6. Withdraw of VPN Prefix ORF entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. VPN Prefix ORF Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Source PE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Route Target TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
[I-D.wang-idr-vpn-routes-control-analysis] analysis the scenarios and
necessaries for VPN routes control in the shared BGP session. This
draft analyzes the existing solutions and their limitations for these
scenarios, proposes the new VPN Prefix ORF solution to meet the
requirements that described in section 8 of
[I-D.wang-idr-vpn-routes-control-analysis].
Now, there are several solutions can be used to alleviate these
problem:
o Route Target Constraint (RTC) as defined in [RFC4684]
o Address Prefix ORF as defined in [RFC5292]
o CP-ORF mechanism as defined in [RFC7543]
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o PE-CE edge peer Maximum Prefix
o Configure the Maximum Prefix for each VRF on edge nodes
However, there are limitations to existing solutions:
1) Route Target Constraint
RTC can only filter the VPN routes from the uninterested VRFs, if the
"trashing routes" come from the interested VRF, filter on RTs will
erase all prefixes from this VRF.
2) Address Prefix ORF
Using Address Prefix ORF to filter VPN routes need to pre-
configuration, but it is impossible to know which prefix may cause
overflow in advance.
3) CP-ORF Mechanism
[RFC7543] defines the Covering Prefixes ORF (CP-ORF). A BGP speaker
sends a CP-ORF to a peer in order to pull routes that cover a
specified host address. A prefix covers a host address if it can be
used to forward traffic towards that host address.
CP-ORF is applicable in Virtual Hub-and-Spoke[RFC7024] VPN and also
the BGP/MPLS Ethernet VPN (EVPN) [RFC7432]networks, but its main aim
is also to get the wanted VPN prefixes and can't be used to filter
the overwhelmed VPN prefixes dynamically.
4) PE-CE edge peer Maximum Prefix
The BGP Maximum-Prefix feature is used to control how many prefixes
can be received from a neighbor. By default, this feature allows a
router to bring down a peer when the number of received prefixes from
that peer exceeds the configured Maximum-Prefix limit. This feature
is commonly used for external BGP peers. If it is applied to
internal BGP peers, for example the VPN scenarios, all the VPN routes
from different VRFs will share the common fate, which is not
desirable for the fining control of the VPN Prefixes advertisement.
5) Configure the Maximum Prefix for each VRF on edge nodes
When a VRF overflows, it stops the import of routes and log the extra
VPN routes into its RIB. However, PEs still need to parse the BGP
updates. These processes will cost CPU cycles and further burden the
overflowing PE.
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This draft defines a new ORF-type, called the VPN Prefix ORF. This
mechanism is event-driven and does not need to be pre-configured.
When a VRF of a router overflows, the router will find out the VPN
prefix (RD, RT, source PE, etc.) of offending VPN routes in this VRF,
and send a VPN Prefix ORF to its BGP peer that carries the relevant
information. If a BGP speaker receives a VPN Prefix ORF entry from
its BGP peer, it will filter the VPN routes it tends to send
according to the entry.
VPN Prefix ORF is applicable when the VPN routes from different VRFs
are exchanged via one shared BGP session.
2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .
3. Terminology
The following terms are defined in this draft:
o RD: Route Distinguisher, defined in [RFC4364]
o ORF: Outbound Route Filter, defined in [RFC5291]
o AFI: Address Family Identifier, defined in [RFC4760]
o SAFI: Subsequent Address Family Identifier, defined in [RFC4760]
o EVPN: BGP/MPLS Ethernet VPN, defined in [RFC7432]
o RR: Router Reflector, provides a simple solution to the problem of
IBGP full mesh connection in large-scale IBGP implementation.
o VRF: Virtual Routing Forwarding, a virtual routing table based on
VPN instance.
4. Operation process of VPN Prefix ORF mechanism on sender
The operation of VPN Prefix ORF mechanism on each device is
independent, each of them makes a local judgement to determine
whether it needs to send VPN Prefix ORF to its peers. The operators
need to make sure the algorithms in different devices consistent. On
PE, each VRF has a prefix limit, and routes associated with each <RD,
source PE> tuple has a pre-configurated quota.
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o when routes associated with <RD, source PE> tuple past the quota
but the prefix limit of VRF is not exceeded, PE should send
warnings to the operator, and the VPN Prefix ORF mechanism should
not be triggered.
o when routes associated with <RD, source PE> tuple past the quota
and the prefix limit is exceeded and there is no other VRFs on
offended PE need VPN routes with this RD, they should be dropped
via VPN Prefix ORF mechanism.
When the VPN Prefix ORF mechanism is triggered, the device must send
an alarm information to network operators.
4.1. Intra-domain Scenarios and Solutions
For intra-AS VPN deployment, there are three scenarios:
o RD is allocated per VPN per PE, each VRF only import one RT(see
Section 4.1.1).
o RD is allocated per VPN per PE. Multiple RTs are associated with
such VPN routes, and are imported into different VRFs in other
devices(see Section 4.1.2).
o RD is allocated per VPN, each VRF imports one/multiple RTs(see
Section 4.1.3).
The following sections will describe solutions to the above scenarios
in detail.
4.1.1. Scenario-1 and Solution (Unique RD, One RT)
In this scenario, RD is allocated per VPN per PE. The offending VPN
routes only carry one RT. We assume the network topology is shown in
Figure 1.
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| |
| +-------+ +-------+ |
| | PE1 +----------------+ +-----------------+ PE4 | |
| +-------+ | | +-------+ |
| VPN1(RD11,RT1) | | VPN2(RD12,RT2) |
| VPN2(RD12,RT2) | | |
| +-+----+-+ |
| | RR | |
| +-+----+-+ |
| | | |
| | | |
| +-------+ | | +-------+ |
| | PE2 +----------------+ +-----------------+ PE3 | |
| +-------+ +-------+ |
| VPN1(RD21,RT1) VPN1(RD31,RT1) |
| VPN2(RD22,RT2,RT1) VPN2(RD32,RT2) |
| |
| AS 100 |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1 Network Topology of Scenario-1
When PE3 sends excessive VPN routes with RT1, while both PE1 and PE2
import VPN routes with RT1, the process of offending VPN routes will
influence performance of VRFs on PEs. PEs and RR should have some
mechanisms to identify and control the advertisement of offending VPN
routes.
On PE1, each VRF has a prefix limit, and each <RD, source PE> tuple
imported into VRF has a quota. When routes associated with <RD31,
PE3> tuple past the quota but the prefix limit of VPN1 VRF is not
exceeded, PE1 sends a warning message to the operator, and the VPN
Prefix ORF mechanism should not be triggered. After the prefix limit
of VPN1 VRF is exceeded, due to there is no other VRFs on PE1 need
the VPN routes with RT1, PE1 will generate a BGP ROUTE-REFRESH
message contains a VPN Prefix ORF entry, and send to RR. RR will
withdraw and stop to advertise such offending VPN routes (RD31, RT1,
source PE is PE3) to PE1.
On PE2, both VPN1 VRF and VPN2 VRF import VPN routes with RT1. If
PE2 triggers VPN Prefix ORF mechanism when VPN1 VRF overflows, VPN2
VRF cannot receive VPN routes with RT1 as well. PE2 should not
trigger the VPN Prefix ORF mechanism to RR (RD31, RT1, source PE is
PE3) until all the VRFs that import RT1 on it overflow.
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4.1.2. Scenario-2 and Solution (Unique RD, Multiple RTs)
In this scenario, RD is allocated per VPN per PE. Multiple RTs are
associated with the offending VPN routes, and be imported into
different VRFs in other devices. We assume the network topology is
shown in Figure 2.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| |
| +-------+ +-------+ |
| | PE1 +----------------+ +-----------------+ PE4 | |
| +-------+ | | +-------+ |
| VPN1(RD11,RT1) | | VPN2(RD42,RT2) |
| VPN2(RD12,RT2) | | |
| +-+----+-+ |
| | RR | |
| +-+----+-+ |
| | | |
| | | |
| +-------+ | | +-------+ |
| | PE2 +----------------+ +-----------------+ PE3 | |
| +-------+ +-------+ |
| VPN1(RD21,RT1) VPN1(RD31,RT1,RT2) |
| VPN2(RD32,RT2) |
| |
| AS 100 |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 2 Network Topology of Scenario-2
When PE3 sends excessive VPN routes with RT1 and RT2, while both PE1
and PE2 import VPN routes with RT1, and PE1 also imports VPN routes
with RT2.
On PE1, when routes associated with <RD31, PE3> tuple past the quota
but the prefix limit of VPN1 VRF is not exceeded, PE1 sends a warning
to the operator. After the prefix limit of VPN1 VRF is exceeded, due
to there is no other VRFs on PE1 need the VPN routes with RT1, PE1
will generate a BGP ROUTE-REFRESH message contains a VPN Prefix ORF
entry, and send to RR. RR will withdraw and stop to advertise such
offending VPN routes to PE1.
On PE2, due to there is only one VRF imports VPN routes with RT1. If
it overflows, it will trigger VPN Prefix ORF (RD31, RT1, comes from
PE3) mechanisms. RR will withdraw and stop to advertise such
offending VPN routes to PE2.
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4.1.3. Scenario-3 and Solution (Universal RD)
In this scenario, RD is allocated per VPN. One/Multiple RTs are
associated with the offending VPN routes, and be imported into
different VRFs in other devices. We assume the network topology is
shown in Figure 3.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| |
| +-------+ +-------+ |
| | PE1 +----------------+ +-----------------+ PE4 | |
| +-------+ | | +-------+ |
| VPN1(RD1,RT1) | | VPN2(RD12,RT2) |
| VPN2(RD12,RT2) | | |
| +-+----+-+ |
| | RR | |
| +-+----+-+ |
| | | |
| | | |
| +-------+ | | +-------+ |
| | PE2 +----------------+ +-----------------+ PE3 | |
| +-------+ +-------+ |
| VPN1(RD1,RT1) VPN1(RD1,RT1,RT2) |
| VPN2(RD32,RT2) |
| |
| AS 100 |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 3 Network Topology of Scenario-3
When PE3 sends excessive VPN routes with RD1 and attached RT1 and
RT2, while both PE1 and PE2 import VPN routes with RT1, the process
of offending VPN routes will influence performance of VRFs on PEs.
When PE2 overflows and PE1 does not overflow. PE2 triggers the VPN
Prefix ORF message (RD1, RT1, comes from PE3). Using Source PE and
RD, RR will only withdraw and stop to advertise VPN routes (RD1, RT1)
come from PE3 to PE2. The communication between PE2 and PE1 for VPN1
will not be influenced.
5. Operation process of VPN Prefix ORF mechanism on receiver
The receiver of VPN Prefix ORF entries may be a RR or PE. As it
receives the VPN Prefix ORF entries, it will check <AFI/SAFI, ORF-
Type, Sequence, Route Distinguisher> to find if it already existed in
its ORF-Policy table. If not, the receiver will add the VPN Prefix
ORF entries into its ORF-Policy table; otherwise, the receiver will
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discard it. Before the receiver send a VPN route, it will check its
ORF-Policy table whether there is a related VPN Prefix ORF entry or
not. If not, the receiver will send this VPN route; otherwise, the
receiver will stop sending that VPN route to its peer.
6. Withdraw of VPN Prefix ORF entries
When the VPN Prefix ORF mechanism is triggered, the alarm information
will be generated and sent to the network operators. Operators
should manually configure the network to resume normal operation.
Due to devices can record the VPN Prefix ORF entries sent by each
VRF, operators can find the entries needs to be withdrawn, and
trigger the withdraw process as described in [RFC5291] manually.
After returning to normal, the device sends withdraw ORF entries to
its peers who have previously received ORF entries.
7. VPN Prefix ORF Encoding
In this section, we defined a new ORF type called VPN Prefix Outbound
Route Filter (VPN Prefix ORF). The ORF entries are carried in the
BGP ROUTE-REFRESH message as defined in [RFC5291]. A BGP ROUTE-
REFRESH message can carry one or more ORF entries. The ROUTE-REFRESH
message which carries ORF entries contains the following fields:
o AFI (2 octets)
o SAFI (1 octet)
o When-to-refresh (1 octet): the value is IMMEDIATE or DEFER
o ORF Type (1 octet)
o Length of ORF entries (2 octets)
A VPN Prefix ORF entry contains a common part and type-specific part.
The common part is encoded as follows:
o Action (2 bits): the value is ADD, REMOVE or REMOVE-ALL
o Match (1 bit): the value is PERMIT or DENY
o Reserved (5 bits)
VPN Prefix ORF also contains type-specific part. The encoding of the
type-specific part is shown in Figure 4.
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+-----------------------------------------+
| |
| Route Distinguisher (8 octets) |
| |
+-----------------------------------------+
| |
| Optional TLVs (variable) |
| |
+-----------------------------------------+
Figure 4: VPN Prefix ORF type-specific encoding
o Route Distinguisher: distinguish the different user routes. The
VPN Prefix ORF filters the VPN routes it tends to send based on
Route Distinguisher.
o Optional TLVs: carry the potential additional information to give
the extensibility of the VPN Prefix ORF mechanism.
Note that if the Action component of an ORF entry specifies REMOVE-
ALL, the ORF entry does not include the type-specific part.
When the BGP ROUTE-REFRESH message carries VPN Prefix ORF entries, it
must be set as follows:
o The ORF-Type MUST be set to VPN Prefix ORF.
o The AFI MUST be set to IPv4, IPv6, or Layer 2 VPN (L2VPN).
o If the AFI is set to IPv4 or IPv6, the SAFI MUST be set to MPLS-
labeled VPN address.
o If the AFI is set to L2VPN, the SAFI MUST be set to BGP EVPN.
o The Match field MUST be set to DENY.
7.1. Source PE TLV
Source PE TLV is defined to identify the source of the VPN routes.
Using source PE and RD to filter VPN routes together can achieve more
refined route control. The source PE TLV contains the following
types:
o In single-domain or Option C cross-domain scenario, NEXT_HOP
attribute is fixed during routing transmission, so it can be used
as source address.
Type = 1, Length = 4 octets, value = NEXT_HOP.
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Type = 2, Length = 16 octets, value = NEXT_HOP.
o In Option B or Option AB cross-domain scenario, NEXT_HOP attribute
may be changed by ASBRs and cannot be used as the source address.
The originator can be traced by the Route Origin Community in BGP
(as defined in Section 5 of [RFC4360]).
Type = 3, Length = 6 octets, value = the value field of Route
Origin Community.
In principle, when the device can extract Route Origin Community from
the received packet, the value of Source PE TLV should be set to
Route Origin Community; Otherwise, the value should be set to
NEXT_HOP.
7.2. Route Target TLV
Route Target TLV is defined to identify the RT of the offending VPN
routes. RT and RD can be used together to filter VPN routes when the
source VRF contains multiple RTs, and the VPN routes with different
RTs may be assigned to different VRFs on the receiver. The encoding
of Route Target TLV is following:
Type = 4, Length = 8*n (n is the number of RTs that the offending
VPN routes attached) octets, value = the RT of the offending VPN
routes. If multiple RTs are included, there must be an exact
match.
8. Implementation Considerations
Before originating an VPN Prefix ORF message, the device should
compare the list of RD and RT(s) carried by VPN routes signaled for
filtering and the RD and RT(s) imported by not affected VRF(s). Once
they have intersection, the VPN Prefix ORF message MUST NOT be
originated.
Since the motivation of VPN Prefix ORF mechanism is to filter the
unwanted VPN routes, "Match" field of VPN Prefix ORF message MUST be
set to "DENY". The default behavior of the VPN Prefix ORF MUST be
PERMIT-ALL.
9. Security Considerations
A BGP speaker will maintain the VPN Prefix ORF entries in an ORF-
Policy table, this behavior consumes its memory and compute
resources. To avoid the excessive consumption of resources,
[RFC5291] specifies that a BGP speaker can only accept ORF entries
transmitted by its interested peers.
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10. IANA Considerations
This document defines a new Outbound Route Filter type - VPN Prefix
Outbound Route Filter (VPN Prefix ORF). The code point is from the
"BGP Outbound Route Filtering (ORF) Types". It is recommended to set
the code point of VPN Prefix ORF to 66.
This document also define a VPN Prefix ORF TLV type under "Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) Parameters", three TLV types are defined:
+===========================+======+===========================+
| Registry | Type | Meaning |
+===========================+======+===========================+
|IPv4 Source PE TLV | 1 |IPv4 address for source PE.|
+---------------------------+------+---------------------------+
|IPv6 Source PE TLV | 2 |IPv6 address for source PE.|
+---------------------------+------+---------------------------+
|ROC Source PE TLV | |Route Origin Community for |
| | 3 |Source PE. |
+---------------------------+------+---------------------------+
|Route Target TLV | 4 |Identify the RT of the |
| | |offending VPN routes |
+---------------------------+------+---------------------------+
Figure 5: IANA Allocation for newly defined TLVs
11. Acknowledgement
Thanks Robert Raszuk, Jim Uttaro, Jakob Heitz, Jeff Tantsura, Rajiv
Asati, John E Drake, Gert Doering, Shuanglong Chen, Enke Chen and
Srihari Sangli for their valuable comments on this draft.
12. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-bess-evpn-inter-subnet-forwarding]
Sajassi, A., Salam, S., Thoria, S., Drake, J. E., and J.
Rabadan, "Integrated Routing and Bridging in Ethernet VPN
(EVPN)", draft-ietf-bess-evpn-inter-subnet-forwarding-15
(work in progress), July 2021.
[I-D.wang-idr-vpn-routes-control-analysis]
Wang, A., Wang, W., Mishra, G. S., Wang, H., Zhuang, S.,
and J. Dong, "Analysis of VPN Routes Control in Shared BGP
Session", draft-wang-idr-vpn-routes-control-analysis-04
(work in progress), September 2021.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
February 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
[RFC4364] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/RFC4364, February
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364>.
[RFC4684] Marques, P., Bonica, R., Fang, L., Martini, L., Raszuk,
R., Patel, K., and J. Guichard, "Constrained Route
Distribution for Border Gateway Protocol/MultiProtocol
Label Switching (BGP/MPLS) Internet Protocol (IP) Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4684, DOI 10.17487/RFC4684,
November 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4684>.
[RFC4760] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter,
"Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4760, January 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4760>.
[RFC5291] Chen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "Outbound Route Filtering
Capability for BGP-4", RFC 5291, DOI 10.17487/RFC5291,
August 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5291>.
[RFC5292] Chen, E. and S. Sangli, "Address-Prefix-Based Outbound
Route Filter for BGP-4", RFC 5292, DOI 10.17487/RFC5292,
August 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5292>.
[RFC7432] Sajassi, A., Ed., Aggarwal, R., Bitar, N., Isaac, A.,
Uttaro, J., Drake, J., and W. Henderickx, "BGP MPLS-Based
Ethernet VPN", RFC 7432, DOI 10.17487/RFC7432, February
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7432>.
[RFC7543] Jeng, H., Jalil, L., Bonica, R., Patel, K., and L. Yong,
"Covering Prefixes Outbound Route Filter for BGP-4",
RFC 7543, DOI 10.17487/RFC7543, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7543>.
Authors' Addresses
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Wei Wang
China Telecom
Beiqijia Town, Changping District
Beijing, Beijing 102209
China
Email: weiwang94@foxmail.com
Aijun Wang
China Telecom
Beiqijia Town, Changping District
Beijing, Beijing 102209
China
Email: wangaj3@chinatelecom.cn
Haibo Wang
Huawei Technologies
Huawei Building, No.156 Beiqing Rd.
Beijing, Beijing 100095
China
Email: rainsword.wang@huawei.com
Gyan S. Mishra
Verizon Inc.
13101 Columbia Pike
Silver Spring MD 20904
United States of America
Phone: 301 502-1347
Email: gyan.s.mishra@verizon.com
Shunwan Zhuang
Huawei Technologies
Huawei Building, No.156 Beiqing Rd.
Beijing, Beijing 100095
China
Email: zhuangshunwan@huawei.com
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Jie Dong
Huawei Technologies
Huawei Building, No.156 Beiqing Rd.
Beijing, Beijing 100095
China
Email: jie.dong@huawei.com
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