TLS Working Group Y. Nir
Internet-Draft Y. Sheffer
Intended status: Standards Track Check Point
Expires: December 9, 2007 H. Tschofenig
NSN
P. Gutmann
University of Auckland
June 7, 2007
TLS using EAP Authentication
draft-nir-tls-eap-00.txt
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Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
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Abstract
This document describes an extension to the TLS protocol to allow TLS
clients to authenticate with legacy credentials using the Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP).
This work follows the example of IKEv2, where EAP has been added to
the IKEv2 protocol to allow clients to use different credentials such
as passwords, token cards, and shared secrets.
When TLS is used with EAP, additional records are sent after the
ChangeCipherSpec protocol message and before the Finished message,
effectively creating an extended handshake before the application
layer data can be sent. Each EapMsg handshake record contains
exactly one EAP message. Using EAP for client authentication allows
TLS to be used with various AAA back-end servers such as RADIUS or
Diameter.
TLS with EAP may be used for securing a data connection such as HTTP
or POP3. We believe it has three main benefits:
o The ability of EAP to work with backend servers can remove that
burden from the application layer.
o Moving the user authentication into the TLS handshake protects the
presumably less secure application layer from attacks by
unauthenticated parties.
o Using mutual authentication methods within EAP can help thwart
certain classes of phishing attacks.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. EAP Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Operating Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. The tee_supported Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. The InterimAuth Handshake Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. The EapMsg Handshake Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. Calculating the Finished message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. InterimAuth vs. Finished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Identity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. Changes from Previous Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.1. Changes from the protocol model draft . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 20
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1. Introduction
This document describes a new extension to [TLS]. This extension
allows a TLS client to authenticate using [EAP] instead of performing
the authentication at the application level. The extension follows
[TLS-EXT]. For the remainder of this document we will refer to this
extension as TEE (TLS with EAP Extension).
TEE extends the TLS handshake beyond the regular setup, to allow the
EAP protocol to run between the TLS server (called an "authenticator"
in EAP) and the TLS client (called a "supplicant"). This allows the
TLS architecture to handle client authentication before exposing the
server application software to an unauthenticated client. In doing
this, we follow the approach taken for IKEv2 in [RFC4306]. However,
similar to regular TLS, we protect the user identity by only sending
the client identity after the server has authenticated. In this our
solution differs from that of IKEv2.
Currently used applications that rely on non-certificate user
credentials use TLS to authenticate the server only. After that, the
application takes over, and presents a login screen where the user is
expected to present their credentials.
This creates several problems. It allows a client to access the
application before authentication, thus creating a potential for
anonymous attacks on non-hardened applications. Additionally, web
pages are not particularly well suited for long shared secrets and
for interfacing with certain devices such as USB tokens.
TEE allows full mutual authentication to occur for all these
applications within the TLS exchange. The application receives
control only when the user is identified and authenticated. The
authentication can be built into the server infrastructure by
connecting to an AAA server. The client side can be integrated into
client software such as web browsers and mail clients. An EAP
infrastructure is already built into some operating systems providing
a user interface for each authentication method within EAP.
We intend TEE to be used for various protocols that use TLS such as
HTTPS, in cases where certificate based client authentication is not
practical. This includes web-based mail services, online banking,
premium content websites and mail clients.
Another class of applications that may see benefit from TEE are TLS
based VPN clients used as part of so-called "SSL VPN" products. No
such client protocols have so far been standardized.
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1.1. EAP Applicability
Section 1.3 of [EAP] states that EAP is only applicable for network
access authentication, rather than for "bulk data transfer". It then
goes on to explain why the transport properties of EAP indeed make it
unsuitable for bulk data transfer, e.g. for large file transport.
Our proposed use of EAP falls squarely within the applicability as
defined, since we make no further use of EAP beyond access
authentication.
1.2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Operating Environment
TEE will work between a client application and a server application,
performing either client authentication or mutual authentication
within the TLS exchange.
Client Server
+-------------------------+ +------------------------+
| |GUI| | Client | |TLS+-+-----+-+TLS| |Server | |
| +-^-+ |Software| +-^-+ | +-+-^-+ |Application | |
| | +--------+ | | | | |Software | |
| | | | | | +------------+ |
| +-v----------------v-+ | | | |
| | EAP | | +---|--------------------+
| | Infrastructure | | |
| +--------------------+ | | +--------+
+-------------------------+ | | AAA |
| | Server |
+----- |
+--------+
The above diagram shows the typical deployment. The client has
software that either includes a UI for some EAP methods, or else is
able to invoke some operating system EAP infrastructure that takes
care of the user interaction. The server is configured with the
address and protocol of the AAA server. Typically the AAA server
communicates using the RADIUS protocol with EAP ([RADIUS] and
[RAD-EAP]), or the Diameter protocol ([Diameter] and [Dia-EAP]).
As stated in the introduction, we expect TEE to be used in both
browsers and applications. Further uses may be authentication and
key generation for other protocols, and tunneling clients, which so
far have not been standardized.
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3. Protocol Overview
The TEE extension defines the following:
o A new extension type called tee_supported, used to indicate that
the client supports this extension.
o A new message type for the handshake protocol, called InterimAuth,
which is used to sign previous messages.
o A new message type for the handshake protocol, called EapMsg,
which is used to carry a single EAP message.
The diagram below outlines the protocol structure. For illustration
purposes only, we use the MSCHAPv2 EAP method
[I-D.dpotter-pppext-eap-mschap].
Client Server
------ ------
ClientHello(*) -------->
ServerHello(*)
(Certificate)
ServerKeyExchange
EapMsg(Identity-Request)
<-------- ServerHelloDone
ClientKeyExchange
(CertificateVerify)
ChangeCipherSpec
InterimAuth
EapMsg(Identity-Reply) -------->
ChangeCipherSpec
InterimAuth
EapMsg(MS-CHAP-v2-Request)
<--------
EapMsg(MS-CHAP-v2-Reply) -------->
EapMsg(Success)
<-------- Finished
Finished -------->
(*) The ClientHello and ServerHello include the tee_supported
extension to indicate support for TEE
The client indicates in the first message its support for TEE. The
server sends an EAP identity request in the reply. The client sends
the identity reply after the handshake completion. The EAP request-
response sequence continues until the client is either authenticated
or rejected.
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3.1. The tee_supported Extension
The tee_supported extension is a ClientHello and ServerHello
extension as defined in section 2.3 of [TLS-EXT]. The extension_type
field is TBA by IANA. The extension_data is zero-length.
3.2. The InterimAuth Handshake Message
The InterimAuth message is identical in syntax to the Finished
message described in section 7.4.9 of [TLS]. It is calculated in
exactly the same way.
The semantics, however, are somewhat different. The "Finished"
message indicates that application data may now be sent. The
"InterimAuth" message does not indicate this. Instead, further
handshake messages are needed.
The HandshakeType value for the InterimAuth handshake message is TBA
by IANA.
3.3. The EapMsg Handshake Message
The EapMsg handshake message carries exactly one EAP message as
defined in [EAP].
The HandshakeType value for the EapMsg handshake message is TBA by
IANA.
The EapMsg message is used to tunnel EAP messages between the
authentication server, which may be co-located with the TLS server,
or else may be a separate AAA server, and the supplicant, which is
co-located with the TLS client. TLS on either side receives the EAP
data from the EAP infrastructure, and treats it as opaque. TLS does
not make any changes to the EAP payload or make any decisions based
on the contents of an EapMsg handshake message.
Note that it is expected that the authentication server notifies the
TLS server about authentication success or failure, and so TLS need
not inspect the eap_payload within the EapMsg to detect success or
failure.
struct {
opaque eap_payload[4..65535];
} EapMsg;
eap_payload is defined in section 4 of RFC 3748. It includes
the Code, Identifier, Length and Data fields of the EAP
packet.
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3.4. Calculating the Finished message
If the EAP method is key-generating (see [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]), the
Finished message is calculated as follows:
struct {
opaque verify_data[12];
} Finished;
verify_data
PRF(MSK, finished_label, MD5(handshake_messages) +
SHA-1(handshake_messages)) [0..11];
The finished_label and the PRF are as defined in section 7.4.9 of
[TLS].
The handshake_messages field, similar to regular TLS, comprises all
of the data from all messages in this handshake, including any EapMsg
and InterimAuth messages, up to but not including this Finished
message. This is the concatenation of all the Handshake structures
exchanged thus far, as defined in section 7.4 of [TLS].
The Master Session Key (MSK) is derived by the AAA server and by the
client if the EAP method is key-generating. On the server-side, it
is typically received from the AAA server over the RADIUS or Diameter
protocol. On the client-side, it is passed to TLS by some other
method.
If the EAP method is not key-generating, then the Finished message is
calculated exactly as described in [TLS]. For a discussion on the
use of such methods, see Section 4.1.
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4. Security Considerations
4.1. InterimAuth vs. Finished
In regular TLS, the Finished message provides two functions: it signs
all preceding messages, and it signals that application data can now
be sent. In TEE, some of the messages are signed twice.
Some EAP methods, such as EAP-TLS, EAP-IKEv2 and EAP-SIM generate
keys in addition to authenticating clients. Such methods are said to
be resistant to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks as discussed in
[MITM]. Such methods are called key-generating methods.
To realize the benefit of such methods, we need to verify the key
that was generated within the EAP method. This is referred to as the
MSK in EAP. In TEE, the InterimAuth message signs all previous
messages with the master_secret, just like the Finished message in
regular TLS. The Finished message signs all previous messages using
the MSK if such exists. If not, then the messages are signed with
the master_secret as in regular TLS.
The need for signing twice arises from the fact that we need to use
both the master_secret and the MSK. It was possible to use just one
Finished record and blend the MSK into the master_secret. However,
this would needlessly complicate the protocol and make security
analysis more difficult. Instead, we have decided to follow the
example of IKEv2, where two AUTH payloads are exchanged.
It should be noted that using non-key-generating methods may expose
the client to a MITM attack if the same method and credentials are
used in some other situation, in which the EAP is done outside of a
protected tunnel with an authenticated server. Unless it can be
determined that the EAP method is never used in such a situation,
non-key-generating methods SHOULD NOT be used.
4.2. Identity Protection
Unlike [TLS-PSK], TEE provides identity protection for the client.
The client's identity is hidden from a passive eavesdropper using TLS
encryption. Active attacks are discussed in Section 4.3.
We could save one round-trip by having the client send its identity
within the Client Hello message. This is similar to TLS-PSK.
However, we believe that identity protection is a worthy enough goal,
so as to justify the extra round-trip.
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4.3. Mutual Authentication
In order to achieve our security goals, we need to have both the
server and the client authenticate. Client authentication is
obviously done using the EAP method. The server authentication can
be done in either of two ways:
1. The client can verify the server certificate. This may work well
depending on the scenario, but implies that the client or its
user can recognize the right DN or alternate name, and
distinguish it from plausible alternatives. The introduction to
[I.D.Webauth-phishing] shows that at least in HTTPS, this is not
always the case.
2. The client can use a mutually authenticated (MA) EAP method such
as MS-CHAPv2. In this case, server certificate verification does
not matter, and the TLS handshake may as well be anonymous. Note
that in this case, the client identity is sent to the server
before server authentication.
To summarize:
o Clients MUST NOT propose anonymous ciphersuites, unless they
support MA EAP methods.
o Servers MUST NOT accept anonymous ciphersuites, unless they
support MA EAP methods. If they support both MA and non-MA
methods, they SHOULD prefer to use the MA methods.
o Clients MUST NOT accept non-MA methods if the ciphersuite is
anonymous.
o Clients MUST NOT accpet non-MA mehtods if they are not able to
verify the server credentials. Note that this document does not
define what verification involves. If the server DN is known and
stored on the client, verifying certificate signature and checking
revocation may be enough. For web browsers, the case is not as
clear cut, and MA methods SHOULD be used.
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5. Performance Considerations
Regular TLS adds two round-trips to a TCP connection. However,
because of the stream nature of TCP, the client does not really need
to wait for the server's Finished message, and can begin sending
application data immediately after its own Finished message. In
practice, many clients do so, and TLS only adds one round-trip of
delay.
TEE adds as many round-trips as the EAP method requires. For
example, EAP-MD5 requires 1 round-trip, while EAP-SIM requires 2
round-trips. Additionally, the client MUST wait for the EAP-Success
message before sending its own Finished message, so we need at least
3 round-trips for the entire handshake. The best a client can do is
two round-trips plus however many round-trips the EAP method
requires.
It should be noted, though, that these extra round-trips save
processing time at the application level. Two extra round-trips take
a lot less time than presenting a log-in web page and processing the
user's input.
It should also be noted, that TEE reverses the order of the Finished
messages. In regular TLS the client sends the Finished message
first. In TEE it is the server that sends the Finished message
first. This should not affect performance, and it is clear that the
client may send application data immediately after the Finished
message.
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6. Operational Considerations
Section 4.3 defines a dependency between the TLS state and the EAP
state in that it mandates that certain EAP methods should not be used
with certain TLS ciphersuites. To avoid such dependencies, there are
two approaches that implementations can take. They can either not
use any anonymous ciphersuites, or else they can use only MA EAP
methods.
Where certificate validation is problematic, such as in browser-based
HTTPS, we recommend the latter approach.
In cases where the use of EAP within TLS is not known before opening
the connection, it is necessary to consider the implications of
requiring the user to type in credentials after the connection has
already started. TCP sessions may time out, because of security
considerations, and this may lead to session setup failure.
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7. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to assign an extension type value from the
"ExtensionType Values" registry for the tee_supported extension.
IANA is asked to assign two handshake message types from the "TLS
HandshakeType Registry", one for "EapMsg" and one for "InterimAuth".
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8. Acknowledgments
The TLS Inner Application Extension work ([TLS/IA]) has inspired the
authors to create this simplified work. TLS/IA provides a somewhat
different approach to integrating non-certificate credentials into
the TLS protocol, in addition to several other features available
from the RADIUS namespace.
The authors would also like to thank the various contributors to
[RFC4306] whose work inspired this one.
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9. Changes from Previous Versions
9.1. Changes from the protocol model draft
o Added diagram for EapMsg
o Added discussion of EAP applicability
o Added discussion of mutually-authenticated EAP methods vs other
methods in the security considerations.
o Added operational considerations.
o Other minor nits.
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10. References
10.1. Normative References
[EAP] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[TLS] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[TLS-EXT] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 4366, April 2006.
10.2. Informative References
[Dia-EAP] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
August 2005.
[Diameter]
Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[I-D.dpotter-pppext-eap-mschap]
Potter, D. and J. Zamick, "PPP EAP MS-CHAP-V2
Authentication Protocol",
draft-dpotter-pppext-eap-mschap-01 (work in progress),
January 2002.
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-18 (work in
progress), February 2007.
[I.D.Webauth-phishing]
Hartman, S., "Requirements for Web Authentication
Resistant to Phishing", draft-hartman-webauth-phishing-03
(work in progress), March 2007.
[MITM] Asokan, N., Niemi, V., and K. Nyberg, "Man-in-the-Middle
in Tunneled Authentication Protocols", October 2002.
[RAD-EAP] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
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Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
[RADIUS] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, June 2000.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.
[TLS-PSK] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279,
December 2005.
[TLS/IA] Funk, P., Blake-Wilson, S., Smith, H., Tschofenig, N., and
T. Hardjono, "TLS Inner Application Extension (TLS/IA)",
draft-funk-tls-inner-application-extension-03 (work in
progress), June 2006.
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Authors' Addresses
Yoav Nir
Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.
5 Hasolelim st.
Tel Aviv 67897
Israel
Email: ynir@checkpoint.com
Yaron Sheffer
Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.
5 Hasolelim st.
Tel Aviv 67897
Israel
Email: yaronf at checkpoint dot com
Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bavaria 81739
Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
URI: http://www.tschofenig.com
Peter Gutmann
University of Auckland
Department of Computer Science
New Zealand
Email: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz
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