NVO3 D. Migault
Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Informational S. Boutros
Expires: August 30, 2018 D. Wing
VMware
S. Krishnan
Kaloom
February 26, 2018
Geneve Protocol Security Requirements
draft-mglt-nvo3-geneve-security-requirements-03
Abstract
The document defines the security requirements to protect tenants
overlay traffic against security threats from the NVO3 network
components that are interconnected with tunnels implemented using
Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation (Geneve).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 30, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Passive Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Requirements for Security Mitigations . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Protection Against Traffic Sniffing . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Protecting Against Traffic Injection . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Protecting Against Traffic Redirection . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4. Protecting Against Traffic Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described BCP 14
[RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals,
as shown here.
2. Introduction
The network virtualization overlay over Layer 3 (NVO3) as depicted in
Figure 1, allows an overlay cloud provider to provide a logical L2/L3
interconnect for the Tenant Systems TSes that belong to a specific
tenant network. A packet received from a TS is encapsulated by the
ingress Network Virtualization Edge (NVE). The encapsulated packet
is then sent to the remote NVE through a tunnel. When reaching the
egress NVE of the tunnel, the packet is decapsulated and forwarded to
the target TS. The L2/L3 address mappings to the remote NVE(s) are
distributed to the NVEs by a logically centralized Network
Virtualization Authority (NVA) or using a distributed control plane
such as Ethernet-VPN. In a datacenter, the NVO3 tunnels can be
implemented using Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation
(Geneve) [I-D.ietf-nvo3-geneve]. Such Geneve tunnels establish NVE-
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
to-NVE communications, may transit within the data center via Geneve
Transit Nodes (GTN). The Geneve tunnels overlay network enable
multiple Virtual Networks to coexist over a shared underlay
infrastructure, and a Virtual Network may span a single data center
or multiple data centers.
The underlay infrastructure on which the multi-tenancy overlay
networks are hosted, can be owned and provided by an underlay
provider who may be different from the overlay cloud provider.
+--------+ +--------+
| Tenant +--+ +----| Tenant |
| System | | (') | System |
+--------+ | ................. ( ) +--------+
| +---+ +---+ (_)
+--|NVE|---+ +---|NVE|-----+
+---+ | | +---+
/ . +-----+ .
/ . +--| NVA | .
/ . | +-----+ .
| . | .
| . | L3 Overlay +--+--++--------+
+--------+ | . | Network | NVE || Tenant |
| Tenant +--+ . | | || System |
| System | . \ +---+ +--+--++--------+
+--------+ .....|NVE|.........
+---+
|
|
=====================
| |
+--------+ +--------+
| Tenant | | Tenant |
| System | | System |
+--------+ +--------+
Figure 1: Generic Reference Model for Network Virtualization Overlays
[RFC7365]
This document discusses the security risks that a Geneve based NVO3
network may encounter and tries to provide a list of essential
security requirements that needs to be fulfilled. In addition, this
document lists the requirements to protect the Geneve packet
components defined in [I-D.ietf-nvo3-geneve] that include the Geneve
tunnel IP and UDP header, the Geneve Header, Geneve options, and
inner payload. Protecting the complete Geneve packet - that is the
full IP packet or the full outer UDP payload for example - is out of
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
scope of this document, given that this can be supported using
existing mechanisms.
This document assumes that a tenant subscribes to an overlay cloud
provider for hosting its Tenant Systems, the cloud provider manages
the Geneve overlay network on behalf of the tenant. The overlay
network will be hosted on an underlay network infrastructure, that
may be managed by another underlay cloud provider.
The security requirements in this document aims at providing the
overlay cloud provider the necessary options to ensure:
1. Delivering tenant payload traffic and ensuring privacy and
integrity of the overlay traffic, and isolation between the
overlay and underlay networks, as well preventing tenant traffic
from being redirected or injected to other tenants.
2. Protecting tenant traffic from rogue devices in the providers of
Geneve overlay or underlay networks.
In summary, the document defines the security requirements to protect
tenants overlay traffic against security threats from the NVO3
network components that are interconnected with tunnels implemented
using Geneve.
The security requirements in the document are expressed regarding the
threats to mitigate. It is expected that a security mechanism
designed for NVO3 overlay network implementing Geneve is able to
mitigate all the threats and as such fulfills all the security
requirements expressed in the document. The document RECOMMENDs that
the definition of a Geneve security mechanism fulfills all
requirements expressed in this document
On the other hand, the specificities and the context of some Geneve
deployments may consider the risk associated to some threats as very
low and as such ignore the threats. In such cases, a specific
security mechanism designed for that specific deployment may not
fulfill all the requirements associated to that given threat. This
document RECOMMENDs to consider all the threats while designing a
security mechanism for the Geneve overlay network. In addition, some
deployments may not take advantage of some features provided by
Geneve, in which case, a specific security mechanisms designed for a
specific deployment may not fulfill the requirements associated to
that feature. This document RECOMMENDs that such specific security
mechanisms be an intermediary approach toward the deployment of a
Geneve security mechanism. In fact, such specific mechanisms present
the risk to ossifying Geneve as well as the security being lowered in
favor of Geneve features.
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
The document strongly recommend to re-use existing security protocols
like IP Security (IPsec) [RFC4301] and Transport Layer Security (TLS)
[RFC5246], and existing encryption algorithms ( such as [RFC8221]),
and authentication protocols.
Authentication requirements for NVO3 devices, automated key
management, as well as packet level security providing
confidentiality, integrity and authorization requirements defined in
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-security-requirements] are also requirements for this
document.
3. Terminology
This document uses the terminology of [RFC8014], [RFC7365] and
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-geneve]. In addition to these document the following
term is used:
o Immutable Geneve Option: designate a Geneve Option that are not
expected to be modified by any on path element, such as a GTN.
o Geneve Transit Node (GTN): A transit device that is not Geneve
termination point. GTN MAY understand and Geneve packet and MAY
process Geneve Option.
4. Security Threats
Attacks from compromised NVO3 and underlay network devices, and
attacks from compromised tenant systems defined in
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-security-requirements] are considered for the Geneve
overlay network. Furthermore, the attackers knowing the details of
the Geneve packets can perform their attacks by changing fields in
the Geneve tunnel header, base header, Geneve options and Geneve
packet inner payload.
Threats include traffic analysis, sniffing, injection, redirection,
and replay. Based on these threats, this document enumerates the
security requirements.
Threats are divided into two categories: passive attack and active
attack.
Threats are always associated with risks and the evaluation of these
risks depend among other things on the environment.
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
4.1. Passive Attacks
Passive attacks include traffic analysis (noticing which workloads
are communicating with which other workloads, how much traffic, and
when those communications occur) and sniffing (examining traffic for
useful information such as personally-identifyable information or
protocol information (e.g., TLS certificate, overlay routing
protocols).
A rogue element of the overlay Geneve network under the control of an
attacker may leak and redirect the traffic from a virtual network to
the attacker for passive monitoring [RFC7258].
Avoiding leaking information is hard to enforced and the security
requirements expect to mitigate such attacks by lowering the
consequences, typically making leaked data unusable to an attacker..
4.2. Active Attacks
Active attacks involve modifying packets, injecting packets, or
interfering with packet delivery (such as by corrupting packet
checksum).
There are multiple motivations to inject illegitimate traffic into a
tenants network. When the rogue element is on the path of the TS
traffic, it may be able to inject and receive the corresponding
messages back. On the other hand, if the attacker is not on the path
of the TS traffic it may be limited to only inject traffic to a TS
without receiving any response back. When rogue element have access
to the traffic in both directions, the possibilities are only limited
by the capabilities of the other on path elements - GTN, NVE or TS -
to detect and protect against the illegitimate traffic. On the other
hand, when the rogue element is not on path, the surface for such
attacks remains still quite large. For example, an attacker may
target a specific TS or application by crafting a specific packet
that can either generate load on the system or crash the system or
application. TCP syn flood typically overload the TS while not
requiring the ability to receive responses. Note that udp
application are privileged target as they do not require the
establishment of a session and are expected to treat any incoming
packets.
Traffic injection may also be used to flood the virtual network to
disrupt the communications between the TS or to introduce additional
cost for the tenant, for example when pricing considers the traffic
inside the virtual network. The two latest attacks may also take
advantage of applications with a large factor of amplification for
their responses as well as applications that upon receiving a packet
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
interact with multiple TS. Similarly, applications running on top of
UDP are privileged targets.
Note also that an attacker that is not able to receive the response
traffic, may use other channels to evaluate or measure the impact of
the attack. Typically, in the case of a service, the attacker may
have access, for example, to a user interface that provides
indication on the level of disruption and the success of an attack,
Such feed backs may also be used by the attacker to discover or scan
the network.
Preventing traffic to cross virtual networks, reduce the surface of
attack, but rogue element main still perform attacks within a given
virtual network by replaying a legitimate packet. Some variant of
such attack also includes modification of unprotected parts when
available in order for example to increase the payload size.
5. Requirements for Security Mitigations
The document assumes that Security protocols, algorithms, and
implementations provide the security properties for which they are
designed, an attack caused by a weakness in a cryptographic algorithm
is out of scope.
Protecting network connecting TSes and NVEs which could be accessible
to outside attackers is out of scope.
An attacker controlling an underlying network device may break the
communication of the overlays by discarding or delaying the delivery
of the packets passing through it. The security consideration to
prevent this type of attack is out of scope of this document.
Securing communication between NVAs and NVEs is out of scope.
Selectively providing integrity / authentication, confidentiality /
encryption of only portions of the Geneve packet is in scope. This
will be the case if the Tenant Systems uses security protocol to
protect its communications.
5.1. Protection Against Traffic Sniffing
A passive network observer can determine two virtual machines are
communicating by manipulating activity or network activity of other
virtual machines on that same host. For example, the attacker could
control (or be otherwise aware of) network activity of the other VMs
running on the same host, and deduce other network activity is due to
a victim VM. Comparing application TLS to guest IPsec ESP to NVE
IPsec ESP, each provides stronger protection from traffic analysis in
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
the same order. Application TLS exposes TCP port numbers to a
passive observer, guest IPsec ESP encrypts the inner transport header
but still identifies the communicating VM's IP address, while NVE
IPsec ESP encrypts the entire inner payload.
To protect packet payloads from passive listeners, application-level
encryption (e.g., JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516]), application TLS,
guest IPsec ESP, or hypervisor IPsec ESP can be used. Each provides
the same protection against a passive listener.
To protect against the above-described traffic sniffing attacks, we
require:
GEN-REQ1: The NVE MUST ensure the traffic leaving the NVE has its
payload encrypted. The encryption operation MAY be
performed by the NVE, but could also be performed, for
example, by the TS.
GEN-REQ2: To provide best protection from traffic analysis, the NVE
SHOULD encrypt the payload fields that appears in clear.
Typically, this could include VM's inner IP address,
transport header, and IP payload when Geneve carries IP
packets.
GEN-REQ1 and GEN-REQ2 are inline with NVE-NVE and NVE-Hypervisor data
plane security requirements for confidentiality in
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-security-requirements] like REQ 10, 11 and 16.
5.2. Protecting Against Traffic Injection
Traffic injection from a rogue non legitimate NVO3 Geneve overlay
device or a rogue underlay transit device can target an NVE, a
transit underlay device or a Tenant System. Targeting a Tenant's
System requires a valid MAC and IP addresses of the Tenant's System.
Tenant's System may protect their communications using IPsec or TLS.
Such protection protects the Tenants from receiving spoofed packets,
as any injected packet is expected to be discarded by the destination
Tenant's System. Such protection does not protect the tenant system
from receiving illegitimate packets that may disrupt the Tenant's
System performance.
The Geneve overlay network MAY still need to prevent such spoofed
Tenant's system packets from being steered to the Tenant's system.
When the Tenant's System are not protecting their communications, the
Geneve overlay network SHOULD be able to to prevent a rogue device
from injecting traffic into the overlay network.
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
In order to prevent traffic injection to one virtual network, the
destination legitimate Geneve NVE MUST be able to authenticate the
incoming Geneve packets from the source NVE. Authenticated Geneve
Packet MAY be checked by underlay intermediary nodes.
Based on a policy partial authentication MAY be performed on Geneve
packets if tenant's system is protecting it's communication. In
situations where the tenant system is already encrypting its traffic
with application-level encryption (e.g., S/MIME), transport
encryption (e.g., TLS), or IP encryption (e.g., IPsec ESP), it is
redundant for the NVE to apply additional encryption. Note that
relaying on upper security layers, results from a compromise between
security and performance as it may introduce cut and paste
vulnerability.
The Geneve architecture considers intermediary nodes designated as
GTN. A protection established between NVE SHOULD NOT prevent GTN to
perform their operations, such as the insertion of a Geneve Option,
authenticating a Geneve Option or steering Geneve packets. In the
later case, in order to ease the transition from a non secured to
secure Geneve overlay network, it is expected that GTN that are not
aware of Geneve security mechanisms can steer authenticated Geneve
packets the same way as non protected Geneve packets. Similarly, the
transition from non secure to secure Geneve overlay network may also
be performed by introducing GTN that performs the security
functionalities - such as authentication of Geneve packets- on behalf
of NVE.
This leads to the following security requirements:
GEN-REQ3: A Geneve NVE MUST be able to authenticate at least one of
the Geneve tunnel Header, the Geneve base header, the
immutable Geneve Options, or the Geneve payload. The
combination of fields that are authenticated is defined by
security policies.
GEN-REQ4: A Geneve NVE MAY be able to authenticate only a portion of
the Geneve payload if the Tenant's system is protecting
its communication.
GEN-REQ5: A GTN MAY be able to validate the authentication before
the packet reaches the Geneve destination NVE.
GEN-REQ6: A GTN MUST be able to insert an authenticated Geneve
Option into a authenticated Geneve Packet - protected by
the source Geneve NVE.
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
GEN-REQ7: A GTN capable of forwarding non-authenticated Geneve
packets MUST be capable of forwarding the Geneve
authenticated packet without any additional security
specific functionalities. In other words, forwarding
authenticated Geneve packet MUST done the same way as
authenticated Geneve packets.
GEN-REQ8: A Geneve NVE SHOULD be able to set different security
policies for different flows. A flow MUST be identified
at minimum by the Geneve virtual network identifier and
the inner IP and transport headers, and optionally
additional fields which define a flow (e.g., inner IP
DSCP, IPv6 flow id, Geneve options).
GEN-REQ9: In the case when Tenant systems secure their
communications using protocols such as TLS or IPsec. A
Geneve NVE MAY be able to selectively encrypt and/or
authenticate only the sections that are not encrypted/
authenticated by the Tenant System. For example, only the
IP, transport (TCP / UDP) in case of TLS/DTLS MAY be
encrypted/authenticated, while only the IP header and ESP
header MAY be encrypted/authenticated.
Requirements listed in this section are inline with authentication
and integrity requirements in [I-D.ietf-nvo3-security-requirements],
like REQ 9, 10, 11, 14 and 16.
The requirements further define mechanisms to fully and partially
authenticate Geneve Header, and Geneve options, as well fully and
partially encrypt the same.
5.3. Protecting Against Traffic Redirection
A rogue device of the NVO3 overlay Geneve network or the underlay
network may redirect the traffic from a virtual network to the
attacker for passive or active attacks. If the rogue device is in
charge of the securing the Geneve packet, then Geneve security
mechanisms are not intended to address this threat. More
specifically, a rogue source NVE will still be able to redirect the
traffic in clear text before protecting ( and encrypting the packet).
A rogue destination NVE will still be able to redirect the traffic in
clear text after decrypting the Geneve packets. The same occurs with
GTN that are in charge of encrypting and decrypting a Geneve Packet,
Geneve Option or any information. The security mechanisms are
intended to protect a Geneve information from any on path node.
To prevent an attacker located in the middle between the NVEs and
modifying the tunnel address information in the data packet header to
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
redirect the data traffic, the solution need to provide
confidentiality protection for data traffics exchanged between NVEs.
Based on a policy partial encryption MAY be performed on Geneve
packets if tenant's system is protecting it's communication.
The Geneve architecture considers intermediary nodes designated as
GTN. A protection established between NVE SHOULD NOT prevent GTN to
perform their operations, such as the insertion of a Geneve Option,
encrypting a Geneve Option or steering Geneve packets. In the later
case, in order to ease the transition from a non secured to secure
Geneve overlay network, it is expected that GTN that are not aware of
Geneve security mechanisms can steer encrypted Geneve packets the
same way as non protected Geneve packets. Similarly, the transition
from non secure to secure Geneve overlay network may also be
performed by introducing GTN that performs the security
functionalities - such as encryption of Geneve packets- on behalf of
NVE.
This leads to the following security requirements:
GEN-REQ10: A Geneve NVE MUST be able encrypt Geneve base Header, and/
or Geneve Payload and/or Geneve Options not intended for
the GTN.
GEN-REQ11: A Geneve NVE MAY be able encrypt portion of Geneve Payload
as well as as Geneve Options not intended for the GTN.
GEN-REQ12: A transit underlay intermediary node MUST be able to
insert an encrypted Geneve Option into an encrypted/
authenticated Geneve Packet - protected by the source
Geneve NVE.
GEN-REQ13: A Geneve NVE SHOULD be able to assign different
cryptographic keys to protect the unicast tunnels between
NVEs respectively.
GEN-REQ14: If there are multicast packets, a Geneve NVE SHOULD be
able to assign distinct cryptographic group keys to
protect the multicast packets exchanged among the NVEs
within different multicast groups. Upon receiving a data
packet, an egress Geneve NVE MUST be able to verify
whether the packet is sent from a proper ingress NVE which
is authorized to forward that packet.
Requirements listed in this section are inline with the requirements
in the data plane sections in [I-D.ietf-nvo3-security-requirements]
to protect against traffic redirection and man in the middle attacks.
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
The requirements further define mechanisms for a transit intermediary
node to insert an encrypted Geneve option to an encrypted/
authenticated Geneve packet.
5.4. Protecting Against Traffic Replay
A rogue device of the NVO3 overlay Geneve network or the underlay
network may replay a Geneve packet, to load the network and/or a
specific Tenant System with a modified Geneve payload. In some
cases, such attacks may target an increase of the tenants costs.
When traffic between tenants is not protected, the rogue device may
forward the modified packet over a valid Geneve Header. The crafted
packet may for example, include a specifically crafted application
payload for a specific Tenant Systems application, with the intention
to load the tenant specific application.
Updating the Geneve header and option parameters such as setting an
OAM bit, adding bogus option TLVs, or setting a critical bit, may
result in different processing behavior, that could greatly impact
performance of the overlay network and the underlay infrastructure
and thus affect the tenants traffic delivery.
The NVO3 overlay network and underlay network nodes that may address
such attacks MUST provide means to authenticate the Geneve packet
components.
This leads to the following security requirements:
GEN-REQ15: A Geneve NVE or a GTN MUST be able to validate the Geneve
Header corresponds to the Geneve payload, and discard such
packets.
GEN-REQ16: A Geneve NVE or a GTN SHOULD provide anti replay
mechanisms and discard replayed packet.
The requirements in this section are inline with REQ 10 and 14 in
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-security-requirements], and they further specifies
requirements to validate that a Geneve Header corresponds to the
Geneve payload.
6. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA consideration for this document.
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
7. Security Considerations
The whole document is about security.
Limiting the coverage of the authentication / encryption provides
some means for an attack to craft special packets.
The current document details security requirements that are related
to the Geneve protocol. Their purpose is to design appropriated
Geneve security Options or to appropriately secure NVE-NVE
communication based on Geneve. Instead,
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-security-requirements] provides generic architecture
security requirement upon the deployment of an NVO3 overlay network.
It is strongly recommended to read that document as architecture
requirements also apply here. In addition, architecture security
requirements go beyond the scope of Geneve communications, and as
such are more likely to adress the security needs upon deploying an
Geneve overlay network.
More precisely, REQ 1 to REQ 8 are focused on the control plane which
is outside the scope of this document.
REQ 9 is a data plane security requirement, but focused on the
establishment of a NVO3 tunnels. This is outside the scope of Geneve
which only address data in motion. As such REQ 9 is outside the
scope of this document.
REQ 10 to REQ 14 are in the scope of this document. REQ 12 and REQ
13 are identical as GEN-REQ13 and GEN-REQ14. All other requirements
from GEN-REQ1 to GEN-REQ16 are declinasons of REQ 10, REQ 11 and REQ
14. These requirements are the declination of architecture
requirements in a context for Geneve, which includes the presence of
GTN, Geneve Options as well as the possibility to split the security
opration between tenants and teh overlay infrastructure.
REQ 15 to REQ 18 from [I-D.ietf-nvo3-security-requirements] are
focused on the NVE-Hypervisor Data Plane which is not based on Geneve
and thus is outside the scope of the document.
8. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Ilango S Ganaga for its useful reviews and
clarifications as well as Matthew Bocci, Sam Aldrin and Ignas Bagdona
for moving the work forward.
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-geneve]
Gross, J., Ganga, I., and T. Sridhar, "Geneve: Generic
Network Virtualization Encapsulation", draft-ietf-
nvo3-geneve-05 (work in progress), September 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8221] Wouters, P., Migault, D., Mattsson, J., Nir, Y., and T.
Kivinen, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 8221,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8221, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8221>.
9.2. Informational References
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-security-requirements]
Hartman, S., Zhang, D., Wasserman, M., Qiang, Z., and M.
Zhang, "Security Requirements of NVO3", draft-ietf-nvo3-
security-requirements-07 (work in progress), June 2016.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Geneve Protocol Security Requirements February 2018
[RFC7365] Lasserre, M., Balus, F., Morin, T., Bitar, N., and Y.
Rekhter, "Framework for Data Center (DC) Network
Virtualization", RFC 7365, DOI 10.17487/RFC7365, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7365>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC8014] Black, D., Hudson, J., Kreeger, L., Lasserre, M., and T.
Narten, "An Architecture for Data-Center Network
Virtualization over Layer 3 (NVO3)", RFC 8014,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8014, December 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8014>.
Authors' Addresses
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
8400 boulevard Decarie
Montreal, QC H4P 2N2
Canada
Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
Sami Boutros
VMware, Inc.
Email: sboutros@vmware.com
Dan Wing
VMware, Inc.
Email: dwing@vmware.com
Suresh Krishnan
Kaloom
Email: suresh@kaloom.com
Migault, et al. Expires August 30, 2018 [Page 15]