Internet Engineering Task Force M. Jenkins
Internet-Draft L. Zieglar
Intended status: Informational NSA
Expires: October 12, 2018 April 10, 2018
Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
draft-jenkins-cnsa-cert-crl-profile-02
Abstract
This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and
X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use with the United
States National Security Agency's Commercial National Security
Algorithm (CNSA) Suite. The reader is assumed to have familiarity
with RFC 5280, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile".
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2018.
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. General Requirements and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Implementing the CNSA Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. CNSA Suite Object Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. CNSA Suite Base Certificate Required Values . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. signatureAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. signatureValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. SubjectPublicKeyInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Certificate Extensions for Particular Types of Certificates . 8
5.1. CNSA Suite Self-Signed CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. CNSA Suite Non-Self-Signed CA Certificates . . . . . . . 8
5.3. CNSA Suite End Entity Signature and Key Establishment
Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. CNSA Suite CRL Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and
X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use by applications
that support the United States National Security Agency's Commercial
National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite [CNSA].
This profile of [RFC5280] applies to all CNSA Suite solutions that
make use of X.509 v3 Certificates or X.509 v2 CRLs. The reader is
assumed to have familiarity with RFC 5280. All MUST-level
requirements of RFC 5280 apply throughout this profile and are
generally not repeated here. In cases where a MUST-level requirement
is repeated for emphasis, the text notes the requirement is "in
adherence with RFC 5280". This profile contains changes that elevate
some SHOULD-level options in RFC 5280 to MUST-level for this profile;
this profile also contains changes that elevate some MAY-level
options in RFC 5280 to SHOULD-level or MUST-level in this profile.
All options from RFC 5280 that are not listed in this profile remain
at the requirement level of RFC 5280.
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The reader is also assumed to have familiarity with these documents:
o [RFC5480] for the syntax and semantics for the Subject Public Key
Information field in certificates that support Elliptic Curve
Cryptography;
o [RFC5758] for the algorithm identifiers for Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA);
o [RFC3279] for the syntax and semantics for the Subject Public Key
Information field in certificates that support RSA Cryptography;
and
o [RFC4055] for the algorithm identifiers for RSA Cryptography with
the SHA-384 hash function.
2. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. General Requirements and Assumptions
The goal of this document is to define a base set of requirements for
certificates and CRLs to support interoperability among CNSA Suite
solutions. Specific communities, such as the US National Security
Systems, may define community profiles that further restrict
certificate and CRL contents by mandating the presence of extensions
that are optional in this base profile, defining new optional or
critical extension types, or restricting the values and/or presence
of fields within existing extensions. However, communications
between distinct communities MUST conform to the requirements
specified in this document when interoperability is desired.
Applications may add requirements for additional non-critical
extensions but they MUST NOT assume that a remote peer will be able
to process them.
3.1. Implementing the CNSA Suite
Every CNSA Suite certificate MUST use the X.509 v3 format, and
contain either:
o An ECDSA-capable signature verification key using curve P-384; or
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o An ECDH-capable (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) key establishment
key using curve P-384; or
o An RSA-capable signature verification key using RSA-3072 or RSA-
4096; or
o An RSA-capable key transport key using RSA-3072 or RSA-4096.
The signature algorithm applied to all CNSA Suite certificates and
CRLs MUST use the SHA-384 hashing algorithm. The signing
Certification Authority's (CA) key MUST conform to the following:
o for certificates containing key generated on the curve P-384, or
CRLs citing such certificates, the CA's certificate signing key
MUST also have been generated on the curve P-384.
o for certificates containing an RSA-3072 key, or CRLs citing such
certificates, the CA's certificate signing key MUST be either an
RSA-3072 key or RSA-4096 key.
o for certificates containing an RSA-4096 key, or CRLs citing such
certificates, the CA's certificate signing key MUST also be an
RSA-4096 key.
As a result, a community that uses both ECC and RSA cryptographic key
primatives will need a separate trust points for each.
RSA exponents e MUST satisfy 2^16<e<2^256 and be odd per [FIPS186-4].
3.2. CNSA Suite Object Identifiers
3.2.1. CNSA Suite Object Identifiers for ECDSA
The primary Object Identifier (OID) structure for the CNSA Suite is
as follows per [X9.62], [SEC2], [RFC5480], and [RFC5758].
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ansi-X9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 }
certicom-arc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) }
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-X9-62 keyType(2) 1 }
secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
certicom-arc curve(0) 34 }
id-ecSigType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-X9-62 signatures(4) }
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-ecSigType ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
3.2.2. CNSA Suite Object Identifiers for RSA
The primary OID structure for CNSA Suite is as follows per [RFC3279].
pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
pkcs-1 1}
The rsaEncryption OID is intended to be used in the algorithm field
of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier. The parameters field MUST
have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm identifier.
The object identifier used to identify the PKCS #1 version 1.5
signature algorithm with SHA-384 is per [RFC4055]:
sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
pkcs-1 12 }
4. CNSA Suite Base Certificate Required Values
This section specifies changes to the basic requirements in [RFC5280]
for applications that create or use CNSA Suite certificates. Note
that RFC 5280 has varying mandates for marking extensions as critical
or non-critical. This profile changes some of those mandates for
extensions that are included in CNSA Suite certificates.
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4.1. signatureAlgorithm
4.1.1. ECDSA
For ECDSA, the algorithm identifier used by the CNSA Suite is:
1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 for ecdsa-with-SHA384, as described in
[RFC5758] and [X9.62].
The parameters MUST be absent as per [RFC5758].
4.1.2. RSA
For RSA, the algorithm identifier used by the CNSA Suite is:
1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 for sha384WithRSAEncryption, as described in
[RFC4055]
Per [RFC4055], the parameters MUST be NULL. Implementations MUST
accept the parameters being absent as well as present.
4.2. signatureValue
4.2.1. ECDSA
ECDSA digital signature generation is described in [FIPS186-4]. An
ECDSA signature value is composed of two unsigned integers, denoted
as r and s. r and s MUST be represented as ASN.1 INTEGERs. If the
high order bit of the unsigned integer is a 1, an octet with the
value 0x00 MUST be prepended to the binary representation before
encoding it as an ASN.1 INTEGER. Unsigned integers for the P-384
curves can be a maximum of 48 bytes. Therefore, converting each r
and s to an ASN.1 INTEGER will result in a maximum of 49 bytes for
the P-384 curve.
The ECDSA signatureValue in an X.509 certificate is encoded as a BIT
STRING value of a DER-encoded SEQUENCE of the two INTEGERS.
4.2.2. RSA
The RSA signature generation process and the encoding of the result
is RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as described in detail in PKCS #1 version 2.2
[RFC8017]
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4.3. Version
For this profile, Version MUST be v3, which means the value MUST be
set to 2.
4.4. SubjectPublicKeyInfo
4.4.1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
For ECDSA signature verification keys and ECDH key agreement keys,
the algorithm ID id-ecPublicKey MUST be used.
The parameters of the AlgorithmIdentifier in this field MUST use the
namedCurve option. The specifiedCurve and implicitCurve options
described in [RFC5480] MUST NOT be used. The namedCurve MUST be the
OID for secp384r1 (curve P-384) [RFC5480].
The elliptic curve public key, ECPoint, SHALL be the OCTET STRING
representation of an elliptic curve point following the conversion
routine in section 2.2 of [RFC5480] and sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 of
[SEC1].
CNSA Suite implementations MAY use either the uncompressed form or
the compressed form of the elliptic curve point [RFC5480]. For
interoperability purposes, all relying parties MUST be prepared to
process the uncompressed form.
The elliptic curve public key (an ECPoint that is an OCTET STRING) is
mapped to a subjectPublicKey (a BIT STRING) as follows: the most
significant bit of the OCTET STRING becomes the most significant bit
of the BIT STRING and the least significant bit of the OCTET STRING
becomes the least significant bit of the BIT STRING [RFC5480].
4.4.2. RSA
For RSA signature verification keys and key transport keys, the
algorithm ID, rsaEncryption MUST be used.
The parameters field MUST have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm
identifier [RFC3279].
The RSA public key MUST be encoded using the ASN.1 type RSAPublicKey
per section 2.3.1 of [RFC3279].
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5. Certificate Extensions for Particular Types of Certificates
Different types of certificates in this profile have different
required and recommended extensions. Those are listed in this
section. Those extensions from RFC 5280 not explicitly listed in
this profile remain at the requirement levels of RFC 5280.
5.1. CNSA Suite Self-Signed CA Certificates
In adherence with [RFC5280], self-signed CA certificates in this
profile MUST contain the subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, and
basicConstraints extensions.
The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical. The keyCertSign
and cRLSign bits MUST be set. The digitalSignature and
nonRepudiation bits MAY be set. All other bits MUST NOT be set.
In adherence with [RFC5280], the basicConstraints extension MUST be
marked as critical. The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the
subject is a CA and the pathLenConstraint MUST NOT be present.
5.2. CNSA Suite Non-Self-Signed CA Certificates
Non-self-signed CA Certificates in this profile MUST contain the
authorityKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, and basicConstraints extensions.
If there is a policy to be asserted, then the certificatePolicies
extension MUST be included.
The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical. The keyCertSign
and CRLSign bits MUST be set. The digitalSignature and
nonRepudiation bits MAY be set. All other bits MUST NOT be set.
In adherence with [RFC5280], the basicConstraints extension MUST be
marked as critical. The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the
subject is a CA and the pathLenConstraint subfield is OPTIONAL.
If a policy is asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST be
marked as non-critical, MUST contain the OIDs for the applicable
certificate policies and SHOULD NOT use the policyQualifiers option.
If a policy is not asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST
be omitted.
Relying party applications conforming to this profile MUST be
prepared to process the policyMappings, policyConstraints, and
inhibitAnyPolicy extensions, regardless of criticality, following the
guidance in [RFC5280] when they appear in non-self-signed CA
certificates.
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5.3. CNSA Suite End Entity Signature and Key Establishment Certificates
In adherence with [RFC5280], end entity certificates in this profile
MUST contain the authorityKeyIdentifier and keyUsage extensions. If
there is a policy to be asserted, then the certificatePolicies
extension MUST be included. End entity certificates SHOULD contain
the subjectKeyIdentifier extension.
The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical.
For end entity digital signature certificates, the keyUsage extension
MUST be set for digitalSignature. The nonRepudiation bit MAY be set.
All other bits in the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be set.
For end entity key establishment certificates, in ECDH certificates
the keyUsage extension MUST BE set for keyAgreement, and in RSA
certificates the keyUsage extension MUST be set for keyEncipherment.
The encipherOnly or decipherOnly bit MAY be set. All other bits in
the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be set.
If a policy is asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST be
marked as non-critical, MUST contain the OIDs for the applicable
certificate policies and SHOULD NOT use the policyQualifiers option.
If a policy is not asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST
be omitted.
6. CNSA Suite CRL Requirements
This CNSA Suite CRL profile is a profile of [RFC5280]. There are
changes in the requirements from [RFC5280] for the signatures on CRLs
of this profile.
The signatures on CRLs in this profile MUST follow the same rules
from this profile that apply to signatures in the certificates, see
section 4.
7. Security Considerations
The security considerations in [RFC3279], [RFC4055], [RFC5280],
[RFC5480], and [RFC5758], and [RFC8017] apply.
A single key pair SHOULD NOT be used for both signature and key
establishment per [SP-800-57].
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8. IANA Considerations
No IANA actions are required.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[FIPS186-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard", FIPS 186-4, July 2013,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC5758] Dang, Q., Santesson, S., Moriarty, K., Brown, D., and T.
Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA",
RFC 5758, DOI 10.17487/RFC5758, January 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5758>.
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[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References
[CNSA] Committee for National Security Systems, "Commercial
National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite", 2015,
<https://www.iad.gov/iad/programs/iad-initiatives/
cnsa-suite.cfm>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", September 2000.
[SEC2] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 2:
Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", September
2000.
[SP-800-57]
Barker, E., "Recommendation for Key Management-Part 1
Revision 4: General", Special Publication 800-57, January
2016,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4.pdf>.
[X9.62] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry; The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
ANS X9.62, December 2005.
[X9.63] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry; Key
Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve
Cryptography", ANS X9.63, December 2001.
Authors' Addresses
Michael Jenkins
National Security Agency
Email: mjjenki@tycho.ncsc.mil
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Lydia Zieglar
National Security Agency
Email: llziegl@nsa.gov
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