DNSOP W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft Sparta, Inc.
Intended status: Informational March 31, 2008
Expires: October 2, 2008
Requirements for Management of Name Servers for the DNS
draft-hardaker-dnsops-name-server-management-reqs-01.txt
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Abstract
Management of name servers for the Domain Name Service (DNS) has
traditionally been done using vendor-specific monitoring,
configuration and control methods. Although some service monitoring
platforms can test the functionality of the DNS itself, there has not
been a interoperable way to control, configure and examine the
internal performance of a given DNS server.
This document discusses the requirements of a management system for
DNS name servers. A management solution that is designed to manage
the DNS should meet the needs discussed in this document.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2. Document Requirement Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Management Architecture Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Expected Deployment Scenerios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Zone Size Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Configuration Data Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.3. Protocol Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.4. Common Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.5. Operational Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Name Server Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Management Operation Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Control Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. Asyncronous status notifications . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Configuration Requiremets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. Served Zone Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.2. Trust Anchor Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.3. Security Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.4. TSIG Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.5. DNS Protocol Authorization Management . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Monitoring Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4. Alarm and Event Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5. Solution Impacts on Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Other Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Extensiblity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.1. Vendor Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.2. Extension Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.3. Namespace Collison Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Deployment Scenerios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.1. Non-Standard Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.2. Reduancy Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
Management of name servers for the Domain Name Service (DNS)
[RFC1034] [RFC1035] has traditionally been done using vendor-specific
monitoring, configuration and control methods. Although some service
monitoring platforms can test the functionality of the DNS itself,
there has not been a interoperable way to control, configure and
examine the internal performance of a given DNS server. Previous
standardization work within the IETF resulted in the creation of two
SNMP MIB modules [RFC1611] [RFC1612] but they failed to achieve
significant implementation and deployment. The perceived reasons
behind the failure for the two MIB modules is further documented in
[RFC3197].
This document discusses the requirements of a management system for
DNS name servers. A management solution that is designed to manage
the DNS should meet the needs discussed in this document.
Specifically out of scope for this document are requirements
associated with management of stub resolvers. It is not the intent
of this document to document stub resolver requirements, although
some of the requirements listed may applicable to stub resolvers as
well.
The task of creating a management system for managing DNS servers is
not expected to be a small one. It is likely that components of the
solution will need to be designed in parts over time and these
requirements take this into consideration. In particular,
Section 5.1 discusses the need for future extensibility of the base
management solution. This document is intended to be a road-map
towards a desired outcome and is not intended to define an "all-or-
nothing" system. Successful interoperable management of name servers
even in part is expected to be beneficial to network operators
compared to the entirely custom solutions that must be used at the
time of this writing.
1.1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.1.1. Terminology
This document is consistent with the terminology defined in Section 2
of [RFC4033]. Additional terminology needed for this document are
described below:
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Name Server: When we are discussing a servers that don't fall into a
more specific type of server category defined in other documents,
this document will refer to them generically as "name servers".
In particular the servers may be any valid combination of
authoritative, recursive, validating, or security-aware. The more
specific name server labels will be used when this document refers
only to a specific type of server. However, the term "name
server", in this document, will not include stub resolvers.
1.1.2. Document Requirement Layout
The document is written so that 0 to 1 requirements will be outlined
in the text of each numbered section. These requirements will
contain needed wording from the terminology described in Section 1.1.
Subsections, however, may exist with additional related requirements.
This is done so that a specific requirement can be uniquely referred
to using the section number itself and the document version that it
came from.
2. Management Architecture Requirements
This section discusses requirements that reflect the needs of the
expected deployment environments.
2.1. Expected Deployment Scenerios
DNS zones vary greatly in the type of content published within them.
Name Servers, too, are deployed with a wide variety of configurations
to support the diversity of the deployed content. It is important
that a management solution trying to meet the criteria specified in
this document consider supporting the largest number of potential
deployment cases as possible. Further deployment scenario's that are
not used as direct examples of specific requirements are listed in
Appendix A.
2.1.1. Zone Size Constraints
The management solution should support both name servers that are
serving a small number of potentially very large zones (e.g. Top
Level Domains (TLDs)) as well as name servers that are serving a very
large number of small zones. These scenarios are both commonly seen
deployments.
2.1.2. Configuration Data Volatility
Configuration data is defined as data that relates only to the
configuration of a server and the zones it serves. It specifically
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does not include data from the zone contents that is served through
DNS itself. The solution should support servers that remain fairly
statically configured over time as well as servers that have numerous
zones being added and removed within an hour. Both of these
scenarios are also commonly seen deployments.
2.1.3. Protocol Selection
There are many requirements in this document for many different types
of management operations (see Section 3 for further details). It is
possible that no one protocol will ideally fill all the needs of the
requirements listed in this document and thus multiple protocols may
be needed to produce a completely functional management system.
Multiple protocols may be used to create the complete management
solution, but the number of protocols used should be reduced to a
reasonable minimum number.
2.1.4. Common Data Model
Defining a standardized protocol (or set of protocols) to use for
managing name servers would be a step forward in achieving an
interoperable management solution. However, just defining a protocol
to use by itself would not achieve the complete end goal of a
complete interoperable management solution. Devices also need to
represent their internal management interface using a common
management data model. The solution must create a common data model
that management stations can make use of when sending or collecting
data from a managed device so it can successfully manage equipment
from vendors as if they were generic DNS servers. This common data
model is needed for of the operations discussion in section
Section 3. Note that this does not preclude the fact that name
server vendors may provide additional management infrastructure
beyond a base management specification, as discussed further in
section Section 5.1.
2.1.5. Operational Impact
It is impossible to add new features to an existing server (such as
the inclusion of a management infrastructure) and not impact the
existing service and/or server in some fashion. At a minimum, for
example, more memory, disk and/or CPU resources will be required to
implement a new management system. However, the impact to the
existing DNS service must be minimized since the DNS service itself
is still the primary service to be offered by the modified name
server.
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2.2. Name Server Types
There are multiple ways in which name servers can be deployed. Name
servers can take on any of the following roles:
o Master Servers
o Slave Servers
o Recursive Servers
All of these types of servers are equally as important to support
within the solution. It should be noted that "Recursive Servers" can
be further broken down by the security sub-roles they may
implementing, as defined in section 2 of [RFC4033]. These sub-roles
are also important to support within any management solution.
The requirements in this document explicitly exclude dealing with
management of stub resolvers. Management of stub resolvers is
considered specifically out of scope of this document.
3. Management Operation Types
Management operations can traditionally be broken into four
categories:
o Control
o Configuration
o Health and Monitoring
o Alarms and Events
This section discusses requirements for each of these for management
types in detail.
3.1. Control Requirements
The management solution must be capable of performing basic service
control operations. These operations must include, at a minimum, the
following operations
o Starting the name server
o Reloading the service configuration
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o Reloading zone data
o Restarting the name server
o Stopping the name server
It should be noted that no further restriction is placed on how the
management system be implemented so that these operations can be
performed. In particular, at least "starting the name server" will
require a minimal management system component to exist independently
of the name server itself.
3.1.1. Asyncronous status notifications
Some control operations may take a long time to complete. As an
example, some name servers take a long time to perform reloads of
large zones. Because of these timing issues, the management solution
should take this into consideration and offer a mechanism to ease the
burden associated with awaiting the status of a long-running command.
This could, for example, result in the use of asynchronous
notifications for returning the status of a long-running task or it
may require the management station to poll for the status of a given
task using monitoring commands. These and other potential solutions
need to be evaluated carefully to select one that balances the result
delivery needs with the perceived implementation costs.
Also, see the related discussion in Section 3.4 which discusses
notification messages for supporting delivery of alarm and event
messages.
3.2. Configuration Requiremets
Many features of name servers need to be configured before the server
can be considered functional. The most important data to be
configured, for example, is the served zone data itself.
3.2.1. Served Zone Modification
The ability to add, modify and delete zones being served by name
servers is needed. Although there are already solutions for zone
content modification (such as Dynamic DNS (DDNS) [RFC2136] [RFC3007],
AXFR [RFC1035], and incremental zone transfer (IXFR) [RFC1995]) that
might be used as part of the final management solution, the
management system must still be able to natively create a new zone
with enough minimal data to allow the other mechanisms to function.
This may be, for example, a management operation that at least allows
for the creation of the initial SOA record for a new zone as that's
the minimum amount of zone data needed for the other operations to
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function..
3.2.2. Trust Anchor Management
The ability to add, modify and delete trust anchors that are used by
DNS Security (DNSSEC) [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035] [RFC4509]
[RFC5011] [RFC5155] validating resolvers is needed. These trust
anchors may be configured using the data from the DNSKEY key Resource
Records (RRs) themselves or by using Delegation Signer (DS)
fingerprints.
3.2.3. Security Expectations
DNSSEC Validating resolvers need to make policy decisions about the
requests being processed. They need to be, for example, be
configured with a list of zones they should expect to be secured with
DNSSEC. The management solution must be able to add, modify and
delete attributes of DNSSEC security policies.
3.2.4. TSIG Key Management
TSIG [RFC2845] allows transaction level authentication of DNS
traffic. The management solution must be able to add, modify and
delete TSIG keys known to the name server.
3.2.5. DNS Protocol Authorization Management
The management solution must have the ability to add, modify and
delete authorization settings for the DNS protocols itself. This
should not be confused with the ability to manage the authorization
associated with the management protocol itself, which is discussed
later in section Section 4.4. There are a number of authorization
settings that are used by a name server. Example authorization
settings that the solution may need to cover are:
o Access to operations on zone data (E.G. DDNS)
o Access to certain zone data from certain sources (E.G. from
particular network subnets)
o Access to specific DNS protocol services (E.G. recursive service)
Note: the above list is expected to be used as examples and is not a
complete list of needed authorization protections.
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3.3. Monitoring Requirements
Monitoring is the process of collecting aspects of the internal state
of a name server at a given moment in time. The solution must be
able to monitor the health of a name server to determine it's
operational status, load and other internal attributes. Example
management tasks that the solution may need to cover are:
o Number of requests sent, responses sent and other counting
statistics
o Server status (E.G. "serving data", "starting up", "shutting
down", ...)
o Access control violations
o List of zones being served
o Detailed statistics about clients interacting with the name server
(E.G. top 10 clients requesting data).
Note: the above list is expected to be used as examples and is not a
complete list of needed monitoring operations. In particular, some
monitoring statics are expected to be computationally or resource
expensive and should be considered "nice to haves" as opposed to
"necessary to have".
3.4. Alarm and Event Requirements
Events occurring at the name server that trigger alarm notifications
can quickly inform a management station about critical issues. A
management solution should include support for delivery of alarm
conditions.
Example alarm conditions may include:
o The server's status is changing. (E.G it is starting up,
reloading configuration, restarting or shutting down)
o A needed resource (E.G. memory or disk space) is exhausted or
nearing exhaustion
o An authorization violation was detected
o The server has not received any data traffic (E.G. DNS requests or
NOTIFYs) recently (AKA the "lonely warning"). This condition
might indicate a problem with it's deployment.
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4. Security Requirements
The management solution will need to be appropriately secured against
attacks on the management infrastructure.
4.1. Authentication
The solution must support mutual authentication. The management
client must be able to ensure that the management operations are
being transferred to and from the correct name server. The managed
name server must be able to authenticate the system that is accessing
the management infrastructure within itself.
4.2. Integrity Protection
Management operations must be protected from modification while in
transit from the management client to the server.
4.3. Confidentiality
The management solution must support message confidentiality. The
potential transfer of sensitive configuration is expected (such as
TSIG keys or security policies). The solution does not, however,
necessarily need to provide confidentiality to data that would
normally be carried without confidentiality by the DNS system itself.
4.4. Authorization
The solution should be capable of providing a fine-grained
authorization model for any management protocols it introduces to the
completed system. This authorization differs from the authorization
previously discussed in Section 3.2.5 in that this requirement is
concerned solely with authorization of the management system itself.
There are a number of authorization settings that may be used by a
managed system to determine whether the managing entity has
authorization to perform the given management task. Example
authorization settings that the solution may need to cover are:
o Access to the configuration that specifies which zones are to be
served
o Access to the management system infrastructure
o Access to other control operations
o Access to other configuration operations
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o Access to monitoring operations
Note: the above list is expected to be used as examples and is not a
complete list of needed authorization protections.
4.5. Solution Impacts on Security
The solution must minimize the security risks introduced to the
complete name server system. It is impossible to add new
infrastructure to a server and not impact the security in some
fashion as the introduction of a management protocol alone will
provide a new avenue for potential attack. Although the added
management benefits will be worth the increased risks, the solution
still needs to minimize this impact as much as possible.
5. Other Requirements
5.1. Extensiblity
The management solution is expected to change and expand over time as
lessons are learned and new DNS features are deployed. Thus, the
solution must be flexible and be able to accommodate new future
management operations. The solution might, for example, make use of
protocol versioning or capability description exchanges to ensure
that management stations and name servers that weren't written to the
same specification version can still interoperate to the best of
their combined ability.
5.1.1. Vendor Extensions
It must be possible for vendors to extend the standardized management
model with vendor-specific extensions to support additional features
offered by their products.
5.1.2. Extension Identification
It must be possible for a management station to understand which
parts of returned data are specific to a given vendor or other
standardized extension. The data returned needs to be appropriately
marked through the use of name spaces or similar mechanisms to ensure
that the base management model data can be logically separated from
extension data without needing to understand the extension data
itself.
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5.1.3. Namespace Collison Protection
It must be possible to protect against multiple extensions
conflicting with each other. The use of name-space protection
mechanisms for communicated management variables is common practice
to protect against problems. Name-space identification techniques
also frequently solve the "Extension Identification" requirement
discussed in Section 5.1.2 as well.
6. Security Considerations
Any management protocol that meets the criteria discussed in this
document needs to support the criteria discussed in Section 4 in
order to protect the management infrastructure itself. The DNS is a
core Internet service and management traffic that protects it could
be the target of attacks designed to subvert that service. Because
the management infrastructure will be adding additional interfaces to
that service it is critical that the management infrastructure
support adequate protections against network attacks.
7. IANA Considerations
No action is required from IANA for this document.
8. Document History
A requirement gathering discussion was held at the December 2007 IETF
meeting in Vancouver, BC, Canada and a follow up meeting was held at
the March 2008 IETF meeting in Philadelphia. This document is a
compilation of the results of those discussions as well as
discussions on the DCOMA mailing list.
9. Acknowledgements
This draft is the result of discussions within the DCOMA design team
chaired by Jaap Akkerhuis. This team consisted of a large number of
people all of whom provided valuable insight and input into the
discussions surrounding name server management. This work documents
the consensus of the DCOMA design team.
10. References
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10.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
August 1996.
[RFC2136] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, April 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
(TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.
[RFC3007] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
(DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.
[RFC5011] StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
Trust Anchors", RFC 5011, September 2007.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.
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10.2. Informative References
[RFC1611] Austein, R. and J. Saperia, "DNS Server MIB Extensions",
RFC 1611, May 1994.
[RFC1612] Austein, R. and J. Saperia, "DNS Resolver MIB Extensions",
RFC 1612, May 1994.
[RFC2182] Elz, R., Bush, R., Bradner, S., and M. Patton, "Selection
and Operation of Secondary DNS Servers", BCP 16, RFC 2182,
July 1997.
[RFC3197] Austein, R., "Applicability Statement for DNS MIB
Extensions", RFC 3197, November 2001.
Appendix A. Deployment Scenerios
This appendix documents some additional deployment scenarios that
have been traditionally difficult to manage. They are provided as
guidance to protocol developers as data points of real-world name
server management problems.
A.1. Non-Standard Zones
If an organization uses non-standard zones (for example a purely-
local TLD), synchronizing all the nameservers for these zones is
usually a time-consuming task. It is made worse when two
organizations with conflicting zones merge. It should be obvious
that this situation is not a recommended deployment scenario (and is
even heavily discouraged) but it is, unfortunately, seen in the wild.
It is typically implemented using "forwarding" zones. But there is
no way to ensure automatically that all the resolvers have the same
set of zones to forward at any given time. New zones may be added to
a local forwarding recursive server, for example, without modifying
the rest of the deployed forwarding servers. It is hoped that a
management solution which could handle the configuration of zone
forwarding would finally allow management of servers deployed in this
fashion.
A.2. Reduancy Sharing
For reliability reasons it is recommended that zone operators follow
the guidelines documented in [RFC2182] which recommends that multiple
name servers be configured for each zone and that the name servers
are separated both physically and via connectivity routes. A common
solution is to establish DNS-serving partnerships: "I'll host your
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zones and you'll host mine". Both entities benefit from increased
DNS reliability via the wider service distribution. This frequently
occurs between cooperating but otherwise unrelated entities (such as
between two distinct companies) as well as between affiliate
organizations (such as between branch offices within a single
company).
These configuration of these relationships must currently be manually
configured and maintained. Changes to the list of zones that should
be cross-hosted must be manually negotiated between the cooperating
network administrators. A management protocol with the ability to
provide selective authorization, as discussed in Section 4.4, would
solve many of the management difficulties between cooperating
organizations.
Author's Address
Wes Hardaker
Sparta, Inc.
P.O. Box 382
Davis, CA 95617
US
Phone: +1 530 792 1913
Email: hardaker@tislabs.com
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Hardaker Expires October 2, 2008 [Page 16]