Network Working Group M. Ersue, Ed.
Internet-Draft Nokia Siemens Networks
Intended status: Informational January 27, 2011
Expires: July 31, 2011
An Overview of the IETF Network Management Standards
draft-ersue-opsawg-management-fw-03
Abstract
This document gives an overview of the IETF network management
standards and summarizes existing and ongoing development of IETF
standards-track network management protocols and data models. The
purpose of this document is on the one hand to help system developers
and users to select appropriate standard management protocols and
data models to address relevant management needs. On the other hand
the document can be used as an overview and guideline by other SDOs
or bodies planning to use IETF management technologies and data
models.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 31, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Scope and Target Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Core Network Management Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1. Architectural Principles of SNMP . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2. SNMP and its Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.3. Structure of Managed Information (SMI) . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.4. SNMP Security and Access Control Models . . . . . . . 10
2.1.5. SNMP Transport Subsystem and Transport Models . . . . 13
2.2. SYSLOG Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3. IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) and Packet Sampling
(PSAMP) Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4. Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.1. YANG - NETCONF Data Modeling Language . . . . . . . . 21
3. Management Protocols and Mechanisms with specific Focus . . . 22
3.1. IP Address Management with Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2. IPv6 Network Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3. Policy-based Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3.1. IETF Policy Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3.2. Common Open Policy Service (COPS) and COPS Usage
for Policy Provisioning (COPS-PR) . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.4. IP Performance Metrics (IPPM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.5. Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) . . . 27
3.6. Diameter Base Protocol (DIAMETER) . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.7. Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
(CAPWAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.8. Access Node Control Protocol (ANCP) . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.9. Ad-Hoc Network Autoconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.10. Application Configuration Access Protocol (ACAP) . . . . . 34
3.11. XML Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP) . . . . . . . . . 35
3.12. Extensible Provision Protocol (EPP) . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4. Proposed, Draft and Standard Level Data Models . . . . . . . . 36
4.1. Fault Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2. Configuration Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3. Accounting Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4. Performance Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5. Security Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
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6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Appendix A. New Work related to IETF Management Framework . . . . 59
A.1. Energy Management (EMAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Appendix B. Open issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
C.1. 02-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
C.2. 01-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
C.3. 00-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
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1. Introduction
1.1. Scope and Target Audience
This document gives an overview of the IETF network management
standards and summarizes existing and ongoing development of IETF
standards-track network management protocols and data models.
The target audience of the document are on the one hand IETF working
groups, which aim to select appropriate standard management protocols
and data models to address their management needs. On the other hand
the document can be used as an overview and guideline by non-IETF
SDOs planning to use IETF management technologies and data models.
The document can be also used to initiate a discussion between the
bodies with the goal to gather new requirements and to detect
possible gaps. Finally, this document is directed to all interested
parties, which seek to get an overview of the current set of the IETF
management protocols such as network administrators or new comers to
IETF.
Section 2 gives an overview of the IETF core network management
standards with a special focus on Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP), SYSLOG, IPFIX/PSAMP, and NETCONF. Section 3 discusses IETF
management protocols and mechanisms with a specific focus and their
use cases. Section 4 discusses Proposed, Draft and Standard Level
data models, such as MIBs designed to address specific set of issues
and maps them to different management tasks.
This document mainly refers to Proposed, Draft or Full Standard
documents at IETF (see [RFCSEARCH]). As far as it is valuable Best
Current Practice (BCP) documents are referenced. In exceptional
cases and if the document provides substantial guideline for standard
usage or fills an essential gap, Experimental and Informational RFCs
are noticed and ongoing work is mentioned.
Note that IETF specifications must have "multiple, independent, and
interoperable implementations" before they can be advanced to Draft
Standard status. An Internet or Full Standard (also referred as
Standard), is characterized by a high degree of technical maturity
and by a generally held belief that the specified protocol or service
provides significant benefit to the Internet community [RFC2026].
Information on active and concluded IETF working groups (e.g.
charters, documents and mail archive) can be found at [IETF-WGS].
Note: The final document will not contain any references to Internet-
Drafts. Current references in the document are assumed to be
published soon.
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RFC Editor: Please delete the note above before publication.
1.2. Related Work
[I-D.baker-ietf-core] identifies the key protocols of the Internet
Protocol Suite. In analogy to [I-D.baker-ietf-core] this document
gives an overview of the IETF network management standards and its
usage scenarios.
[RFC3535] "Overview of the 2002 IAB Network Management Workshop"
documented strengths and weaknesses of some IETF management
protocols. In choosing existing protocol solutions to meet the
management requirements, it is recommended that these strengths and
weaknesses be considered, even though some of the recommendations
from the 2002 IAB workshop have become outdated, some have been
standardized, and some are being worked on at the IETF.
[RFC5706] "Guidelines for Considering Operations and Management of
New Protocols and Extensions" recommends working groups to consider
operations and management needs, and then select appropriate
management protocols and data models. This document can be used to
ease surveying the IETF standards-track network management protocols
and management data models.
Note: This document uses the expired draft [I-D.ietf-opsawg-survey-
management] as a starting point and enhances it with a special focus
on the description of the IETF network management standards and
management data models developed at IETF.
Note: The document does not cover OAM technologies on the data-path,
e.g. OAM of tunnels, MPLS-TP OAM, Pseudowire, etc. [I-D.ietf-
opsawg-oam-overview] gives an overview on the OAM toolset for
detecting and reporting connection failures or measurement of
connection performance parameters. [I-D.ietf-mpls-tp-oam-framework]
describes the OAM Framework for MPLS-based Transport Networks.
1.3. Terminology
This document does not describe standard requirements. Therefore key
words from RFC2119 are not used in the document.
o Agent: A software module that performs the network management
functions requested by network management stations. An agent
module may be implemented in any network element that is to be
managed, such as a host, bridge, or router. The 'management
server' in NETCONF terminology.
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o CLI: Command Line Interface. A management interface that human
administrators use to interact with networking equipment.
o Data model: A mapping of the contents of an information model into
a form that is specific to a particular type of data store or
repository (see [RFC3444]).
o Event: An occurrence of something in the "real world". Events can
be indicated to managers through an event message or notification.
o FCAPS: Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, Security.
The five categories of management functionality defined by TMN.
o Information model: An abstraction and representation of entities
in a managed environment, their properties, attributes and
operations, and the way they relate to each other. Independent of
any specific repository, protocol, or platform (see [RFC3444]).
o Managed object: A management abstraction of a resource; a piece of
management information in a MIB. In the context of SNMP, a
structured set of data variables that represent some resource to
be managed or other aspect of a managed device.
o Manager: An entity that acts in a manager role, either a user or
an application. The counterpart to an agent. A 'management
client' in NETCONF terminology.
o Management Information Base (MIB): The definition of a related
collection of objects that represent a collection of resources to
be managed defined by using the modeling language SMI.
o MIB module: A MIB definition, typically for a particular network
technology feature, that constitutes a subtree in an object
identifier tree. A MIB that is provided by a management agent is
typically composed of multiple instantiated MIB modules.
o Modeling language: A modeling language is any artificial language
that can be used to express information or knowledge or systems in
a structure that is defined by a consistent set of rules.
Examples are SMIv2, XSD, and YANG.
o Notification: An event message.
o Trap: An unsolicited message sent by an agent to a management
station to notify an unusual event.
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2. Core Network Management Protocols
2.1. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
2.1.1. Architectural Principles of SNMP
As described in [RFC3410] the SNMPv3 Framework, builds upon both the
original SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 framework. The basic structure and
components for the SNMP framework did not change between its versions
and comprises following components:
o managed nodes, each with an SNMP entity providing remote access to
management instrumentation (the agent),
o at least one SNMP entity with management applications (the
manager), and
o a management protocol used to convey management information
between the SNMP entities, and management information.
During its evolution, the fundamental architecture of the SNMP
Management Framework remained consistent based on a modular
architecture, which consists of:
o a generic protocol definition independent of the data it is
carrying, and
o a protocol-independent data definition language,
o a virtual database containing data sets of management information
definitions (the Management Information Base, or MIB), and
o security and administration.
As such following standards build up the basis of the current SNMP
Management Framework:
o SNMPv3 protocol,
o the modeling language SMIv2, and
o MIB modules for different management issues.
The SNMPv3 Framework extends the architectural principles of SNMPv1
and SNMPv2 by:
o building on these three basic architectural components, in some
cases incorporating them from the SNMPv2 Framework by reference,
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and
o by using the same layering principles in the definition of new
capabilities in the security and administration portion of the
architecture.
2.1.2. SNMP and its Versions
SNMP is based on three conceptual entities: Manager, Agent, and the
Management Information Base (MIB). In any configuration, at least
one manager node runs SNMP management software. Typically, network
devices such as bridges, routers, and servers are equipped with an
agent. The agent is responsible for providing access to a local MIB
of objects that reflects the resources and activity at its node.
Following the manager-agent paradigm, an agent can generate
notifications and send them as unsolicited messages to the management
application.
To enhance this basic functionality, a new version of SNMP has been
introduced in 1993. SNMPv2 added a Trap PDU, an Inform message, a
bulk transfer capability and other functional extensions like an
administrative model for access control, security extensions, and
Manager-to-Manager communication. SNMPv2 entities can have a dual
role as manager and agent. However, neither SNMPv1 nor SNMPv2 offers
sufficient security features. To address the security deficiencies
of SNMPv1/v2, SNMPv3 was issued as a set of Proposed Standards in
January 1998 (see [STD62]).
[BCP74][RFC3584] "Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and
Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework"
gives an overview of the relevant standard documents on the three
SNMP versions. The BCP document furthermore describes how to convert
MIB modules from SMIv1 format to SMIv2 format and how to translate
notification parameters as well as describes the mapping between the
message processing and security models (see [RFC3584]).
SNMP utilizes the Management Information Base, a virtual information
store of modules of managed objects. Generally, standard MIB modules
support common functionality in a device. Based on this fact
operators often define additional MIB modules for their enterprise or
use other protocols such as a Command Line Interface (CLI) to
configure non standard data in managed devices and their interfaces.
SNMP traps and informs can alert an operator or an application when
some aspect of a protocol fails or encounters an error condition, and
the contents of a notification can be used to guide subsequent SNMP
polling to gather additional information about an event.
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SNMP is widely used for monitoring fault and performance data and
with its stateless nature SNMP also works well for status polling and
determining the operational state of specific functionality. The
widespread use of counters in standard MIB modules permits the
interoperable comparison of statistics across devices from different
vendors. Counters have been especially useful in monitoring bytes
and packets going in and out over various protocol interfaces. SNMP
is often used to poll a device for sysUpTime, which serves to report
the time since the last reinitialization of the device, to check for
operational liveliness, and to detect discontinuities in some
counters.
Some operators use SNMP for configuration in their environment (e.g.
for DOCSIS based systems such as cable modems), while others find
SNMP has a limited configuration management support. Compared to
SNMP, with its data-centric view, CLI has a task-oriented view where
NETCONF follows the document-based view for configuration management.
SNMP does not separate clearly between configuration data and
operational state. SMIv2 has limited support for structured data
types and relationships among managed objects.
SNMPv1 [RFC1157] is a Full Standard that the IETF has declared
Historic and it is not recommended due to its lack of security
features. SNMPv2c [RFC1901] is only an Experimental RFC that the
IETF has declared Historic and it is not recommended due to its lack
of security features.
SNMPv3 [STD62] is a Full Standard that is recommended due to its
security features, including support for authentication, encryption,
message timeliness and integrity checking, and fine-grained data
access controls. An overview of the SNMPv3 document set is in
[RFC3410].
Standards exist to use SNMP over diverse transport and link layer
protocols, including TCP, UDP, Ethernet, OSI, and others (see
Section 2.1.5.1).
2.1.3. Structure of Managed Information (SMI)
SNMP MIB modules are defined with the notation and grammar specified
as the Structure of Managed Information (SMI), which uses an adapted
subset of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1).
The SMI is divided into three parts: module definitions, object
definitions, and, notification definitions.
o Module definitions are used when describing information modules.
An ASN.1 macro, MODULE-IDENTITY, is used to concisely convey the
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semantics of an information module.
o Object definitions are used when describing managed objects. An
ASN.1 macro, OBJECT-TYPE, is used to concisely convey the syntax
and semantics of a managed object.
o Notification definitions are used when describing unsolicited
transmissions of management information. An ASN.1 macro,
NOTIFICATION-TYPE, is used to concisely convey the syntax and
semantics of a notification.
Note that SMIv1 is outdated and shouldn't be used.
SMIv2 is the new notation for managed information definition and
should be used to define MIB modules. SMIv2 is specified in
following RFCs:
o [STD58][RFC2578] defines Version 2 of the Structure of Management
Information (SMIv2),
o [STD58][RFC2579] defines common MIB "Textual Conventions",
o [STD58][RFC2580] defines Conformance Statements and requirements
for defining agent and manager capabilities, and
o [RFC3584] defines the mapping rules for and the conversion of MIB
documents between SMIv1 and SMIv2 formats.
2.1.4. SNMP Security and Access Control Models
2.1.4.1. Security Requirements on the SNMP Management Framework
Several of the classical threats to network protocols are applicable
to management problem space and therefore applicable to any security
model used in an SNMP Management Framework. This section lists
principal threats, secondary threats, and threats which are of lesser
importance as defined in [RFC3411].
The principal threats against which SNMP Security Models can provide
protection are:
Modification of Information:
Information might be altered by an unauthorized entity, e.g. in-
transit SNMP messages can be generated to effect unauthorized
management operations, including falsifying the value of an
object.
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Masquerade:
The masquerade threat is the danger that management operations not
authorized for some principal may be attempted by assuming the
identity of another principal that has the appropriate
authorizations.
Secondary threats against which any Security Model used within this
architecture can provide protection are:
Message Stream Modification:
The SNMP protocol is typically based upon a connectionless
transport service which may operate over any subnetwork service.
The re-ordering, delay or replay of messages can and does occur
through the natural operation of many such subnetwork services.
The message stream modification threat is the danger that messages
may be maliciously re-ordered, delayed or replayed to an extent
which is greater than what can occur through the natural operation
of a subnetwork service, in order to effect unauthorized
management operations.
Disclosure:
The disclosure threat is the danger of eavesdropping on the
exchanges between SNMP engines. Protecting against this threat
may be required as a matter of local policy.
There are at least two threats against which a Security Model within
this architecture need not protect, since they are deemed to be of
lesser importance in this context:
Denial of Service:
A Security Model need not attempt to address the broad range of
attacks by which service on behalf of authorized users is denied.
Indeed, such denial-of-service attacks are in many cases
indistinguishable from the type of network failures with which any
viable management protocol must cope as a matter of course.
Traffic Analysis:
A Security Model need not attempt to address traffic analysis
attacks. Many traffic patterns are predictable - entities may be
managed on a regular basis by a relatively small number of
management stations - and therefore there is no significant
advantage afforded by protecting against traffic analysis.
2.1.4.2. User-Based Security Model (USM)
The User Security Model (USM) provides authentication and privacy
services for SNMP (RFC3414). Specifically, USM is designed to secure
against the principal and secondary threats discussed in
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Section 2.1.4.1.
USM does not secure against Denial of Service and attacks based on
Traffic Analysis.
The security services the SNMP Security Model supports are:
o Data Integrity is the provision of the property that data has not
been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner, nor have data
sequences been altered to an extent greater than can occur non-
maliciously.
o Data Origin Authentication is the provision of the property that
the claimed identity of the user on whose behalf received data was
originated is supported.
o Data Confidentiality is the provision of the property that
information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized
individuals, entities, or processes.
o Message timeliness and limited replay protection is the provision
of the property that a message whose generation time is outside of
a specified time window is not accepted.
See [RFC3414] in [STD62] for a detailed description of SNMPv3 USM.
2.1.4.3. View-Based Access Control Model (VACM)
The View-Based Access Control facility of SNMP enables the
configuration of agents to provide different levels of access to the
agent's MIB. An agent entity can restrict access to its MIB for a
particular manager entity in two ways:
o It can restrict access to a certain portion of its MIB, e.g., an
agent may restrict most manager principals to viewing performance-
related statistics and allow only a single designated manager
principal to view and update configuration parameters.
o The agent can limit the operations that a principal can use on
that portion of the MIB. E.g., a particular manager principal
could be limited to read-only access to a portion of an agent's
MIB.
The access control policy to be used by an agent must be pre-
configured for each manager. The policy is based on a table that
details the access privileges of the various authorized managers.
VACM defines five elements that make up the Access Control Model:
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groups, security level, contexts, MIB views, and access policy.
Access to a MIB is controlled by means of a MIB view. The
vacmAccessTable maps the group name, security information, the
context, and the message type (read, write, or notification) into
three MIB views for read, write, or notification access, which are
used to determine whether a managed object is allowed to access.
See [RFC3415] in [STD62] for a detailed description of SNMPv3 VACM.
2.1.5. SNMP Transport Subsystem and Transport Models
The User-based Security Model (USM) was designed to be independent of
other existing security infrastructures to ensure it could function
when third-party authentication services were not available. As a
result, USM utilizes a separate user and key-management
infrastructure. Operators have reported that having to deploy
another user and key-management infrastructure in order to use SNMPv3
is costly and hinders the deployment of SNMPv3.
SNMP Transport Subsystem [RFC5590] extends the existing SNMP
framework and transport model and enables the use of transport
protocols to provide message security unifying the administrative
security management for SNMP, and other management interfaces.
Transport Models are tied into the SNMP framework through the
Transport Subsystem. The Transport Security Model has been designed
to work on top of lower-layer, secure Transport Models. The
Transport Security Model [RFC5591] and the Secure Shell Transport
Model [RFC5592] utilize the Transport Subsystem.
2.1.5.1. SNMP Transport Security Model
The Transport Security Model is an alternative to the existing SNMPv1
Security Model [RFC3584], the SNMPv2c Security Model [RFC3584], and
the User-based Security Model [RFC3414]. The Secure Shell Transport
Model defines furthermore an alternative to existing standard
transport mappings described in [RFC3417] such as SNMP over OSI, SNMP
over IPX and SNMP over UDP. SNMP over UDP has been so far the most
commonly used SNMP transport binding. The Experimental RFC [RFC3430]
defines a transport mapping with TCP.
The new SNMP Transport Subsystem modifies the Abstract Service
Interfaces to pass transport-specific security parameters to other
subsystems. This includes transport-specific security parameters
that are translated into the transport-independent parameters such as
securityName and securityLevel.
The SNMP Transport Subsystem utilizes one or more lower-layer
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security mechanisms to provide message-oriented security services.
These include authentication of the sender, encryption, timeliness
checking, and data integrity checking.
A secure Transport Model establishes an authenticated and possibly
encrypted link between the Transport Models of two SNMP engines.
After a transport-layer tunnel is established, SNMP messages can be
sent through this tunnel from one SNMP engine to the other. The new
Transport Model supports sending multiple SNMP messages through the
same tunnel to amortize the costs of establishing a security
association.
The Transport Model on top of a secure transport protocol performs
security functions within the Transport Subsystem, including the
translation of transport-security parameters to/from Security-Model-
independent parameters. To accommodate this, an implementation-
specific cache of transport-specific information is introduced and
the data flows on this path are extended to pass Security-Model-
independent values. For this purpose, the Transport Subsystem
extends SNMPv3 Abstract Service Interfaces (ASI). New Security
Models can be defined using the modified ASIs and the transport-
information cache.
[RFC5592] introduces a Transport Model (Secure Shell Transport
Model), which makes use of the commonly deployed Secure Shell
security infrastructure establishing a channel between itself and the
SSH Transport Model of another SNMP engine.
Different IETF standards use security layers at the transport or
application layer to address security threads (e.g. TLS [RFC5246],
Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [RFC4422], and SSH
[RFC4251]). Different management interfaces, e.g. CLI, SYSLOG
[RFC5424] and NETCONF [RFC4741], use a secure transport layer to
provide secure information and message exchange to build management
applications.
Detailed description of the Transport Subsystem for SNMP and
Transport Security Model for SNMP can be found in [RFC5590] and
[RFC5591]. Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP is specified in
[RFC5592] and Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for SNMP
is described in [RFC5953].
2.1.5.2. RADIUS Authentication and Authorization with SNMP Transport
Models
[RFC5608] describes the use of a RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial-In User Service) authentication and authorization service by
SNMP secure Transport Models for authentication of users and
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authorization of secure transport session creation.
The secure transport protocols selected for use with RADIUS and SNMP
need to support user authentication methods that are compatible with
those that exist in RADIUS. Transport Models rely upon the
underlying secure transport for user authentication services. The
SSH protocol provides a secure transport channel with support for
channel authentication via local accounts and integration with
various external authentication and authorization services such as
RADIUS, Kerberos, etc. SSH Server integration with RADIUS
traditionally uses the username and password mechanism.
Service authorization and access control authorization are the use
cases for RADIUS support of management access via SNMP. User
authentication needs to be done prior to each of these use cases.
Service authorization allows a RADIUS server to authorize an
authenticated principal to use SNMP, optionally over a secure
transport, typically using an SNMP Transport Model (see [RFC5608]).
Access control authorization, i.e. how RADIUS attributes and messages
are applied to the specific application area of SNMP Access Control
Models, and VACM in particular is currently being specified in the
Integrated Security Model for SNMP (ISMS) working group.
2.2. SYSLOG Protocol
SYSLOG is a mechanism for distribution of logging information
initially used on Unix systems. IETF documented the status quo of
the BSD SYSLOG protocol in the Informational [RFC3164]. The IETF
SYSLOG protocol [RFC5424] obsoletes [RFC3164] and introduces a
layered architecture allowing the use of any number of transport
protocols, including reliable transports and secure transports, for
transmission of SYSLOG messages.
The content of BSD SYSLOG messages has traditionally been
unstructured natural language text. This content is human-friendly,
but difficult for applications to parse and correlate across vendors,
or correlate with other event reporting such as SNMP traps. The
SYSLOG protocol [RFC5424] includes structured data elements to aid
application-parsing.
The SYSLOG protocol enables a machine to send system log messages
across networks to event message collectors. The protocol is simply
designed to transport and distribute these event messages. No
acknowledgement of the receipt is made. The SYSLOG protocol and
process does not require a stringent coordination between the
transmitters and the receivers. Indeed, the transmission of SYSLOG
messages may be started on a device without a receiver being
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configured, or even actually physically present. Conversely, many
devices will most likely be able to receive messages without explicit
configuration or definitions. This simple approach aided the
deployment of SYSLOG.
BSD SYSLOG had little uniformity for the message format and the
content of SYSLOG messages. The IETF has standardized a new message
header format, including timestamp, hostname, application, and
message ID, to improve filtering, interoperability and correlation
between compliant implementations.
The SYSLOG protocol further introduces a mechanism for defining
Structured Data Elements (SDEs). The SDEs allow vendors to define
their own structured data elements to supplement standardized
elements. [RFC5675] defines a mapping from SNMP notifications to
SYSLOG messages and [RFC5676] defines the corresponding managed
objects for this purpose. [RFC5674] defines the way alarms are sent
in SYSLOG, which includes the mapping of ITU perceived severities
onto SYSLOG message fields and a number of alarm-specific definitions
from ITU-T X.733 and the IETF Alarm MIB.
[RFC5848] "Signed Syslog Messages" defines a mechanism to add origin
authentication, message integrity, replay resistance, message
sequencing, and detection of missing messages to the transmitted
SYSLOG messages to be used in conjunction with the SYSLOG protocol.
The SYSLOG protocol layered architecture provides for support of any
number of transport mappings. However, for interoperability
purposes, SYSLOG protocol implementers are required to support the
transmission of SYSLOG Messages over UDP as defined in [RFC5426].
[RFC3195] describes mappings of the syslog protocol to TCP
connections, useful for reliable delivery of event messages. As such
the specification provides robustness and security in message
delivery with encryption and authentication over a connection-
oriented protocol that is unavailable to the usual UDP-based syslog
protocol.
IETF furthermore defined the TLS transport mapping for SYSLOG in
[RFC5425], which provides a secure connection for the transport of
SYSLOG messages and describes the security threats to SYSLOG and how
TLS can be used to counter such threats. Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) Transport Mapping for SYSLOG is defined in [RFC6012],
which can be used in cases where a connection-less transport is
desired.
IETF working groups are encouraged to standardize structured data
elements, extensible human-friendly text, and consistent facility/
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severity values for SYSLOG to report events specific to their
protocol.
For information on SYSLOG related MIB modules see Section 4.1.
2.3. IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) and Packet Sampling (PSAMP)
Protocols
The IPFIX protocol [RFC5101], IP Flow Information eXport, is a
Proposed Standard, which defines a push-based data export mechanism
for formatting and transferring IP flow information in a compact
binary format from an exporter to a collector.
The IPFIX architecture [RFC5470] defines components involved in IP
flow measurement and reporting of information on IP flows,
particularly, a metering process generating flow records, an
exporting process that sends metered flow information using the IPFIX
protocol, and a colleting process that receives flow information as
IPFIX data records.
The IPFIX protocol and the IPFIX architecture have been specified
following the collected requirements in [RFC3917].
IPFIX can run over different transport protocols. The IPFIX protocol
[RFC5101] specifies SCTP as the mandatory transport protocol to
implement. SCTP is used with its Partial Reliability extension (PR-
SCTP) specified in [RFC3758]. Optional alternatives are TCP and UDP.
[I-D.ietf-ipfix-export-per-sctp-stream] specifies an extension for
IPFIX over SCTP.
IPFIX transmits IP flow information in data records containing IPFIX
Information Elements (IEs) defined by the IPFIX information model
[RFC5102]. IPFIX information elements are quantities with unit and
semantics defined by the information model. When transmitted over
the IPFIX protocol, only their values need to be carried in data
records. This compact encoding allows efficient transport of large
numbers of measured flow values. Remaining redundancy in data
records can be further reduced by methods described in [RFC5473] (for
further discussion on IPFIX IEs see Section 4).
The IPFIX information model is extensible. New information elements
can be registered at IANA (see 'IPFIX Information Elements' in [IANA-
PROT]). IPFIX also supports the use of proprietary, i.e. enterprise-
specific information elements.
The PSAMP protocol [RFC5476] extends the IPFIX protocol by means for
formatting and transferring information on individual packets.
[RFC5475] specifies a set of sampling and filtering techniques for IP
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packet selection and the PSAMP information model [RFC5477] provides a
set of basic information elements for reporting packet information
with the IPFIX/PSAMP protocol.
The IPFIX model of an IP traffic flow is uni-directional. [RFC5103]
adds means to IPFIX for reporting bi-directional flows, for example
both directions of packet flows of a TCP connection.
When enterprise-specific information elements are transmitted with
IPFIX, a collector receiving data records may not know the type of
received data and cannot choose the right format for storing the
contained information. [RFC5610] provides means for providing type
information of enterprise-specific information Elements from an
exporter to a collector.
Collectors may store received flow information in files. The IPFIX
file format [RFC5655] can be used for storing IP flow information in
a way that facilitates exchange of traffic flow information between
different systems and applications.
At the time of this writing a framework for IPFIX flow mediation is
in preparation, which addresses the need for mediation of flow
information in IPFIX applications in large operator networks, e.g.
for aggregating huge amounts of flow data and for anonymization of
flow information (see the problem statement in [RFC5982]).
The IPFIX Mediation Framework defines the intermediate device between
exporters and collectors, which provides an IPFIX mediation by
receiving a record stream from e.g. a collecting process, hosting one
or more intermediate processes to transform this stream, and
exporting the transformed record stream into IPFIX messages via an
exporting process [I-D.ietf-ipfix-mediators-framework].
Examples for mediation functions are flow aggregation, flow selection
[I-D.ietf-ipfix-flow-selection-tech], and anonymization of traffic
information [I-D.ietf-ipfix-anon].
Privacy, integrity, and authentication of exporter and collector are
important security requirements for IPFIX [RFC3917]. The IPFIX and
PSAMP protocol do not define any new security mechanisms, but rely on
security mechanisms of the underlying protocols, such as, for
example, TLS [RFC5246] and DTLS [RFC4347] [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-dtls-for-
sctp].
Several applications such as usage-based accounting, traffic
profiling, traffic engineering, intrusion detection, and QoS
monitoring, that require flow-based traffic measurements can be
realized using IPFIX.
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With further information elements, IPFIX can also be applied to
monitoring application-level protocols, for example, SIP [RFC3261]
and related media transfer protocols. Requirements to such a
monitoring on the application level include measuring signaling
quality (e.g., session request delay, session completion ratio, or
hops for request), media QoS (e.g., jitter, delay or bit rate), and
user experience (e.g., Mean Opinion Score).
Note that even if the initial IPFIX focus has been around IP flow
information exchange, non IP-related information elements are now
specified in IPFIX IANA registration (e.g. MAC address, MPLS labels,
etc.). At the time of this writing, there are requests to widen the
focus of IPFIX and to export also non-IP related information elements
(such as SIP monitoring IEs).
For information on IPFIX/PSAMP related data models see Section 4.1
and Section 4.2.
2.4. Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)
The IAB workshop on Network Management [RFC3535] determined advanced
requirements for configuration management:
o Robustness: Minimizing disruptions and maximizing stability,
o Support of task-oriented view,
o Extensible for new operations,
o Standardized error handling,
o Clear distinction between configuration data and operational
state,
o Distribution of configurations to devices under transactional
constraints,
o Single and multi-system transactions and scalability in the number
of transactions and managed devices,
o Operations on selected subsets of management data,
o Dump and reload a device configuration in a textual format in a
standard manner across multiple vendors and device types,
o Support a human interface and a programmatic interface,
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o Data modeling language with a human friendly syntax,
o Easy conflict detection and configuration validation, and
o Secure transport, authentication, and robust access control.
The NETCONF protocol [RFC4741] is a Proposed Standard that provides
mechanisms to install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of
network devices and aims to address the advanced configuration
management requirements pointed in the IAB workshop. It uses an
Extensible Markup Language (XML)-based data encoding for the
configuration data as well as the protocol messages. The NETCONF
protocol operations are realized on top of a simple and reliable
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) layer.
A key aspect of NETCONF is that it allows the functionality of the
management protocol to closely mirror the native command line
interface of the device. In addition, applications can access both
the syntactic and semantic content of the device's native user
interface.
NETCONF working group developed the NETCONF Event Notifications
Mechanism as an optional capability, which provides an asynchronous
message notification delivery service for NETCONF [RFC5277]. NETCONF
notification mechanism enables using general purpose notification
streams, which can also transport alarms from other sources, where
the originator of the notification stream can be any managed device
(e.g. SNMP alarms).
NETCONF Partial Locking introduces fine-grained locking of the
configuration datastore to enhance NETCONF for fine-grained
transactions on parts of the datastore [RFC5717].
NETCONF working group also defined the necessary data model to
monitor the NETCONF protocol by using YANG [RFC6022] (see
Section 4.1).
NETCONF working group defined SSH transport binding as the mandatory
secure transport of its RPC messages [RFC4742]. Other optional
secure transport bindings are available for TLS [RFC5539], BEEP (over
TLS) [RFC4744], and SOAP (over HTTP over TLS) [RFC4743]. There is an
implementation available using NETCONF over SOAP as a Web Service
[RFC5381].
Currently NETCONF working group is focusing on bug fixing of the
NETCONF base protocol standard [I-D.draft-ietf-netconf-4741bis] and
the SSH transport protocol mapping [I-D.draft-ietf-netconf-4742bis]
as well as the specification of the NETCONF Access Control Model
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(NACM). NACM is going to provide a secure operating environment for
NETCONF and proposes standard mechanisms to restrict protocol access
to particular users with a pre-configured subset of operations and
content.
2.4.1. YANG - NETCONF Data Modeling Language
Following the guideline and requests of the IAB management workshop
[RFC3535], the NETMOD working group developed a data modeling
language defining the semantics of operational and configuration
data, notifications, and operations [RFC6020]. The new data modeling
language maps directly to XML encoded content (on the wire) and will
serve as the normative description of NETCONF data models.
YANG has following properties addressing specific requirements on a
modeling language for configuration management:
o YANG provides the means to define hierarchical data models. It
supports reusable data types and groupings, i.e., a set of schema
nodes that can be reused across module boundaries.
o YANG supports the distinction between configuration and state
data. In addition, it provides support for modeling event
notifications and the specification of operations that extend the
base NETCONF operations.
o YANG allows to express constraints on data models by means of type
restrictions and XPATH 1.0 [XPATH] expressions. XPATH expressions
can also be used to make certain portions of a data model
conditional.
o YANG supports the integration of standard and vendor defined data
models. YANG's augmentation mechanism allows to seamlessly
augment standard data models with proprietary extensions.
o YANG data models can be partitioned into collections of features,
allowing low-end devices to only implement the core features of a
data model while high-end devices may choose to support all
features. The supported features are announced via the NETCONF
capability exchange to management applications.
o The syntax of the YANG language is compact and optimized for human
readers. An associated XML-based syntax called the YANG
Independent Notation (YIN) [RFC6020] is available to allow the
processing of YANG data models with XML-based tools. The mapping
rules for the translation of YANG data models into Document Schema
Definition Languages (DSDL), of which Relax NG is a major
component, are defined in [I-D.draft-ietf-netmod-dsdl-map].
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o Devices implementing standard data models can document deviations
from the data model in separate YANG modules. Applications
capable of discovering deviations can make allowances that would
otherwise not be possible.
A collection of common data types for IETF-related standards is
provided in [RFC6021]. This standard data type library has been
derived to a large extend from common SMIv2 data types, generalizing
them to a less constrained NETCONF framework where necessary.
The document "An Architecture for Network Management using NETCONF
and YANG" describes how NETCONF and YANG can be used to build network
management applications that meet the needs of network operators
[I-D.draft-ietf-netmod-arch].
The Experimental RFC [I-D.draft-linowski-netmod-yang-abstract]
specifies extensions for YANG introducing language abstractions such
as class inheritance and recursive data structures.
Work is underway to standardize a translation of SMIv2 data models
into YANG data models, which preserves investments into SNMP MIB
modules, which are widely available for monitoring purposes.
Several independent and open source implementations of the YANG data
modeling language and associated tools are available. The IETF has
also developed guidelines [I-D.draft-ietf-netmod-yang-usage] for the
use of YANG within standardization organizations such as the IETF.
While YANG is a relatively recent language, some data models have
already been produced. IPFIX working group prepared the normative
model for configuring and monitoring IPFIX and PSAMP compliant
monitoring devices using the YANG modeling language
[I-D.draft-ietf-ipfix-configuration-model]. The specification of the
base NETCONF protocol operations has been revised and uses YANG as
the normative modeling language to specify its operations
[I-D.draft-ietf-netconf-4741bis].
At the time of this writing NETMOD working group is developing core
system and interface data models. Following the example of IPFIX
configuration model, working groups at IETF will prepare models for
their specific needs.
3. Management Protocols and Mechanisms with specific Focus
This section reviews additional protocols IETF offers for management
and discusses for which applications they were designed and/or
already successfully deployed. These are protocols that have mostly
reached Proposed Standard status or higher within the IETF.
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3.1. IP Address Management with Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCP)
The Draft Standard Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
[RFC2131] was defined as an extension to BOOTP (Bootstrap Protocol)
[RFC0951]. DHCP provides a framework for passing configuration
information to hosts on a TCP/IP network and enables as such auto-
configuration in IP networks. In addition to IP address management,
DHCP can also provide other configuration information, particularly
the IP addresses of local caching DNS resolvers or servers providing
servers. As described in [I-D.baker-ietf-core] DHCP can be used for
IPv4 and IPv6 Address Allocation and Assignment as well as Service
Discovery.
There are two versions of DHCP, one for IPv4 [RFC2131] and one for
IPv6 [RFC3315]. While both versions bear the same name and perform
much the same purpose, the details of the protocol for IPv4 and IPv6
are sufficiently different that they can be considered separate
protocols.
Following are examples, where DHCP options have been used to provide
configuration information or access to specific servers.
o [RFC3646] describes two DHCPv6 options for passing a list of
available DNS recursive name servers and a domain search list to a
client.
o [RFC2610] describes how entities using the Service Location
Protocol can find out the address of Directory Agents in order to
transact messages and how the assignment of scope for
configuration of SLP User and Service Agents can be achieved.
o [RFC3319] specifies two DHCPv6 options that allow SIP clients to
locate a local SIP server that is to be used for all outbound SIP
requests, a so-called outbound proxy server.
o [RFC4280] defines new options to discover the Broadcast and
Multicast Service (BCMCS) controller in an IP network.
3.2. IPv6 Network Operations
The IPv6 Operations Working Group (v6ops) develops guidelines for the
operation of a shared IPv4/IPv6 Internet and provides operational
guidance on how to deploy IPv6 into existing IPv4-only networks, as
well as into new network installations.
o The Proposed Standard [RFC4213] specifies IPv4 compatibility
mechanisms for dual stack and configured tunneling that can be
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implemented by IPv6 hosts and routers. Dual stack implies
providing complete implementations of both IPv4 and IPv6, and
configured tunneling provides a means to carry IPv6 packets over
unmodified IPv4 routing infrastructures.
o [RFC3574] lists different scenarios in 3GPP defined packet network
that would need IPv6 and IPv4 transition, where [RFC4215] does a
more detailed analysis of the transition scenarios that may come
up in the deployment phase of IPv6 in 3GPP packet networks.
o [RFC4029] describes and analyzes different scenarios for the
introduction of IPv6 into an ISP's existing IPv4 network.
[RFC5181] provides a detailed description of IPv6 deployment,
integration methods and scenarios in wireless broadband access
networks (802.16) in coexistence with deployed IPv4 services.
[RFC4057] describes the scenarios for IPv6 deployment within
enterprise networks.
o [RFC4038] specifies scenarios and application aspects of IPv6
transition considering how to enable IPv6 support in applications
running on IPv6 hosts, and giving guidance for the development of
IP version-independent applications.
NOTE: Additional input needed.
3.3. Policy-based Management
3.3.1. IETF Policy Framework
IETF specified a general policy framework [RFC2753] for managing,
sharing, and reusing policies in a vendor independent, interoperable,
and scalable manner. [RFC3460] specifies the Policy Core Information
Model (PCIM), an object-oriented information model for representing
policy information developed jointly in the IETF Policy Framework
working group and as extensions to the Common Information Model (CIM)
activity in the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF) [DMTF-CIM].
The policy framework is based on a policy-based admission control
specifying two main architectural elements, the Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) and the Policy Decision Point (PDP). For the purpose of
network management, policies allow an operator to specify how the
network is to be configured and monitored by using a descriptive
language. Furthermore, it allows the automation of a number of
management tasks, according to the requirements set out in the policy
module.
IETF Policy Framework has been accepted by the industry as a
standard-based policy approach and has been adopted by different SDOs
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e.g. for 3GGP charging standards.
3.3.2. Common Open Policy Service (COPS) and COPS Usage for Policy
Provisioning (COPS-PR)
[RFC3159] defines the Structure of Policy Provisioning Information
(SPPI), an extension to the SMI modeling language used to write
Policy Information Base (PIB) modules. COPS-PR [RFC3084] uses the
Common Open Policy Service (COPS) protocol [RFC2748] for provisioning
of policy information. The COPS-PR specification is independent of
the type of policy being provisioned (QoS, Security, etc.) but
focuses on the mechanisms and conventions used to communicate
provisioned information between policy-decision-points (PDPs) and
policy enforcement points (PEPs). Policy data is modeled using
Policy Information Base modules (PIB modules).
COPS-PR has not been widely deployed, and operators have stated that
its use of binary encoding (BER) for management data makes it
difficult to develop automated scripts for simple configuration
management tasks in most text-based scripting languages. In the IAB
Workshop on Network Management [RFC3535], the consensus of operators
and protocol developers indicated a lack of interest in PIB modules
for use with COPS-PR.
As a result, even if COPS-PR and the Structure of Policy Provisioning
Information (SPPI) were initially approved as Proposed Standards, the
IESG has not approved any policy models (PIB modules) as IETF
standard, and the use of COPS-PR is not recommended.
3.4. IP Performance Metrics (IPPM)
The IPPM working group has defined metrics for accurately measuring
and reporting the quality, performance, and reliability of Internet
data delivery. The metrics include connectivity, one-way delay and
loss, round-trip delay and loss, delay variation, loss patterns,
packet reordering, bulk transport capacity, and link bandwidth
capacity.
These metrics are designed for use by network operators and their
customers, and provide unbiased quantitative measures of performance.
The IPPM metrics have been developed inside an active measurement
context, that is, the devices used to measure the metrics produce
their own traffic. However, most of the metrics can be used inside a
passive context as well. At the time of this writing there is no
work planned in the area of passive measurement.
The main properties of individual IPPM performance and reliability
metrics are that the metrics should be well-defined and concrete thus
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implementable, and they should exhibit no bias for IP clouds
implemented with identical technology. In addition, the methodology
used to implement a metric should have the property of being
repeatable with consistent measurements.
IETF IP Performance Metrics have been introduced widely in the
industry and adopted by different SDOs such as the Metro Ethernet
Forum.
Following are examples of essential IPPM documents published as
Proposed Standard:
o IPPM Framework document [RFC2330] defines a general framework for
particular metrics developed by IPPM working group and defines the
fundamental concepts of 'metric' and 'measurement methodology' and
discusses the issue of measurement uncertainties and errors as
well as introduces the notion of empirically defined metrics and
how metrics can be composed.
o One-way Delay Metric for IPPM [RFC2679] defines a metric for one-
way delay of packets across Internet paths. It builds on notions
introduced in the IPPM Framework document.
o Round-trip Delay Metric for IPPM [RFC2681] defines a metric for
round-trip delay of packets across network paths and follows
closely the corresponding metric for One-way Delay.
o IP Packet Delay Variation Metric [RFC3393] refers to a metric for
variation in delay of packets across network paths and is based on
the difference in the One-Way-Delay of selected packets called "IP
Packet Delay Variation (ipdv)".
o One-way Packet Loss Metric for IPPM [RFC2680] defines a metric for
one-way packet loss across Internet paths.
o One-Way Packet Duplication Metric [RFC5560] defines a metric for
the case, where multiple copies of a packet are received and
discusses methods to summarize the results of streams.
o Packet Reordering Metrics [RFC4737] defines metrics to evaluate
whether a network has maintained packet order on a packet-by-
packet basis and discusses the measurement issues, including the
context information required for all metrics.
o IPPM Metrics for Measuring Connectivity [RFC2678] defines a series
of metrics for connectivity between a pair of Internet hosts.
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o Framework for Metric Composition [RFC5835] describes a detailed
framework for composing and aggregating metrics.
Next to the metrics, two protocols to measure these metrics have been
standardized:
o A One-way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) [RFC4656] measures
unidirectional characteristics such as one-way delay and one-way
loss between network devices and enables the interoperability of
these measurements.
o A Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) [RFC5357] adds
round-trip or two-way measurement capabilities to OWAMP.
o [RFC3432] 'Network performance measurement with Periodic Streams'
describes a periodic sampling method and relevant metrics for
assessing the performance of IP networks, as an alternative to the
Poisson sampling method described in [RFC2330].
For the "Information Model and XML Data Model for Traceroute
Measurements [RFC5388] and [BCP108] "IP Performance Metrics (IPPM)
Metrics Registry" (see Section 4.4).
3.5. Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)
RADIUS [RFC2865], the Remote Authentication Dial In User Service, is
a Draft Standard that describes a client/server protocol for carrying
authentication, authorization, and configuration information between
a Network Access Server (NAS), which desires to authenticate its
links and a shared Authentication Server. The companion document
[RFC2866] 'Radius Accounting' describes a protocol for carrying
accounting information between a network access server and a shared
accounting server. [RFC2867] adds required new RADIUS accounting
attributes and new values designed to support the provision of
tunneling in dial-up networks.
RADIUS protocol is widely implemented and is used in environments
like enterprise networks, where a single administrative authority
manages the network, and protects the privacy of user information.
RADIUS also has a strong position in fixed broadband access provider
networks and well as in certain cellular broadband operators'
networks.
RADIUS is extensible with a known limitation of maximum 255 attribute
codes and 253 octets as attribute content length. RADIUS has Vendor-
Specific Attributes (VSA), which have been used both for vendor-
specific purposes as an addition to standardized attributes as well
as to extend the limited attribute code space. IETF has been working
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on for a solution to extend the attribute space beyond 255 and
allowing attributes longer than 253 octets. A recent proposal
[I-D.dekok-radext-radius-extensions] would extend the 'conventional'
attribute space up to ~1000 attributes and add another ~500 'long'
attributes with a length bound by the RADIUS packet size. As side
product, the attribute extension also introduces a new RADIUS
attribute type Type-Length-Value (TLV) in a similar fashion as
Diameter AVPs (see [RFC3588]). TLVs allow grouping and nesting of
attributes in a similar way as Diameter Grouped AVPs.
The RADIUS protocol uses a shared secret along with the MD5 hashing
algorithm to secure passwords. Based on the known threads additional
protection like IPsec tunnels are used to further protect the RADIUS
traffic. However, building and administering large IPsec protected
networks may become a management burden, especially when IPsec
protected RADIUS infrastructure should provide inter-provider
connectivity. A trend has been moving towards TLS-based security
solutions and establishing dynamic trust relationships between RADIUS
servers. Once TCP transport was introduced to RADIUS, it became
natural to have a TLS support for RADIUS [I-D.ietf-radext-radsec].
In addition to TLS-based security for TCP transport, the UDP
transport also has Datagram TLS (DTLS) based security solution
[I-D.ietf-radext-dtls].
Once the 'flavors' of different RADIUS servers/proxies increase, a
mechanism to discover RADIUS servers/proxies dynamically in a desired
realm based on their transport and security properties becomes
topical. A DNS based dynamic discovery, equivalent to DIAMETER
[RFC3588], is under development [I-D.ietf-radext-dynamic-discovery].
Naturally, piggy-packing RADIUS realm information in DNS
infrastructure would add a new area for general management and
administration. This is specifically something new as, for example,
previously RADIUS realm and realm-based routing information has been
completely separate from DNS namespace.
[RFC2868] 'RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol Support' defines a
number of RADIUS attributes designed to support the provision
compulsory of tunneling in dial-up network access. Some applications
involve compulsory tunneling i.e. the tunnel is created without any
action from the user and without allowing the user any choice in the
matter. In order to provide this functionality, specific RADIUS
attributes are needed to carry the tunneling information from the
RADIUS server to the tunnel end points. RFC 3868 defines those
attributes, attribute values and the required IANA registries.
[RFC3162] 'RADIUS and IPv6' specifies the operation of RADIUS over
IPv6 and the RADIUS attributes used to support the IPv6 network
access. [RFC4818] describes how to transport delegated IPv6 prefix
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information over RADIUS
[RFC4675] 'RADIUS Attributes for Virtual LAN and Priority Support'
defines additional attributes for dynamic Virtual LAN assignment and
prioritization, for use in provisioning of access to IEEE 802 local
area networks usable with RADIUS and Diameter.
[RFC5080] 'Common RADIUS Implementation Issues and Suggested Fixes'
describes common issues seen in RADIUS implementations and suggests
some fixes. Where applicable, unclear statements and errors in
previous RADIUS specifications are clarified. People designing
extensions to RADIUS protocol for various deployment cases should get
familiar with RADIUS Design Guidelines [I-D.ietf-radext-design] in
order to avoid e.g. known interoperability challenges.
[RFC5090] 'RADIUS Extension for Digest Authentication' defines an
extension to the RADIUS protocol to enable support of Digest
Authentication, for use with HTTP-style protocols like the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) and HTTP.
[RFC5580] 'Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and Diameter describes
procedures for conveying access-network ownership and location
information based on civic and geospatial location formats in RADIUS
and Diameter.
[RFC5607] specifies required RADIUS attributes and their values for
authorizing a management access to a NAS. Both local and remote
management are supported, with access rights and management
privileges. Specific provisions are made for remote management via
Framed Management protocols, such as SNMP and NETCONF, and for
management access over a secure transport protocols.
[RFC3579] describes how to use RADIUS to convey EAP payload between
the authenticator and the EAP server using RADIUS. RFC3579 is widely
implemented, for example, in WLAN and 802.1X environment. [RFC3580]
describes how to use RADIUS with IEEE 802.1X authenticators. In the
context of 802.1X and EAP-based authentication, the Vendor Specific
Attributes described in [RFC2458] have been widely accepted by the
industry. [RFC2869] 'RADIUS extensions' is another important RFC
related to EAP use. RFC2869 describes additional attributes for
carrying AAA information between a NAS and a shared Accounting Server
using RADIUS. It also defines attributes to encapsulate EAP message
payload.
There are an extensive number of MIB modules defined for multiple
purposes to use with RADIUS (see Section 4.3 and Section 4.5 ).
RADIUS is catching up DIAMETER (see [RFC3588]) functionality wise.
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However, it should be noted that newly introduced features such as
TCP-based transport, extended attributes or new security features are
not yet widely implemented, and are unlikely to be upgraded to the
deployed legacy in a near future.
3.6. Diameter Base Protocol (DIAMETER)
DIAMETER [RFC3588] is a Proposed Standard that provides an
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) framework for
applications such as network access or IP mobility. DIAMETER is also
intended to work in local Authentication, Authorization, Accounting
situations and in roaming situations. DIAMETER is not directly
backwards compatible, but provides an upgrade path for RADIUS.
DIAMETER is designed to resolve a number of known problems with
RADIUS. DIAMETER supports server failover, reliable transport over
TCP and SCTP, well documented functions for proxy, redirect and relay
agent functions, server-initiated messages, auditability, and
capability negotiation. DIAMETER also provides a larger attribute
space for Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) and identifiers than RADIUS.
DIAMETER features make it especially appropriate for environments,
where the providers of services are in different administrative
domains than the maintainer (protector) of confidential user
information.
Other important differences to RADIUS (as defined in [RFC2865]) are:
o Use of reliable transport protocols (TCP or SCTP, not UDP),
o Network and transport layer security (IPsec or TLS),
o Stateful and stateless models,
o Dynamic discovery of peers (using DNS SRV and NAPTR),
o Concept of an application that describes how a specific set of
commands and Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) are treated by DIAMETER
nodes. Each application has an IANA assigned unique identifier,
o Supports application layer acknowledgements, defines failover
methods and state machines [RFC3539] ??? ,
o Error notification,
o Better roaming support,
o Easier to extend, and
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o Basic support for user-sessions and accounting.
The protocol is designed to be extensible to support e.g. proxies,
brokers, mobility and roaming, Network Access Servers (NASREQ), and
Accounting and Resource Management. DIAMETER applications extend the
DIAMETER base protocol by adding new commands and/or attributes.
Each application is defined by an unique IANA assigned application
identifier and can add new command codes and/or new mandatory AVPs.
The DIAMETER application identifier space has been divided into
Standards Track and First Come First Served vendor-specific
applications. Following are the current Standards Track, IETF
defined, DIAMETER applications:
o Diameter Base Protocol Application [RFC3588],
o Diameter Base Accounting Application [RFC3588],
o Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application [RFC4004],
o Diameter Network Access Server Application (NASREQ, [RFC4005]),
o Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol Application [RFC4072],
o Diameter Credit-Control Application [RFC4006],
o Diameter Session Initiation Protocol Application [RFC4740], and
o Diameter Quality-of-Service Application [RFC5866].
o Diameter Mobile IPv6 IKE (MIP6I) Application [RFC5778].
o Diameter Mobile IPv6 Auth (MIP6A) Application [RFC5778].
o Diameter Relay Agent Application [RFC3588].
The large majority of DIAMETER applications are vendor-specific and
mainly used in various Standards Development Organizations (SDO)
outside IETF. One example of an important SDO extensively using
DIAMETER is 3GPP. For example the whole 3GPP IP Multimedia Subsystem
(IMS) uses DIAMETER based interfaces (e.g. Cx) [3GPPIMS]. Recently,
during the standardization of the 3GPP Evolved Packet Core, DIAMETER
was chosen as the only AAA signaling protocol.
One part of the DIAMETER extensibility mechanism is an easy and
consistent way of creating new commands for applications need.
RFC3588 proposes 'IETF Consensus' as the IANA policy for the DIAMETER
command code allocations, which requires an RFC to pass through the
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IETF publication process. This policy decision caused undesired use
and redefinition of existing Commands Codes within SDOs. Secondly,
diverse RFCs have been published as simple command code allocations
for other SDO purposes (see [RFC3589], [RFC5224], [RFC5431] and
[RFC5516]). Later, the Command Code IANA policy has been changed in
[RFC5719], which added a range for vendor-specific Command Codes with
a First Come First Served policy.
The implementation and deployment experience of DIAMETER has led to
the development of an update of the Base protocol (RFC3588bis)
[I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. One of the major changes is making
transport layer security (TLS) as the preferred security mechanism
and deprecating the in-band security negotiation for TLS.
Some DIAMETER extensions and clarifications that logically would fit
better into RFC3588bis are also needed on the existing RFC3588 based
deployments. Therefore, some extensions specifically usable in large
inter-provider roaming network settlements are made available for
both RFC3588 (updates) and RFC3588bis (part of the document set):
o 'Clarifications on the Routing of Diameter Requests Based on the
Username and the Realm' [RFC5729] defines the behavior required
for DIAMETER agents to route requests when the User-Name AVP
contains a Network Access Identifier formatted with multiple
realms. These multi-realm Network Access Identifiers are used in
order to force the routing of request messages through a
predefined list of mediating realms.
o 'Diameter Extended NAPTR' [I-D.ietf-dime-extended-naptr] describes
an improved DNS-based dynamic DIAMETER Agent discovery mechanism.
Using an extended format for the Straightforward-NAPTR (S-NAPTR)
Application Service Tag allows a DNS-based discovery of DIAMETER
agents of the supported applications without doing DIAMETER
capability exchange beforehand with a number of agents.
Experience has shown, that it is hard for IETF to develop DIAMETER
applications that actually get adopted and deployed by other SDOs.
As a result, there has been a growing number of IETF defined DIAMETER
framework documents that basically are just a collection of AVPs for
a specific purpose or system architecture with semantical AVP
descriptions and logic for "imaginary" applications. It is not
entirely clear whether such practice is worthwhile in the long run.
From IETF point of view, this practice allows the development of
larger 'system architecture' documents that do not need to reference
AVPs or application logic outside IETF. Below are examples of few
recent AVP and framework documents:
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o 'Diameter Mobile IPv6: Support for Network Access Server to
Diameter Server Interaction' [RFC5447] describes the bootstrapping
of the Mobile IPv6 framework and the support of interworking with
existing Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)
infrastructures by using the DIAMETER Network Access Server to
home AAA server interface.
o 'Traffic Classification and Quality of Service (QoS) Attributes
for Diameter' [RFC5777] defines a number of DIAMETER AVPs for
traffic classification with actions for filtering and Quality of
Service (QoS) treatment.
o 'Diameter Proxy Mobile IPv6: Mobile Access Gateway and Local
Mobility Anchor Interaction with Diameter Server' [RFC5779]
defines AAA interactions between Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6)
entities (both Mobile Access Gateway and Local Mobility Anchor)
and a AAA server within a PMIPv6 Domain. These AAA interactions
are primarily used to download and update mobile node specific
policy profile information between PMIPv6 entities and a remote
policy store.
For information on DIAMETER related MIB modules see Section 4.5.
3.7. Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP)
Wireless LAN product architectures have evolved from single
autonomous access points to systems consisting of a centralized
Access Controller (AC) and Wireless Termination Points (WTPs). The
general goal of centralized control architectures is to move access
control, including user authentication and authorization, mobility
management, and radio management from the single access point to a
centralized controller.
Based on the CAPWAP Architecture Taxonomy work [RFC4118] CAPWAP
working group developed the CAPWAP protocol to facilitate control,
management and provisioning of WLAN Termination Points (WTPs)
specifying the services, functions and resources relating to 802.11
WLAN Termination Points in order to allow for interoperable
implementations of WTPs and ACs. The protocol defines the CAPWAP
control plane including the primitives to control data access. The
protocol document also specifies how configuration management of WTPs
can be done and defines CAPWAP operations responsible for debugging,
gathering statistics, logging, and firmware management as well as
discusses operational and transport considerations.
CAPWAP protocol is prepared to be independent of Layer 2
technologies, and meets the objectives in "Objectives for Control and
Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP)" [RFC4564]. Separate
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binding extensions enable the use with additional wireless
technologies. [RFC5416] defines CAPWAP Protocol Binding for IEEE
802.11.
For information on CAPWAP related MIB modules see Section 4.2.
3.8. Access Node Control Protocol (ANCP)
The Access Node Control Protocol (ANCP) [I-D.ietf-ancp-protocol]
realizes a control plane between a service-oriented layer 3 edge
device (the Network Access Server, NAS) and a layer 2 Access Node
(e.g., Digital Subscriber Line Access Module, DSLAM). As such ANCP
operates in a multi-service reference architecture and communicates
QoS-, service- and subscriber-related configurations and operations
between a NAS and an Access Node.
The main goal of this protocol is to configure and manage access
equipments and allow them to report information to the NAS in order
to enable and optimize configuration.
Framework and Requirements for an Access Node Control Mechanism and
the use cases for ANCP are documented in [RFC5851]. Security Threats
and Security Requirements for ANCP are discussed in [RFC5713].
3.9. Ad-Hoc Network Autoconfiguration
Ad-hoc nodes need to configure their network interfaces with locally
unique addresses as well as globally routable IPv6 addresses, in
order to communicate with devices on the Internet. AUTOCONF working
group developed [RFC5889], which describes the addressing model for
ad-hoc networks and how nodes in these networks configure their
addresses.
The ad-hoc nodes under consideration are expected to be able to
support multi-hop communication by running MANET routing protocols as
developed by the IETF MANET working group.
From the IP layer perspective, an ad hoc network presents itself as a
layer 3 multi-hop network formed over a collection of links. The
addressing model aims to avoid problems for ad-hoc-unaware parts of
the system, such as standard applications running on an ad-hoc node
or regular Internet nodes attached to the ad-hoc nodes.
3.10. Application Configuration Access Protocol (ACAP)
The Application Configuration Access Protocol (ACAP) [RFC2244] is a
Proposed Standard protocol designed to support remote storage and
access of program option, configuration and preference information.
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The data store model is designed to allow a client relatively simple
access to interesting data, to allow new information to be easily
added without server re-configuration, and to promote the use of both
standardized data and custom or proprietary data. Key features
include "inheritance" which can be used to manage default values for
configuration settings and access control lists which allow
interesting personal information to be shared and group information
to be restricted.
ACAP's primary purpose is to allow users access to their
configuration data from multiple network-connected computers. Users
can then use any network-connected computer, run any ACAP-enabled
application and have access to their own configuration data. To
enable wide usage client simplicity has been preferred to server or
protocol simplicity whenever reasonable.
3.11. XML Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)
The Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol
(XCAP) [RFC4825] is a Proposed Standard protocol that allows a client
to read, write, and modify application configuration data stored in
XML format on a server.
XCAP is a protocol that can be used to manipulate per-user data.
XCAP is a set of conventions for mapping XML documents and document
components into HTTP URIs, rules for how the modification of one
resource affects another, data validation constraints, and
authorization policies associated with access to those resources.
Because of this structure, normal HTTP primitives can be used to
manipulate the data. XCAP is meant to support the configuration
needs for a multiplicity of applications, rather than just a single
one.
3.12. Extensible Provision Protocol (EPP)
The Extensible Provision Protocol [RFC5730] is a Full Standard
[STD69] that describes an application layer client-server protocol
for the provisioning and management of objects stored in a shared
central repository. EPP permits multiple service providers to
perform object provisioning operations using a shared central object
repository, and addresses the requirements for a generic registry
registrar protocol.
EPP is specified in XML and defines generic object management
operations and an extensible framework that maps protocol operations
to objects. EPP is a stateful XML protocol that can be layered over
multiple transport protocols. Protected using lower-layer security
protocols, clients exchange identification, authentication, and
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option information, and then engage in a series of client-initiated
command-response exchanges.
EPP has been adopted by numerous domain name registries mainly for
the communication between domain name registries and domain name
registrars and for allocating objects within registries over the
Internet.
4. Proposed, Draft and Standard Level Data Models
This section lists management data models standardized at IETF, which
can be reused and applied to different solutions. The different data
models covered in this section are MIB modules, IPFIX Information
Elements, Syslog Structured Data Elements, and YANG modules.
Management data models have a slightly different interpretation for
interoperability. This is discussed in detail in [BCP27]
"Advancement of MIB specifications on the IETF Standards Track"
[RFC2438] with special considerations about the advancement process
for management data models. However most IETF management data models
never advance beyond Proposed Standard.
This section discusses management data models that have reached
Proposed Standard status at the IETF. In exceptional cases important
Informational RFCs are referred.
4.1. Fault Management
Draft Standards:
[RFC3418], part of SNMPv3 standard [STD62], contains objects in the
system group that are often polled to determine if a device is still
operating, and sysUpTime can be used to detect if a system has
rebooted, and counters have been reinitialized.
[RFC3413], part of SNMPv3 standard [STD62], includes objects designed
for managing notifications, including tables for addressing, retry
parameters, security, lists of targets for notifications, and user
customization filters.
An RMON monitor [RFC2819] can be configured to recognize conditions,
most notably error conditions, and continuously to check for them.
When one of these conditions occurs, the event may be logged, and
management stations may be notified in a number of ways (for further
discussion on RMON see Section 4.4).
Proposed Standards:
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DISMAN-EVENT-MIB in [RFC2981] and DISMAN-EXPRESSION-MIB in [RFC2982]
provide a superset of the capabilities of the RMON alarm and event
groups. These modules provide mechanisms for thresholding and
reporting anomalous events to management applications.
The ALARM MIB in [RFC3877] and the Alarm Reporting Control MIB in
[RFC3878] specify mechanisms for expressing state transition models
for persistent problem states.
ALARM MIB defines:
- a mechanism for expressing state transition models for persistent
problem states,
- a mechanism to correlate a notification with subsequent state
transition notifications about the same entity/object, and
- a generic alarm reporting mechanism (extends ITU-T work X.733 [ITU-
X733).
[RFC3878] in particular defines objects for controlling the reporting
of alarm conditions and extends ITU-T work M.3100 Amendment 3 [ITU-
M3100].
Other MIB modules that may be applied to fault management with SNMP
include:
o NOTIFICATION-LOG-MIB [RFC3014] describes managed objects used for
logging SNMP Notifications.
o ENTITY-STATE-MIB [RFC4268] describes extensions to the Entity MIB
to provide information about the state of physical entities.
o ENTITY-SENSOR-MIB [RFC3433] describes managed objects for
extending the Entity MIB to provide generalized access to
information related to physical sensors, which are often found in
networking equipment (such as chassis temperature, fan RPM, power
supply voltage).
The SYSLOG protocol document defines an initial set of Structured
Data Elements (SDEs) that relate to content time quality, content
origin, and meta-information about the message, such as language.
Proprietary SDEs can be used to supplement the IETF-defined SDEs.
The IETF has standardized MIB Textual-Conventions for facility and
severity labels and codes to encourage consistency between SYSLOG and
MIB representations of these event properties [RFC5427]. The intent
is that these textual conventions will be imported and used in MIB
modules that would otherwise define their own representations.
An IPFIX MIB module [RFC5815] has been defined for monitoring IPFIX
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meters, exporters and collectors (see Section 2.3). The PSAMP MIB
module (work ongoing) extends the IPFIX MIB modules by managed
objects for monitoring PSAMP implementations.
NETCONF working group defined the necessary data model to monitor the
NETCONF protocol with the modeling language YANG [RFC6022]. The
monitoring data model includes information about NETCONF datastores,
sessions, locks, and statistics, which facilitate the management of a
NETCONF server. NETCONF monitoring RFC also defines methods for
NETCONF clients to discover the data models supported by a NETCONF
server and defines the operation <get-schema> to retrieve them.
4.2. Configuration Management
It is expected that standard XML-based data models will be developed
for use with NETCONF, and working groups might identify specific
NETCONF data models that would be applicable to the new protocol.
MIB modules for monitoring of network configuration (e.g. for
physical and logical network topologies) already exist and provide
some of the desired capabilities. New MIB modules might be developed
for the target functionality to allow operators to monitor and modify
the operational parameters, such as timer granularity, event
reporting thresholds, target addresses, and so on.
Draft standards:
[RFC3418] contains objects in the system group useful e.g. for
identifying the type of device, the location of the device, the
person responsible for the device. [RFC3413], part of STD 62 SNMPv3,
includes objects designed for configuring notification destinations,
and for configuring proxy- forwarding SNMP agents, which can be used
to forward messages through firewalls and NAT devices.
The Interfaces MIB [RFC2863] is used for managing Network Interfaces.
This includes the 'interfaces' group of MIB-II and discusses the
experience gained from the definition of numerous media-specific MIB
modules for use in conjunction with the 'interfaces' group for
managing various sub-layers beneath the internetwork-layer.
Proposed standards:
The Entity MIB [RFC4133] is used for managing multiple logical and
physical entities managed by a single SNMP agent. This module
provides a useful mechanism for identifying the entities comprising a
system. There are also event notifications defined for configuration
changes that may be useful to management applications.
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[RFC3165] supports the use of user-written scripts to delegate
management functionality.
Policy Based Management MIB [RFC4011] defines objects that enable
policy-based monitoring using SNMP, using a scripting language, and a
script execution environment.
Few vendors have implemented MIB modules that support scripting.
Some vendors consider running user-developed scripts within the
managed device as a violation of support agreements.
At the time of this writing, only the YANG module for the monitoring
of the NETCONF protocol exists as proposed standard [RFC6022].
For configuring IPFIX and PSMAP devices, the IPFIX working group has
developed an XML-based configuration data model [I-D.ietf-ipfix-
configuration-model], in close collaboration with the NETMOD working
group. IPFIX configuration data model uses YANG as modeling language
(see Section 2.4.1). The model specifies the necessary data for
configuring and monitoring selection processes, caches, exporting
processes, and collecting processes of IPFIX and PSAMP compliant
monitoring devices.
Non-standard data models:
CAPWAP Base MIB [RFC5833] specifies managed objects for modeling the
CAPWAP Protocol and provides configuration and WTP status-monitoring
aspects of CAPWAP, where CAPWAP Binding MIB [RFC5834] defines managed
objects for modeling of CAPWAP protocol for IEEE 802.11 wireless
binding.
Note: RFC 5833 and RFC 5834 have been published as Informational RFCs
to provide the basis for future work on a SNMP management of the
CAPWAP protocol.
At the time of this writing NETMOD working group is developing core
system and interface models in YANG.
4.3. Accounting Management
Non-standard data models:
[RFC4670] 'RADIUS Accounting Client MIB for IPv6' defines RADIUS
Accounting Client MIB objects that support version-neutral IP
addressing formats.
[RFC4671] 'RADIUS Accounting Server MIB for IPv6' defines RADIUS
Accounting Server MIB objects that support version-neutral IP
addressing formats.
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4.4. Performance Management
MIB modules typically contain counters to determine the frequency and
rate of an occurrence.
RMON [RFC2819] has the full standard status [STD59] and defines
objects for managing remote network monitoring devices. An
organization may employ many remote management probes, one per
network segment, to manage its internet. These devices may be used
for a network management service provider to access a client network,
often geographically remote. Most of the objects in the RMON MIB
module are suitable for the management of any type of network, where
some of them are specific to management of Ethernet networks.
RMON allows a probe to be configured to perform diagnostics and to
collect statistics continuously, even when communication with the
management station may not be possible or efficient. The alarm group
periodically takes statistical samples from variables in the probe
and compares them to previously configured thresholds. If the
monitored variable crosses a threshold, an event is generated.
The RMON host group discovers hosts on the network by keeping a list
of source and destination MAC Addresses seen in good packets
promiscuously received from the network, and contains statistics
associated with each host. The hostTopN group is used to prepare
reports that describe the hosts that top a list ordered by one of
their statistics. The available statistics are samples of one of
their base statistics over an interval specified by the management
station. Thus, these statistics are rate based. The management
station also selects how many such hosts are reported.
The RMON matrix group stores statistics for conversations between
sets of two addresses. The filter group allows packets to be matched
by a filter equation. These matched packets form a data stream that
may be captured or may generate events. The Packet Capture group
allows packets to be captured after they flow through a channel. The
event group controls the generation and notification of events from
this device.
Draft standards:
The RMON-2 MIB [RFC4502] extends RMON by providing RMON analysis up
to the application layer. The SMON MIB [RFC2613] extends RMON by
providing RMON analysis for switched networks.
Proposed standards:
RMON MIB Extensions for High Capacity Alarms [RFC3434] describes
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managed objects for extending the alarm thresholding capabilities
found in the RMON MIB and provides similar threshold monitoring of
objects based on the Counter64 data type.
RMON MIB Extensions for High Capacity Networks [RFC3273] defines
objects for managing RMON devices for use on high-speed networks.
RMON MIB Extensions for Interface Parameters Monitoring [RFC3144]
describes an extension to the RMON MIB with a method of sorting the
interfaces of a monitored device according to values of parameters
specific to this interface.
[RFC4710] describes Real-Time Application Quality of Service
Monitoring. RAQMON is part of the RMON protocol family, and supports
end-2-end QoS monitoring for multiple concurrent applications and
does not relate to a specific application transport. RAQMON is
scalable and works well with encrypted payload and signaling. RAQMON
uses TCP to transport RAQMON PDUs.
[RFC4711] proposes an extension to the Remote Monitoring MIB
[RFC2819] and describes managed objects used for real-time
application Quality of Service (QoS) monitoring. [RFC4712] specifies
two transport mappings for the RAQMON information model using TCP as
a native transport and SNMP to carry the RAQMON information from a
RAQMON Data Source (RDS) to a RAQMON Report Collector (RRC).
Application Performance Measurement MIB [RFC3729] uses the
architecture created in the RMON MIB and defines objects by providing
measurement and analysis of the application performance as
experienced by end-users. Application performance measurement
measures the quality of service delivered to end-users by
applications.
Transport Performance Metrics MIB [RFC4150] describes managed objects
used for monitoring selectable performance metrics and statistics
derived from the monitoring of network packets and sub-application
level transactions. The metrics can be defined through reference to
existing IETF, ITU, and other standards organizations' documents.
IPPM working group defined an Information Model and XML Data Model
for Traceroute Measurements [RFC5388], which defines a common
information model dividing the information elements into two
semantically separated groups (configuration elements and results
elements) with an additional element to relate configuration elements
and results elements by means of a common unique identifier. Based
on the information model, an XML data model is provided to store the
results of traceroute measurements.
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IPPM working group has defined [BCP108] "IP Performance Metrics
(IPPM) Metrics Registry", which defines a registry for IP Performance
Metrics [RFC4148]. The IANA-assigned registry contains an initial
set of OBJECT IDENTITIES to currently defined metrics in the IETF as
well as defines the rules for adding IP Performance Metrics that are
defined in the future. However, the current registry structure has
been found to be insufficiently detailed to uniquely identify IPPM
metrics. Due to the ambiguities between the current metrics
registrations and the metrics used, and the apparent non-adoption of
the registry in practice, it has been proposed to reclassify
[RFC4148] as Obsolete and to withdraw the current IPPM Metrics
Registry from use.
Note: In case [RFC4148] is declared as Obsolete, IANA will prevent
registering new metrics and actual users can continue to use the
current registry and its contents.
SIP Package for Voice Quality Reporting [RFC6035] defines a SIP event
package that enables the collection and reporting of metrics that
measure the quality for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) sessions.
Traffic Flow Measurement: Meter MIB [RFC2720] defines a MIB for use
in controlling an RTFM Traffic Meter, in particular for specifying
the flows to be measured and provides a mechanism for retrieving flow
data from the meter using SNMP.
4.5. Security Management
Proposed standards:
There are an extensive number of MIB modules defined for multiple
purposes to use with RADIUS:
o [RFC4668] 'RADIUS Authentication Client MIB for IPv6' defines
RADIUS Authentication Client MIB objects that support version-
neutral IP addressing formats and defines a set of extensions for
RADIUS authentication client functions.
o [RFC4669] 'RADIUS Authentication Server MIB for IPv6' defines
RADIUS Authentication Server MIB objects that support version-
neutral IP addressing formats and defines a set of extensions for
RADIUS authentication server functions.
o [RFC4670] 'RADIUS Accounting Client MIB for IPv6' defines RADIUS
Accounting Client MIB that objects that support version-neutral IP
addressing formats.
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o [RFC4671] 'RADIUS Accounting Server MIB for IPv6' defines RADIUS
Accounting Server MIB that objects that support version-neutral IP
addressing formats.
o [RFC4672] 'RADIUS Dynamic Authorization Client MIB' defines the
MIB module for entities implementing the client side of the
Dynamic Authorization Extensions to RADIUS [RFC5176].
o [RFC4673] 'RADIUS Dynamic Authorization Server MIB' defines the
MIB module for entities implementing the server side of the
Dynamic Authorization Extensions to RADIUS [RFC5176].
The MIB Module definitions in [RFC4668], [RFC4669], [RFC4670],
[RFC4671], [RFC4672], [RFC4673] are intended to be used only for
RADIUS over UDP and therefore do not support RADIUS/TCP. There is
also a recommendation that RADIUS clients and servers implementing
RADIUS/TCP should not re-use earlier listed MIB modules to perform
statistics counting for RADIUS/TCP connections.
Currently there are no standardized MIB modules for DIAMETER
applications, which can be considered as a weakness on the management
side of DIAMETER nodes. There is an ongoing effort to produce a
standard MIB for the [RFC3588] defined 'Diameter Base Protocol'
[I-D.ietf-dime-diameter-base-protocol-mib] and the [RFC4006] defined
'Diameter Credit-Control Application' [I-D.ietf-dime-diameter-cc-
appl-mib].
5. IANA Considerations
This document does not introduce any new codepoints or name spaces
for registration with IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
6. Security Considerations
This document introduces no new security concerns.
7. Contributors
Following persons made significant contributions to this document:
o Benoit Claise - Cisco - edited parts of the section on IPFIX/PSAMP
and contributed the section on Energy Management.
o Dave Harrington - Huawei - edited the expired document
'draft-ietf-opsawg-survey-management-00.txt', which has been used
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as a starting point for this document.
o Jouni Korhonen - Nokia Siemens Networks - contributed the sections
on RADIUS and DIAMETER.
o Al Morton - AT&T - contributed to the section on IP Performance
Metrics.
o Juergen Quittek - NEC - contributed the section on IPFIX/PSAMP.
o Juergen Schoenwaelder - Jacobs University Bremen - contributed the
section on YANG.
8. Acknowledgements
The editor would like to thank to Tom Petch, Dan Romascanu and Henk
Uijterwaal for their valuable suggestions and comments in the OPSAWG
session and on its maillist.
9. Informative References
[3GPPIMS] 3GPP, "Release 10, IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage
2", September 2010,
<http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/23228.htm>.
[BCP108] Emile, S., "IP Performance Metrics (IPPM) Metrics
Registry", August 2005.
[BCP27] D. O'Dell, M., "Advancement of MIB specifications on the
IETF Standards Track", October 1998.
[BCP74] Frye, R., "Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and
Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Management
Framework", August 2003.
[DMTF-CIM] DMTF, "Common Information Model Schema, Version 2.27.0",
November 2010, <http://www.dmtf.org/standards/cim>.
[IANA-PROT] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "IANA Protocol
Registries", October 2010,
<http://www.iana.org/protocols/>.
[IETF-WGS] IETF, "IETF Working Groups",
<http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/>.
[ITU-M3100] International Telecommunication Union, "M.3100: Generic
network information model", January 2006,
<http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-M.3100-200504-I>.
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[RFC0951] Croft, B. and J. Gilmore, "Bootstrap Protocol", RFC 951,
September 1985.
[RFC1157] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin,
"Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 15,
RFC 1157, May 1990.
[RFC1901] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and
S. Waldbusser, "Introduction to Community-based SNMPv2",
RFC 1901, January 1996.
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, March 1997.
[RFC2244] Newman, C. and J. Myers, "ACAP -- Application
Configuration Access Protocol", RFC 2244, November 1997.
[RFC2330] Paxson, V., Almes, G., Mahdavi, J., and M. Mathis,
"Framework for IP Performance Metrics", RFC 2330,
May 1998.
[RFC2438] O'Dell, M., Alvestrand, H., Wijnen, B., and S. Bradner,
"Advancement of MIB specifications on the IETF Standards
Track", BCP 27, RFC 2438, October 1998.
[RFC2458] Lu, H., Krishnaswamy, M., Conroy, L., Bellovin, S.,
Burg, F., DeSimone, A., Tewani, K., Davidson, P.,
Schulzrinne, H., and K. Vishwanathan, "Toward the PSTN/
Internet Inter-Networking --Pre-PINT Implementations",
RFC 2458, November 1998.
[RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information
Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999.
[RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2",
STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999.
[RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., and J. Schoenwaelder,
"Conformance Statements for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580,
April 1999.
[RFC2610] Perkins, C. and E. Guttman, "DHCP Options for Service
Location Protocol", RFC 2610, June 1999.
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[RFC2613] Waterman, R., Lahaye, B., Romascanu, D., and S.
Waldbusser, "Remote Network Monitoring MIB Extensions
for Switched Networks Version 1.0", RFC 2613, June 1999.
[RFC2678] Mahdavi, J. and V. Paxson, "IPPM Metrics for Measuring
Connectivity", RFC 2678, September 1999.
[RFC2679] Almes, G., Kalidindi, S., and M. Zekauskas, "A One-way
Delay Metric for IPPM", RFC 2679, September 1999.
[RFC2680] Almes, G., Kalidindi, S., and M. Zekauskas, "A One-way
Packet Loss Metric for IPPM", RFC 2680, September 1999.
[RFC2681] Almes, G., Kalidindi, S., and M. Zekauskas, "A Round-
trip Delay Metric for IPPM", RFC 2681, September 1999.
[RFC2720] Brownlee, N., "Traffic Flow Measurement: Meter MIB",
RFC 2720, October 1999.
[RFC2748] Durham, D., Boyle, J., Cohen, R., Herzog, S., Rajan, R.,
and A. Sastry, "The COPS (Common Open Policy Service)
Protocol", RFC 2748, January 2000.
[RFC2753] Yavatkar, R., Pendarakis, D., and R. Guerin, "A
Framework for Policy-based Admission Control", RFC 2753,
January 2000.
[RFC2819] Waldbusser, S., "Remote Network Monitoring Management
Information Base", STD 59, RFC 2819, May 2000.
[RFC2863] McCloghrie, K. and F. Kastenholz, "The Interfaces Group
MIB", RFC 2863, June 2000.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, June 2000.
[RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
[RFC2867] Zorn, G., Aboba, B., and D. Mitton, "RADIUS Accounting
Modifications for Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2867,
June 2000.
[RFC2868] Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J., Holdrege,
M., and I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel
Protocol Support", RFC 2868, June 2000.
[RFC2869] Rigney, C., Willats, W., and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS
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Extensions", RFC 2869, June 2000.
[RFC2981] Kavasseri, R., "Event MIB", RFC 2981, October 2000.
[RFC2982] Kavasseri, R., "Distributed Management Expression MIB",
RFC 2982, October 2000.
[RFC3014] Kavasseri, R., "Notification Log MIB", RFC 3014,
November 2000.
[RFC3084] Chan, K., Seligson, J., Durham, D., Gai, S., McCloghrie,
K., Herzog, S., Reichmeyer, F., Yavatkar, R., and A.
Smith, "COPS Usage for Policy Provisioning (COPS-PR)",
RFC 3084, March 2001.
[RFC3144] Romascanu, D., "Remote Monitoring MIB Extensions for
Interface Parameters Monitoring", RFC 3144, August 2001.
[RFC3159] McCloghrie, K., Fine, M., Seligson, J., Chan, K., Hahn,
S., Sahita, R., Smith, A., and F. Reichmeyer, "Structure
of Policy Provisioning Information (SPPI)", RFC 3159,
August 2001.
[RFC3162] Aboba, B., Zorn, G., and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6",
RFC 3162, August 2001.
[RFC3164] Lonvick, C., "The BSD Syslog Protocol", RFC 3164,
August 2001.
[RFC3165] Levi, D. and J. Schoenwaelder, "Definitions of Managed
Objects for the Delegation of Management Scripts",
RFC 3165, August 2001.
[RFC3195] New, D. and M. Rose, "Reliable Delivery for syslog",
RFC 3195, November 2001.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
June 2002.
[RFC3273] Waldbusser, S., "Remote Network Monitoring Management
Information Base for High Capacity Networks", RFC 3273,
July 2002.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
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[RFC3319] Schulzrinne, H. and B. Volz, "Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCPv6) Options for Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) Servers", RFC 3319, July 2003.
[RFC3393] Demichelis, C. and P. Chimento, "IP Packet Delay
Variation Metric for IP Performance Metrics (IPPM)",
RFC 3393, November 2002.
[RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
"Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410, December 2002.
[RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62,
RFC 3411, December 2002.
[RFC3413] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62,
RFC 3413, December 2002.
[RFC3414] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
(USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, December 2002.
[RFC3415] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based
Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3415,
December 2002.
[RFC3417] Presuhn, R., "Transport Mappings for the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3417,
December 2002.
[RFC3418] Presuhn, R., "Management Information Base (MIB) for the
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62,
RFC 3418, December 2002.
[RFC3430] Schoenwaelder, J., "Simple Network Management Protocol
Over Transmission Control Protocol Transport Mapping",
RFC 3430, December 2002.
[RFC3432] Raisanen, V., Grotefeld, G., and A. Morton, "Network
performance measurement with periodic streams",
RFC 3432, November 2002.
[RFC3433] Bierman, A., Romascanu, D., and K. Norseth, "Entity
Sensor Management Information Base", RFC 3433,
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December 2002.
[RFC3434] Bierman, A. and K. McCloghrie, "Remote Monitoring MIB
Extensions for High Capacity Alarms", RFC 3434,
December 2002.
[RFC3444] Pras, A. and J. Schoenwaelder, "On the Difference
between Information Models and Data Models", RFC 3444,
January 2003.
[RFC3460] Moore, B., "Policy Core Information Model (PCIM)
Extensions", RFC 3460, January 2003.
[RFC3535] Schoenwaelder, J., "Overview of the 2002 IAB Network
Management Workshop", RFC 3535, May 2003.
[RFC3539] Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", RFC 3539,
June 2003.
[RFC3574] Soininen, J., "Transition Scenarios for 3GPP Networks",
RFC 3574, August 2003.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579,
September 2003.
[RFC3580] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G., and J.
Roese, "IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User
Service (RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580,
September 2003.
[RFC3584] Frye, R., Levi, D., Routhier, S., and B. Wijnen,
"Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3
of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework",
BCP 74, RFC 3584, August 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
September 2003.
[RFC3589] Loughney, J., "Diameter Command Codes for Third
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Release 5",
RFC 3589, September 2003.
[RFC3646] Droms, R., "DNS Configuration options for Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3646,
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December 2003.
[RFC3729] Waldbusser, S., "Application Performance Measurement
MIB", RFC 3729, March 2004.
[RFC3758] Stewart, R., Ramalho, M., Xie, Q., Tuexen, M., and P.
Conrad, "Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
Partial Reliability Extension", RFC 3758, May 2004.
[RFC3877] Chisholm, S. and D. Romascanu, "Alarm Management
Information Base (MIB)", RFC 3877, September 2004.
[RFC3878] Lam, H., Huynh, A., and D. Perkins, "Alarm Reporting
Control Management Information Base (MIB)", RFC 3878,
September 2004.
[RFC3917] Quittek, J., Zseby, T., Claise, B., and S. Zander,
"Requirements for IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)",
RFC 3917, October 2004.
[RFC4004] Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and
P. McCann, "Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application", RFC 4004,
August 2005.
[RFC4005] Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton,
"Diameter Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005,
August 2005.
[RFC4006] Hakala, H., Mattila, L., Koskinen, J-P., Stura, M., and
J. Loughney, "Diameter Credit-Control Application",
RFC 4006, August 2005.
[RFC4011] Waldbusser, S., Saperia, J., and T. Hongal, "Policy
Based Management MIB", RFC 4011, March 2005.
[RFC4029] Lind, M., Ksinant, V., Park, S., Baudot, A., and P.
Savola, "Scenarios and Analysis for Introducing IPv6
into ISP Networks", RFC 4029, March 2005.
[RFC4038] Shin, M-K., Hong, Y-G., Hagino, J., Savola, P., and E.
Castro, "Application Aspects of IPv6 Transition",
RFC 4038, March 2005.
[RFC4057] Bound, J., "IPv6 Enterprise Network Scenarios",
RFC 4057, June 2005.
[RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application",
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RFC 4072, August 2005.
[RFC4118] Yang, L., Zerfos, P., and E. Sadot, "Architecture
Taxonomy for Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access
Points (CAPWAP)", RFC 4118, June 2005.
[RFC4133] Bierman, A. and K. McCloghrie, "Entity MIB (Version 3)",
RFC 4133, August 2005.
[RFC4148] Stephan, E., "IP Performance Metrics (IPPM) Metrics
Registry", BCP 108, RFC 4148, August 2005.
[RFC4150] Dietz, R. and R. Cole, "Transport Performance Metrics
MIB", RFC 4150, August 2005.
[RFC4213] Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition
Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 4213,
October 2005.
[RFC4215] Wiljakka, J., "Analysis on IPv6 Transition in Third
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Networks",
RFC 4215, October 2005.
[RFC4251] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, January 2006.
[RFC4268] Chisholm, S. and D. Perkins, "Entity State MIB",
RFC 4268, November 2005.
[RFC4280] Chowdhury, K., Yegani, P., and L. Madour, "Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Options for Broadcast and
Multicast Control Servers", RFC 4280, November 2005.
[RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 4347, April 2006.
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
[RFC4502] Waldbusser, S., "Remote Network Monitoring Management
Information Base Version 2", RFC 4502, May 2006.
[RFC4564] Govindan, S., Cheng, H., Yao, ZH., Zhou, WH., and L.
Yang, "Objectives for Control and Provisioning of
Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP)", RFC 4564, July 2006.
[RFC4656] Shalunov, S., Teitelbaum, B., Karp, A., Boote, J., and
M. Zekauskas, "A One-way Active Measurement Protocol
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(OWAMP)", RFC 4656, September 2006.
[RFC4668] Nelson, D., "RADIUS Authentication Client MIB for IPv6",
RFC 4668, August 2006.
[RFC4669] Nelson, D., "RADIUS Authentication Server MIB for IPv6",
RFC 4669, August 2006.
[RFC4670] Nelson, D., "RADIUS Accounting Client MIB for IPv6",
RFC 4670, August 2006.
[RFC4671] Nelson, D., "RADIUS Accounting Server MIB for IPv6",
RFC 4671, August 2006.
[RFC4672] De Cnodder, S., Jonnala, N., and M. Chiba, "RADIUS
Dynamic Authorization Client MIB", RFC 4672,
September 2006.
[RFC4673] De Cnodder, S., Jonnala, N., and M. Chiba, "RADIUS
Dynamic Authorization Server MIB", RFC 4673,
September 2006.
[RFC4675] Congdon, P., Sanchez, M., and B. Aboba, "RADIUS
Attributes for Virtual LAN and Priority Support",
RFC 4675, September 2006.
[RFC4710] Siddiqui, A., Romascanu, D., and E. Golovinsky, "Real-
time Application Quality-of-Service Monitoring (RAQMON)
Framework", RFC 4710, October 2006.
[RFC4711] Siddiqui, A., Romascanu, D., and E. Golovinsky, "Real-
time Application Quality-of-Service Monitoring (RAQMON)
MIB", RFC 4711, October 2006.
[RFC4712] Siddiqui, A., Romascanu, D., Golovinsky, E., Rahman, M.,
and Y. Kim, "Transport Mappings for Real-time
Application Quality-of-Service Monitoring (RAQMON)
Protocol Data Unit (PDU)", RFC 4712, October 2006.
[RFC4737] Morton, A., Ciavattone, L., Ramachandran, G., Shalunov,
S., and J. Perser, "Packet Reordering Metrics",
RFC 4737, November 2006.
[RFC4740] Garcia-Martin, M., Belinchon, M., Pallares-Lopez, M.,
Canales-Valenzuela, C., and K. Tammi, "Diameter Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) Application", RFC 4740,
November 2006.
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[RFC4741] Enns, R., "NETCONF Configuration Protocol", RFC 4741,
December 2006.
[RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)",
RFC 4742, December 2006.
[RFC4743] Goddard, T., "Using NETCONF over the Simple Object
Access Protocol (SOAP)", RFC 4743, December 2006.
[RFC4744] Lear, E. and K. Crozier, "Using the NETCONF Protocol
over the Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP)",
RFC 4744, December 2006.
[RFC4818] Salowey, J. and R. Droms, "RADIUS Delegated-IPv6-Prefix
Attribute", RFC 4818, April 2007.
[RFC4825] Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", RFC 4825,
May 2007.
[RFC5080] Nelson, D. and A. DeKok, "Common Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service (RADIUS) Implementation Issues and
Suggested Fixes", RFC 5080, December 2007.
[RFC5090] Sterman, B., Sadolevsky, D., Schwartz, D., Williams, D.,
and W. Beck, "RADIUS Extension for Digest
Authentication", RFC 5090, February 2008.
[RFC5101] Claise, B., "Specification of the IP Flow Information
Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of IP Traffic
Flow Information", RFC 5101, January 2008.
[RFC5102] Quittek, J., Bryant, S., Claise, B., Aitken, P., and J.
Meyer, "Information Model for IP Flow Information
Export", RFC 5102, January 2008.
[RFC5103] Trammell, B. and E. Boschi, "Bidirectional Flow Export
Using IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)", RFC 5103,
January 2008.
[RFC5176] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B.
Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 5176,
January 2008.
[RFC5181] Shin, M-K., Han, Y-H., Kim, S-E., and D. Premec, "IPv6
Deployment Scenarios in 802.16 Networks", RFC 5181,
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May 2008.
[RFC5224] Brenner, M., "Diameter Policy Processing Application",
RFC 5224, March 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
August 2008.
[RFC5277] Chisholm, S. and H. Trevino, "NETCONF Event
Notifications", RFC 5277, July 2008.
[RFC5357] Hedayat, K., Krzanowski, R., Morton, A., Yum, K., and J.
Babiarz, "A Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol
(TWAMP)", RFC 5357, October 2008.
[RFC5381] Iijima, T., Atarashi, Y., Kimura, H., Kitani, M., and H.
Okita, "Experience of Implementing NETCONF over SOAP",
RFC 5381, October 2008.
[RFC5388] Niccolini, S., Tartarelli, S., Quittek, J., Dietz, T.,
and M. Swany, "Information Model and XML Data Model for
Traceroute Measurements", RFC 5388, December 2008.
[RFC5416] Calhoun, P., Montemurro, M., and D. Stanley, "Control
and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP)
Protocol Binding for IEEE 802.11", RFC 5416, March 2009.
[RFC5424] Gerhards, R., "The Syslog Protocol", RFC 5424,
March 2009.
[RFC5425] Miao, F., Ma, Y., and J. Salowey, "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog", RFC 5425,
March 2009.
[RFC5426] Okmianski, A., "Transmission of Syslog Messages over
UDP", RFC 5426, March 2009.
[RFC5427] Keeni, G., "Textual Conventions for Syslog Management",
RFC 5427, March 2009.
[RFC5431] Sun, D., "Diameter ITU-T Rw Policy Enforcement Interface
Application", RFC 5431, March 2009.
[RFC5447] Korhonen, J., Bournelle, J., Tschofenig, H., Perkins,
C., and K. Chowdhury, "Diameter Mobile IPv6: Support for
Network Access Server to Diameter Server Interaction",
RFC 5447, February 2009.
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[RFC5470] Sadasivan, G., Brownlee, N., Claise, B., and J. Quittek,
"Architecture for IP Flow Information Export", RFC 5470,
March 2009.
[RFC5473] Boschi, E., Mark, L., and B. Claise, "Reducing
Redundancy in IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) and
Packet Sampling (PSAMP) Reports", RFC 5473, March 2009.
[RFC5475] Zseby, T., Molina, M., Duffield, N., Niccolini, S., and
F. Raspall, "Sampling and Filtering Techniques for IP
Packet Selection", RFC 5475, March 2009.
[RFC5476] Claise, B., Johnson, A., and J. Quittek, "Packet
Sampling (PSAMP) Protocol Specifications", RFC 5476,
March 2009.
[RFC5477] Dietz, T., Claise, B., Aitken, P., Dressler, F., and G.
Carle, "Information Model for Packet Sampling Exports",
RFC 5477, March 2009.
[RFC5516] Jones, M. and L. Morand, "Diameter Command Code
Registration for the Third Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP) Evolved Packet System (EPS)", RFC 5516,
April 2009.
[RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security
(TLS)", RFC 5539, May 2009.
[RFC5560] Uijterwaal, H., "A One-Way Packet Duplication Metric",
RFC 5560, May 2009.
[RFC5580] Tschofenig, H., Adrangi, F., Jones, M., Lior, A., and B.
Aboba, "Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and
Diameter", RFC 5580, August 2009.
[RFC5590] Harrington, D. and J. Schoenwaelder, "Transport
Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP)", RFC 5590, June 2009.
[RFC5591] Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, "Transport Security
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP)", RFC 5591, June 2009.
[RFC5592] Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and W. Hardaker, "Secure
Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 5592, June 2009.
[RFC5607] Nelson, D. and G. Weber, "Remote Authentication Dial-In
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User Service (RADIUS) Authorization for Network Access
Server (NAS) Management", RFC 5607, July 2009.
[RFC5608] Narayan, K. and D. Nelson, "Remote Authentication
Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) Usage for Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) Transport Models", RFC 5608,
August 2009.
[RFC5610] Boschi, E., Trammell, B., Mark, L., and T. Zseby,
"Exporting Type Information for IP Flow Information
Export (IPFIX) Information Elements", RFC 5610,
July 2009.
[RFC5655] Trammell, B., Boschi, E., Mark, L., Zseby, T., and A.
Wagner, "Specification of the IP Flow Information Export
(IPFIX) File Format", RFC 5655, October 2009.
[RFC5674] Chisholm, S. and R. Gerhards, "Alarms in Syslog",
RFC 5674, October 2009.
[RFC5675] Marinov, V. and J. Schoenwaelder, "Mapping Simple
Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Notifications to
SYSLOG Messages", RFC 5675, October 2009.
[RFC5676] Schoenwaelder, J., Clemm, A., and A. Karmakar,
"Definitions of Managed Objects for Mapping SYSLOG
Messages to Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
Notifications", RFC 5676, October 2009.
[RFC5706] Harrington, D., "Guidelines for Considering Operations
and Management of New Protocols and Protocol
Extensions", RFC 5706, November 2009.
[RFC5713] Moustafa, H., Tschofenig, H., and S. De Cnodder,
"Security Threats and Security Requirements for the
Access Node Control Protocol (ANCP)", RFC 5713,
January 2010.
[RFC5717] Lengyel, B. and M. Bjorklund, "Partial Lock Remote
Procedure Call (RPC) for NETCONF", RFC 5717,
December 2009.
[RFC5719] Romascanu, D. and H. Tschofenig, "Updated IANA
Considerations for Diameter Command Code Allocations",
RFC 5719, January 2010.
[RFC5729] Korhonen, J., Jones, M., Morand, L., and T. Tsou,
"Clarifications on the Routing of Diameter Requests
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Based on the Username and the Realm", RFC 5729,
December 2009.
[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol
(EPP)", STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009.
[RFC5777] Korhonen, J., Tschofenig, H., Arumaithurai, M., Jones,
M., and A. Lior, "Traffic Classification and Quality of
Service (QoS) Attributes for Diameter", RFC 5777,
February 2010.
[RFC5778] Korhonen, J., Tschofenig, H., Bournelle, J., Giaretta,
G., and M. Nakhjiri, "Diameter Mobile IPv6: Support for
Home Agent to Diameter Server Interaction", RFC 5778,
February 2010.
[RFC5779] Korhonen, J., Bournelle, J., Chowdhury, K., Muhanna, A.,
and U. Meyer, "Diameter Proxy Mobile IPv6: Mobile Access
Gateway and Local Mobility Anchor Interaction with
Diameter Server", RFC 5779, February 2010.
[RFC5815] Dietz, T., Kobayashi, A., Claise, B., and G. Muenz,
"Definitions of Managed Objects for IP Flow Information
Export", RFC 5815, April 2010.
[RFC5833] Shi, Y., Perkins, D., Elliott, C., and Y. Zhang,
"Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
(CAPWAP) Protocol Base MIB", RFC 5833, May 2010.
[RFC5834] Shi, Y., Perkins, D., Elliott, C., and Y. Zhang,
"Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
(CAPWAP) Protocol Binding MIB for IEEE 802.11",
RFC 5834, May 2010.
[RFC5835] Morton, A. and S. Van den Berghe, "Framework for Metric
Composition", RFC 5835, April 2010.
[RFC5848] Kelsey, J., Callas, J., and A. Clemm, "Signed Syslog
Messages", RFC 5848, May 2010.
[RFC5851] Ooghe, S., Voigt, N., Platnic, M., Haag, T., and S.
Wadhwa, "Framework and Requirements for an Access Node
Control Mechanism in Broadband Multi-Service Networks",
RFC 5851, May 2010.
[RFC5866] Sun, D., McCann, P., Tschofenig, H., Tsou, T., Doria,
A., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Quality-of-Service
Application", RFC 5866, May 2010.
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[RFC5889] Baccelli, E. and M. Townsley, "IP Addressing Model in Ad
Hoc Networks", RFC 5889, September 2010.
[RFC5953] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP)", RFC 5953, August 2010.
[RFC5982] Kobayashi, A. and B. Claise, "IP Flow Information Export
(IPFIX) Mediation: Problem Statement", RFC 5982,
August 2010.
[RFC6012] Salowey, J., Petch, T., Gerhards, R., and H. Feng,
"Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Transport
Mapping for Syslog", RFC 6012, October 2010.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
October 2010.
[RFC6021] Schoenwaelder, J., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6021,
October 2010.
[RFC6022] Scott, M. and M. Bjorklund, "YANG Module for NETCONF
Monitoring", RFC 6022, October 2010.
[RFC6035] Pendleton, A., Clark, A., Johnston, A., and H.
Sinnreich, "Session Initiation Protocol Event Package
for Voice Quality Reporting", RFC 6035, November 2010.
[RFCSEARCH] IETF, "RFC Index Search Engine", January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfcsearch.html>.
[STD58] McCloghrie, K., David, D., and J. Juergen, "Structure of
Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)", April 1999.
[STD59] Waldbusser, S., "Remote Network Monitoring Management
Information Base", May 2000.
[STD62] Harrington, D., "An Architecture for Describing Simple
Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management
Frameworks", December 2002.
[STD69] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol
(EPP)", August 2009.
[XPATH] World Wide Web Consortium, "XML Path Language (XPath)
Version 1.0", November 1999,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xpath-19991116>.
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Appendix A. New Work related to IETF Management Framework
A.1. Energy Management (EMAN)
Energy management is becoming an additional requirement for network
management systems due to several factors including the rising and
fluctuating energy costs, the increased awareness of the ecological
impact of operating networks and devices, and the regulation of
governments on energy consumption and production.
The basic objective of energy management is operating communication
networks and other equipments with a minimal amount of energy while
still providing sufficient performance to meet service level
objectives. Today, most networking and network-attached devices
neither monitor nor allow control energy usage as they are mainly
instrumented for functions such as fault, configuration, accounting,
performance, and security management. These devices are not
instrumented to be aware of energy consumption. There are very few
means specified in IETF documents for energy management, which
includes the areas of power monitoring, energy monitoring, and power
state control.
A particular difference between energy management and other
management tasks is that in some cases energy consumption of a device
is not measured at the device itself but reported by a different
place. For example, at a Power over Ethernet (PoE) sourcing device
or at a smart power strip, in which cases one device is effectively
metering another remote device. This requires a clear definition of
the relationship between the reporting devices and identification of
remote devices for which monitoring information is provided. Similar
considerations will apply to power state control of remote devices,
for example, at a PoE sourcing device that switches on and off power
at its ports. Another example scenario for energy management is a
gateway to low resourced and lossy network devices in wireless a
building network. Here the energy management system talks directly
to the gateway but not necessarily to other devices in the building
network.
At the time of this writing the EMAN working group works on the
management of energy-aware devices, covered by the following items:
o Requirements for energy management, specifying energy management
properties that will allow networks and devices to become energy
aware. In addition to energy awareness requirements, the need for
control functions will be discussed. Specifically the need to
monitor and control properties of devices that are remote to the
reporting device should be discussed.
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o Energy management framework, which will describe extensions to
current management framework, required for energy management.
This includes: power and energy monitoring, power states, power
state control, and potential power state transitions. The
framework will focus on energy management for IP-based network
equipment (routers, switches, PCs, IP cameras, phones and the
like). Particularly, the relationships between reporting devices,
remote devices, and monitoring probes (such as might be used in
low-power and lossy networks) need to be elaborated. For the case
of a device reporting on behalf of other devices and controlling
those devices, the framework will address the issues of discovery
and identification of remote devices.
o Energy-aware Networks and Devices MIB document, for monitoring
energy-aware networks and devices, will address devices
identification, context information, and potential relationship
between reporting devices, remote devices, and monitoring probes.
o Power and Energy Monitoring MIB document will document defining
managed objects for monitoring of power states and energy
consumption/production. The monitoring of power states includes:
retrieving power states, properties of power states, current power
state, power state transitions, and power state statistics. The
managed objects will provide means for reporting detailed
properties of the actual energy rate (power) and of accumulated
energy. Further, it will provide information on electrical power
quality.
o Battery MIB document will define managed objects for battery
monitoring, which will provide means for reporting detailed
properties of the actual charge, age, and state of a battery and
of battery statistics.
o Applicability statement will describe the variety of applications
that can use the energy framework and associated MIB modules.
Potential examples are building networks, home energy gateway,
etc. Finally, the document will also discuss relationships of the
framework to other architectures and frameworks (such as Smart
Grid). The applicability statement will explain the relationship
between the work in this WG and the other existing standards such
as those from the IEC, ANSI, DMTF, and others. Note that the EMAN
WG will be looking into existing standards such as those from the
IEC, ANSI, DMTF and others, and reuse existing work as much as
possible.
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Appendix B. Open issues
Need additional discussion on usage scenarios for different RFCs.
Appendix C. Change Log
C.1. 02-03
o Rearranged the document structure using a flat structure putting
all protocols onto the same level.
o Incorporated contributions for RADIUS/DIAMETER, IPFIX/PSAMP, YANG,
and EMAN.
o Added diverse references.
o Added Contributors and Acknowledgements sections.
o Bug fixing and issue solving.
C.2. 01-02
o Added terminology section.
o Changed the language for neutral standard description addressing
diverse SDOs.
o Extended NETCONF and NETMOD related text.
o Extended section for 'IPv6 Network Operations'.
o Bug fixing.
C.3. 00-01
o Extended text for SNMP
o Extended RADIUS and DIAMETER sections.
o Added references.
o Bug fixing.
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Author's Address
Mehmet Ersue (editor)
Nokia Siemens Networks
St.-Martin-Strasse 53
Munich 81541
Germany
EMail: mehmet.ersue@nsn.com
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