MIP6 J. Kempf
Internet-Draft DoCoMo Labs USA
Expires: August 24, 2005 E. Nordmark
S. Chakrabarti
Sun Microsystems
February 20, 2005
Bootstrapping Mobile IPv6
draft-chakrabarti-mip6-bmip-01.txt
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
This document defines an easy mechanism of boot-strapping Mobile IPv6
service. The boot-strapping mechanism includes locating a home
agent, dynamic home-address allocation and setting up initial
security association with the home-agent using IKE version 2 and EAP.
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This solution provides a way of secure and easy deployment without
the involvement of AAA servers for the boot-strapping purpose. It is
particularly useful in scenarios where AAA infrastructure is not
available, although this mechanism can be applicable in general.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Deployment Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Universal Access Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Enterprise/University Campus Network . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Network Access Provider Service Only . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Protocol Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1 Obtaining Home Agent Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.1 Security in retrieving Home Agent Address . . . . . . 8
3.2 Setting up Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3 Dynamic Home Address Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4 Renewal of Bootstrapping Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Home Agent Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Mobile Node Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. EAP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Protocol Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Changes from revision 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 23
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1. Introduction
Mobile IPv6 [4] describes mobility protocol between a Mobile Node and
a Home Agent. This document describes a simple method to initiate
the Mobile IPv6 service by the Mobile Node, without requiring home
network topology-dependent information, such as the home agent
address, on the Mobile Node. The initiation or boot-strapping of
Mobile IPv6 [4] can happen any time depending on the policy applied
on the Mobile Node. It is possible that the boot-strapping method
starts every time a Mobile Node boots or wakes up from standby
status; alternately, it can be started when the user turns on
"Mobility Service".
Mobile IPv6 Bootstrapping problem statement [2] indicates that the
mobile node must know its Home Agent address, its own Home Address
and materials to obtain MN-HA [5] security association in order to
start the Mobility service in a deployment scenario. Mobile IPv6
[4][5] protocols do not describe a method to obtain such initial
information; it assumes that a Mobile Node is already configured with
a home-address from its Home Agent and MN-HA security association is
configured at MN and HA. However, in real deployment, this
assumption requires manual configuration which does not scale as the
Mobile Nodes increase in number.
This document, in the following sections describes a solution for
bootstrapping method that only involves Domain Naming Service (DNS)
and a Home Agent running IKE version 2 [7]. Hence it does not
require any other additional infrastructure such as AAA
(Authentication, Authorization and Accounting Protocol) and operates
separately from whatever scheme is used for authenticating the
network access for the mobile node. However, this draft does not
exclude AAA based solutions for service authentication and can
co-exist with AAA deployment for access-authentication in the local
network. Thus a deployment model which uses Home-Agent and a backend
AAA server, can co-exist with this solution of Mobile IPv6
boot-strapping without conflicts. However, defining or specifying
Home Agent-AAA interface or any other interface between Home Agent
and a back-end server is out of scope of this document. In practice,
it is possible that the Mobile Node bootstraps in a foreign network
under a different Service Provider - the ideas discussed in this
draft allow a Mobile Node user to bootstrap irrespective of business
relationship of the Foreign Nework Access Service Provider and the
user's Home Network Service Provider or Mobility Service Provider,
provided the Home Agent is accessible from the foreign network.
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+------+
| DNS |
+------+
/
Mobile Node / Home Agent
+------+-----+/ +------------+
| IKEv2 | | IKEv2 |
| Initiator |<---////////////////////--->| Responder |
+------------+ IKEv2 +------------+
| EAP Peer | Exchange | EAP Server |
+------------+ +------------+
Figure 1: Boot-strapping of a Mobile Node
The solution refers to other existing protocols and documents
whenever possible. The document assumes that the mobile node has
already acquired IP service at its location, which might have been
authenticated any number of ways:
o IEEE 802.1X
o PANA
o Local AAA
o Universal Access Methods [18] or web-based credit card number
verification for authenticated and authorized network access.
o Other local schemes based on manually handling out L2 (WEP) keys,
registering MAC addresses, or controlling physical access a
(wired) network.
Thus it does not necessarily assume that the L2/EAP authentication is
used for network access authentication.
Section 3.1.1 discusses security in retrieving Home Agent address
from DNS. Privacy considerations are discussed in the Appendix.
The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, MAY and RECOMMENDED
are defined in [1].
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2. Deployment Examples
[Access |<----Access Network-->| INTERNET <------Home Network------>
Network | |
Auth ] | +-----+ +------+|
| |DHCP | | DNS ||
| | | +------+|
802.1x | +-----+ / |
| / |
| Mobile Node/ | Home Agent
UAM | +------+-----+ | +------------+
| | IKEv2 | | | IKEv2 |
AAA | | Initiator |<---////////////////////--->| Responder |
| +------------+ | +------------+
PANA | | EAP Peer | | | EAP Server |
| +------------+ | +------------+
Physical | | |
plug-in | | |
| | +-----------+
: | Backend |
| Accounting|
Etc. | Server or |
| AAA |
+-----------+
Figure 2: An example of a deployment Scenario for boot-strapping
This section describes a few examples of where AAA bootstrapping
might not be available.
2.1 Universal Access Method
Universal Access Method [18] is a technology for basic network access
authentication and authorization that is widely used in 802.11
hotspot networks throughout the world. In a UAM network, the host is
allowed to perform DHCP to obtain an IP address and other parameters
necessary for network access, but routing to the Internet is
inhibited until the host completes a login process. The login
process requires the host's user to attempt to browse a Web page,
using a Web browser. Any other IP traffic is dropped. The HTTP GET
issued by the Web browser is redirected, and a login page is
displayed instead.
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On the login page, the user typically has a choice to either provide
a login/password, for an account on file with the service provider,
or a credit card number, for one-time only access. If a
login/password is provided, the back end conducts a typical Radius
AAA transaction back to the home network AAA server. If a credit
card number is provided, a secure E-commerce protocol is used to
contact the user's credit card provider, and the charges are billed
to the user's credit card. Acceptance of the charge by the credit
card provider constitutes authorization for the user to get IP
service. Once the user has been authenticated and authorized for IP
service, routing to the Internet is established and the original Web
page browsed by the user is displayed. The only protocol involved in
the transaction is HTTP.
In this deployment scenario, there is no hook for providing the
Mobile Node with Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping parameters, because there
is no L2 AAA transaction conducted between the Mobile Node and the
network. For account-based access, Radius is used on the back end,
between the network access server (called a Public Access Control
(PAC) Gateway in the UAM architecture) and the home network of the
user, but there is no path from the PAC Gateway to the Mobile Node
for delivering the bootstrap parameters. For one-time access, there
is no AAA involved at all.
The protocol discussed in this document would be an appropriate
solution to bootstrapping in this scenario, because it could be run
after the PAC Gateway has opened Internet routing access.
2.2 Enterprise/University Campus Network
Many university and enterprise networks authenticate hosts attempting
to use their network by checking whether the MAC address corresponds
to a MAC address in a database of allowed terminals. Some such
deployments additionally require a login/password from the user for
an account, using the same kind of HTTP Redirect procedure used by
UAM. In order for a user to access the network, the MAC address of
the laptop must be provided to system administrators and an account
established.
In such deployment scenarios, there is also no L2 AAA transaction
between the Mobile Node and the network that can serve to provide
configuration parameters. The protocol described in this document
can be deployed by the campus or enterprise system administrator to
bootstrap Mobile IPv6 service.
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2.3 Network Access Provider Service Only
The Mobile IPv6 Bootstrapping problem statement [2] describes a case
where an Internet service provider only provides network access and
does not provide mobility service. In this case, the initial L2 AAA
transaction cannot provide the Mobile Node with bootstrapping
parameters, because the access network provider doesn't provide
Mobile IPv6 service. In this case, the Mobile Node could use the
protocol discussed in this document to obtain service from another
provider, perhaps one discovered opportunistically or perhaps one
with which the user has a long term account.
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3. Protocol Descriptions
Mobile IPv6 Bootstrapping [2] problem statement describes network
access service and Mobile IPv6 service. This document does not
define protocols for network access and assumes that network access
and authorization have taken place before the Mobile Node bootstraps
for mobility service. Thus, the following steps are required to
perform this solution, they are:
o Find appropriate Home Agent FQDN from DNS SRV record
o Use IKEv2, possibly with EAP method to obtain IKE security
association. (And this would allow an evolution towards
certificate-based authentication in the future without changing
any protocols.)
o Use IKEv2 to obtain the Home-address dynamically if it's not
available to the Mobile Node already and then obtain MN-HA
security association
3.1 Obtaining Home Agent Address
A Mobile Node queries the DNS server to request information on Home
Agent service. RFC 2782[3] describes the policies to choose a
service agent based on the preference and weight values. The DNS SRV
record may contain the preference and weight values for multiple Home
Agents available to the Mobile Node in addition to the Home Agent
FQDNs. If multiple Home Agents are available in the DNS SRV record
then Mobile Node is responsible to process the information as per
policy and pick one Home Agent. If the Home Agent of choice does not
respond for some reason or the IKE authentication fails, the Mobile
Node SHOULD try other Home Agents on the list. The Home Agent
information MUST be stored in the Mobile Node as long as it is using
the mobility service or on the same access network in order to
expedite the bootstrapping process for obtaining security association
and home address.
The service name for Mobile IPv6 home agent service as required by
RFC 2782 is "mip6" and the protocol name is "ipv6". Note that a
transport name cannot be used here because Mobile IPv6 does not run
over a transport.
Example: A mobile node with the example.net home domain would perform
a SRV query for _mip6._ipv6.example.net.
3.1.1 Security in retrieving Home Agent Address
Mobile IPv6 Bootstrapping problem statement [2] requires that the
configuration information between Mobile Node and Home Agent must be
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secured using integrity and replay protection. The requirement can
be extended to provide server to host security between the Domain
Name Server and the Mobile Node by using standard DNS security
mechanisms. Name Server, in some deployment scenarios may require
authenticity of Home Agent address information from the server.
DNSSEC(RFC2535) [8] can be used to provide SRV record integrity and
server authentication to a security aware bootstrapping resolver for
Home Agent address assignment at the Mobile Node. RFC1035, Section
4.1.1 [10] provides replay protection through the 16 bit ID field in
the DNS header. The ID field or the message identifier will allow
the Mobile Node to match up the service query request and the
response from the DNS server carrying Home Agent Address. However,
DNS does not encrypt the Home Agent address information, thus anyone
can snoop the network to figure out the address; the only way to
protect the confidentiality in this case is to encrypt Home Agent
address in the resource record. The threat in this case is low,
since the Home Agent is by necessity publicly accessable from the
Internet and therefore open to denial of service attack from any node
that happens to obtain the address by any means, including random
probing. Security measures and alternative bootstrapping proposals
that only deliver the address to subscribers just serve to make
obtaining the address harder, since a subscriber can launch an attack
after they have the address, or provide the address to someone who
will. In order to reduce threat of anyone obtaining a Home Agent
address from the server, DNS TSIG (RFC 2845) [9] protocol may be used
to provide authenticity of the Mobile Node to server. DNS TSIG [9]
protocol allows for transaction level authentication using shared
secrets and one way hashing.
Note that as with any method that limits distribution of the address
to subscribers, TSIG[9] will only work to the extent that the
mobility service provider can trust its subscribers not to distribute
the address to others, or to use it for harmful purposes themselves.
Other measures, such as overprovisioning of Home Agent capacity,
periodically changing the Home Agent address, or limiting the number
of users on a Home Agent to reduce the impact of a denial of service
attack are more likely to be effective. The problem of denial of
service prevention for a Home Agent is, in principle, the same as for
any server publicly accessable from the Internet, and restricting to
whom the address is distributed is unlikely to help reduce the threat
much, if at all.
3.2 Setting up Security Association
IKEv2 [7] describes IKE authentication by using EAP methods. IKE
version 2 allows a client to use an EAP method for authentication
while the responder uses certificates or pre-shared keys for the
server authentication. Thus the Mobile Node must have some
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information about the Home Agent's certificate authority in order to
verify the certificate. Such information MUST be preconfigured on
the Mobile Node, if the Mobile Node has a long term relationship with
the mobility service provider. If that is not the case, the Home
Agent's certificate authority (CA) or root CA information SHOULD be
obtained from the Home Agent's network through the DNS SRV record.
Each Home Agent's information is bound to its root CA or certificate
authority. While certificates are not commonly used on hosts today,
certificate-based authentication - in which no EAP transaction is
involved - can also be accommodated by the protocol.
For purposes of tying the Mobile Node's IKEv2 identity to its EAP
identity, the users Network Access Identifier [12] SHOULD be used to
establish the IKEv2 security association. This corresponds to an
IKEv2 identity type of 3 (ID_RFC822_ADDR). For more details in
setting up the parameters for IKE authentication phase and consequent
IKE child-SA phase refer to [6].
3.3 Dynamic Home Address Assignment
A Mobile Node may obtain its home address dynamically from the Home
Agent when it reboots or when its security association with the Home
Agent expires. If Home Agent knows its home address or the last used
home address for the corresponding Home Agent, it SHOULD include that
home address in the assignment request. If Mobile Node is using SEND
[13], it SHOULD supply a host id suffix for a CGA (Cryptographically
generated address).
The details of home address assignment using IKEv2 is described in
[6]. A Mobile Node SHOULD store the home address locally for
efficient renewal of security association with its Home Agent.
3.4 Renewal of Bootstrapping Materials
A Mobile Node SHOULD store the home address and the Home Agent
information locally as long as it is in the same network or using the
same Mobile IPv6 service. A Mobile Node MUST have its unique
identity (for example, NAI) which is bound with home address and
MN-HA IKEv2/IPsec security associations. This unique identity must
be stored both at Mobile Node and at the Home Agent. This identity
is used by the Home Agent to verify that it is talking to the same
node which perhaps expired the SA (security Association) recently.
This is useful for additional proof of authentication. Binding to
unique identity is also useful when a mobile node uses multiple home
addresses.
A Mobile Node SHOULD renew its IKE/IPsec security associations before
they expire. It is recommended that the default IKE security
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association is at least same as IPsec SA and home-address lifetime.
The default IKE SA lifetime SHOULD be large (say
IKE_BMIP_SA_LIFETIME_MAX).
Thus the Mobile Node does not need to go through the whole
bootstrapping process to renew home Address and IKE SA if it stays on
the same access network for a long period of time. Dynamic home
address lifetime SHOULD be at least long enough to match IKE/IPsec SA
lifetimes in order to prevent unnecessary boot-strapping messaging
exchange.
Upon reboot, a Mobile Node may or may not lose its home address, Home
Agent address and IKE/IPsec security associations depending on the
Mobile Node configuration options. By default, a Mobile Node must
start bootstrapping process upon reboot.
If the access method involves user interaction, such as UAM, the user
may be presented with a Web page after initial network access
offering the FQDNs of one or several mobility service provider links.
These links, when selected, may directly or indirectly cause the
bootstrapping procedure described here to run.
Reasons for re-bootstrapping after the initial one are subject to
individual service provider policy, but some possible reasons for
re-bootstrapping are the following:
o Load balancing
o Home Agents being taken off line for maintenance
o Unanticipated HA failure
Note that RFC 3775 [4] currently defines no way for a HA to inform
its active Mobile Nodes that it is about to go down and that it
should find a new HA or recommending a new HA, like the ICMP Redirect
message used by a first hop router. By the existing Mobile IPv6
standard, an MN will only discover that its HA is unavailable when
either tunneled packets stop arriving, if traffic is not route
optimized, or when it tries to perform a binding update to the HA and
the HA does not respond. It is possible that IKEv2 could provide
some indication that the IPsec SA is being deactivated, but such an
indication would not provide enough information to determine whether
the MN should re-bootstrap and find a new HA, since the SA may be
deactivated for other reasons.
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4. Home Agent Requirements
Home Agent MUST support [6].
A Home Agent MAY operate along with a AAA home-server. But the
communication between Home Agent and the AAA home-server is
independent of the boot-strapping process in this solution.
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5. Mobile Node Requirements
o A Mobile Node is aware of its Home Domain name or Home ISP domain
name
o A Mobile Node MUST support [6].
o A Mobile Node must have configuration policies to control
bootstrapping frequencies
o A Mobile Node must be capable of storing home address and Home
Agent address and IKE MN-HA [6] security associations
o A Mobile Node MUST be configured with a Network Access Identifier
or other identity sufficient to obtain mobility service.
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6. EAP Considerations
IKE version 2 [7] specifies that when using EAP authentication of the
initiator the responder must have a certificate. There is a draft
[14] discusses how EAP methods that provide mutual authentication and
key agreement can be used for responder authentication instead of
certificates. If this proposal is standardized as an extension of
EAP usage in IKEV2, then boot-strapping process does not need to use
or process certificates. However, for wide scale deployments,
responder authentication using certificates may be more practical.
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7. Security Considerations
The protocol uses IKEv2/IPsec and EAP methods for secure exchange of
initial security material exchange and security association. It also
talks about an unique Mobile Node identity to bind with the offered
home addresses and the IPsec/IKE security associations. The solution
also discusses the security aspects of obtaining the Home Agent
address from the domain name server by using DNSSEC for server
authentication and TSIG method for requestor authentication.
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8. Protocol Constants
IKE_BMIP_SA_LIFETIME_MAX 1 day
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9. Changes from revision 00
o Clarified that the solution can co-exist with AAA-HA backend
interface and with presence of AAA for access-authentication in
the local network.
o Added example figures.
o Added a section (3.1.1) to describe security options in obtaining
Home Agent Address.
o Added text in Acknowledgement section.
o Updated Security Considerations section.
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10. Acknowledgments
The authors like to thank the Mobile IPv6 working group members for
the valuable comments. Gerardo Giaretta, Alper Yegin, Junghoon Jee,
Julien Bournelle, Marc Manthey, Hesham Soliman, John Loughney
provided helpful feedback on this document.
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Appendix A. Privacy Considerations
Bootstrapping process can be leveraged to assign a temporary address
[11] to the Mobile Node in addition to the home address. The Home
Agent SHOULD tie these temporary addresses with the same MN-HA tunnel
that is used for home address of the Mobile Node. Thus the Mobile
Node and Home Agent should share the same security associations as
with Home address. The unique identity binding is also useful in
this case. Purpose of having temporary home-address assignment is
that the Mobile Node may use them for some applications as it does in
non- mobile cases for privacy reasons.
Publishing Home Agent addresses publicly in DNS servers may lead to
unwarranted attention from undesirable elements seeking to disrupt
mobility service through DoS attack. While IKEv2 has been carefully
engineered to prevent subtle DoS attacks, such as state depletion, a
brute force DDoS attack can still be mounted. The threat from DDoS
in this case is no larger than for any other widely known public
Internet server, such as a popular Web site or, indeed, a DNS server
for a top level domain. Measures similar to those used by popular
Web site providers or DNS server operators can be deployed to
mitigate such attacks. Note that measures which "hide" Home Agent
addresses by only sending them to authorized nodes through AAA
transactions are not exempt from DDoS attack, because worm-style
probing - in which the attacker sequentially iterates through all
addresses on a subnet - can be used to determine whether a particular
address corresponds to a deployed Home Agent. In IPv6, such probing
attacks are expected to be less effective due to the enormously
enlarged address space, but with enough zombie nodes under their
control, an attacker could still tie up a network.
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11. References
11.1 Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Patel, A., "Problem Statement for bootstrapping Mobile IPv6",
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrap-ps-01, October 2004.
[3] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P. and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
February 2000.
[4] Johnson, D., Perkins, C. and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in
IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
[5] Arkko, J., Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, "Using IPsec to
Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes and Home
Agents", RFC 3776, June 2004.
[6] Devarapalli, V., "Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the
revised IPsec Architecture",
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-mip6-ikev2-ipsec-00, October 2004.
[7] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17, October 2004.
[8] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
RFC 2535, March 1999.
[9] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D. and B. Wellington,
"Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)",
RFC 2845, May 2000.
[10] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
11.2 Informative References
[11] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.
[12] Aboba, B. and M. Beadles, "The Network Access Identifier",
RFC 2486, January 1999.
[13] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Sommerfeld, B., Zill, B. and P. Nikander,
"SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)",
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Internet-Draft draft-ietf-send-ndopt-06, July 2004.
[14] Eronen, P., "Extension for EAP Authentication in IKEv2",
Internet-Draft draft-eronen-ipsec-ikev2-eap-auth-02, October
2004.
[15] Giaretta, G., "MIPv6 Authorization and Configuration based on
EAP", Internet-Draft draft-giaretta-mip6-authorization-eap-02,
October 2004.
[16] Giaretta, G., "Goals for AAA-HA interface",
Internet-Draft draft-giaretta-mip6-aaa-ha-goals-00, September
2004.
[17] Yegin, A., "AAA Mobile IPv6 Application Framework",
Internet-Draft draft-yegin-mip6-aaa-fwk-00, September 2004.
[18] Anton, B., Bullock, B. and J. Short, "Best Current Practices
for Wireless Service Provider (WISP) Roaming", Feb. 2003,
<http://www.wifialliance.org/OpenSection/downloads/wispr_v1.0.p
df>.
Authors' Addresses
James Kempf
DoCoMo Labs USA
181 Metro Drive
Suite 300
San Jose, CA, 95110
USA
Phone: +1 408 451 4711
Email: kempf@docomolabs-usa.com
Erik Nordmark
Sun Microsystems
17 Network Circle
Menlo Park, CA 95025
USA
Phone: +1 650 786 2921
Email: erik.nordmark@sun.com
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Samita Chakrabarti
Sun Microsystems Inc.
16 Network Circle
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Internet-Draft BMIP February 2005
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