Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) Certificate Delegation
RFC 9060

Document Type RFC - Proposed Standard (September 2021; No errata)
Author Jon Peterson 
Last updated 2021-09-18
Replaces draft-peterson-stir-cert-delegation
Stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       J. Peterson
Request for Comments: 9060                                       Neustar
Category: Standards Track                                 September 2021
ISSN: 2070-1721

   Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) Certificate Delegation

Abstract

   The Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) certificate profile
   provides a way to attest authority over telephone numbers and related
   identifiers for the purpose of preventing telephone number spoofing.
   This specification details how that authority can be delegated from a
   parent certificate to a subordinate certificate.  This supports a
   number of use cases, including those where service providers grant
   credentials to enterprises or other customers capable of signing
   calls with STIR.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9060.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Terminology
   3.  Motivation
   4.  Delegation of STIR Certificates
     4.1.  Scope of Delegation
   5.  Authentication Service Signing with Delegate Certificates
   6.  Verification Service Behavior for Delegate Certificate
           Signatures
   7.  Acquiring Multiple Certificates in STIR
   8.  Certification Authorities and Service Providers
     8.1.  ACME and Delegation
     8.2.  Handling Multiple Certificates
   9.  Alternative Solutions
   10. IANA Considerations
   11. Privacy Considerations
   12. Security Considerations
   13. References
     13.1.  Normative References
     13.2.  Informative References
   Acknowledgments
   Author's Address

1.  Introduction

   The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] reviews the difficulties facing
   the telephone network that are enabled by impersonation, including
   various forms of robocalling, voicemail hacking, and swatting
   [RFC7375].  One of the most important components of a system to
   prevent impersonation is the implementation of credentials that
   identify the parties who control telephone numbers.  The STIR
   certificate specification [RFC8226] describes a credential system
   based on version 3 certificates [X.509] in accordance with [RFC5280]
   for that purpose.  Those credentials can then be used by STIR
   authentication services [RFC8224] to sign PASSporT objects [RFC8225]
   carried in SIP [RFC3261] requests.

   [RFC8226] specifies an extension to X.509 that defines a Telephony
   Number (TN) Authorization List that may be included by certification
   authorities (CAs) in certificates.  This extension provides
   additional information that relying parties can use when validating
   transactions with the certificate.  When a SIP request, for example,
   arrives at a terminating administrative domain, the calling number
   attested by the SIP request can be compared to the TN Authorization
   List of the certificate that signed the PASSporT to determine if the
   caller is authorized to use that calling number.

   Initial deployment of [RFC8226] has focused on the use of Service
   Provider Codes (SPCs) to attest to the scope of authority of a
   certificate.  Typically, these codes are internal telephone network
   identifiers such as the Operating Company Numbers (OCNs) assigned to
   carriers in the United States.  However, these network identifiers
   are effectively unavailable to non-carrier entities, and this has
   raised questions about how such entities might best participate in
   STIR when needed.  Additionally, a carrier may sometimes operate
   numbers that are formally assigned to another carrier.  [RFC8226]
   gives an overview of a certificate enrollment model based on
   "delegation", whereby the holder of a certificate might allocate a
   subset of that certificate's authority to another party.  This
   specification details how delegation of authority works for STIR
   certificates.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This specification also uses the following terms:

   delegation:  The concept of STIR certificate delegation and its terms
      are defined in [RFC8226].

   legitimate spoofing:  The practice of selecting an alternative
      presentation number for a telephone caller legitimately.

3.  Motivation

   The most pressing need for delegation in STIR arises in a set of use
   cases where callers want to use a particular calling number, but for
   whatever reason, their outbound calls will not pass through the
   authentication service of the service provider that controls that
   numbering resource.

   One example would be an enterprise that places outbound calls through
   a set of service providers; for each call, a provider is chosen based
   on a least-cost routing algorithm or similar local policy.  The
   enterprise was assigned a calling number by a particular service
   provider, but some calls originating from that number will go out
   through other service providers.

   A user might also roam from their usual service provider to a
   different network or administrative domain for various reasons.  Most
   "legitimate spoofing" examples are of this form, where a user wants
   to be able to use the main callback number for their business as a
   calling party number, even when the user is away from the business.

   These sorts of use cases could be addressed if the carrier who
   controls the numbering resource were able to delegate a credential
   that could be used to sign calls regardless of which network or
   administrative domain handles the outbound routing for the call.  In
   the absence of something like a delegation mechanism, outbound
   carriers may be forced to sign calls with credentials that do not
   cover the originating number in question.  Unfortunately, that
   practice would be difficult to distinguish from malicious spoofing,
   and if it becomes widespread, it could erode trust in STIR overall.

4.  Delegation of STIR Certificates

   STIR delegate certificates are certificates containing a TNAuthList
   object that have been signed with the private key of a parent
   certificate that itself contains a TNAuthList object (either by value
   or by reference; see Section 4.1).  The parent certificate needs to
   contain a basic constraints extension with the cA boolean set to
   "true" [RFC5280], indicating that the subject can sign certificates.
   Every STIR delegate certificate identifies its parent certificate
   with a standard Authority Key Identifier extension [RFC5280].

   The authority bestowed on the holder of the delegate certificate by
   the parent certificate is recorded in the delegate certificate's
   TNAuthList.  Because STIR certificates use the TNAuthList object
   rather than the Subject Name for indicating the scope of their
   authority, traditional name constraints [RFC5280] are not directly
   applicable to STIR.  In a manner similar to the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] "encompassing" semantics, each
   delegate certificate MUST have a TNAuthList scope that is equal to or
   a subset of its parent certificate's scope: it must be "encompassed".
   For example, a parent certificate with a TNAuthList that attested
   authority for the numbering range +1-212-555-1000 through 1999 could
   issue a certificate to one delegate attesting authority for the range
   +1-212-555-1500 through 1599 and, to another delegate, a certificate
   for the individual number +1-212-555-1824.

   Delegate certificates MAY also contain a basic constraints extension
   with the cA boolean set to "true", indicating that they can sign
   subordinate certificates for further delegates.  As only end-entity
   certificates can actually sign PASSporTs, the holder of a STIR
   certificate with a "true" cA boolean may create a separate end-entity
   certificate with either an identical TNAuthList to its parent or a
   subset of the parent's authority, which would be used to sign
   PASSporTs.

4.1.  Scope of Delegation

   The TNAuthList of a STIR certificate may contain one or more SPCs,
   one or more telephone number ranges, or even a mix of SPCs and
   telephone number ranges.  When delegating from a STIR certificate, a
   child certificate may inherit from its parent either or both of the
   above, and this specification explicitly permits SPC-only parent
   certificates to delegate individual telephone numbers or ranges to a
   child certificate, as this will be necessary in some operating
   environments.  Depending on the sort of numbering resources that a
   delegate has been assigned, various syntaxes can be used to capture
   the delegated resource.

   Some non-carrier entities may be assigned large and complex
   allocations of telephone numbers, which may be only partially
   contiguous or entirely disparate.  Allocations may also change
   frequently in minor or significant ways.  These resources may be so
   complex, dynamic, or extensive that listing them in a certificate is
   prohibitively difficult.  Section 10.1 of [RFC8226] describes one
   potential way to address this: including the TNAuthList (specified in
   [RFC8226]) in the certificate by reference rather than by value,
   where a URL in the certificate points to a secure, dynamically
   updated list of the telephone numbers in the scope of authority of a
   certificate.  For entities that are carriers in all but name, another
   alternative is the allocation of an SPC; this yields much the same
   property, as the SPC is effectively a pointer to an external database
   that dynamically tracks the numbers associated with the SPC.  Either
   of these approaches may make sense for a given deployment.
   Certification path construction as detailed below treats by-reference
   TNAuthLists in a certificate as if they had been included by value.

   Other non-carrier entities may have straightforward telephone number
   assignments, such as enterprises receiving a set of a thousand blocks
   from a carrier that may be kept for years or decades.  Particular
   freephone numbers may also have a long-term association with an
   enterprise and its brand.  For these sorts of assignments, assigning
   an SPC may seem like overkill, and using the TN ranges of the
   TNAuthList (by value) is sufficient.

   Whichever approach is taken to represent the delegated resource,
   there are fundamental trade-offs regarding when and where in the
   architecture a delegation is validated -- that is, when the delegated
   TNAuthList is checked and determined to be "encompassed" by the
   TNAuthList of its parent.  This might be performed at the time the
   delegate certificate is issued, at the time that a verification
   service receives an inbound call, or potentially both.  It is
   generally desirable to offload as much of this as possible to the
   certification process as verification occurs during call setup; thus,
   additional network dips could lead to perceptible delay, whereas
   certification happens outside of call processing as a largely
   administrative function.  Ideally, if a delegate certificate can
   supply a by-value TN range, then a verification service could
   ascertain that an attested calling party number is within the scope
   of the provided certificate without requiring any additional
   transactions with a service.  In practice, verification services may
   already incorporate network queries into their processing (for
   example, to dereference the "x5u" field of a PASSporT) that could
   piggyback any additional information needed by the verification
   service.

   Note that the permission semantics of the TNAuthList [RFC8226] are
   additive: that is, the scope of a certificate is the superset of all
   of the SPCs and telephone number ranges enumerated in the TNAuthList.
   As SPCs themselves are effectively pointers to a set of telephone
   number ranges, and a telephone number may belong to more than one
   SPC, this may introduce some redundancy to the set of telephone
   numbers specified as the scope of a certificate.  The presence of one
   or more SPCs and one or more sets of telephone number ranges are
   similarly treated additively, even if the telephone number ranges
   turn out to be redundant to the scope of an SPC.

5.  Authentication Service Signing with Delegate Certificates

   Authentication service behavior varies from [RFC8224] as follows,
   although the same checks are performed by the authentication service
   when comparing the calling party number attested in call signaling
   with the scope of the authority of the signing certificate.
   Authentication services SHOULD NOT use a delegate certificate without
   validating that its scope of authority is encompassed by that of its
   parent certificate, and if that certificate has its own parent, the
   entire certification path SHOULD be validated.

   This delegation architecture does not require that a non-carrier
   entity act as its own authentication service.  That function may be
   performed by any authentication service that holds the private key
   corresponding to the delegate certificate, including one run by an
   outbound service provider, a third party in an enterprise's outbound
   call path, or in the SIP User Agent itself.

   Note that authentication services creating a PASSporT for a call
   signed with a delegate certificate MUST provide an "x5u" link
   corresponding to the entire certification path rather than just the
   delegate certificate used to sign the call, as described in
   Section 7.

6.  Verification Service Behavior for Delegate Certificate Signatures

   The responsibility of a verification service validating PASSporTs
   signed with delegate certificates, while largely following baseline
   specifications [RFC8224] and [RFC8225], requires some additional
   procedures.  When the verification service dereferences the "x5u"
   parameter, it will acquire a certificate list rather than a single
   certificate.  It MUST then validate all of the credentials in the
   list, identifying the parent certificate for each delegate through
   its Authority Key Identifier extension.

   While relying parties ordinarily have significant latitude in
   certification path construction when validating a certification path,
   STIR assumes a more rigid hierarchical subordination model rather
   than one where relying parties may want to derive their own
   certification path to particular trust anchors.  If the certificates
   acquired from the "x5u" element of a PASSporT do not lead to an
   anchor that the verification service trusts, it treats the validation
   no differently than it would when a non-delegated certificate was
   issued by an untrusted root; in SIP, it MAY return a 437 "Unsupported
   Credential" response if the call should be failed for lack of a valid
   Identity header.

7.  Acquiring Multiple Certificates in STIR

   PASSporT [RFC8225] uses the "x5u" element to convey the URL where
   verification services can acquire the certificate used to sign a
   PASSporT.  This value is mirrored by the "info" parameter of the
   Identity header when a PASSporT is conveyed via SIP.  Commonly, this
   is an HTTPS URI.

   When a STIR delegate certificate is used to sign a PASSporT, the
   "x5u" element in the PASSporT will contain a URI indicating where a
   certificate list is available.  While the baseline JSON Web Signature
   (JWS) also supports an "x5c" element specifically for certificate
   chains, in operational practice, certification paths are already
   being delivered in the STIR environment via the "x5u" element, so
   this specification RECOMMENDS that implementations continue to use
   "x5u". "x5c" is OPTIONAL for environments where it is known to be
   supported.  That list will be a concatenation of certificates encoded
   with Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) of the type "application/pem-
   certificate-chain" defined in [RFC8555].  The certificate path
   [RFC5280] ordering MUST be ordered from the signer to the trust
   anchor.  The list begins with the certificate used to sign the
   PASSporT, followed by its parent, and then any subsequent
   grandparents, great-grandparents, and so on.  The key identifier in
   the Authority Key Identifier extension in the first certificate MUST
   appear in the Subject Key Identifier extension in the second
   certificate.  The key identifier pairing MUST match in this way
   throughout the entire chain of certificates.  Note that Automatic
   Certificate Management Environment (ACME) [RFC8555] requires the
   first element in a pem-certificate-chain to be an end-entity
   certificate.

8.  Certification Authorities and Service Providers

   Once a telephone service provider has received a CA certificate
   attesting to their numbering resources, they may delegate resources
   from it as they see fit.  Note that the allocation to a service
   provider of a certificate with a basic constraints extension with the
   cA boolean set to "true" does not require that a service provider act
   as a certification authority itself; serving as a certification
   authority is a function requiring specialized expertise and
   infrastructure.  Certification authorities are, for example,
   responsible for maintaining certificate revocation lists and related
   functions as well as publishing certification practice statements.  A
   third-party certification authority, including the same one that
   issued the service provider its parent certificate, could act as the
   CA that issues delegate certificates for the service provider if the
   necessary business relationships permit it.  A service provider might
   in this case act as a Token Authority (see Section 8.1) granting its
   customers permissions to receive certificates from the CA.

   Note that if the same CA that issued the parent certificate is also
   issuing a delegate certificate, it may be possible to shorten the
   certification path, which reduces the work required of verification
   services.  The trade-off here is that if the CA simply issued a non-
   delegate certificate (whose parent is the CA's trust anchor) with the
   proper TNAuthList value, relying parties might not be able to
   ascertain which service provider owned those telephone numbers,
   information that might be used to make an authorization decision on
   the terminating side.  However, some additional object in the
   certificate outside of the TNAuthList could preserve that
   information; this is a potential area for future work, and longer
   certification paths are the only mechanism currently defined.

   All CAs must detail in their practices and policies a requirement to
   validate that the "encompassing" of a delegate certificate is done by
   its parent.  Note that this requires that CAs have access to the
   necessary industry databases to ascertain whether, for example, a
   particular telephone number is encompassed by an SPC.  Alternatively,
   a CA may acquire an Authority Token (see Section 8.1) that affirms
   that a delegation is in the proper scope.  Exactly what operational
   practices this entails may vary in different national telephone
   administrations and are thus left to the Certificate Policy /
   Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) [RFC3647].

8.1.  ACME and Delegation

   STIR deployments commonly use ACME [RFC8555] for certificate
   acquisition, and it is anticipated that delegate certificates will
   also be acquired through an ACME interface.  An entity can acquire a
   certificate from a particular CA by requesting an Authority Token
   [ACME-CHAL] from the parent with the desired TNAuthList [ACME-TOKEN]
   object.  Note that if the client intends to do further subdelegation
   of its own, it should request a token with the "ca" Authority Token
   flag set.

   The entity then presents that Authority Token to a CA to acquire a
   STIR delegate certificate.  ACME returns an "application/pem-
   certificate-chain" object, and that object would be suitable for
   publication as an HTTPS resource for retrieval with the PASSporT
   "x5u" mechanism as discussed in Section 7.  If the Certificate
   Signing Request (CSR) presented to the ACME server is for a
   certificate with the cA boolean set to "true", then the ACME server
   makes a policy decision to determine whether or not it is appropriate
   to issue that certificate to the requesting entity.  That policy
   decision will be reflected by the "ca" flag in the Authority Token.

   Service providers that want the capability to rapidly age out
   delegated certificates can rely on the ACME Short-Term, Automatically
   Renewed (STAR) [RFC8739] mechanism to automate the process of short-
   term certificate expiry.

8.2.  Handling Multiple Certificates

   In some deployments, non-carrier entities may receive telephone
   numbers from several different carriers.  This could lead to
   enterprises needing to maintain a sort of STIR keyring, with
   different certificates delegated to them from different providers.
   These certificates are potentially issued by different CAs, which
   enterprises choose between when signing a call.  This could be the
   case regardless of which syntax is used in the TNAuthList to
   represent the scope of the delegation (see Section 4.1).  As noted in
   Section 8, if the parent certs use the same CA, it may be possible to
   shorten the certification path.

   For non-carrier entities handling a small number of certificates,
   this is probably not a significant burden.  For cases where it
   becomes burdensome, a few potential approaches exist.  A delegate
   certificate could be cross-certified with another delegate
   certificate via an Authority Information Access (AIA) field
   containing the URL of a Certificate Authority Issuer so that a signer
   would only need to sign with a single certificate to inherit the
   privileges of the other certificate(s) with which it has cross-
   certified.  In very complex delegation cases, it might make more
   sense to establish a bridge CA that cross-certifies with all of the
   certificates held by the enterprise rather than requiring a mesh of
   cross-certification between a large number of certificates.  Again,
   this bridge CA function would likely be performed by some existing CA
   in the STIR ecosystem.  These procedures would, however, complicate
   the fairly straightforward certification path reconstruction approach
   described in Section 7 and would require further specification.

9.  Alternative Solutions

   At the time this specification was written, STIR was only starting to
   see deployment.  In some future environment, the policies that govern
   CAs may not permit them to issue intermediate certificates with a
   TNAuthList object and a cA boolean set to "true" in the basic
   constraints certificate extension [RFC5280].  Similar problems in the
   web PKI space motivated the development of TLS subcerts [TLS-CRED],
   which substitutes a signed "delegated credential" token for a
   certificate for such environments.  A comparable mechanism could be
   developed for the STIR space, which would allow STIR certificates to
   sign a data object that contains effectively the same data as the
   delegate certificate specified here, including a public key that
   could sign PASSporTs.  The TLS subcerts system has further explored
   leveraging ACME to issue short-lived certificates for temporary
   delegation as a means of obviating the need for revocation.
   Specification of a mechanism similar to TLS subcerts for STIR is
   future work and will be undertaken only if the market requires it.

10.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

11.  Privacy Considerations

   Any STIR certificate that identifies a narrow range of telephone
   numbers potentially exposes information about the entities that are
   placing calls.  As such a telephone number range is a necessary
   superset of the calling party number that is openly signaled during
   call setup, the privacy risks associated with this mechanism are not
   substantially greater than baseline STIR.  See [RFC8224] for guidance
   on the use of anonymization mechanisms in STIR.

12.  Security Considerations

   This document is entirely about security.  As delegation can allow
   signing-in scenarios where unauthenticated "legitimate" spoofing
   would otherwise be used, the hope is that delegation will improve the
   overall security of the STIR ecosystem.  For further information on
   certificate security and practices, see [RFC5280], particularly its
   security considerations.  Also see the security considerations of
   [RFC8226] for general guidance on the implications of the use of
   certificates in STIR and [RFC7375] for the STIR threat model.

   Much of the security of delegation depends on the implementation of
   the encompassing semantics described in Section 4.  When delegating
   from an SPC-based TNAuthList to a set of telephone number ranges,
   understanding the encompassing semantics may require access to
   industry databases that track the numbering assets of service
   providers associated with a given SPC.  In some operating
   environments, such databases might not exist.  How encompassing is
   policed is therefore a matter outside the scope of this document and
   specific to operational profiles of STIR.

   The use of by-reference TNAuthLists as described in Section 4 means
   that the TNAuthList associated with a certificate can change over
   time; see the security considerations of [RFC3986] for more on the
   implications of this property.  It is considered a useful feature
   here due to the potential dynamism of large lists of telephone
   numbers, but this dynamism means that a relying party might at one
   point accept that a particular telephone number is associated with a
   certificate but later reject it for the same certificate as the
   dynamic list changes.  Also note that if the HTTPS service housing
   the by-reference telephone number list is improperly secured, that
   too can lead to vulnerabilities.  Ultimately, the CA that issued a
   delegated certificate populates the URL in the AIA field and is
   responsible for making a secure selection.  Service providers acting
   as CAs are directed to the cautionary words about running a CA in
   Section 8 regarding the obligations this entails for certificate
   revocation and so on.

13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8224]  Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
              "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>.

   [RFC8225]  Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
              Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.

   [RFC8226]  Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
              Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.

   [RFC8555]  Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
              Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
              (ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.

13.2.  Informative References

   [ACME-CHAL]
              Peterson, J., Barnes, M., Hancock, D., and C. Wendt, "ACME
              Challenges Using an Authority Token", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-06, 12
              July 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              ietf-acme-authority-token-06>.

   [ACME-TOKEN]
              Wendt, C., Hancock, D., Barnes, M., and J. Peterson,
              "TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-
              tnauthlist-08, 27 March 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-acme-
              authority-token-tnauthlist-08>.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.

   [RFC3647]  Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
              Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3647, November 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

   [RFC7340]  Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
              Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
              RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.

   [RFC7375]  Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model",
              RFC 7375, DOI 10.17487/RFC7375, October 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375>.

   [RFC8739]  Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Gonzalez de Dios, O., Pastor
              Perales, A., and T. Fossati, "Support for Short-Term,
              Automatically Renewed (STAR) Certificates in the Automated
              Certificate Management Environment (ACME)", RFC 8739,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8739, March 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8739>.

   [TLS-CRED] Barnes, R., Iyengar, S., Sullivan, N., and E. Rescorla,
              "Delegated Credentials for TLS", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-10, 24 January
              2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              tls-subcerts-10>.

   [X.509]    ITU-T, "Information technology - Open Systems
              Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute
              certificate frameworks", ITU-T Recommendation X.509,
              October 2016, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509>.

Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Ines Robles, Richard Barnes, Chris Wendt, Dave
   Hancock, Russ Housley, Benjamin Kaduk, and Sean Turner for key input
   on this document.

Author's Address

   Jon Peterson
   Neustar, Inc.

   Email: jon.peterson@team.neustar