@misc{rfc8784, series = {Request for Comments}, number = 8784, howpublished = {RFC 8784}, publisher = {RFC Editor}, doi = {10.17487/RFC8784}, url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8784}, author = {Scott Fluhrer and Panos Kampanakis and David McGrew and Valery Smyslov}, title = {{Mixing Preshared Keys in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) for Post-quantum Security}}, pagetotal = 16, year = 2020, month = jun, abstract = {The possibility of quantum computers poses a serious challenge to cryptographic algorithms deployed widely today. The Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) is one example of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a quantum computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support quantum-secure key exchange algorithms; however, that is not likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant to a quantum computer by using preshared keys.}, }