Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
RFC 8708
Document | Type | RFC - Proposed Standard (February 2020; No errata) | |
---|---|---|---|
Author | Russ Housley | ||
Last updated | 2020-03-09 | ||
Replaces | draft-housley-cms-mts-hash-sig | ||
Stream | IETF | ||
Formats | plain text html xml pdf htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | Tim Hollebeek | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2019-03-14) | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 8708 (Proposed Standard) | |
Action Holders |
(None)
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Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Roman Danyliw | ||
Send notices to | Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com> | ||
IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - Actions Needed | |
IANA action state | RFC-Ed-Ack | ||
IANA expert review state | Expert Reviews OK |
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Housley Request for Comments: 8708 Vigil Security Category: Standards Track February 2020 ISSN: 2070-1721 Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Abstract This document specifies the conventions for using the Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) / Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) hash-based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). In addition, the algorithm identifier and public key syntax are provided. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-based digital signature; it is described in RFC 8554. Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8708. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1.1. ASN.1 1.2. Terminology 1.3. Motivation 2. HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature Algorithm Overview 2.1. Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) 2.2. Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) 2.3. Leighton-Micali One-Time Signature (LM-OTS) Algorithm 3. Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters 4. HSS/LMS Public Key Identifier 5. Signed-Data Conventions 6. Security Considerations 7. IANA Considerations 8. References 8.1. Normative References 8.2. Informative References Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Acknowledgements Author's Address 1. Introduction This document specifies the conventions for using the Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) / Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) hash-based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS] signed-data content type. The LMS system provides a one-time digital signature that is a variant of Merkle Tree Signatures (MTS). The HSS is built on top of the LMS system to efficiently scale for a larger numbers of signatures. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash- based digital signature, and it is described in [HASHSIG]. The HSS/ LMS signature algorithm can only be used for a fixed number of signing operations with a given private key, and the number of signing operations depends upon the size of the tree. The HSS/LMS signature algorithm uses small public keys, and it has low computational cost; however, the signatures are quite large. The HSS/LMS private key can be very small when the signer is willing to perform additional computation at signing time; alternatively, the private key can consume additional memory and provide a faster signing time. The HSS/LMS signatures [HASHSIG] are currently defined to exclusively use SHA-256 [SHS]. 1.1. ASN.1 CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [ASN1-B], using the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [ASN1-E]. 1.2. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 1.3. Motivation Recent advances in cryptanalysis [BH2013] and progress in the development of quantum computers [NAS2019] pose a threat to widely deployed digital signature algorithms. As a result, there is a need to prepare for a day when cryptosystems such as RSA and DSA that depend on discrete logarithms and factoring cannot be depended upon. If large-scale quantum computers are ever built, these computers will be able to break many of the public key cryptosystems currently in use. A post-quantum cryptosystem [PQC] is a system that is secure against quantum computers that have more than a trivial number ofShow full document text