A Root Key Trust Anchor Sentinel for DNSSEC
RFC 8509
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RFC - Proposed Standard
(December 2018; No errata)
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Last updated |
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2018-12-18
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Replaces |
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draft-huston-kskroll-sentinel
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IETF
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WG state
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Submitted to IESG for Publication
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Document shepherd |
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Tim Wicinski
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Shepherd write-up |
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Show
(last changed 2018-07-20)
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| IESG |
IESG state |
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RFC 8509 (Proposed Standard)
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Consensus Boilerplate |
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Yes
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Responsible AD |
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Terry Manderson
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Benno Overeinder <benno@NLnetLabs.nl>, Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com>
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| IANA |
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No IANA Actions
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston
Request for Comments: 8509 J. Damas
Category: Standards Track APNIC
ISSN: 2070-1721 W. Kumari
Google
December 2018
A Root Key Trust Anchor Sentinel for DNSSEC
Abstract
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin
authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital
signatures. These digital signatures can be verified by building a
chain of trust starting from a trust anchor and proceeding down to a
particular node in the DNS. This document specifies a mechanism that
will allow an end user and third parties to determine the trusted key
state for the root key of the resolvers that handle that user's DNS
queries. Note that this method is only applicable for determining
which keys are in the trust store for the root key.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8509.
Huston, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 8509 DNSSEC Trusted Key Sentinel December 2018
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Sentinel Mechanism in Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Preconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Special Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Sentinel Tests for a Single DNS Resolver . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Forwarders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Sentinel Tests for Multiple Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Test Scenario and Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Test Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Test Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Protocol Walk-Through Example . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Huston, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 8509 DNSSEC Trusted Key Sentinel December 2018
1. Introduction
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], [RFC4034], and
[RFC4035] were developed to provide origin authentication and
integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures.
DNSSEC uses Key Tags to efficiently match signatures to the keys from
which they are generated. The Key Tag is a 16-bit value computed
from the RDATA of a DNSKEY Resource Record (RR) as described in
Appendix B of [RFC4034]. RRSIG RRs contain a Key Tag field whose
value is equal to the Key Tag of the DNSKEY RR that was used to
generate the corresponding signature.
This document specifies how security-aware DNS resolvers that perform
validation of their responses can respond to certain queries in a
manner that allows an agent performing the queries to deduce whether
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