A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
RFC 8209
| Document | Type |
RFC - Proposed Standard
(September 2017; No errata)
Updates RFC 6487
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Mark Reynolds , Sean Turner , Stephen Kent | ||
| Last updated | 2017-09-27 | ||
| Replaces | draft-turner-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Chris Morrow | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2016-06-24) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 8209 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Alvaro Retana | ||
| Send notices to | "Chris Morrow" <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, aretana@cisco.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
| IANA action state | RFC-Ed-Ack | ||
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Reynolds
Request for Comments: 8209 IPSw
Updates: 6487 S. Turner
Category: Standards Track sn3rd
ISSN: 2070-1721 S. Kent
BBN
September 2017
A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates,
Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used
to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
known as BGPsec. BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the
Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec
is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the
requirement to provide security for BGP. The goal of BGPsec is to
provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong
cryptographic primitives. The end entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued to routers within an AS. Each of these
certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate. These CA
certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS Resource
extension. An EE certificate of this type asserts that the router or
routers holding the corresponding private key are authorized to emit
secure route advertisements on behalf of the AS(es) specified in the
certificate. This document also profiles the format of certification
requests and specifies Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation
procedures for these EE certificates. This document extends the
RPKI; therefore, this document updates the RPKI Resource Certificates
Profile (RFC 6487).
Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Terminology ................................................4
2. Describing Resources in Certificates ............................4
3. Updates to RFC 6487 .............................................6
3.1. BGPsec Router Certificate Fields ...........................6
3.1.1. Subject .............................................6
3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info .............................6
3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3
Extension Fields ....................................6
3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints ..........................6
3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage .........................6
3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access .................7
3.1.3.4. IP Resources ...............................7
3.1.3.5. AS Resources ...............................7
3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile ..................7
3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation .......................8
3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI ......8
4. Design Notes ....................................................9
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