Protecting Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Implementations from Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks
RFC 8019
Document | Type | RFC - Proposed Standard (November 2016; No errata) | |
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Yoav Nir , Valery Smyslov | ||
Last updated | 2016-11-15 | ||
Stream | Internent Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | David Waltermire | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2016-08-18) | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 8019 (Proposed Standard) | |
Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Kathleen Moriarty | ||
Send notices to | "David Waltermire" <david.waltermire@nist.gov> | ||
IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
IANA action state | RFC-Ed-Ack |
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Y. Nir Request for Comments: 8019 Check Point Category: Standards Track V. Smyslov ISSN: 2070-1721 ELVIS-PLUS November 2016 Protecting Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Implementations from Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks Abstract This document recommends implementation and configuration best practices for Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) Responders, to allow them to resist Denial-of-Service and Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks. Additionally, the document introduces a new mechanism called "Client Puzzles" that helps accomplish this task. Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8019. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Nir & Smyslov Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 8019 DDoS Protection for IKEv2 November 2016 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. The Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Defense Measures While the IKE SA Is Being Created . . . . . 6 4.1. Retention Periods for Half-Open SAs . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. Rate Limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3. The Stateless Cookie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.4. Puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.5. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.6. Keeping Computed Shared Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.7. Preventing "Hash and URL" Certificate Encoding Attacks . 11 4.8. IKE Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. Defense Measures after an IKE SA Is Created . . . . . . . . . 12 6. Plan for Defending a Responder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Using Puzzles in the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.1. Puzzles in IKE_SA_INIT Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.1.1. Presenting a Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.1.2. Solving a Puzzle and Returning the Solution . . . . . 19 7.1.3. Computing a Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.1.4. Analyzing Repeated Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.1.5. Deciding Whether to Serve the Request . . . . . . . . 22 7.2. Puzzles in an IKE_AUTH Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7.2.1. Presenting the Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7.2.2. Solving the Puzzle and Returning the Solution . . . . 24 7.2.3. Computing the Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7.2.4. Receiving the Puzzle Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 8. Payload Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 8.1. PUZZLE Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 8.2. Puzzle Solution Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 9. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Show full document text