Problem Definition and Classification of BGP Route Leaks
RFC 7908

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 04 and is now closed.

(Alia Atlas) Yes

(Ben Campbell) Yes

Alissa Cooper Yes

(Stephen Farrell) Yes

Comment (2016-05-03 for -05)
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- Thanks for doing this. The set of references alone seems
particularly valuable.

- section 2, does "propagation" in the definition mean
that purely faked announcement messages (ignoring RPKI for
the moment) that overlap with genuine announcements cannot
be considered route-leaks?  From the receiver POV, those
would not be distinct. It was probably already suggested
but if not, do you think would s/propagation/receipt/ or
similar be a little better?

(Joel Jaeggli) Yes

(Terry Manderson) Yes

Comment (2016-05-03 for -05)
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Thank you for an exceptionally well formed and well written coverage of route leaks.

(Kathleen Moriarty) Yes

(Jari Arkko) No Objection

Deborah Brungard No Objection

Comment (2016-05-04 for -05)
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Thanks for this well written document as others noted. I prefer a rewording of a somewhat choppy sentence in section 3.2 as it inaccurately quotes from the reference. The sentence says "[Mauch] observes that these are anomalies and potentially route leaks because very large ISPs such as ATT, Sprint, Verizon, and Globalcrossing do not in general buy transit services from each other." But the reference says "Example: UUNet (701) does not buy from Sprint (1239) to get to Globalcrossing (3549)." As this section in the document is "Example incidents" for Type 2, it infers this was an actual incident. But the reference itself simply says it is monitoring for this association.

Suggest to reword:
[Mauch] observes that its detection algorithm detects for these anomalies and potentially route leaks because very large ISPs do not in general buy transit services from each other.

Suresh Krishnan No Objection

Mirja K├╝hlewind No Objection

Alvaro Retana No Objection