Port Control Protocol (PCP) Authentication Mechanism
RFC 7652

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 12 and is now closed.

(Brian Haberman) Yes

(Jari Arkko) No Objection

(Alia Atlas) No Objection

Deborah Brungard No Objection

(Ben Campbell) No Objection

(Benoît Claise) No Objection

Comment (2015-07-06 for -13)
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Thanks for addressing Jouni's OPS DIR review.

Alissa Cooper No Objection

(Spencer Dawkins) No Objection

(Stephen Farrell) (was Discuss, No Objection) No Objection

Comment (2015-07-09 for -13)
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Thanks for getting this done.


- How would this work in a home network where the f/w is not
managed by the ISP and there'd otherwise be no EAP
infrastructure? That could be out-of-scope or require some
new/odd EAP implementation and no change to this protocol, and
that is probably fine, but I do wonder. 

- 3.3: Is this really needed? I wonder if we could do without
it. The protocol would be simpler if this wasn't needed and
simpler == more-secure in general.

- 5.11: would s/issued the credentials/issued the EAP
credentials that will be used to authenticate the client/ be
better? As-is, it's a tiny bit confusing maybe.

- 6.2: Maybe this is being overly paranoid, but would it be
worth saying that in all failure cases when you say discard the
message, you mean to not process it's content?  With a very
perverse reading of the current text, I might be able to argue
that I could process the message content first and only then
check the authentication afterwards. Yes, that'd be fairly
spectacularly dim, but that kind of thing does sometimes
happen. (If there's a better place in the draft to put some
text on that, that's just fine.)

(Joel Jaeggli) No Objection

Barry Leiba No Objection

(Terry Manderson) No Objection

Comment (2015-07-07 for -13)
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Thanks for addressing an aspect of security in relation to PCP, especially the Advanced Threat Model from RFC6887.

I have a few comments

1) I'm sure the RFC editor will pick these up, however there is some comma usage in the document that caused me to re-read some of the paragraphs to understand. The Abstract is one example of this. I'm certainly no expert so perhaps have a skim over this: http://www.grammarbook.com/punctuation/commas.asp

2) s 3.1.1, please consider rewording the text "Section 5.1 updates the PCP request message format to have a result code." to something like "Section 5.1 updates the PCP request message format with result codes for the PCP Authentication mechanism" ...The wording as it stands seems a little non-specific.

3) Basic DoS attacks (such as state bloat) are mentioned in the security section, are there any complex DoS attacks that can be leveraged using the PCP authentication mechanism itself?

(Kathleen Moriarty) No Objection

Alvaro Retana No Objection

(Martin Stiemerling) No Objection