Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation
RFC 7353

Approval announcement
Draft of message to be sent after approval:

From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Cc: RFC Editor <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>,
    sidr mailing list <sidr@ietf.org>,
    sidr chair <sidr-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Document Action: 'Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation' to Informational RFC (draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs-12.txt)

The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation'
  (draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs-12.txt) as Informational RFC

This document is the product of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working
Group.

The IESG contact persons are Alia Atlas and Adrian Farrel.

A URL of this Internet Draft is:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs/


Technical Summary

This document describes requirements for a BGP security protocol
   design to provide cryptographic assurance that the origin AS had the
   right to announce the prefix and to provide assurance of the AS Path
   of the announcement.

Working Group Summary

The document spent quite some time in WG discussion, one particular sticky point was around the lack of notice that 'route leaks are not fixed by this protocol change'. There is a standing discussion about this in this WG, and the agreed upon process is being followed (get the GROW folk to decide if 'route leaks' are a problem, then get IDR to code some bgp changes that might do the detection/notification/etc, and have SIDR properly secure whatever that result was.

Document Quality

There are two vendors planning on supporting this protocol once it's finished, both are active in the working group (and have been for a while).

Personnel

  Document Shepherd:  Chris Morrow
  Area Director: Alia Atlas