Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation
RFC 7353

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       S. Bellovin
Request for Comments: 7353                           Columbia University
Category: Informational                                          R. Bush
ISSN: 2070-1721                                Internet Initiative Japan
                                                                 D. Ward
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                             August 2014

             Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation

Abstract

   This document describes requirements for a BGP security protocol
   design to provide cryptographic assurance that the origin Autonomous
   System (AS) has the right to announce the prefix and to provide
   assurance of the AS Path of the announcement.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7353.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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RFC 7353          Requirements for BGP Path Validation       August 2014

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Recommended Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  General Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  BGP UPDATE Security Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Origin validation based on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
   [RFC6811] provides a measure of resilience to accidental
   mis-origination of prefixes; however, it provides neither
   cryptographic assurance (announcements are not signed) nor assurance
   of the AS Path of the announcement.

   This document describes requirements to be placed on a BGP security
   protocol, herein termed "BGPsec", intended to rectify these gaps.

   The threat model assumed here is documented in [RFC4593] and
   [RFC7132].

   As noted in the threat model [RFC7132], this work is limited to
   threats to the BGP protocol.  Issues of business relationship
   conformance, while quite important to operators, are not security
   issues per se and are outside the scope of this document.  It is
   hoped that these issues will be better understood in the future.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
   appear in all upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed
   case, without normative meaning.

2.  Recommended Reading

   This document assumes knowledge of the RPKI [RFC6480] and the RPKI
   Repository Structure [RFC6481].

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RFC 7353          Requirements for BGP Path Validation       August 2014

   This document assumes ongoing incremental deployment of Route Origin
   Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], the RPKI to the Router Protocol
   [RFC6810], and RPKI-based Prefix Validation [RFC6811].

   And, of course, a knowledge of BGP [RFC4271] is required.

3.  General Requirements

   The following are general requirements for a BGPsec protocol:

   3.1   A BGPsec design MUST allow the receiver of a BGP announcement